The monograph presents the articles by leading Ukrainian sociologists focused on the problems of sociological theory and methodology, in particular, the tendencies of post-Soviet social transformation, political, economic, social and cultural aspects of the development of contemporary Ukrainian society. Thanks to this edition, English-speaking colleagues will be able to get acquainted with the most interesting and ambitious research projects of Ukrainian sociologists in the XXI century. The book contains both new and previously published articles by the representatives of different generations of Ukrainian sociological thought coming from different regions research centers, theoretical schools and methodological platforms. They are all united by the desire to comprehend and explain complex and sometimes contradictory reality of modern Ukrainian society undergoing a series of fundamental transformations.
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Preface

In 2000 the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine published the book of Ukrainian sociologists’ articles that first appeared in the English-language journals in the 1990s (Golovakha E., Panina N., Vorona V. (Eds) “Sociology in Ukraine. Selected Works Published During the 90s”. – Kiev: IS NASU, 2000). This was the first collection of works that introduced the results of Ukrainian sociological research to foreign readers. Almost two decades have passed since then. The number of publications in professional journals abroad has been growing with every passing year. However, they can hardly represent the full range of the Ukrainian sociological achievements. In this context, the book of works by the leading Ukrainian sociologists prepared by the Sociological Association of Ukraine ("Ukrainian Sociology in the 21st Century: Theory, Methods, Research Results") can bring Ukrainian scholars closer to the foreign reader.

The main aim of this publishing effort is to provide an opportunity to our English-speaking colleagues all over the world to get a glimpse of the most interesting and ambitious research projects by Ukrainian sociologists in the XXIst century.

Modern Ukrainian sociology focuses its attention primarily on the problems of sociological theory, methodology and tendencies of the post-soviet social transformation, as well as political, economic, social, and cultural aspects of the modern Ukrainian society. These aspects of sociological research determine the contents of the book. The works in the first chapter are dedicated to the current issues of modern sociological theory. The second chapter contains methodological studies of Ukrainian sociologists. The articles in the third chapter are dealing with the problems of the Ukrainian society’s development.

Conditions necessary for studying social processes in Ukraine and in its regions, as well as their prospects are convincingly described in research projects on:
- methodology and sociological estimation of social orientations of Ukrainian people;
- determination of the factors of further stabilization and integration of the Ukrainian society;
- analysis of sources and specificity of Ukrainian political culture;
- social dynamics in ethnic communities of Ukraine.

The articles published in the book afford to obtain relevant information on current situation in the Ukrainian society, as well as its main developmental
tendencies. The book provides a fuller picture of Ukraine’s modern social structure, the results of recent sociological studies that might be valuable for sociological theory, and the development of empirical social research methods.

The curious reader can get a clearer view of Ukrainian sociologists’ fields of interest, understand what kind of social problems are their main concern and see what exploratory tasks they put forward while thoroughly investigating various aspects of Ukrainian social life.

The book presents new or previously published articles by representatives of different generations of Ukrainian sociological thought. Under its cover, you can find next to one another the texts of experienced and well-known far behind the Ukrainian borders scientists and young, talented authors whose scholarly careers are only beginning to unfold.

The authors come from different Ukrainian cities; they work at different universities, at the National Academy of Sciences, at different governmental and non-governmental research institutions. They preach different theoretical doctrines and belong to different methodological platforms but they are all united by the desire to comprehend and to explain complex and sometimes contradictory reality of the Ukrainian post-soviet society undergoing several simultaneous fundamental transformations in the XXIst century. Here belong: the transition from totalitarian society to market relations and political pluralism; formation of national and cultural identity; immersion into globalization processes and digital technologies; and finally, the rejection of the soviet civilization paradigm together with the aspiration to assimilate European social values and cultural senses.

All these complex transitional processes are to some extent reflected in this book offered to the readers’ judgment. Here they can hardly find ready answers to pressing theoretical and methodological questions but rather attempts to sociologically interpret them; you can feel intellectual atmosphere in which modern Ukrainian sociology lives and evolves and see the specific traits of its methodological culture.

We sincerely hope that this book will help our foreign colleagues to see the Ukrainian society in all the complexity of its institutes, problems and processes and thus will contribute to Ukraine’s integration into the modern globalizing world.

We are grateful to all those who helped to create and support this book. First of all, to the staff of Mykola Lukash Translation Studies department and to its head Professor Oleksandr Rebrii for editing and proofreading the English translations of the articles; and also to Vera Kutyreva for her invaluable technical assistance in compiling this Collection and arranging its Contents.

Vil Bakirov
Yevhen Golovakha
1

HISTORY AND THEORY OF SOCIOLOGY
PRESENT-DAY SOCIOLOGY: TENDENCIES AND PROSPECTS OF DEVELOPMENT*

Nataliya Chernysh (Lviv)

In the present paper, the author attempts to establish the stages in the evolution of sociology, taking into account theoretical foundations of the discipline and the techniques of sociological research. As a criteria for their selection, the author has chosen, firstly, the qualitative changes in the nature of sociology in accordance with the socio-cultural milieu of a certain historical period and, secondly, the principle of increasing variability of scientific knowledge in general and sociological knowledge, in particular. Four distinct stages which span from the emergence of sociology as a separate scholarly field up till the present time have been established. The author describes the specificity of each stage by highlighting the research tendencies prevalent for each period: the nature of sociology of the period, its defining features, main concepts, central issues, main functions, prevalent traits and most typical methods of empirical research. This enables the author to establish ten tendencies in the development of sociological theorizing and the molding of novel research methodologies together with three prospective future trends.

Keywords: present-day sociology; stages, tendencies and prospects of the development of sociology; sociology of post-globalist development; globalization; sub-globalizations, globalized humankind, fragmented humankind.

Human nature (including that of sociologists who are also humans) is characterized by a deeply rooted conservatism and inertia of thinking which is manifested in fixed behavioral templates and patterns. We all crave for stability, peace and tranquility, but the modern world does not give us such blessings; on the contrary, as never before, it constantly and incessantly interferes with our scholarly and pedagogical activities, resolutely demanding an adequate response to current events and challenges. Sociology is a relatively new academic discipline which is both good and bad at the same time. It is good in the sense that, within its boundaries, sociology is not cramped by the burden of centuries-old traditions that are so difficult to leave behind when trying to make sense of today’s radically changing world; however, the constant changes to the seemingly well-established body of sociological thought are also detrimental, for they give rise to a certain confusion when tackling numerous cognitive challenges, and can eventually impel the emergence of a persistent aversion to the sociological profession, leading some sociologists to ponder on changing their professional occupations. I would like to reassure my disappointed colleagues and to console them by saying that many other professions will soon cease to exist, whereas sociology, being the study of humanity, will undoubtedly carry on perpetually. So, let us get down to work, and try not only to feel the winds of change, but also to catch them in our sails and make our sociological ark move forward.

The question of present-day sociology, its current trends and the prospects of further sociological theorizing, as well as the related issue of the methodologies of empirical research, are currently the crux of our academic and pedagogical work, of our activities as public sociologists. But do we always manage to properly reflect on these changes, transformations, modifications and hybrid states? Are we up to the task of coping with the need to swiftly reflect on them in our academic stance and in our teaching activities? Are we able to discern those new research tendencies which will mold the future of our discipline? The aforementioned reflections have prompted me to share my experience with the graduate and post-graduate students of the Department of Sociology of Ivan Franko National University in Lviv where I have been teaching courses in present-day Sociology. First of all, I will present in a generalized manner my own classification of the stages in the evolution of sociology up to the present time. This is indispensable for a sound identification of future tendencies and prospects, since it is quite difficult to write about tendencies without making comparisons. In our case, it seems possible to highlight these tendencies by establishing certain stages in the evolution of sociology and subsequently carrying out a comparative analysis of the substance of each stage.
The establishment of certain stages or periods in the development of sociology has stirred vigorous academic debates over a long period of time. There have been many attempts to classify the stages of the development of sociology, mostly in the works by foreign authors. Here we should mention the works by Garold Zborovsky (Зборовський, 2008), Piotr Sztompka, who wrote of a “first”, “second” and “third” sociology (Штомпка, 2009), Dmitry Ivanov, who postulates five stages of the development of sociological thought and mentions the types of theorizing prevalent for each of them (Иванов, 2013), Alexander Viktorov, who writes of three distinct stages (Викторов, 2015), etc. Their due should also be given to the works by Michael Burawoy (Буравой, 2009) who tries to distinguish four pure types of sociology in the age of globalization. Unfortunately, Ukrainian sociology has been mostly preoccupied with the establishment of certain milestones in the history of sociological doctrines. As a result, there are comparatively few Ukrainian studies dealing with the early decades of the twenty-first century.

In my opinion, it is expedient to distinguish four stages in the development of sociological thought, two of which are related to the rise of globalization. As criteria for their selection I have chosen, firstly, the qualitative changes in the nature of sociology in accordance with the socio-cultural milieu of a certain historical period and, secondly, Jean Piaget’s principle of increasing variability of scientific knowledge which has been adapted to the needs of Sociology. Structurally each stage is represented by seven components which I consider most important for the understanding of their respective specificity: the nature of the sociology of the period, its defining features, main concepts, central issues, main functions, prevalent traits and most frequent methods of empirical research. Metaphorically speaking, sociology can be visualized in the form of a flower on a long stalk, a cup (its internal substance) as well as petals which symbolize the instances when sociology transcends its traditional subject field through so-called methodological “turns” and gives rise to multi- and transdisciplinarity. At first this flower’s nurturing field was society itself which later on was substituted by humanity in its entirety or in a fragmented form.

In describing the contents of these stages I shall avoid excessive detail and will present only the most important or salient features. At the same time, I am by no means arguing that other features and characteristics different from those that will be stated do not exist. We will, however, be preoccupied only with those principles which lie at the core of each respective stage and form its axis. Such an approach also seems to be conducive to teaching purposes, since it allows both graduate and postgraduate students to quickly familiarize themselves with all the main issues of present-day sociology which, in turn, may encourage students to develop a more profound interest for each of them in the future. Finally, I shall establish certain tendencies in the development of present-day sociology which will then be highlighted through a comparison of the contents and motivation of each of the stages and their substance. Such considerations are crucial for the structure of this paper which, in spite of providing a somewhat simplified framework, will hopefully serve as an incentive for further discussions among the scholars of the field.
Thus, the first stage in the development of sociology, which lasted from its appearance and institutionalization until around 1985, is characterized, in general terms, by the fact that sociology (even etymologically) was seen as a science which dealt with society, and since its founding fathers all hailed from the developed nations of Western Europe, this society was not only a projection of an abstract ideal society, but was also highly reminiscent of an ideal Western society with its territorial, national and state attributes. The sociology of this period was Eurocentric and logocentric, its focal point was the idea of successful progressive development which would ultimately result in prosperity (typical of Western thought) as well as the concept of a linear ascending progression from primitive to more sophisticated stages of development. The key notion of the period was that of “order” as well as the subsidiary notions of rationality, institute, control and socialization. At the time, the central issue was the stability of this type of society and, although inequality within it did exist, it was believed that it could be controlled (mainly by the state through such methods as tax policy, antitrust laws, social work, etc.). The functions of this type of sociology encompassed theoretical, cognitive, descriptive and prognostic issues as well as the function of social control. Sociology at this time was considered a monolithic discipline, in spite of the fact that certain paradigms, such as the structural paradigm, the interpretative paradigm or the integrative paradigm, were already distinguishable within its boundaries. The methodology used by the sociologists of the period was centered around the now traditional quantitative and qualitative approaches (or, in the words of Piotr Sztompka, around verbal methods) (see Table 1). Figuratively speaking, this first stage in the development of sociology resembles a long stem enframed by several leaves closer to the top.

As early as the last quarter of the twentieth century the world became immersed in the profound shift towards globalization. Sociologists have been at the forefront of interpreting this process since around 1985, when the first three papers with the word “globalization” in their titles appeared. Thus, this second stage, in my opinion, began at this particular time and lasted until around 2002. The process of globalization has profoundly altered our understanding of the nature of sociology as a discipline which studies globalization itself: from that point on sociology has been seen as a field concerned with humankind in the age of globalization. And since the sociology of this period was dominated by Western sociologists (in the words of Pierre Bourdieu, by the representatives of the intellectual international of the “rich sociological North”), who were also proponents of a Western societal model, the discipline as a whole viewed this shift in terms of a victorious Westernization (or Americanization, or, even more precisely, a kind of McDonaldization which is very aptly described in the books of George Ritzer (see in detail: (Ritzer, 2008), based on the idea of the triumph of liberalism, the market economy and the principles of democracy throughout the world. Even within the realm of culture, which has put up the greatest resistance to the globalist onslaught, the triumphant march of globalization has led to the wide dissemination of global models rooted in the Western tradition. This is true
both of elite culture (e.g. the so-called Davos business culture, the intellectuals’ club culture, the culture of the Yuppies international) and of mass consumption (mass pop culture in the English language, Hollywood film production, mainly English-language songs on television channels and on FM radio, clothes (T-shirts) and footwear (sneakers), and ultimately in the fast-food industry). The defining features of this second stage were Western hegemonism, reflexivity, the preeminence of models of sustainable development as well as a synthesis of linear and nonlinear concepts of development. The concept of “globalization” took central stage in this transitional period which has also seen the appearance of global hybrid pairs of concepts (according to John Urry), such as order - chaos, rationality - irrationality, institute - network, control - choice, socialization - multiplicity of identities, universalism - particularism, exclusion - inclusion, constancy - fluidity, global - local, etc. Urry has also postulated global hybrids on the brink of chaos, such as informational systems, the Internet, global media, global money, climate change, health hazards, social instability, etc. (Urry, 2005: p. 139). The issues that are becoming most crucial are social turbulence and inequality (both material and non-material in nature) as well as social mobility. The sociology of this period played a theoretical, communicative and prognostic role. Its prevalent trait was the existence of a multitude of internal paradigms. According to Roger Burrows and Michael Savage, this period also saw the rise of

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Stage 1. Sociology before globalization (or pre-global stage) (till 1985)</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. The nature of the sociology of the period</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sociology as a science which dealt with society (of Western type)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Defining features</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eurocentric</td>
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<tr>
<td>Logocentric</td>
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<tr>
<td>The idea of successful progressive development and prosperity</td>
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<tr>
<td>The concept of a linear ascending progression</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Main concepts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Order</td>
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<td>Rationality</td>
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<tr>
<td>Institute</td>
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<td>Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>Socialization</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Central issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stability</td>
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<tr>
<td>Controlled inequality</td>
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<td>5. Main functions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Theoretical</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cognitive</td>
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<td>Descriptive</td>
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<td>Prognostic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Function of social control</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Prevalent traits</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sociology as a monolithic discipline</td>
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<td>Integral discipline</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Most frequent methods of empirical research</td>
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<tr>
<td>“Orthodox” methods: quantitative and qualitative (verbal)</td>
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mixed methods in sociological research, such as online opinion polls or obtrusive methods adapted to digital data. With the rapid rise of globalization comparative methods have continued to gain in popularity. Following the lead of Sztomkka, scholars have also been turning to the so-called non-verbal methods (see Table 2).
The impact of globalization on sociology was of paramount consequence, since at the time of the rise of globalization sociologists had not yet managed to clearly define the field of their discipline. Consequently, sociologists, in the words of Neil Smelser, had to rethink everything, including their own perception of their field and the changes that the new global developments had brought about (initially sociology was to deal with societies within their national and state boundaries, but now this was about to change) as well as many issues of methodology. In other words, sociologists had to tackle the task of defining a new status for their discipline, of establishing new methodologies and methods of comparative analysis (Смелзер, 2003: p.115). Another scholar, Ulrich Beck who was greatly concerned with the above, shared the opinion that sociology in the age of globalization had gained a new profile by turning into the study of humans who were trapped in their own existence. “Globalism reflects the new state of our planet. From now on everything that takes place on it cannot be reduced to a local event; every invention, triumph and catastrophe is intertwined with the whole world. Consequently, we are obliged to conduct a reorientation of our life and our actions, of our organizations and institutions, and to reorganize them according to the axis “local-global” (Бек, 2001: p. 27).

However, the triumphant march of Western globalization has also turned out to be short-lived which makes us think of Prigogine’s “arrow of time”. It is my view that the period since 2002 has witnessed the shift to a third stage in the development of sociology as a discipline about the globe’s mankind which encompasses both western globalization (or Westernization) and Easternization (the rise of local eastern cultural models to the global scene) as well as a multitude of other sociocultural entities of a global nature, including those which serve as alternatives to globalization. This is what has given rise to the sociology of the age of multiple globalizations. Why is the year 2002 so crucial in this context? In 2002, a group of scholars led by Peter Berger and Samuel Huntington came out with a book called “Many Globalizations” which was an attempt to gather and to analyze the results of sociological research pertaining to the influence of globalization on the culture of ten different countries (Многоликая глобализация, 2004). This book, which argued on the basis of the collected data that eastern countries with strong cultural traditions were more than capable not only of withstanding the onslaught of western globalization, but also of becoming cultural emitters themselves, i.e. manufacturing products which could permeate world markets and become global, caused a shift in the prevailing scholarly opinion on the issue, since one of the book’s authors, Peter Berger, had previously stated that globalization and Westernization were virtually one and the same and that the role of the world’s main globalizing power clearly belonged to the US.

Hence, this stage in the development of sociology may be characterized by a rejection of the centralist approach, by radical reflexivity, by the spread of models of non-linear socio-cultural dynamics as well as cycle-wave understanding of development. The term “globalizations” (in the plural) became overarching in this period, so did the notions of alternative globalizations (as global cultural
movements, according to Berger (Бергер, 2004: p. 19), glocality, world order, new types of rationality (reflexivity - Margaret Archer; governmentality - Michel Foucault, McDonaldization, now pertaining to the principles governing the “fast food” industry which would shortly expand into other walks of life, giving rise to “fast education” or even to “fast love” - George Ritzer; gamification - Sergei Kravchenko; see also: (Кравченко, 2010: p. 21) of the imagination and sensitivity, of global challenges, global integral networks, virtual reality, etc. Urry introduces the concept of global fluids as partially structured networks and network torrents as well as such notions as a new epochalism, a new catastrophism and a new universalism (Урри, 2012). A central issue of his work is that of fluidity, multilayered social inequality, mostly of a non-material nature as well as complex social mobility (including mobility which is virtual, unstructured, unconstrained by time and space, etc.). The functions of sociology became the topic of a scholarly debate between Pierre Bourdieu (who was later supported by Пiotr Sztompka) and Michael Burawoy. The former scholar and his followers were of the opinion that present-day sociology had retained its heretofore well-known theoretical and cognitive functions (i.e. its task was to understand the world as a complex system or humanity in all its diversity and complexity), whereas the latter, conversely, stated his conviction that sociology had to play a practical and transformational role, i.e. to stimulate the social transformation brought about by globalization. At this time, the prognostic function of sociology also gains momentum based on the development of the sociological imagination and sensitivity. The sociology of the period (2002-2016) was also dominated by methodological turns displayed through multidisciplinarity as well as the rise of metatheorizing within its boundaries (should we expand the flower metaphor, these would be the petals growing from the cup). The year 2008 saw the rise of Big Data Processing, the introduction of novel methods of processing data which enabled scholars to tackle immense quantities of data that would have been unmanageable within the framework of older methodologies. The period also saw an increase in the use of cross-cultural methods and studies (the World Values Survey, the European Social Survey (Головаха, 2014) as well as the implementation of the methods of Sztompka’s “third sociology” (see Table 3).

However, the year 2016 witnessed events that became the starting point of a qualitatively new stage in the development of sociology. First and foremost, we have to mention Donald Trump’s ascendance to the office of US president. Trump managed, perhaps intuitively, to exploit those anti-globalist societal trends which had been lurking within American society for a long time, especially among representatives of the provincial middle class, who had lost their employment and social status as a result of the encroachment of the globalized economy and were unable to meet the higher requirements of retraining, mastering new skills, being mobile, etc. It was typical of these strata to hope for a president who would bring order to America, who would return to its shores the industries which, enticed by the prospects of cheap labor and abundant mineral resources, had moved overseas. They longed to see the return to the US of unprofitable industries (such
as coal mining), they staunchly supported renouncing environmental protection programs, banning the arrival of immigrant to the US, building a wall along the border with Mexico and giving employment preferences to US citizens. The slogan Trump appropriated for his campaign (“America first!”) quite vividly reflected the expectations of many voters who for many years had been part of the

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| 2 | Defining features | Rejection of the centralist approach  
Radical reflexivity  
Models of non-linear socio-cultural dynamics (S. Kravchenko)  
Cycle-wave understanding of development |
| 3 | Main concepts | **Globalizations**  
Glocality  
World order  
Imagination and sensitivity  
Global challenges  
Global integral networks  
Virtual reality  
Global fluids (as partially structured networks and network torrents) (J. Urri)  
New epochalism, a new catastrophism and a new universalism (J. Urri) |
| 4 | Central issues | Fluidity  
Multilayered social inequality (mostly of a non-material nature)  
Complex social mobility (*including virtual, unstructured networked, unconstrained by time and space, etc.*) |
| 5 | Main functions | Theoretical and cognitive functions (P. Bourdieu, P. Sztompka) VS practical and transformational (M. Burawoy)  
Prognostic |
| 6 | Prevalent traits | Methodological turns  
Interdisciplinarity  
Metatheorizing within the boundaries of interdisciplinarity |
| 7 | Most frequent methods of empirical research | Big Data (2008); Data Mining  
Knowledge Discovery in Databases  
Unmatched Count Technique  
The Techniques of Crowd-Sourcing (L. von Ahn, J. Howe)  
Cross-cultural methods and studies (*World Values Survey, European Social Survey, etc.*) |
silent anti-globalist majority. The fact that this clearly anti-globalist agenda had taken root in the politics of the world’s richest and most advanced nation greatly contributed to the general atmosphere of the downturn of globalization. For many it also sparked hopes that national interests would from now on dominate the political scene, whereas the heretofore sole center of global power, the US, would undergo diffusion with its president refusing to lead the process of globalization into the future. This was the prevalent mood during the July 2017 G-20 summit in Hamburg where, according to analysts, the first outlines of a new world order were drawn. This order, having no clear-cut leaders, will consist of many fluid alliances and a host of local confrontations that will turn the world into an arena of rivaling regional powers (Немировський, 2017).

This fourth stage, which commenced in 2016, has yet again altered our understanding of sociology. Within the field, there is an ever clearer sense of the end of globalization, which has already reached its peak, and a shift to a new configuration of the trends of the future within which post-globalist tendencies seem to be prevailing. The most crucial question for me is how this stage is to be named. I have yet to encounter any well-articulated and well-grounded proposals, although they probably exist.

However, in a recent book authored by my colleagues in Kyiv and entitled “The State of Singularity: Social Structures, Situations and Everyday Practices” (2017) (ed. S. Makeeva and S. Oksamytna) we come across an important point concerning alternative projects of the future of separate countries that have chosen a positive, non-global route of evolution (Стан сингулярності, 2017: p. 6).

This statement can, in principle, be agreed with, but it seems to me that the global and non-global processes we are witnessing in the twenty-first century have become intertwined so intricately that the use of notions which separate them or put them in opposition has become redundant. We should be thinking not of a complete substitution of certain processes by others, but of the centrality of certain characteristics and the retreat of others. This is why I find the opinion of Daniel Bell, stated in his appraisal of the names and relatedness between the three types of society he proposes in his work (preindustrial, industrial and postindustrial), more sensible. Bell was of the opinion that none of these types presupposed a total downfall of the previous type or one of the core sectors of each type (agrarian production for the preindustrial stage; the production of goods for the industrial stage; and the supply of services for the postindustrial stage). For instance, within an industrial society, the agrarian sector continues to flourish alongside the sector of industrial production and the service sector, however, only the second of these sectors can be regarded central within such a society. Conversely, within a postindustrial society, the central position is occupied by the tertiary sector (the service sector), although the other two sectors continue to exist, albeit in a less prominent form with their substance undergoing both qualitative and quantitative alterations. Bell writes that “postindustrial tendencies cannot substitute previous social forms as stages of human evolution. They usually coexist and at that they make society and the nature of its social
structure more complex” (Белл, 2004: p. CIX). It is difficult to agree with the fact that there are nowadays countries that take no part whatsoever in the process of globalization. However, it is clear that the manifestations and influence of globalization are more profound in some countries than in others, and each society has its own configuration of global and local elements. In our case, we are probably witnessing, as in the similar arguments brought forth by Bell, the coexistence of formations, processes and phenomena of a globalist and non-globalist nature, the architectonics and centrality of which vary in each country.

Hence, in this fourth stage of its development sociology is seen as a discipline concerned with the post-global (according to the logic of Bell) development of societies that are centered around a few regional powers most of which are no longer part of the West. Using Berger’s logic, we can also consider a different notion of sociology as a discipline that studies sub-globalizations, i.e. processes that, in their nature, are more regional than global (Бергер, 2004: p. 22). However, in my opinion, a third definition of present-day sociology, namely that of a discipline about humanity in a fragmented state, is more adequate than the previous two. There is no doubt that the onslaught of globalization, albeit less volatile, has not yet totally subsided, however at the same time we are witnessing a clear turn towards the centrality of anti-globalist processes. The isolationist stance of Donald Trump’s presidential campaign, the contraction (due to Brexit) and subsequent reconfiguration of the EU, the rise of right-wing radicalism headed by Marine Le Pen in France, the electoral success of the far-right “Alternative für Deutschland” in Germany, the strengthening of China’s (and lately also India’s) geopolitical position as well as the progress recently made by many African nations have all given rise to a multiregionalism which has provided ample food for thought to sociologists. A tentative list of the fundamental traits of their work at this point could probably include reactive reflexivity (or, according to others, a critical non-linear reflection or double reflexivity in the sense of the reflexivity of objective structures and human reflexivity) as well as the plurality of development models with various ratios of exogenic and endogenic factors, models of global self-regulating systems with emergent characteristics and clashing ideas of development connected to the specificity of separate regions. The main notions of this stage of sociology are sub-globalization (plurality) and, to a certain extent, Europeanization as well as that of a new world order which lacks a single leading country, but has a few regional centers; a universalism limited by regional constraints vs. singularity; liminality, emergence; a new type of power embodied in the dominance of a handful of IT companies (among the ten largest and most successful companies in the world nine are representatives of the IT industry which are broadening their horizons through the acquisition of companies from other spheres (Курц, 2017) as well as the shift from IT do DT (i.e. from informational to digital technologies) and the related notion of digitalization; augmented reality as well as isolationism, protectionism, populism, autonomy, nationalism, etc. The central issues may include hyperdynamism or hyperergia as well as modified and regionally marked inequalities and mobilities which have retained their
significance (the latter include the rising exclusion in the affluent circles of the West, the rapid diffusion of inequality in poor nations, the disproportionate spread of digital inequality, the limitations of inclusiveness in post-communist countries, etc.). The main functions of sociology, as in previous stages, are those of theorizing and cognition, whereas its main traits are those of transdisciplinarity along with the correspondent metatheorizing of a higher level as well as the search for valid theories for a new regionalism which is still in its infancy (e.g. the work done in the realm of Euro concepts). The transdisciplinarity and metatheorizing of modern sociology greatly rely on the breakthroughs achieved in the natural sciences, namely the four revolutions of the twentieth century (Albert Einstein and the theory of probability, the work of Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg within quantum mechanics, Geoffrey Chew and the synthesis of the former two with the quantum and relativist aspects of subatomic substance as well as the revolution of the late twentieth century, i.e. the conformal field theory and the bootstrap model (Амбарова, Зборовський, 2015). This latest period has seen the rapid rise of research technologies and methods based on the collaborative efforts of IT specialists and sociologists, e.g. the establishment within Big Data of three specialized research fields – Fast Data, Big Analytics and Deep Insight, each of which possesses its own sophisticated internal structure (e.g. the rapid increase in the significance of predictive and requisitive analytics seen lately in Big Analytics, which was elaborated by the CEO of Cambridge Analytica Alexander Nix during his talk at the Lviv IT Arena in September 2017, was crucial for Donald Trump’s triumph in the US presidential election (Юрасов, 2017). However, we should not fall into a state of unconditional adoration of modern quantitative studies and “big data”. In her paper, Nataliya Kostenko has aptly argued for the significance and prospects of post-qualitative studies (Костенко, 2017) (see Table 4).

This is the way I see the four stages in the development of sociology as well as the current state of the field. At this point it is worth mentioning that most sociologists have mechanically continued to think of their discipline in the terms set by globalization. This approach can be found in the works by such prominent scholars as Anthony Giddens and Philip W. Sutton who, in a recent joint publication, continue to argue for the centrality of globalization to present-day sociology (Giddens, Sutton, 2013; Giddens, Sutton, 2014). However, the age of globalization has turned out to be much shorter than the existence of the industrial and postindustrial types of society as well as that of sociology as a discipline which studies society. The wind of change seems to have undermined the very idea of globalization. We are currently witnessing the rise of a new world order within which older centripetal and more recent centrifugal tendencies coexist with the latter currently displaying unprecedented vitality. In this context, sociologists are once again facing the issue of their discipline’s subject matter which is a dilemma that, so far, has not received a well-grounded answer. The vagueness surrounding the subject matter of sociology also poses a threat, for if this state becomes an inherent feature of sociology, it will undoubtedly be detrimental both to the field’s academic status and to its attractiveness in the eyes of prospective scholars.
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<th>Stage 4. Sociology of post-globalization age (since 2016)</th>
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<td>The nature of the sociology of the period</td>
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<td>Most frequent methods of empirical research</td>
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Now we can establish the tendencies of present-day sociology according to the substance of the aforementioned stages. A tentative list could include the following:

- the rapid broadening of the boundaries of sociology, its subject matter and object of study as a result of the permeation of the discipline traditional spheres of interest (individual, group, society, mankind) as well as the introduction into the field of sociological reflections of artificial reality phenomena which have not been previously studied (virtual reality, augmented reality, artificial intelligence, etc.);
- the development and nurturing of a multi-dimensional and polyfunctional sociological reflexivity of a hybrid nature which is up to the task of producing concepts and models of sophisticated self-regulating systems of global, regional or local proportions with an array of possibilities of their implementation in social practice;
- the shift from inter- to transdisciplinarity (both in the sense of the preservation of boundaries between disciplines and the establishment of new disciplines initiated by sociologists and developed with a significant contribution from them; although the issues of discipline positioning are, in my opinion, of a lesser significance), and the appearance of an appropriate type of metatheorizing based on transdisciplinary syncretism (which is devoid of superfluous eclectics) and holistic thinking;
- an increase in the significance and importance of the conceptualization of regional development projects (most importantly, of Euro concepts) as well as the issues of coexistence of local, glocal, global, non-global and post-global processes and phenomena;
- a significant sophistication of the terminology embodied in the increase of the number of hybrid terms stemming from social and natural sciences, as well as technology and the humanities, accompanied by a synthesis of notions of post-classical and post-non-classical sociology;
- the shift of sociologists’ attention from prevalently static to predominantly dynamic and even reactive societal transformations;
- the rise of the significance of the study of complex (predominantly non-material) social inequality with special attention to new forms of inequality embodied in social tension as well as new types of conflicts around opposing interests and values;
- the rise of the significance of the theoretical and cognitive functions of modern sociology under the conditions of hyperergia (or hyperdynamism) and reactive social transformations as well as the humanistic function due to the increasing dehumanization brought about by the continued introduction of new technologies without hindsight of the needs and interests of humans;
- a diversification of the methods and techniques used in sociological scholarship through the use of synthesized and modified quantitative and qualitative methodologies as well as methods from other disciplines. Their combined effect enables sociologists to obtain rapid and valid social results;
- the shift from verbal and non-verbal methods of sociological scholarship to the use of digital technologies, etc.
A list of prospective future trends in sociology may include the following: (1) the establishment of closer ties between the post-classical and post-non-classical paradigms of sociology in their interpretation of the rapidly changing socio-cultural milieu (for more on these metaparadigms see Зборовский, 2008), (2) an increase in the use of studies produced within the recent methodological turns, (3) a sociological reevaluation of the social consequences brought about by the four revolutions in the natural sciences of the twentieth century as well as a cumulation of the work done in the contemporary social sciences and humanities.

All the above mentioned factors are of great significance to Ukrainian sociology which is faced with the task of taking into account the tendencies of sociological theorizing which are prevalent on the global scene and applying them to the Ukrainian context, using the most recent research techniques to conceptualize the socio-cultural modifications that have taken place in Ukrainian society and the general state of this society as well as the pressing need to grasp the prospects of sociology in Ukraine. As a final remark, I would like to encourage my colleagues to state their opinion on the reflections I have provided in this paper, and also to give their due to those Ukrainian sociologists who have carried on their work in the field in spite of the difficult times that our society and our discipline are experiencing. Thanks to the great efforts of Volodymyr Paniotto, Yevhen Holovakha, Andriy Horbachyk, Olha Balakireva as well as the editors of the aforementioned book “The State of Singularity” S. Makeeva and Svitlana Oksamytna, Ukraine has finally been included into the European Values Survey, the World Values Survey and the European Social Survey. I would also like to mention the work done on the issues of new social inequality by Vil Bakirov, Olha Kutsenko and Lyudmyla Sokurianska (Нові нерівності – нові конфлікти, 2017), on the methodological trauma in Ukrainian sociology by Yuriy Yakovenko (Яковенко, 2017), on the beginnings and modern transformations of sociology by Pavlo Kutuyev (Кутуєв, 2009, 2012), on sociological metatheorizing by Valeriy Pylypenko (Пилипенко, 2017), on new regional divisions and Euro concepts by Yu. Chernetskiy (Chernetskiy, 2017), etc. The volumes published on the occasion of the birthdays of our colleagues Volodymyr Paniotto (Методологія і методи соціологічних досліджень в Україні: історія та сучасні проблеми, 2017) and Mykola Churylov (Круглий стіл «Вибіркові соціологічні дослідження в Україні: історія та сучасні проблеми. До 70-річчя Миколи Чурилова», 2017) have provided an impetus for the development within Ukrainian sociology of issues pertaining to methodology. But much is still to be done…

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PLACE AND TIME OF SOCIOLOGY*

Natalia Kostenko (Kyiv)
Serhiy Makeyev (Kyiv)

It is well known that periodical statements of crisis of social sciences proved constantly to be new turns and vistas revealing each time untapped resources of sociology. The essence of modern claims sociologists agree with is in evident weakening of referentiality — sociology is losing the contact with “society”, with that which constituted it both as a science and as a special intellectual practice. This fact seems to prejudice the very ability to be a “modern science about modern society”. The authors believe that the paradox of the current situation lies in the parallel existence both of uncertainty about the key point of the discipline and concern about adequacy of methods, as well as in quite convincing experience of combining tradition and innovation in the works of N. Luhmann, P. Sztompka, L. Thévenot and L. Boltanski, J. Urry, that engenders the phenomenon of “new old sociology”. The article deals with metamorphoses of temporality the social disciplines are concerned with while describing local and extremely wide spaces of human coexistence.

Keywords: statuses of decline, methods of social sciences, new old sociology, modes of temporality, social space, special intellectual practices.

* Translated by Tetiana Herasymenko from the Ukrainian text “Mistse i chas sotsiolohii”, Sotsiolohiia, teoriia, metody, marketynh, 2008, № 1, pp. 11–32. Edited by Leonid Chernovaty.
Today’s situation looks as if the utopian energy ran out, as if it left the historical thinking. The horizon of the future has shrunk, and the spirit of the time, like politics, substantially changed... The intellectuals’ response reflect the same helplessness as in politicians... Let the situation be objectively opaque. Mean while, the opaqueness is one of the functions of readiness for actions, for which the society thinks itself to be capable. The matter is in the confidence of the Western culture of in itself.

Jürgen Habermas

The idea about the end of sociology as a project (in the sense it was conceived and born) has caught on, and its eschatological overtones are about to reach the peripheral discourse. Some twenty years ago, even the implicit communication of the idea seemed to be limited exclusively to refined statements and sophisticated texts, while sociological practices, thriving due to the universal propagation of the social knowledge legitimacy, hardly cared about it at all. Actually, the criticism of sociology, as well as of the entire array of methods and representations, labelled as Social Sciences, was predetermined by the decision (sanctioned by the Modern) to turn the research of the individuals’ coexistence into an authentic academic discipline. In other words, this job had to be taken over by “research operators” who would reduce, according to Laurent Thévenot, the arbitrary norm-regulation to some measurable patterns. The gaps and inconsistencies accompanying this transformation has always induced some critical reflection, both internal and interdisciplinary one. At times, it has resulted in the dramatic settling of the issue concerning the very essence of sociology, which had promised to be unbiased in modelling economically conditioned orders, but did not completely separate itself either from the political and moral philosophy, or from the spheres of humanitarian cognition. Sociology has always been criticised for redundancy or deficit of the abovementioned influences: critical analysis of the modern system of supremacy vs. the latent apology of positive knowledge, patterns of strict science vs. relativism, etc. Meanwhile, the regular proclamations concerning the crisis in Social Sciences interchanged with their confident advancement, their new turns and prospects, while sociology demonstrated its untapped resources and its considerable potential. Peter Wagner called the 20th century the era of Social Sciences, meaning the enormous scale of their human society representations, which were not limited to the autonomous knowledge alone, but provided the sound basis for their use as public arguments in the large-scale political actions.
Statuses of Decline

We cannot say this potential has been realized enthusiastically and across the entire spectrum. Behind the intricate presentations of the discipline history, one can see the gradual evolution that did not comprise radical revolts or a complete destruction of the original project basis. The latter, due to its very general format, was open for further developments and revisions. Graduality, however, involved tension, which did not originate from the inconsistency of sociological responses to social needs. Explicitly or implicitly, they were part of the project: discovering social laws meant collecting useful knowledge for the better management of common wealth, states and processes. Nevertheless, the era of “optimistic scientism” (Andre Malraux) never materialised; it came to an abrupt end between the two atomic bombardments, having diminished all prospects for any reasonable (scientific) discussion of the long-term future issues. Meanwhile, within the thirty post-war “glorious years” of humanities and even later, by inertia, sociologists had been actively appealed to in the process of working out developmental programs. More often than not, those appeals used to be ritual or formal because of the legitimate academic status of social and humanitarian sciences, which the elites were expected to take into account to be well abreast of modern tendencies. However, it was the status itself, being non-sensitive and lacking practical interest, that prevented sociology from participating in political decisions substantiation. Both parties found effective political marketing to be more attractive, but the wind of change is coming. For example, the Ukrainian academic social science had to remind openly that sociology cannot be reduced to political ratings only.

The tension in sociological evolution has been caused by the dynamic competition among perspectives, directions, organizational centres and schools. In a purely analytical sense, they could be subdivided into archaists (fundamentalists) and innovators, the difference between them being the speed, rigidity and intuitiveness of response to the changes on the territories under observation, as well as to the public expectations concerning the assessment of those changes in terms of their favourability. By the end of the last century, the competition had become evident, exceeded the critical threshold and visibly restructured the social thinking area, having narrowed the mainstream space while having simultaneously shaped the multiple sociology concept. The picture got so unexpected that it made researchers seriously revise the very sources of sociology. They sought whether the split of the sociological imagination had been caused by some generic flaw, and whether it was at all possible to hope for the former integrity of the social science idea postulated by it. “Are there any implicit or explicit ideas common to all great authors of sociological tradition?” This was the question for the discussion at the symposium in Paris (2003) dedicated to perspectives of the general sociological theory under globalization (Тевеньо, 2004). This time it is more difficult to overcome the crisis: even the subject and method of sociology are in doubt.
As far as the reason is concerned, experts and sociologists themselves see it in the considerable weakening of referentiality – sociology lost its contact with “society” by making itself both a science and a special intellectual practice. One of the last congresses of the International Sociological Association in Durban (2006) has not contested that. The thesis can be divided into a number of contexts explicating disproportions of the main notions, ways of scientific explanation and claims of sociology to be “a modern science about a modern society” (Бек, 2001: p. 41). By now they have been discussed in details and it would be enough just to enumerate them.

**Dismantling of the key concept.** The representation of social life through the “society” idea turned out to be a lucky find for the substantiation of the subject of sociology and enabled it to acquire an official status among other disciplines concerning people and the state. The initial option — to measure the laws of the whole by observing “elementary” units of society – masses, collectives, social groups – was not the only model for consideration. The final indecomposable unit has always been a separate individual whose inclination to activity regulates an order in human communities (Тевенко, 2004). An artificial nature of the “society” concept could have been accepted until the concept itself managed to find convincing structural and functional excuses. However, as Alain Touraine stated in his report “Sociology without Society” (Турен, 2004) at the 15th World Congress of Sociology, the “society” idea has never been evident or natural; it has always been a constructed one and it should be recognized as the most developed and complex approach to the forms of behaviour and social organization. The construct adaptation to the modern world changing realia keeps revealing the logical redundancy of its composition and the arbitrary nature of its general design – the features, which impede the unbiased perception of its integral image, institutions and actors.

“Society” as a clone and an alter ego of the nation-state is losing its ontological and gnoseological universal nature. In the discussion of globalization prospects, this thesis has been transformed into a universally accepted position, or even truism, vividly illustrated by Ulrich Beck in his “container theory of society”. The society limited to a national state is no longer the main unit of social interactions because sociality nowadays is also realized beyond the national space, within the new forms of economic and political integration and the post-national constellations (Jürgen Habermas). Meanwhile, the society orientation remains a dominant feature, especially in research. According to Ulrich Beck, the connection between sociology and a national state is so close that the image of “modern” norm-regulated separate societies turned into a compulsory one. It happened due to the consolidation of the national state organizational and political model, as well as to the claim for fundamentality in its best sense on the part of the key figures in social science. Thus, this image was absolutized as a logically inevitable image of society in general (Бек, 2001: p. 50). In fact, it is hard to imagine Ukrainian sociologists, for example, giving up the search for “their own” (Ukrainian, in our case) society without seeing it in accordance with the generally accepted model
and without perceiving it as a self-reference micro-universe where everything actually takes place. A widening range of cross-cultural monitoring surveys based on the national sample model as an ideal approach to the reality might be seen as additional evidence for it. The rigid nature of the practices, their orientation towards the patterns that used to be successful in the past contribute to the general picture inconsistency. Even the awareness and the scale of our determination to accept ourselves as just a variation of the global world seems doubtful.

*The method-subject irrelevance.* Because of the deliberateness of the initial gesture in the creation of the sociological discipline, there have always been some awkwardness: the underlying idea was to completely separate and oppose the social and natural orders, but to research the former with the means traditionally used for the investigation of the latter (Urry, 2000: p. 11). In addition, viewing the human world as an object of observation and analysis by a naturalist, and later by a free-of-value-judgment interpreter, required accomplishing a sophisticated intellectual work while following the intellectual credo. For example, to accept the compulsory nature of social facts; this issue eventually made Durkheim expand his interpretation of society from a merely empirical reality to essentially transcendent and sacral one, a source and a receptacle of all higher values. Alternatively, as a resource of understanding, we may accept historical “ideal types” determined by Weber as constructions with the “nature of utopia that was achieved with the help of intellectual strengthening of certain elements of reality” (Вебер, 1990: p. 389). It was the reason of the complexity of operations constituting his “aim-rational action”, which actually is a “pure” construct of the mentioned kind, as well as the later Habermas’ communicative action. We may also carry out some phenomenological reduction mandating to refrain from any statements on the existence or non-existence of the outer world objects, or on the contrary, as Schütz suggests, to refrain from any doubts about them to avoid hampering the world’s clear perception and experiencing it. At the same time, in most cases empirical results do not go beyond the common sense statements; they confirm the known facts related to personal or collective (including sociological) experience. There are radically alternative practices: more and more elaborate techniques are applied to establish the links and dependencies of the variables, but they typically fail to convince that the obtained results contribute to the precision and accuracy of the social world representation. The collected knowledge obviously lacks workability, which deprives sociologists of their “expert status”. What comes true is a far cry from Max Weber’s ‘disenchancing the world’ by sociology, instead we see its repeated mystification presented as a written text, the triumph of sociological autarchy, where sociology reaps the fruits of its labour for its own sake.

The relevant discourse on the problems in sociology and with sociology has a wide range of tones: from the admission of the “classical sociology collapse”, caused by the society split-up (Турен, 2004), to suggesting a brave manifest for the discipline that has evidently lost its central concept (Urry, 2000: p. 20). The issues of decline and expectation of change in sociology fits well into a wider
discussion on the current condition of social sciences and humanities. Here, against the background of dissatisfaction and gloomy forecasts, we witness a strong desire of the researchers to work in their spheres and investigate the new perspectives. Some European scientific communities discuss the problem openly, while others prefer to refrain from talking about it officially. Dina Khapayeva, in her book “Dukes of Republic in the Age of Translation” on the transformation of notions in humanities (Xanaeæa, 2005), vividly described dealing with the crisis by French intellectuals and their Russian colleagues. The materials for discussion are also regularly presented by the non-fiction periodicals at the “Zhurnalnyi Zal” (magazines.ru) site. However, nowadays, in the age of translations, as Khapayeva calls it, the full awareness of what is going on in sociology and humanities within other language cultures, is obstructed due to the translation flows irregularity. It is conditioned by many reasons, which are secondary for the topic of our discussion (availability of joint projects, traditions of contacts, preferences and aims of publishers).

The rapid transformations in the intellectual atmosphere over the last decade can hardly be classified as a mere change of scientific fashion, as it was in the case of postmodernism. These transformations are indicative not so much of methodological instability or lack of resistance, but of radical reconsideration of the social sciences priorities and potential. According to Jörn Rüsen, history, which used to be the Enlightenment ideal, is virtually falling apart in our hands (Олабарри, 2004: p. 187). If the “total history” idea is still present in the modern version of the Annals, it would most probably be reformulated with a much stronger emphasis on the actor, going beyond a simple acknowledgement of his anonymous participation in the social, mediated by history structures (Тевенко, 2004). The current space for historical imagination contains a variety of “new” new histories, some of which are characterised by succession and can be represented in terms of the “long duration structures” (Braudel) (Олабарри, 2004: p. 188), while others confuse you as you try to correlate the “new political history”, “conceptual history of politics” or “social history of politics” with academic strategies (Хапаева, 2005: p. 87). Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht in the chapter “After Lessons of History” of his 1926 book speaks about the de pragmatization of history in favour of direct experience of the past as an experience of historical culture (Гумбрехт, 2005: pp. 465-495). Otto Gerhard Oexle is equally unambiguous on the subject, stating that historical sciences have no right to prescribe how life should be organized, but they should see to it that as much as possible information must avoid oblivion (Эксле, 2007: p. 22). Of course, revision cannot deprive history of its didactic function, as truly stated by Natalia Yakovenko and other Ukrainian historians (Яковенко, 2007), but its claims for being “magistra vitae” have to be significantly relinquished.

1 For example, the work by Philippe Corcu “New Sociologies” (Les nouvelles sociologies) on the current state of sociology in France and some other works on humanitarian issues were published within the “Pushkin” program and supported by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the French Embassy of in Russia (Коркюф, 2002).
Like history, sociology has always dealt with the truly current issues, its aim has always been to correspond to the time, and this intention has always been encouraged and cared for. It is quite understandable that sociology was the first entity the changed reality brought its claim against. It turned out that the language of sociology has lagged behind and could hardly meet the new reality needs. It is not that the sociological lexicon got outdated; due to modern means of communication, the national practice quickly acquired the new intellectual language patterns, such as the newly introduced and translated ones. It is not that the extended sociological narratives, implemented in the prospects of structures, actions and culture, customary interpreted as a complex of values and norms, have lost their convincing power. However, something went wrong in an evident or subtle manner. Even if we leave aside the Key concept, which was overwhelmingly deconstructed with the equally overwhelming involvement into the process, it is impossible to avoid the everyday aporia: the sense is dripping out of sociological interpretations, which just yesterday used to be adequate and explained tendencies. Despite the redundancy of words, there is lack of those necessary for the articulation of the current issues specifics. In any case, it is about the language incapability to express the current changes or catch the reality (Xanaesa, 2005: pp. 96-100, 196). A trivial example is the confusion of the political right and left by both ordinary people and experts. If you take into account the widely cited arguments by Reinhart Kozellek, the development of a conceptual dictionary could take several decades. One of the ways involves a shift (in historical notions) of the balance between universal meanings and specific experience towards the latter, that is in favour of the “proper noun logics” without breaking links with the “general statement logics” (Копосов, 2005: p. 222). This might involve the replacement of hyper-metaphors by the metaphors close to literal description. But it seems very similar to what the post-structuralism used to proclaim not long ago. Currently there is only one entry in this dictionary – “Europe” (Копосов, 2005); although, following the same logic, we might as well add “Africa”, meaning the “notion, but not a continent” (Бек, 2001: pp. 54-56). In any case, the representatives of regional sociologies connect the rethinking of universalism aspirations to a decline of its Eurocentric matrix (Чернило, 2007). As to the local languages and sociological dialects, they have been developing quite intensively, but their symbol rows do not often convert into each other and thus remain out of reach for non-initiated. The same concerns the paradigms, especially if you take into account their ability to be easily reproduced by adepts.

**New Old Sociologies**

Meanwhile, the number of new sociologies does not yield to the number of new histories or the kinds of cultural, anthropological and linguistic research, labelled as “continental diseases” in the philosophic environment (Daniel Andler). Practicing sociologists are not unanimous as to the revealed pathologies within
their discipline: accents range from rigorism to freedom. Presenting a generalized
image of the social science at forums of the European Academy of Sociology
in 2002-2003, Raymond Boudon and John Goldthorpe, sharing the same view,
offered four ideal types of sociology: aesthetic or expressive, socially committed or
critical, descriptive or cameral, and at last “real” (‘sociology that really matters’),
cognitive or scientific sociology (Boudon, 2002; Goldthorpe, 2004). Only the
latter — SSS (sociology as social science) — is unconditionally worth an academic
status. It is this kind of sociology that has to be supported by all means in order to
preserve the good reputation of sociology as a clear alternative developed on the
basis of unconditional expressive model experience and critical reflection driven
by moral and political norms (ideology). Called to explain the non-transparent
phenomena of social life, SSS gets involved in an effective cooperation with the
cameral (descriptive) sociology, whose best invention is the sample polls, as vital
to the modern social science, as the telescope for astronomy or the microscope for

Modifications of suggestions for sociology renovation do not involve
any unexpected or revolutionary ideas. Those are predominantly familiar or
less ordinary combinations of traditional perspectives with a strong structural
component and, at the same time, with a deliberate penetrating look at actors’
actions and their position identification regarding the structure or system,
whatever it is: temporary, accidental, sought for, desirable or deep-rooted and
incurable. The uncertainty of fluctuations and hesitations of individuals in the
distributed space integration of societies, intersected by communications, is taken
into account for the construction of system images as well. More often than not,
due to his or her mobility, an individual becomes able to escape from the special
conditions of a particular space and find a substitute for them. As it has become
a social norm, Niklas Luhmann offers changing the concept of an autopoietic
system to establish the system limits as being mobile too. They do not have to rise
high as the system borders, skin layers or the membrane, being the means used by
the system to strengthen itself and fencing off (Луман, 2005: p. 151).

As a rule, the most well-known projects, compositionally designed and
represented as a monograph, can hardly be labelled a mesoscale research because
each of them is worth their own autonomous position, comfortable for a full value
review of the socially interconnected world of people. They will also hardly fit into
the above-mentioned classification, as each of them tries to exploit advantages of
all sociology models, while remaining connected, though with varying degree, to
their parental paradigms. They intend to represent the mechanisms and practices
of the new humanitarian knowledge production by different actors, to make
it correspond to the modern conditions of coexistence. Let us consider several
examples, which seem to be illustrative.

In the Sociology of Mobility by John Urry, the reconstituting social science
deletes the outdated “society” concept and focuses on the “mobilities” accomplished
beyond the barriers of geographically and socially marked territories, and
structuring the global space. The “newer” rules of sociological method require
the introduction of metaphors, more suitable for the representation of the mobile ever-changing reality, emergent regulations and imperatives of temporality than for the statics, structure and social order (Urry, 2000: p. 18). Mobilities involve almost all kinds of human activity, starting with the physical, imaginative and virtual movements of various subjects and up to the “intellectual mobility” used to carry out innovations in some special environments of “creative marginality” of social sciences, and the mobility that supplies sociology with “emancipated interest” of the new social movements (Urry, 2000: pp. 220-221). The objects of the material world, surrounding the active subjects and making up common hybrid mobile formations together with them, are the inevitable participants of mobility. That is why “regarding things as social facts” is one of the natural rules of the renewed method (Urry, 2000: p. 18).

The interaction between the people and the material world, technological and ecological environments, capable nowadays of critically affecting the subjects’ behaviour and actions, no matter whether this world is alienated or appropriated by human communities, becomes more and more significant in various conceptual projects with distinct methodological dominants, ranging from Bruno Latour’s models of actors’ net transitions to Ulrich Beck’s environmentally oriented arguments. Sociology of a plurality of regimes of action by Lauren Thévenot and Luc Boltanski also belongs here. However, its main idea is to construct a highly generalized, even universal, structure representing the way actions depend on the generally meaningful principles or “greatness orders”, which underlie the people’s search for consent in the public or any other space to be justified and achieve recognition. The combination of “greatness orders” and situation typologies produces the segmentation of various regimes related to the actors’ involvement in their cooperation, ranging from everyday communication and professional disputes solution to the creativity configuration in humanities, like technocratism, market configuration, reputation, civil, inspired or patriarchal regimes (Тевено, 2006; Коркюф, 2002: pp. 153–162). With their own work, the authors illustrate the simultaneous accessibility (for an individual) of various involvement patterns; they regard this work as simultaneously being part of “pragmatic sociology” and close to the activity of political philosophers and theorists of justice, because their work represents the modes to express the commonplace feeling of injustice in the form of a model, rules and demands (Тевено, 2006). The highly sophisticated structural construction, realized through “regional” models (i.e. based on the isomorphism of regimes structuring various life spaces), was needed to avoid “relativism” à la Max Weber, and “all the more so – culturological fundamentalism”. According to Thévenot, it becomes possible because the value issues are regarded through the notion of multiple greatness orders; when those orders are oriented towards universality and significance for the mankind, they make values of different societies and cultures commensurable (Тевено, 2006).

Sociology of trust by Piotr Sztompka intends to confirm the claim of social science (still maintaining its “sensitivity to important social issues”) for a role
of the society’s self-consciousness (Sztompka, 2007: p. 19). His book *Trust. Basis of Society* (*Zaufanie. Fundament społeczeństwa*) certainly belongs to the category of epic sociological texts, where tradition and classical patterns of notion explication prevail alongside with the modern vocabulary usage. The moral foundations of modern society are viewed through the “glasses of trust”, opposing the culture of trust to the “culture of cynicism”. In the large-scale representation of the trust phenomenon, including its idea, kinds, bases, social links, functions and manifestation in various spheres of social life, the author uses the culturological approach and “methodology of eclecticism” in the strict Merton’s sense (Sztompka, 2007: p. 19). There is a growing tendency of connecting the prospects of the social reality research with the shift of sociology towards the cultural representation of people’s coexistence that would change the focus from the notion of progress to the chances and risks of subjects, including new collective actors, in the unpredictable world (Бек, 2001).

Towards the Art

Finally, a new perspective for sociology and humanities is being constituted on the freedom pole of methodological emancipation where they are getting rid of the excessive control on the part of tradition. The image of art looms on their horizon, the image attractive for anyone who deals with or creates texts; the image revealed in various contexts and the one that is creeping up on sociology from everywhere. And not only the humanitarians, who found themselves “on the brink of confusion”, feel the magnetism of this eternal “attractor” (Michel Houellebecq) – that had been easily predictable if you consider their methodological misery. However, the same thing is reported by the respectable sociology and other humanities. Talking about the renovation of the social sciences initial project as a whole and sociology in particular, Lauren Thévenot suggests recalling the ancient meaning of the word “science”, which used to be close to the instrumentally oriented *art* of interaction (Теевен, 2004). Nikolay Koposov believes the social sciences crisis could be overcome by means of moving them towards “free arts”, meaning the transformation of universities-supermarkets into colleges of liberal education having their terminological origin in the “seven free arts” (*septem artes liberales*) and better meeting the pedagogical requirements of the global post-industrial society (Копосов, 2005: pp. 234–239). In essence, Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht is of the same opinion, when he explains why humanities should better prefer being “Humanities and Arts” and calls on them to do away with the “icy hug of science” (Гумбрехт, 2006). They both see “Humanities and Arts” as a “space providing opportunities for risky thinking”, the thinking oriented towards imagination and intuition. The thinking free of routine needs of practicality and thus capable of performing its main function: to broaden and develop individual minds, while leaving societies and institutions open for changes (Гумбрехт, 2006). The project does not seek to dismantle the
models; there is just no need of permanent keeping them in mind as the criteria of the intellectual search validity. Art does not deal with the general and the universal, as well as with the standard and the lawful. It is oriented towards the inconspicuous, original and subtle; its aim is not the truth but the details, seen for the first time or presented differently, an unexpected view capable of changing our attitude to something that seems to be evident. The sociology and art association provides not only for the professionalism and desirable perfection of efforts, but also for upgrading the humanitarian and social significance of the subtle, accidental and unstable to the levels much higher than they used to be at in social sciences. These details fill the human life but cannot be reliably registered by “scientific operators”, because the latter are programmed for the norm on the peak of its uninterrupted functioning or at the moment of its final decline.

While its paradigm and descriptive sources come to exhaustion, sociology feels a strong attraction to the risky thinking and ingenuous literary style. However, the price is high. The outcome of “expressive or aesthetic” version, where it is acceptable, is academic condescension, though the author’s literary gift (the source of his or her success) is not regarded as analytical power, but as an “ability to catch Zeitgeist”, even if it is “opportunistic” (Goldthorpe, 2004: p. 98). The failure of practices, like the new historicism in Russia (Эткинд, 2001), negatively perceived by the orthodox sociological criticism (Гудков, Дубин, 2001), as well as the perception of the original trend (i.e. the new historicism) in modern American historiography that was not accepted even by “methodological liberals” because of its high claims for the writing aimed constructively at the “creation of history”; they also criticized its excessive metaphoric character that prevented historical reality from representing itself (Хапаева, 2005; Гумбрехт, 2006: pp. 469–475). Fiascos of such practices remove the project of “sociology as an art” to the field of the possible.

Moreover, on the market of intellectual pleasures, sociology would hardly outrun the monopoly of literature – a legitimate storyteller. Fiction has no taboo of “extreme subjectivity”; it has always managed to describe phenomena and engagements of any actors, including those characterized by social senses or related to social discourses, and it does it with more sincerity. Acknowledged literature (for example, professionally awarded) does not keep away or withdraw from the issues of people’s coexistence, their wish or unwillingness to live together; this aspect brings the storytellers closer to the humanitarians seeking “a chance for a new way to be humane” in the uncertain world (Gianni Vattimo). There is no need to label any of the modern writers as “social storytellers” and simplify their tasks. However, we have serious grounds for “Michel Houellebecq’s sociology” or “Katzuo Ishiguro sociology” as those storytellers are capable of competing with the research in sociology, culturology, anthropology and linguistics. For example, Houellebecq’s (Grand Prix, Interallié, a number of other awards) distinctive features are not limited to the accurate descriptions of an average European’s day-to-day life, his/her shrill loneliness in the phantasmagoria of circumstances and the last hope for “the island opportunities”, charm and farce of the “new social movements” or the inability of
the global communications society to communicate (Уэльбек, 2003; Уэльбек, 2006). His reflections on intellectual climate of French, as well as the European environment in general, are full of sad irony about the uselessness of the “scientific” cognition of social links and “social communities’ ontology” – the notions they try to substitute for the understanding and explanation of human problems and people’s solidarity. As a scholar-character puts it in one of Houellebecq’s stories, in hetetic ontology, particles are indiscernible; in characterizing them, one should confine himself or herself to the aspect of their observable “quantity”. The only entities capable to be distinguished and defined in this ontology are the wave functions and the vectors of state determined by means of these functions — hence, there is an analogous possibility to restore the meaning of the notions of fraternity, sympathy and love (Исигуру, 2006: p. 389). Contrariwise, Ishiguro (the Man Booker and other awards), devoid of irony, in the classic manner of an English novel, systematically and leisurely tells how the incredible in the pseudocultural disguise (the mass production of human clones for medical purposes) brings forward the new social inequalities and exclusions with the habitual and effective mechanisms of their reproduction and the old paradoxes of progress. “A lot of new opportunities have suddenly sprung up; many hopeless diseases became curable. That was the first thing that the world saw, the first thing it wanted to see… Yes, there were some doubts. However, by the time the people started worrying about the alumni, by the time they got interested in the conditions you are brought up and whether it was worthwhile giving you a prospect to be born at all, it was already too late. There was no chance to put it into reverse. How can you demand from the world that has already accustomed to the notion of cancer curability to renounce it and go back to the old gloomy times? (Исигуру, 2006: p. 149).

The literary reminiscences of sociology bring along at least two essential reflections. First, regarding the relevance of its apparent movement towards a self-reference state, “art for art’s sake”. It does not concern just the interpretive versions and narrative practices that broaden the expressive lexicon of sociological texts. It is also related to the meticulous sterilization of abstractions, digital formats and methodological transparency. The legitimate correspondence to the discipline is still explicitly present among the requirements to the authors of the leading sociological journals, where the focus on day-to-day dilemmas, conflicts, rules, conventions, not to mention the stylistic freedom, is not particularly welcome. At the same time, the right to create extremely simplified narratives relating to the typical actions of average actors has been practically taken over by TV series and day talk shows, while their exceedingly sophisticated version is being exploited by high bélles-létrres. The contributing factors include the steady extrusion of sociological arguments to the periphery of public debates concerning the vibrating space of people’s coexistence,

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2 If, as Amitai Etzioni supposes, journals of the American Sociological Association (ASR and others) got “anonymous” essays by Max Weber, Émile Durkheim, Ferdinand Tönnies, Robert Bellah, Daniel Bell, Nathan Glazer, Herbert Hans, Charles R. Mills or any other of the most significant public sociologists, they would be “rejected” (Etzioni, 2005: p. 377).
Kostenko Natalia, Makeyev Serhiy. Place and Time of Sociology

with its vague differentiations and unstable stratification orders, as well as the growing distrust in the public sociology claims for “its better understanding of social problems” (it is not limited to the Ukrainian environment only) (Kalekin-Fishman, 2007: pp. 11-12). Discussions on the weakening of “public voice” of sociology, the vulnerability of its civil value, the controversies of “professional” and “public” social sciences are held at prestige meetings of sociologists and in columns of specialized editions³ (British Journal of Sociology, 2005). The present status quo has been instituted, among other things, due to the considerable distinction between the language of sociologists’ reports and the media social discourses, which are responsible for the establishment of the current mass consciousness orientations and explanatory patterns. However, we can’t help admitting that the “erection of the “Ebony Tower” helps sociology maintaining its ability to remain within the ‘thoughts about society’ sphere, a specific intellectual practice, unaccountable to the political and state pragmatics (Гумбрехт, 2006), whose useful effect, with luck, is transferred to the future.

The second and, to be precise, the main issue, underlying the sociology vs art opposition, is the articulation of the cultural and scientific concern about the Reality; it turned out that the literary invention can be an adequate projective method for its understanding and representation, while a rigorous research project may be limited by its poor pattern. On the other hand, impetuous constructivism can multiply the images, pretending to be real, and imply that pre-conditions of referent’s existence are doubtful, while “investments in shape” (Thévenot), conducted by adherents of scientific canons, may strengthen the idea of the sustainable interdependencies between numerous actors and structures of the modern social world. It leaves us with the permanently supported main intrigue of sociology, especially under the deficiency of conceptual and imaginative context, providing for the very opportunity of the content-related, individually and collectively significant interpretations of empirical information.

Metamorphoses of Temporality

The wish for (or the need in?) a new, different sociology seems to be justified and unquestionable. In addition to its old, not completely discredited images, sociology has to be especially sensitive to the world of people — globalizing,

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³ The discussion on “public” sociology, activated by the speech of Michael Burawoy, President of the American Sociological Association, at the annual meeting of 2004, was supported by a number of leading and regional sociological journals, like the British Journal of Sociology, in which the topic was discussed by Ulrich Beck, Craig Calhoun, John Hall and other famous sociologists (British Journal of Sociology, 2005). The talk is about possibility of sociology to take a full part in social transformations, the need of society in public sociologists, capable of appealing to the wide audience and taking a special place in “division of sociological work” (Burawoy, 2005: p. 431). However, it is inevitably connected to the rise of “populism” and provinciality of sociological practices, which do not eliminate academic superiority in social sciences. According to Ulrich Beck, to get the “public voice”, sociology has to be reconstructed; otherwise, its public and non-public forms will turn into “museum pieces” (Бек, 2001: p. 335).
mobile, vacillating, fragile, full of risks and uncertainty. We talk about gaining experience of mobile sociological description and interpreting the “new reality”, and in a more general sense – about time. It is time that we talk about, because the description of the fluid, changeable and fickle reality is perceived as metaphors of time in the first place, as convincingly emphasized by John Urry (Urry, 2000: pp. 1–20). A different question is what stylistic and compositional devices should be used to generate the texts relevant to the time. There is no conclusive and didactic answer to it so far. More so because the space dominant of the recent sociology — due to the numerous reasons, like the insistency of the global and local subject fields, the authoritative methodology of the social space within Bourdieu’s school, the cultural articulation of the present, the visual presentation of “elegant decisions” and many others — has regularly intercepted the time experience shifting the accents to stable positions and measured dynamics. However, the passion for the processes of “place production and consumption” (John Urry) by modern culture and sociology (if you take into account its orientation towards social discourses) is ever more weakening outside the temporal contexts or involvement in different time modes. It is happening because the achievement of places (statuses) is indissolubly connected with the time implications, like speed and periods of individual and collective lives. One can say that, in the cultural perspective, time gains revenge on space by turning its images into metaphors of temporality.

It is well known that the era of the Modern radically revises the concept of social time. The knowledge and sensation of its acceleration were perceptible to the specialized consciousness first and then to the mass one even back in the 19th century. In the 20th century, as Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht showed on the basis of fiction, social philosophy, historical research and, to a lesser extent, on sociology (Niklas Luhmann), the idea of historical time succession was revised in an equally fundamental manner. In the suddenly broadened present — the world of simultaneity — the sequence of the temporal modi has been curtailed, taken away, it became indifferent. The past does not determine the present, the latter is not a reason for the future: the reasons are either absent or it is impossible to see the means for their identification. Only an active subject renews the time links by differentiating their modi and setting them in a settled order (Гумбрехт, 2005: pp. 475–477). In the available language spaces of scientific communities, a story of “presentism” triumph — the new experience of time — has been described by Dina Khapaeva (Хапаева, 2005: pp. 194–219). What fiction had delicately and subtly narrated by the middle of the last century, by the end of it had turned into a “collective wisdom” of social sciences scholars, into the issue that could not be repeated without a slight confusion.

The simple paradox of the present relates to its seemingly short duration and transiency. It is usually viewed as a compact, easily crossable bridge between the past and the future, while for an individual it is ever lasting, because at each moment of their life they physically exist in the present, “here and now”, in all its materiality, with all possible eventualities and effects. And it is here that the
most significant (for an individual) events take place. Facts and details of an individual’s life slide back from the present into the quite ambiguous “past”. While beginning their work, sociologists find their objects — individuals — in their continuous “today”. It is—as the leaders of scientific opinion make us see it and understand—“wide”, because “the present” seems to have kind of colonized the past and the future. Simultaneously it is a “reducing present” (German Lübbe) — being under a rapid delegitimization of the previous individual and collective experience because of the thickening of innovations and their competition (Люббе, 1994). However, behind the simplicity of the paradox, one can see a real complexity of what is described as a “wide but simultaneously reducing present”, i.e. its layer composition where the layers do not very well fit each other and are hard to imagine and characterize. That is why the following scenarios are nothing more than mere approximations – the non-exhaustive, inconclusive descriptions of the structuring of the present, mediated by the actors’ perception.

In the Ukrainian sociology, special research on time has been rare. It is also difficult to find a genre corresponding to the descriptions and representations of the continuous, imminent and escaping reality incarnating the time flow. However, there have been some approaches towards the issue. Recently, Irina Popova presented her book “1989–1991. Diagnosis of Time (Odesa Inhabitants about Themselves and Changes in Society)”, identifying its genre as “historic and sociological essays” (Попова, 2006). The book’s allusions relate to those aspects of sociology’s status, its heuristic and “ontological” suppositions, ambitions, possibilities and limits, which were revealed in the debates at the last two congresses of the International Sociological Association and in the mentioned publications.

The indication to the historical and sociological architectonics of the book, when the chronotopos vector — year by year — determines the order of sociological evidence presentation, turns out to be also an indication to a special speech situation for two voices, constructed by the author for herself. One voice is a collective one, comprising the author herself and her carefully cited colleagues, represented by the materials for Odesa periodicals and reports on public opinion surveys of the corresponding period. The second voice is the author’s one from the present, from the middle of the first decade of the new century, with the assessments of the previous assessments of the situations and the assessors: a motivated aspiration to reinterpret what was commented once – a legitimate method, though not customary in our country. The two voices separated by fifteen years. Thus, the readers are offered the diagnoses of the time that used to be “the present” first, i.e. at the moment ultimately close to the survey completion. Simultaneously, they are the diagnoses of the time that became a distant “past”, quite different from “the future”, or to be more exact – “the new present”, where the expert is situated in the first decade of the next century. It is the difference of times that truly or only imaginary brings the heuristic horizon nearer. Through the eyeglass of this difference, the chronotopos locality determined as the “old present” or “past” is characterized as the “crisis of perestroika” (Попова, 2006: p. 11), its “evening”.
The nuance is not only in the fact that the direct participants cannot know that the “evening” of the event has already come: one has a chance for periodization only in the future, after the event is over. This chance is given because only one of the supposed scenarios happens to be realized. In “the new present” sociologists have the improved knowledge, as if having gained a “new sight”. In this way, we have an indication to the principle, practically never mentioned or discussed in sociology: although the continuous actual temporality is socially structured, the identification of the structure components is extremely difficult or even impossible.

In the fact that sociologists either deliberately or automatically ignore self-reflection, i.e. the attempt to find out the perception and explanation schemes underlying our thoughts and texts, when an observer is within the time of the situation and when he\she is beyond it, i.e. when he/she is within another situation or some other experience — one can discern a number of reasons, vague and impossible for convincing specification. To talk about them, we need to appeal to the time notion.

Approximation I. Models of Temporal Modes

French historians, to whom the substantive essay by François Hartog is partially devoted (Артог, 2007), are acknowledged masters of “time work”, and they have succeeded in the identification of time heterogeneity (multidimensionality) more than any other social and humanitarian researchers.

4 Apart from the work by the authors from Kyiv, mentioned in the book (Головаха, Панина, Чурилов, 1992), others can be mentioned (Политическая культура населения Украины. Результаты социологических исследований, 1993), the archives of sociologists from Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Lviv surely include numerous reports, certificates and clips from publications in the local newspapers. However, all those who wrote about that time at that moment (our list is, of course, not complete), seem to leave that heritage for future historians of Ukrainian sociology: their chance for gaining factuality has not been lost yet, while the corresponding publications have already formed an archive, available for them. The similar situation is in Russia. Recently the “New Literary Review” journal (Novoye Literaturnoye Obozreniye) presented a collective work by historians, literary critics, sociologists and philosophers about 1990 (Новое литературное обозрение, 2007) — the project of maximally full reconstruction of events and corresponding mass and individual experiences, inspired by the realized effort by Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht to create, in structures and images, the left behind world of conditions, actions and emotions (Гумбрехт, 2005). However, Aleksey Levinson and Boris Dubin (Yuri Levada Analytical Center) appeal exclusively to the information collected by VTsIOM (All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion); this might be because the project developers were asked to recreate the situation rather than reinterpret the data gained in that time. Poly-disciplinary talk about the “long” 1970-ies was supported by the journal “Reserve Fund” (Неприкосновенный запас); it confirmed and affirmed mutually complementary differences between those two kinds of experience, sources of which are direct and alienated feelings, knowledge and understanding (Неприкосновенный запас, 2007).
A model — simultaneously a pattern and an example how such work can be done — was suggested by Fernand Braudel (Бродель, 2002—2004).

According to him, a historian has three models of temporality at his/her disposal. First, it is a short time or an event time of what is happening. The events do not root in the present; they are inevitably replaced by other events that follow them. The short time looks like a kaleidoscope of events, some configurations of which are fixed by historians, although their mutual or separate logics can rarely be reconstructed. Essentially, it is a political time, “a patter of political history”; professionals try to listen to it but keep wondering about its weak coherence. Initially, according to its original meaning, history used to be a narration and knowledge about events (Козелек, 2004). Second, time is relative concerning the prolonged cycles and changes. In it, events follow in a clear sequence with its beginning and end (cycle) or they are characterized by a broken vector of transformations. This time is based on a mid-duration situational order, but it is not a decades-long project. Fernand Braudel labelled a historian’s narration about it as a “recitative of conjuncture”. Third, there is a slow time, “slow history on the brink of an invisible flow”, where we can see the basic structures, which fragmentize the space of people’s coexistence and ensure succession of experience and culture. Nations, peoples and civilizations are agents of the slow time (“big history”), and they are the subject of a historian research as well.

Analogy is not the best interpretative technique but it is justified as the first step to start a discussion. Thus, beyond doubt, the wide present is not socially homogeneous. However, we should take into account something more than its obvious heterogeneity, like occupational differentiation (work, study, leisure etc.), being in the permanent focus of sociology. The factuality of the present is (otherwise it would be impossible even to imagine it) in its temporal multi-component structure that was pointed at by Fernand Braudel, though meaning the historical time in general. There we can see all those time flows, characterized by their mutually varying rhythms of presence, constituting the temporal plurality of the present, its simplest mental card. However, the answer to the question concerning the “position” in temporality lacks definiteness. An individual (a respondent and a sociologist himself) stays in all three times simultaneously: in a “hot” flow of events, in a relatively “cool” flow of cycles and in a hardly perceptible flow of “slow” time. The individual’s taste and ability to localize himself/herself in the temporal plurality of the present becomes an organic component of his/her social competence and of the researcher’s professional competence.

The ever accelerating “event time” is not a token but a full-fledged representation of the modern unsteady and changing world arrangement. The advent of technological and cultural innovations is steady and ever more frequent; it accelerates the substitution of occurrences and facts in the “event time”, but the window of opportunities for a further acceleration is still open. The nearest consequence is that the “event time” becomes thinner, is unable to supply its own fractions and fragments for the formation of trends in the “cycle time”: the rapid flow of “event time” slides along it leaving no trace, capturing, with an
unexpected result, the world of individuals’ feelings and desires. The supposition that individuals possess an intrinsic desire to cognize the environment or that they take a hidden pleasure in finding out what is going on becomes more and more difficult to justify and prove empirically. Referentiality is no more than an element of a verbal game of “designation and labelling” — anything can be said about the thinning “event time”. No “history” is born in it to continue and develop. It does not matter where to go: the paths are not paved or lead anywhere.

The 1989–1991 diagnosis book starts with the chapter “Events of the Perestroika Period”, thus clearly indicating the temporal modality of the then present that became the nearly forgotten past. It certainly was not the author’s intent; she just had to remind the reader what had happened within the diagnosed period. After that, we can understand what the people questioned by Odesa sociologists reacted to. As to the perspective of the discussed temporal mode, the way how they reacted turns out to be extremely symptomatic. In the quoted statements of the respondents, people keep saying that “nothing is happening”, “perestroika is a TV show”, “all talk and no action” — so the refrain goes in the commentaries to the questionnaire answers (Попова, 2006: pp. 45–47). The respondents directly talk about the “non-tactual” nature of events, doubting their very credibility even more than complaining about their being beyond the people’s immediate experience. The events look light, ephemeral, traceless and they do not bring about other events. The thinned “event time” turns into unauthentic time.

Unauthentic time has nothing to share with the “cycle time”, nothing to yield and nothing to turn into a tradition. Having no new notions, in our social and cultural space the cycle time is also being emptied due to the accelerated annihilation of the recent past ideological images, like socialism being a step to communism or developed socialism as a stage of socialism in general. Perestroika itself pretended for the “cycle” status in the evolution of socialism. The cycle time keeps losing its subject and content, turning into an empty shell, whose uselessness is realized even individually. The new generations have nothing to correlate the biological life cycles with. Youth, maturity, old age can hardly be correlated with the society evolution cycles: within the cycle time, the social is substituted by the individual and biographical, weakening the feeling of belonging to what is habitually called “society”.

The thickened big time — “historical time” — remains a receptacle of archetypes and types, facts and artefacts of the collective memory, ways and criteria of the national and cultural identity formation, and many other things (there is no national idea there but we can endeavour intellectual search for it). In the national evolution process, the authority and reputation of historical time are provided for by the materialization, in the form of institutional structures (e.g. a national state) and a specific way of life. A sequence of republics, reichs, rzeczpospolitas partially fills the cycle time, and proves the vitality of mental orientations and sociocultural practices, as well as the lack of ruptures in various kinds of temporality — the thing that people used to regard as a history of a people
or a nation. Against the background of continuity, the changeability partially neutralizes — probably, less and less convincingly — the growing doubts concerning the reliability of tradition at the current stage of globalization. As for the many post-Soviet countries, where the history time, bypassing the cycle time, has been transferred directly into the event time, the situation format is merely unprecedented. To be more exact, the actors’ performance opens doors for the transfers, filling people’s life with big time of the total history, like it could be observed in the autumn and winter of 2004 in Ukraine.

**Approximation II. The Present: Boring, Desired, Unidentifiable**

In the history mode, which was substantiated by the New Time, and which clearly exhausted itself in the past century, enlightenment and illumination come from the future (François Hartog). The exhaustion happened because the mode’s intrinsic potential of unexpectedness (unpredictability) turned out to be significantly higher than even the most capable futurologists had ever foreseen. The future of ideologists, as an alternative to the current state of society and as a supplier of concepts for the interpretation of the present, has been radically cancelled by the flow of events. However, the unrealized “trend” future predicted by the Club-of-Rome-oriented forecasters just corroborates the fact that the tendencies of the past do not commit the future to anything. What is destined to happen, has become unavailable for the observation, inviting to pause and think in the face of a genuine or just imaginary non-conditionality of human deeds and uncertainty of human achievements and results.

Sociology, apart from its Marxist version, is not affected by it though. However, the frequent statements on its weak relevance to society mean that traditional explanatory perspectives — structural, cultural and action-related — do not cover anything significant, while sociological narratives on the human world become less and less representative. It is evident that the fragmentation of the factors, which provide orientation, or are capable of orienting the individuals’ behaviour, is finer than the discipline’s dictionary fragmentation. In other words, the tuning of sociological optical instruments requires its readjustment at the beyond-individual level. The departure point here is the individual’s relations with himself/herself, while his/her relations with the world go next – that would help to avoid displaying distrust towards the traditional heuristic and conceptual settings. Existence in the temporal modalities of the present provides for such point. We certainly do not suggest reanimating the microsociological perspective or individualistic (Weber’s) approach; the idea concerns the deliberate distancing from the structural, value- and action-oriented arguments in the description and interpretation of the world of people, the passage into another space of terminological and imaginative probabilities.

The accelerating event time is a clear symptom of life intensification, while the calls for intensity are getting persistent and loud. To be dynamic, mobile, flexible and
renewable (the demand “to be younger”) means to correspond to the time, to be socially adequate. However, there is an opposite side of life in the world of the intensive event time, as Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht described it in one of his latest books, – exhaustion and an acute desire for a moment of rest (Гумбрехт, 2006: pp. 134–151).

Apart from intensity, exhaustion has other sources. The growing concentration of innovations and the speed of their generation significantly broaden the limits of the new, but also those of the unidentifiable. TV programs explaining “How it’s Made” or “How it Works” do not help much because the principles of devices and mechanisms’ operation get ever harder to explain. The practical application of many things has been separated from the understanding of their production technology; it forms a “new unawareness” if not a “new ignorance”. As a result, the world of objects (“the present of things”) together with the “world of knowledge” are no more common for all of us, they are not subdivided by generations, but the new subdivision is much more partitioned; it is next to impossible to determine who can and who cannot be regarded as contemporaries. There is no empirical evidence whether people realize the growing scale of the unidentifiable, what their emotional and behavioural reactions to this process are, how the unidentifiable is distributed among the various social categories, strata and groups. In the absence of such evidence, the idea concerning the differentiation of this temporal modality has the status of a tempting supposition.

However, the volatility and fleetingness of the event time, together with the aggressive promotion of the shining and well-groomed in advertising, postulate the nearly dominant prevalence of the unattractive and plain, as well as the miserable and repulsive. All that serves as a conclusive feature of the “dehumanized time”, and it was labelled by this very name in the title of an earlier book by Jean-François Lyotard (Lyotard, 1991). Common human values and aims were excluded from the event time, while it is being overwhelmingly captured by objectification. As to the state and feeling of disorientation, characteristic of time and individuals, it seems to be José Ortega y Gasset, who discussed this issue at length. His essay “Theme of Our Time” (El tema de nuestro tiempo), though written over fifty years ago, looks like a sociological description of the current situation. In particular, it runs, “Imagine for a minute such a shift, when the great aims, which yesterday provided for the clear architectonics of our space, have lost their clarity, attractiveness and power over us, though the thing, which is going to replace them, has not yet assumed the required obviousness and persuasiveness. At such time, the environment seems broken, unsteady and swaying around the individual, whose steps become uncertain because the reference points have been shaken and blurred. The very path, as if it were slipping under your feet, acquires a tricky vagueness... The western individual has fallen ill with a strongly pronounced disorientation, and does not know what stars to believe in” (Ортега-и-Гасет, 1991: p. 264).

There is less and less confidence that retreating beyond the horizon of the vitally important values and aims attainability is only temporary. Nothing has turned up or come to substitute them: in the past decades, people seem to get used to the uncertainty and society as a whole has learned to live in the time without
reference points and gained the necessary experience. What was thought of as an annoying deviation (or ‘pathology’ in Emile Durkheim’s words), turned into a norm. The periods that lost their attractiveness and grew boring, became shorter. Assessment of the event time by people or experts is often nothing more than a manifestation of the boring. For example, early elections to legislative bodies turned into routine practice, whose legitimate normality is not contested. However, the dynamics of the boring in the form of claims or ultimatums emphasizes the great value of the desirable, despite all the vagueness behind the idea about it. Having no object or concept, the desirable and the smouldering anguish for something different do not leave the event time, while the tension between the desirable and the boring results in either rhetorical figures or practical actions.

Described in the Odesa book from the simultaneous and post-factum points of view, perestroika turned out to be the factor that destabilized the temporality models coherence. Thus, it suggested a possibility of a different time and a different (within the possible range of alternatives) set of conditions and circumstances of coexistence. Perestroika made an equally grandiose claim for the eventuality of transition from one kind of event time to a substantially different one — from the boring to the desirable. Temporality, which had to be overcome now, was reclassified as a fruitless and sham time; it started to be regarded as a receptacle of abortive social and political projects that had been started but not completed, or those that had never been even commenced. Apart from everything else, the strategy is to ensure that the power gave people access to the desirable in a short-term or a long-term perspective by mobilizing the collective and individual hopes in accordance with its own explicit or implicit wishes and intentions. Naturally, the promulgated program of actions is always accompanied by the publicly formulated fears that the inertia of the current event time will not yield to the transformation efforts aimed at the transition to a “new” event time. Alternatively, it will not yield to such efforts. And here the temporal expectations of the power and the people inevitably go apart: to admit the domination of unintentional outcomes of the political elites’ actions or omission would mean to admit the politicians’ professional incompetence, to reduce the scope of the political and to take steps towards the “end of politics” in general.

Assessing the year 1990, the Russian colleagues talk about the “shock of irrevocability” (Гусейнов, 2007), i.e. the immediately perceived feeling and understanding that the old value structure has been discredited; it should not and cannot be restored. At the same time, the source of the shock may as well include the widespread doubts concerning the current time fruitfulness. Many people did not regard the perestroika events as authentic, so the desirable, as a whole or partially, seems equally unattainable in this case either. Inseparable from the period of social transformations, nostalgia reveals itself as a symbolic return, when the valuable and the respected is taken over from the desirable but inaccessible future to the “old present”, the event time left behind.

The feeling that the event time relocations are irrevocable, together with the intuitive, imaginative or conceptual understanding of the diminishing chances
to reach the desirable, create the focus of the individual and group presence in the “cycle time”. It cannot be excluded that this is the time of steady and hardly eliminable discord between the declared aims, plans and technologies for their achievement, as well as the results of their implementation. It equally concerns sociological practices.

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Hard times, like the easy ones, inevitably pass. It may happen in accordance with the spiritual verses from the “Notes and Extractions” by Mikhail Gasparov: “So evil time is now, evil time that has remained. Morrow, it’ll be more evil, and more evil it’ll remain” (Гаспаров, 2001: p. 117). We have to wait and see what time comes for sociology.

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1.3

VALUE FIELD OF A PERSON AS THE MANIFESTATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL CONSCIOUSNESS AMBIVALENCE *

Lyudmila Sokuryanska (Kharkiv)

The article presents the main principles of the mini-theory of the “individual’s value field”, developed by the author on the basis of the analysis and interpretation of the results of qualitative researches conducted among Ukrainian students of the period of independence. It is underlined that the value ambivalence of the modern personality actualizes the development of field characteristics of the consciousness, e.g. entropy, non-coordination, unstructuredness, the inconsistency of axiophenomena, that are acquired by a person. This publication argues that in case of absence of the inner personal axiocrisis the ambivalent condition of the individual’s value consciousness enhances person’s adaptive capacities, activates creative abilities, innovative potential and other phenomena of social subjectness.

Keywords: values, value orientations, personal value field, individual consciousness ambivalence.

United changes occurring in the post-soviet states (as well as from a
global perspective), as a rule, are associated with cardinal political and economic
transformations. However, no change can radically transform the society, until
the values of the people living in it undergo changes.

The priority of individual values (by contrast to group, societal, so-called
universal) is determined by the fact that they (the values of different individuals)
in their entirety predetermine the values of society as a whole. Of course, this
statement may draw objections, because the personality forms its own value
discourse on the basis of the value system of the society. Definitely, this is true,
but this system cannot be internalized by a person if it does not correspond to his
ideas about the importance of certain objects, including ideal ones, for his own life.
It is the person who acts as an agent of values and value orientations. Reasoning
upon values in isolation from a person, in our opinion, makes no sense. On the
other hand, the aforementioned axiophenomena denote the mode of existence of
a person, being a kind of person’s “calling card”.

The importance and ongoing significance of the scientific analysis of the social
microcosm and the value world of the individual in particular, to our opinion are
attributable to the fact that it is the world of values and value orientations of a particular
person which is the sphere of actualization of the culture of the society in which he lives.

Unlike traditional society, the value system of which has been steady for
many centuries, present-day society (especially under the current conditions
of its transformation, owing also to post-modernization) is characterized by
fundamental instability and polyvalence of values and value orientations at all
social levels: from personal to societal ones.

The regional, national and international studies conducted by us reveal the
paradoxes of youth, in particular, student consciousness, that now demonstrates

1 It is referred to such studies as “The formation of the qualities of a specialist in the 21st century in
the university” (1995-1997, 1652 the students of Kharkov universities were interviewed, the sample
size is representative) “Contemporary universities as centers for the formation of the intellectual
elite of society” (2000-2001, the sample size is 1810 respondents), “Higher School as a subject of
socio-cultural transformation” (2002-2004, conducted in universities of Ukraine and Belarus, sample
size - 2953 respondents, Belarus - 981, Ukraine - 1972), research “Higher education as a factor of
sociostructural changes: a comparative analysis of post-communist transformations” (2005-2007,
the sample size is 3057 students of 31 Ukrainian high schools, non-representative sample - 780
students of 13 Higher Educational Institutions of Belarus, and 587 students of 8 Russian Higher
Institutions). All the studies use both quantitative and qualitative methods, within each of them
about 200 biographies of students were collected, and from 5 to 10 focus group interviews were
held with students and their parents.
Sokuryanska Lyudmila. Value field of a person as the manifestation of the individual consciousness ambivalence

seemingly incompatible value phenomena: democratic aspiration along with the fixation on a “firm hand”, the establishment of an order in the society; strongly-pronounced promarket sentiments and statements concerning the necessity of public control over the economy, etc. The hypotheses formulated by us in this connection explain this ambivalence by the existence of youth (student) communities, the value discourse of which differs substantially. And, indeed, the cluster analysis of quantitative data has largely confirmed these hypotheses: “traditionalists”, “modernists” and “postmodernists” are characterized by a fundamentally different value system, and this, in fact, constitutes the basis of the given typology.

However, applying qualitative methodology, in particular, analyzing student biographies and materials of focus group interviews, we came to the conclusion that the value “confrontation” occurs not only at the intergroup, but also at the intrapersonal level.

The purpose of this publication is to analyze the individual’s consciousness value ambivalence factor dependence, as well as outline the main points of the mini-theory of the individual’s value field developed by us.

The analysis of the qualitative information acquired by us shows that value ambivalence as an individual characteristic is manifested in the political and economic values and value orientations of some of our respondents with simultaneous articulation of various civilizational types of values (traditionalist, modernist, postmodern ones) etc. The same student can welcome private property and not conceive it; articulate democratic and totalitarian values; stand for individualism and collectivism; strive for independence, self-actualization and rely on the state to help solve their own problems.

In this case, the value ambivalence can be manifested not only through the simultaneous articulation of alternative value orientations, but also ‘within’ one and the same orientation, where certain components of this orientation “compete for primacy” in its hierarchical structure or the same significance is ascribed to a particular value in the function of both an instrument and goal (for example, the value of freedom and the value of education). However, the latter is not an exception so much as a norm of value consciousness, since the terminal and instrumental discourse of certain values (including those mentioned above) hardly testifies to the internal “antagonism” of these axiophenomena.

Where does this inconsistency arise from, what are the external and internal determinants of the individual’s value ambivalence?

There is no doubt that one of the main sources of this state of individual consciousness is the anomic state of Ukrainian society. The loss of the foregone system of social values, caused by the transition from totalitarian to democratic society, the “demise of ideologies”, on the one hand, and the absence of a new “ideological project”, on the other hand; the fundamental instability of the

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2 As was already emphasized, about 800 biographies of future specialists and 26 focus group interviews with students and their parents were obtained during studies conducted among Ukrainian students in 1995-2006.
emerging system of values and norms, the differentiation of the latter, which, among other things, is determined by the absence of the unified vision of social reality in its past, present and future, and many other objective factors account for the duality and inconsistency of values and value orientations of the post-soviet person. The local context of value transformations associated with the marginal state of Ukrainian society is supplemented by a global axioshift from traditionalist to modernist and postmodernist values (see the works of R. Inglehart, P. Ambranson, and others: (Abramson, Inglehart, 1992; Інглхарт, 1997)), which undoubtedly significantly widens the choice of the individual possible life guidances. When socializing in the conditions of “permanent transformation of meanings” (S. Makeev), a person often internalizes opposing, conflicting values. This is because, unlike a stable society in which an individual, as a rule, used one “generalized other” as a reference, today, under the conditions of socio-cultural transformation, a person looks to not only different but also “alternative” generalized others.

Since socialization is not only the internalization of certain norms and values, but also the acquisition of a particular system of social roles and the corresponding social positions, multiple social positioning plays a pivotal role in actualizing the ambivalence of the value consciousness of a contemporary person, which as well generates “multiple reality”, by which A. Schütz understood the totality of interpretations structuring the social world of subjective experiences, which produce a state of a special “here-and-now” (Schutz, 1953; Schutz, 1967: p. 207). A special “here-and-now” manifests itself under the domestic conditions, in our opinion, primarily in the multiplicity of the ever-changing, “fluid” “here”. Stating it this way, we refer, in particular, to the phenomenon, that S. Makeev designated by such a notion as “the mobility of the structure”. In its interpretation the scientist stresses that under the condition of transformation the relationship between positions and statuses, on the one hand, and those expectations and demands applied to them, on the other hand, that is, the relationship between structure and meaning, becomes problematic, unstable, as both structure and values undergo significant changes (Макеев, Прибыткова, Симончук и др., 1999).

This “incomprehensibility” and “indeterminacy” of the structure of positions as an important characteristic of the current stage of socio-cultural transformation in our country, combined with the multiple positioning of the contemporary personality, with its identification searching provokes, as we believe, the value ambivalence of personality. Today, a person, in particular and primarily, young one, can simultaneously belong to different social networks, and his being within one of them takes turns to being within different one, or even immediately within all of them. Perhaps, this is most clearly manifested in the student environment. One can solely study and be a student; one may both study and work and as well as be a student; one may practically not study, but work and be a student; finally, one may neither study nor work, and also be a student (or, in any case, consider oneself as such one). The phenomenon of a working student is becoming more widespread today. Furthermore, our studies
and personal observations show that during the academic year one student can repeatedly change jobs or occupy several of them at the same time. Such mobility significantly increases the number of positions assumed by today’s students of universities. Each of these positions (social roles) can require of an individual not only relevant expertise, knowledge and skills, but also an actualization of a specific system of values and value orientations.

Beyond that, quite a number of the contemporary students simultaneously belong to several (sometimes a number of) subcultural groups, associations. In this case, some of these groups may have common value bases, but others may not only seriously differ, but also come into conflict. Nevertheless, when entering such groups, identifying himself with them, an individual accepts the values (sometimes alternative) of these associations, which predetermines the ambivalence of his consciousness.

Thus, the anomic state of Ukrainian society, the transformation of values both in the post-soviet space and the global context, as well as significant changes in the socialization environment, its factor dependence and nature (by which the increasing subjectness of the socializing individual is meant) are the most important objective determinants of the value ambivalence of the contemporary personality.

Analyzing the causes of the civil and political values ambivalence, E. I. Golovakha states that it is actualized because of such an objective reason as the contradiction between two cultures: the emerging democratic culture in our society and the culture of totalitarianism so firmly entrenched in it. “The consciousness of the ambivalent personality of the transition period,” he writes, “reflects the contemporary nature of the opposition of the two cultures, their uncompromising antagonism alongside with the interrelation and convergence...” (Головаха, 1992: p. 110).

In our opinion, not only the contradictory unity of the totalitarian and democratic culture, but also the convergence of the axiophenomena of the domestic and western cultures in general contributes to the development of the contemporary person’s life practices polystylization process. As its consequence, the axiological ambivalence (the acceptance of values of conflicting cultures), in addition, appears to be determined by such a subjective phenomenon as the consciousness individuation and everyday practices of an individual. The process of individuation manifests itself primarily in the life styles pluralization, including consumption patterns; in the selective attitude of a person to the values offered by society in general or by the people closest to him; in the actualization of various innovative options for life creation as the realization of a “choice biography” (U. Beck). This means that norms and values, opinions and attitudes become a matter of personal choice of a person who increasingly feels free from the traditions or group affiliation, independent in his decisions and actions.

Describing individuation in the contemporary society, W. Beck emphasizes its ambivalence. From his point of view, the individuation phenomenon is accompanied by standardization obtruded upon a person by the market conditions, media, advertising, fashion in various society’s life spheres, etc. (Бек, 2000). In our opinion, this particular standardization, the stereotypy of individual
consciousness, on the one hand, and its selectivity, innovativeness, on the other hand, provoke a dual, ambivalent nature of values and value orientations of the contemporary personality.

Thus, the constantly changing social field, the growing rates of socio-cultural conditions transformation of the person’s socialization and resocialization actualize a different type of social and individual development, including a different, new combination of cultural values, at both societal and personal levels, a combination, which brings, it would seem, incongruous things together. The resulting “value mosaic” can hardly lay claim to its components, practically unrelated to each other, being called a system. We consider the use of this concept - a system of values – to be incorrect in relation to society as a whole, to a social group, but above all in relation to a contemporary person, especially young one. This is due to the fact that a system usually means an ordered unity, integrity, the elements of which are closely interrelated, being mutually dependent and conditioned.

As the analysis of qualitative information shows, in particular, obtained through the use of the biographical method, the most important characteristics of the future person’s value consciousness are alternativeness, entropy, unstructuredness, inconsistency, simultaneous presence of different types of values and value orientations, etc. All of this has conditioned our focusing on the notion of “value field”. By suggesting this concept, we believe that it can be used in the context of the axiological analysis of both society as a whole and various social groups, in particular, student community. However, in the first place, in our opinion, the heuristic potential of the concept “value field” is revealed by studying the axiodiscourse of an individual.

So, let us try to explain why the combination of values and value orientations of a contemporary person is most appropriately designated by such a notion as a “value field”. We emphasize that, referring to this concept, we, first of all, proceeded from the fact that the phenomenon of a person is manifested not only in his corporeity, but primarily in an unlimited field of consciousness. It is this vastness of the space (or field) of human consciousness that allows a person to project all possible value phenomena on it, including, as emphasized above, the alternative ones. At the same time, the totality of such axiophenomena, by virtue of their inconsistency, does not form a “rigid” value system, but constitutes, in our opinion, a unique, if we may say so, “atomized” combination of values and value orientations.

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3 Within the given context we should note that the concept of “field” in the contemporary sociology or, as P. Sztompka puts it, “the image of the field” is used quite intensively. However, most often it is referred to a social field. Let us recall the works of P. Bourdieu and his making reference to such concepts as the “field of forces” (social), “the field of cultural production,” “the field of power,” etc., or the works of P. Sztompka, who views contemporary society not as a rigid, “a firm system” but rather as a “soft” field of relationships, “... “interpersonal field” (Штомпка, 1996: p. 27), being in the state of the constant movement, change, as a “dynamic social field” (Штомпка, 1996: p. 26). The use of the concept of “field” in relation to a certain individual is much less common. For example, N.K. Serov talks about the field structures of personality, “drawing a parallel between similar contemporary terms and such ancient concepts as “soul”, “spirit” (Немировский, 1991: p. 11).
Sokuryanska Lyudmila. Value field of a person as the manifestation of the individual consciousness ambivalence

orientations. Stating it this way, we are far from denying a certain value “order”, a hierarchy of values that forms up due to the fact that a person attaches a certain importance to one or another value. From our point of view, the hierarchical value systems of the individual under contemporary conditions are highly mobile entities, that is, they are not “rigid” structures. This circumstance, as well as the presence of an “atomized” combination of alternative axiophenomena in the individual’s mind, has conditioned our focusing on the concept of the “value field” of the personality, by which the “soft”, disordered structure of individual consciousness is meant, that, under contemporary conditions, is the result of the spiritual comprehending of a constantly changing, transforming society in its global and regional contexts.

We have focused above on the semantic differences of the concepts of the “value system” and the “value field” of a person. However, axiology has one more concept in its categorial number of notions the content of which, at least at the first glance, is largely consonant with the content of the “value field” concept. We refer to the notion of “value consciousness”. Nevertheless, though such concepts as “value consciousness” and “value field” of an individual have similarities, in our view, they are not identical. We consider the latter concept to be narrower, and its phenomena to be one of the characteristics of the person’s value consciousness. Having said so, we proceed from the premise that the value consciousness, as, for example, V.S. Bakirov believes, comprises, “firstly, firmly held views about the different kinds and types of phenomena significance,” that is, values. “Secondly, the value consciousness comprises views about the degree of compliance of realities with value criteria and concepts of what is right, beautiful, decent, useful, etc. These evaluative views, which differentiate all the conditions and circumstances of human life activity according to the nature and degree of their significance for gratification of needs and satisfaction of interests, turn some of them into values ...” (Бакиров, 1988: p. 9).

We emphasize that, in our opinion, due to the evaluative views in particular, among other things, certain elements of the individual value field become actualized, which we will touch upon in greater detail hereafter. So, the value field of the personality comprises not only interrelated axiophenomena, but also mutually exclusive, conflicting values and value orientations, which can lead to the dissent, i.e. the conflict of values, and, consequently, to the inner discomfort of a person. For our emotional, psychological equilibrium, as such researchers, as, for example, I. Zemnik, Y. Shchepansky, D. Pantich and others believe, among other things, depends on the consistency, orderliness of our value world. It is held that “contradictions can not sustain long in the consciousness and behavior, hence certain values, despite their relative stability, undergo changes, establishing an equilibrium and a logical structure” (Пантич, 1997: p. 25). Nevertheless, the results of our research as well as social practice show that alternative values can “peacefully coexist” in the mind of an individual without causing negative effects and provoking an intrapersonal crisis. In our opinion, this does not happen because, despite the contradictory nature of the individual value discourse, certain “stable value dominants” as axiophenomena
form a kind of a “backbone” of personality and act as a “defense mechanism” that keeps a person away from a crisis. As our research shows, for today’s students these are such private values as a family and material well-being, as well as freedom and independence in judgments and actions.

What takes place in the value field of a contemporary person, why does the antagonism of independent axiophenomena of this field not provoke a person’s discomfort, as, for example materials of our focus group interviews have shown?

Before answering these questions, we emphasize that, from our point of view, the personal value field as a new cultural dimension actualizes the process of “thinking in values” (M. Heidegger), that is, a state of human consciousness characterized not only and not so much by knowledge of the world around, which includes the processes of sociocultural changes, as by their evaluation. At the same time, as emphasized above, some evaluative views can transform into values that fill the value field of an individual. The dynamism of sociocultural transformation intensifies evaluation processes and, consequently, the transformation of new evaluative views into values that do not supplant or replace the axiophenomena previously acquired by an individual, but multiply them. This “value-added” (N. Smelser) process often actualizes the ambivalence of a person (especially young one), which may be caused, among other things, due to the influence of various agents and subjects of socialization.

However, we emphasize once again that this situation, according to the data we obtained, does not have negative consequences on the person’s life activity. On the contrary, the value ambivalence, actualizing the various elements of the individual’s vital resources, creates a kind of a “field of potencies, choices and chances” (P. Sztompka), since the alternative value groups do not confront, but complement each other in a particular situation, enriching their content that way.

As our studies have shown, a contemporary person (especially young one) most often focuses on situational values in his day-to-day practice, concentrating his attention on mundane, immediate problems. At the same time, a prompt reaction to a dynamically changing sociocultural situation is achieved owing to, among other things, the individual’s “reflexive monitoring” (E. Giddens) of own behavior and activities, as well as the situations in which they are found. As a result of such a monitoring, a person actualizes the group of values that can be taken as a basis for a new model of his adaptive behavior, different to the previous one and corresponding to the “old” sociocultural situation. Today this is primarily a model of adaptation to the uncertainty and risks. What is more, the change of models of adaptation can occur quite often, and through this process, in our opinion, the values and value orientations emerge as the elements of not only a person’s strategic choice, but also tactical one. In this respect, it seems possible to talk about two mechanisms for choosing values. Firstly, it is the individual’s focusing on objective importance of one or another value; secondly, it is awareness of the value significance of what is missing.

Whatever we say about individuation, the “privatization” of the individual’s value world, it is still quite closely associated with the values of the society as a whole. Therefore, having chosen a particular group of internalized alternative values, an individual, specifically, through his activity based on these axiophenomena,
can both accelerate and slow down, retard the processes of social transformation, modify its value discourse. However, a certain value choice of an individual is, first of all, conditioned by the desire to assure the most optimal conditions of life as well as for self-realization and self-development, to achieve the most comfortable self-awareness in the constantly changing sociocultural field. Hence, we can regard the value field of a person as both an individual and social construct.

Thus, as was emphasized above, variability, value instability, frequent changes of axiopriorities of a particular social space predetermine the value ambivalence of a person. At the same time, internalized through this process alternative values, in their turn, are actualized and applied in human activities, depending on the existing sociocultural situation. The same situation determines the transfer within that part of the value field of an individual, which maintains a certain hierarchy. If we use the definitions of Russian researchers, in particular V.Yadov and his colleagues, values can be characterized as being transferred from the “tail” to the “periphery”, from “dominant” to “nuclear” values and vice versa. However, as we have already noted, such “nuclear” values as health, family, material wealth, freedom practically do not change their position. Although, as our numerous studies show, presently some of these values (primarily a family, children, health), entering into the value ‘core’, while remaining internalized and declared, become realized not in every instance, turning, so to speak, into “deferred” values. Moreover, contemporary students, as well as all young people in general imbue almost all these values, according to the qualitative research, with the substance largely different to the meaning that the “parents” generation attached to them. Thus, the “link of times” does not disjoin, the intergenerational value continuity, in spite of everything, prevails, but the new meanings provide dynamism for even “inherited” values. Nevertheless, the presence of values, though with somewhat different meanings, shared by the “fathers” and “children” is, in our opinion, an important factor that assures the consolidating day-to-day behavior of people in the constantly changing sociocultural reality.

Let us get back to the question of the values transfer within the value field of an individual, in particular, the change in “nuclear” axiophenomena. As our research has shown, the expansion of the value “core” in the consciousness of a contemporary student is accounted for actual (often contextual) axiophenomena. Upon implementation, they return to their former positions, as we have repeatedly ascertained in the course of our research.

In this context, we emphasize that in early years the value “core” of personality (its most important values and value orientations) expands to the greatest possible extent. According to our research, many (if not most) values of today’s students become “nuclear”, consequently a more or less clear differentiation of axiophenomena into “core”, “dominant” values, the “periphery” and “tail” disappears. The latter seems to strengthen the “field” characteristics of the individual’s value consciousness, i.e. its unstructuredness, disorder, etc.

The “nuclear” position of lots of youth values stems from the fact that it is the time when their tension reaches its maximum (especially this is the case of
those values, the implementation of which will help a young person to create the foundation of his future life). Naturally, the implementation of these values, reduction of their level of tension is a long and contradictory process. Moreover, the higher the person’s ambition level, the longer the way towards achieving the desired tactical and strategic goals could be, the longer a particular value will remain tense, determining the tension of the entire individual’s value field. In one’s younger days, due to the optimism inherent with this period of a person’s life, aspiration for the future, faith in it, value tensions, as our studies have shown, including those, first and foremost, conducted with the help of qualitative methods, are perceived less sharply. However, there is a risk that the prolonged tension of the individual’s actual values can contribute to their converting into the “eternal” life-purpose ones, subordinating all other values of an individual. This situation, i.e. the continued failure to implement values, the tension of which is most deeply felt by a person, besides, can cause the depressed mood, on the one hand, and active protest behavior, on the other hand. Thus, it is not so much the presence of alternative values in the person’s value field, as problematical character of particular axiophenomena implementation that can lead to and at times causes intrapersonal conflicts, psychological discomfort of a person.

As for the person’s value ambivalence, it seems that this phenomenon largely determines the subject characteristics of an individual in the contemporary sociocultural conditions. Drawing such a conclusion, we proceed from the premise that, firstly, the actualization and implementation of certain values largely depend on the personality itself, they are initiated by it; secondly, in order to implement conflicting values, a person, in our opinion, should possess such a trait as self-transcendence, about which, in particular, P. Sztompka wrote. Denoting the desire and, most importantly, the ability of a person to go beyond the possible, everyday, ordinary to him behavior, overcoming the internal (primarily psychological) and external (social) barriers and, as a result, achieving the «impossible», self-transcendence is an important source and at the same time an indicator of the personal agency. This trait (self-transcendence), as it appears, can be developed primarily by an ambivalent person, as exactly such an individual keeps his options open to innovations, changes, tends to generating new ideas, ready for experiments in the course of realizing own life project. Of course, every person is a “producer” of own biography. But still, in our opinion, an ambivalent person (naturally, provided that there is no internal value crisis) can more successfully produce his life. This is attributable to his readiness for pluralism of opinions, attitudes, situations, and acceptance of this pluralism, in which, in fact, value ambivalence is manifested.

The next factor that predetermines, as we believe, the greater adjustment of an ambivalent individual to the socio-cultural transformation is its focusing not on the past, but the present and the future, on the actual and future social situation that may require of him articulation and implementation of a particular group of values. However, the ambivalent personality identified in our study is, in our opinion, not so much an adaptive model of the contemporary personality as the “innovative personality” (E. Hagen). For implementing certain values in
the situation of permanent socio-cultural changes, a person takes risks no matter whether he wants it or not. Risk-generating behavior encourages a person to produce what is new: new ideas, new life practices, etc., which, among other things, would reduce the uncertainty and risk.

So, the value ambivalence as a manifestation of the anti-dogmatism of man’s thinking, his keeping options open to changes in himself and the world around him, contributes to the emergence of innovative personality as a subject of the sociocultural transformation experienced by us. Stating it this way, we, naturally, realize that a contemporary ambivalent person is represented by a multitude of types. In this vein, for example, investigating this phenomenon, E. Golovakha distinguishes such types as conformal-ambivalent, mosaic-ambivalent and nihilistic-ambivalent personality (Головаха, 1992: p. 122). At the same time, he believes that “the mosaic consciousness is the most flexible and capable of accepting democratic norms in the course of the past ideological stereotypes destruction” (Головаха, 1992: p. 122). Our research has shown that the ambivalent personality of the future specialist combines the features of a conformal-ambivalent type (the acceptance of conflicting values, for example, democracy and authoritarianism) and a mosaic-ambivalent type (a combination of “elements of emerging democratic consciousness and gradually collapsing totalitarian structures” (Головаха, 1992: p. 122)). We terminated this integrative type as an innovative-ambivalent type, because both the biographies and focus group interviews showed the orientations of respondents whose value-oriented discourse demonstrates antagonistic values and innovative activities. Of course, not all contemporary students can be classified as belonging to this type. Moreover, we, rather, can and must talk about the emerging trend of becoming an innovative-ambivalent person. Nevertheless, in our opinion, it is the individual that can become competitive at the labor market today, considering that the contradictoriness of values and value orientations is a source of constant personal, in particular professional development, that contributes to the increase of human adaptability, his creative potential, and the formation of qualities of the social subjectness.

Thus, our research has shown that the “field” characteristics of the individual’s value consciousness, manifested in unstructuredness, disorder, etc., do not only provoke an intrapersonal axiocisis, a person’s discomfort, but also contribute to more complete and successful self-realization under the conditions of dramatic social changes taking place in our country.

References


This paper studies the basic metaphors in scientific worldviews of modern sociology. The author argues that a change of fundamental metaphors from the metaphor of the system to the metaphors of the network and rhizome is currently taking place in sociology. This is a reflection of the transition from the classical scientific worldview to the modern one. The metaphor of the system allows sociologists to realize that all of the processes taking place in social reality are not random; they are interlinked and must be described in the context. The metaphor of the network allows us to see the permeability of the boundaries of social groups and communities in the modern world, and in many ways challenges the idea of closedness of cultures and civilizations from one another. The metaphor of the rhizome is the least developed, it is mostly philosophical and literary than scientific metaphor. Its cognitive capability lies primarily in the idea of removing the boundaries between the inside and the outside in the analysis of both individual and mass consciousness.

*Keywords:* scientific worldview, system metaphor, network metaphor, rhizome metaphor.
Introduction into the research problem

The world view is a system of representations of reality, accepted in the culture of a particular socio-historical space. The view of the world is formed by both everyday and scientific languages and provides a basis for the perception of the world by a person as a subject of cognition. The worldview of a subject is constituted by a specific way of interpreting reality, which seems self-evident to him. This way of interpreting reality can be called the world view, dominating in the group and mass consciousness in a particular socio-cultural space.

The fundamental ontological concepts are a kind of taboo in relation to other sources of meanings. With the help of such concepts as “man”, “God”, “nature”, “society” in different views of the world, starting from the religious one, reality, variety of forms of life and existence become simplified and unified. This makes it easier for subjects of action (actors) to orient themselves in the world and in socio-cultural space, creates a universal pattern of existence for the whole of the society.

Two fundamental concepts can be pointed out in the worldviews of social world: social reality and the subject of action / cognition / power. The concept of social reality changes depending on the historical period in which a certain world view prevailed, as well as the way in which the subjects of cognition saw the foundations of this social reality. Cognition of the surrounding world by a man is not immediate; it is not based on the principle of direct reflection of the objects of the outside world in the mind of the subject. There is a mediator in the mind of the subject of cognition. In the contemporary philosophy of cognition and sociolinguistics this mediator is called a view or image of the world. At the heart of these images there are common sense and scientific ideas, which have become part of the established notions about the world. But the general frame of meaning in views of the world is created by fundamental philosophical metaphors and assumptions that have become truths in different cultures. They lay the foundations for the traditions of the society and the dominant worldview that distinguishes sense from nonsense, reason from insanity in everyday life, as well as in specific areas of knowledge such as science, religion, philosophy.

Conceptual basis for the research

K. Aydukevich, a representative of Lvov-Warsaw school of logical positivism, formulated the following thesis: “all judgments that we accept, and which form the view of the world, are not unambiguously determined by
knowledge obtained from our experience, they rather depend on the choice of the conceptual apparatus (totality of concepts) through which we interpret this knowledge” (Айдукеевич). This means that, to the extent that the subject of knowledge uses a certain conceptual structure, the data of his experience make him accept or reject certain propositions. In other words, the choice of concepts, with the help of which the subject of cognition describes and analyzes the processes and phenomena of reality, has a direct impact on the results of his cognitive activity. The conceptual apparatus sets the cognitive matrix, which, on the one hand, is necessary for putting the object of cognition in order, and on the other, it, to some extent, substitutes reality for the cognizing subject.

The theoretical basis of any science is a set of some philosophical axioms, which are often not realized by the researcher. During the period of education, they are accepted on faith, because they seem to be conventional and do not require additional proving. However, with the advancement of science, new characteristics of the studied objects are discovered that contradict conventional knowledge, which makes it necessary for the cognizing subject to change the dominant worldview for another one, meeting the standards of scientific knowledge.

In connection with theoretical premise of knowledge in social science, A. Gouldner formulated the conception of basic and domain premises. The peculiarity of this conception is that A. Gouldner connects the definition of the premise, forming the basis for representation of social reality, with interests and preferences of social scientist as representatives of specific social groups of the society which they study.

A. Gouldner defines the basic premise as “the world hypotheses – the basic notions about the world and everything that is in it” (Гоулднер, 2003: p. 56). One of these hypotheses is the idea of order, the internal cohesion of the world, which is the basis of, firstly, religious, and then scientific thinking. Another world hypothesis is the proposition of the oneness of the substances of being of the world, hidden behind the illusory multiplicity of phenomena. This hypothesis is opposed by the idea of absence of a single world substance, chaotic and dynamic nature of realities as its basic substances of being.

The world hypotheses belong to metaphysics. They are these hypotheses that formed the features of classical scientific knowledge and Western thought. At the classical stage, scientific knowledge as knowledge of rational-logical type replaces other forms of knowledge as less authentic, thereby establishing a hierarchy of knowledge similar to the social hierarchy.

Among these peculiarities, postmodern researchers have identified several types of centrism: “1) The presumption of presence of deep immanent sense of existence in general, as well as individual events; 2) the presumption of linear determinism, suggesting existence of exhaustive explanation of any phenomenon or process by the outside quasi-cause; 3) the presumption of expediency as flow of global world process, as well as individual events;

4) the presumption of thinking within the rigid binary (usually interpreted asymmetrically) oppositions” (Можейко, 2002).
The first two presumptions can be combined in the concept of logo-centrism, which serves to make sense of live as having the immanent “logic” and subordinated to linear determinism. The phenomenon of Logos in its rationalistic interpretation, according to post-modern philosophy, has actually become a symbol of culture of the Western type, embodying the fundamental values of Western mentality expressed in emphasizing activity of the powerful formal beginning, that is, in fact, the figure of outside causation. The entire Western cultural tradition is considered by post-modernism as “totally logo-centrist, based on the presumption of existence of universal laws of the universe, understood in the spirit of linear determinism” (Можейко, 2002).

A slightly different point of view on the basic hypotheses of metaphysics was presented by V. Dilthey. He believed that the metaphysics of Western Christian philosophy had three main components. The first component of metaphysics is the aesthetic and scientific position of Greek philosophy. Its fundamental concepts are: the cosmos as thinking, mathematical and harmonious structure of the whole of reality, the world’s mind as the basis of the world and connection between substances of beings and human cognition, the deity as the architect or builder of the world, and finally, the world soul, the soul of the constellations, the souls of plants. The common principle that unites all these groups of concepts is that of “the divine mind – a principle to which reasonable in things is related and to which human mind is related, too; this principle allows cognizing the space in its wisdom, its logical, mathematical, harmonious, and immanently expedient order, and at the same time forms the basis and confidence of expediently forming activity of reasonable man” (Дильтей, 2000: p.10).

The second component of metaphysics is the Roman element. In it “the starting point of understanding of the world and creating metaphysical concepts is the role of the will under the conditions of rule of freedom, the law, the right and duty. The power of the sovereign supreme will over the whole of the world, delimitation of spheres of domination of individual wills from each other in the legal structure of the society, the law as a rule for this delimitation, reduction of an object to a subordinate thing, external teleology” (Дильтей, 2000: p. 13). All the power of thought of the Romans is concentrated in the art and the rules of domination over their own lives and lives of their subjects. “Everywhere there is a desire to establish rules, bring the guiding principles to mind. Instinctively and consciously, expediency, interest and benefits take their place in every sphere of life” (Дильтей, 2000: p. 13).

Finally, the third component of metaphysics is a religious motif that dominates metaphysics at the early stages of development of all nations. In the Judeo-Christian religious tradition, the world appears as an emanation of God, His creation and revelation. The basis of unity of the world is found in the greatness of God.

Basing on the above, it can be assumed that the basic hypotheses underlying the classical Western metaphysics are the following:

1) behind the apparent diversity of the world, there is some constant sphere of substances of being, which it is necessary to learn with the help of the
Logos; in the scientific version of the Logos is rational knowledge of the essence of phenomena with the help of scientific measurement procedures;

2) social reality, as well as any other natural reality has such basic characteristics as expediency and benefits. Social reality must obey universal principles of law and rights. All members of the society who have the Logos must perform their duty under the law.

3) The world is ruled by the laws of determinism: every phenomenon has its own well-defined causes and its consequences. As a rule, the world is cognizable and can be described with the help of binary oppositions.

Metaphysics is, without a doubt, the epistemological basis of the classical picture of both physical and social worlds. Rejection of metaphysics in positivism meant only visible rejection of hypotheses, temporary suspension of this level of analysis, which did not solve the main problem – the formation of independent sociological basis for scientific analysis. Despite the fact that positivism verbally rejects metaphysical tradition, in fact, it is its direct continuation. In fact, metaphysics comes under methodological criticism only in phenomenology and postmodernism. The current stage of development of socio-humanitarian knowledge can be considered as a stage of overcoming the basic hypotheses of classical Western metaphysics.

In addition to the universal hypotheses of metaphysics, the domain premises are pointed out in the conception of sociological knowledge of A. Gouldner. These are the implicit fundamental premises with a more limited scope of application than the global hypotheses. For example, the premise that describes the relationship of man and society as premises of objectivism and subjectivism in sociology. Other domain prerequisites concerning the active or passive position of the researcher in relation to the social order are: “Society needs to be corrected, therefore, a sociologist takes an active civic position” or “social problems will sort out themselves, interference with social order only leads to chaos, a sociologist is a scientist, not a politician.”

The peculiarity of domain premises of theories is that they are not initially chosen as technical instruments. They are the “instruments of knowledge/cognition having the attributional loading, which is formed early in the course of our socialization in a particular culture and are organized by the structure of our character” (Гоулднер, 2003: p. 58). Another feature of domain premises is that they combine two elements – reality and its description in theoretical constructs. “The real and the ideal belong to different dimensions, but they are simultaneously constituted and connected in linguistic categories that make up social domains” (Гоулднер, 2003: p. 60). Such categories as “society”, “power”, “social control”, “individual” or “subject”, indicate what the sociologist takes for real and what he/she does not. If the description of a phenomenon of the social reality does not exist as a concept, it is the same as if it did not exist for sociological theory.

The third characteristic of domain premises in science is that being the product of socialization, and thus endowed with certain methodological arbitrariness, they often “disguise” themselves as reality. Working with their domain premises, a sociologist who seeks to achieve accuracy and correctness of scientific results, according A.Gouldner must have “insight to see what he believes in, and courage to
tell what he sees” (Гоулднер, 2003: p. 62). To a great extent, the concept of reality that sociologists have, stems from the domain premises that they have learned in their culture, in the process of education, i.e. scientific professional socialization, but there also exist individual, personal experience that creates a certain mood.

Sociology as an academic science was created by educated representatives of the middle class. They accepted the rules of the game, given as the basis for the social order of the industrial and, later, post-industrial society. Liberalism of academic sociologists is expressed in the following, hidden in relation to the social order, position: “to take the system, work within it, but at the same time try to keep it at some distance” (Гоулднер, 2003: p. 87). Hence, the critical point of A. Gouldner, who argued that the “dominant forms of academic social sciences base rather on adaptation to alienation of people in modern society than an attempt to overcome it” (Гоулднер, 2003: p. 81).

To maintain the distance from the alienated social world, sociologists create a parallel reality in their theories. In the past, in the religious view of the world reality was divided into the sacred and the profane, and the knowledge of the sacred was available only to the selected, who acted as custodians of the spirit of faith. In sociological theories reality is divided into social life of ordinary people, who do not know its laws, and the reality of social scientists who are free from mass prejudices and myths, because they have special knowledge – the knowledge of the hidden mechanisms of social control of the social world. So, in academic sociology there appears the opposition of the intellectual elite and the “ignorant mass”, which should not only be studied, but also educated, and if it resists enlightenment – then its mass consciousness should be manipulated in order to organize an “efficient” society.

**Statement of the problem.** The transition from the classical worldview to the contemporary one in sociology, as well as in all socio-humanitarian knowledge, is the transition from the classical basic metaphors to non-classical and post-nonclassical, according to the classification accepted in philosophy of science under the influence of the conception of V. S. Stepin. In the present research, I adhere to the point of view of G. Lakoff and M. Johnson who claim that “the biggest part of the ordinary human conceptual system is structured by metaphors” (Лакофф, Джонсон, 2008: p.93). The main metaphor, with the help of which social reality was described in classical sociology, is the metaphor of the society as an organism. In modern sociology there have appeared the metaphors of a social network and rhizomes. The metaphor of the system, in my opinion, can be considered as a variant of transition from the classical to contemporary methods of studying of social reality.

The metaphor of the organism and the system in classical sociology

The first metaphor which was used in sociology to describe the society was the metaphor of the organism. It was mostly used in the works of A. Comte and G. Spenser, then it was formally rejected, but, in fact, it retains its influence on the contemporary sociological theory of systems.

The idea of similarity of the society to a biological organism was first used when A. Compte divided sociology into “social statics” and “social dynamics”.
“Social statics was understood as studying the anatomy of the human society, its parts and their location (similar to the anatomy of the organism (body) with its organs, skeleton and muscles), and social dynamics, according to Comte, was to focus on physiology, that is, the processes that take place within the society (like bodily functions – breathing, metabolism, blood circulation). The final result of the development of the society was also likened to the result of evolution of the organism (from the embryo to maturity). It was assumed that there existed a stable state of the society, which can be monitored and analyzed independently from the movement of the latter” (Штомпка, 1996: p. 19).

H. Spencer held the same opinion, in spite of the fact that he changed the terminology. His opposition of “structures” and “functions” was the basis of sociological language for more than a century. The concept of “structure” in the conception H. Spencer implied studying the internal structure, or shape, of the social whole, the concept of “function” implied studying the ways of its functioning or transformation. Like A. Comte, H. Spencer argued that the society can be regarded as a kind of solid substance, tangible entity, in isolation from the processes taking place in it. In other words, he assumed it possible to separate the social structure from its functions. “The methodological heritage of the above-mentioned ideas was opposition of two types of research procedures that are described by Comte: the search for the laws of coexistence (figuring out why certain social phenomena always appear together) and eliciting, in contrast to them, the laws of succession (establishing why certain social phenomena invariably preceded or, follow one another)” (Штомпка, 1996: p. 19-20). This division was fixed in most textbooks, which defined “synchronous research” as one in which the society was seen from a static time perspective, and “diachronic (or successive)” research – as the research involving the flow of time and focusing on social changes.

Such approaches had great impact on the contemporary (diachronic) study of social changes. It has inherited the classical organic metaphor and, connected with it, separation and opposition through influential approaches of the XX century, such as the theory of systems, functionalism, or structural-functionalism.

“The systemic model of the society, developed as part of this approach, combined and synthesized a set of ideas that are typical for organicism» (Штомпка, 1996: p. 19). The whole conceptual apparatus commonly used in the analysis of changes, was initially used in the system model, even if scientists do not realize it or do not consider themselves supporters of the systemic and structural-functionalist theories. Only recently the “system model” was opposed by an “alternative image (concept)” of the society, considered from the point of view of a process, but not an element or a social fact. Perhaps it is “owing” to the metaphor of the organism that social systems as theoretical models are usually described in terms of static and have little resemblance to the dynamic models of open of biological and cognitive systems.

*The metaphor of an open system*

In this study, the criteria for systemic thinking are based on the conception of F. Kapra (Karpa, 2003; Karpa, 2004), who believed that modern science is undergoing a
fundamental paradigm shift from Cartesian type of thinking to process thinking. The peculiarity of the conception of system thinking by F. Kapra is that it was created as a scientific-popular exposition of the foundations of modern microphysics, biology and cognitive sciences. These foundations were laid in the period from the 30s to the 70s of the twentieth century. In this respect, it becomes obvious that the social and humanitarian sciences still use the metaphor of the system in the traditional meaning of the word—as an organism, but not in the non-classical interpretation of a system as an open field of interaction with the environment.

In his book “The Web of Life” F. Kapra identifies the criteria of the systemic approach:

- direction of the analysis – from the parts to the whole;
- shifting the focus of attention from one level of the system to another one in the process of research;
- contextual thinking;
- network thinking.

Let us consider these criteria in more detail. The first and most general criterion of systemic thinking is the direction of the analysis – from the parts to the whole. “Living systems are integrated entities, whose properties cannot be reduced to the properties of their constituting parts. Their significant or systemic properties are the properties of the whole, which none of the parts possess. New properties emerge from the organizing relations between the parts, that is, from the configuration of regulated relations, which are characteristic of a particular class of organisms or systems. Systemic properties are destroyed when the system is dissected into isolated elements” (Kapra, 2003).

All the criteria of systemic thinking, as described in this brief summary, are interdependent. “Nature is viewed as an interconnected web of relationships in which identification of certain patterns as “objects” depends on the observer and the process of learning. This web of relationships is described in the language of the corresponding network of concepts and models, none of which is more fundamental than the others” (Kapra, 2003).

In connection with this new approach to science, an important question arises: if everything is connected to everything, how can one hope to understand anything? Since all of the natural and social phenomena are ultimately interconnected, then to explain any of them we will have to understand all the others, which is obviously not possible.

“Discovery of approximate knowledge helps turn the systemic approach into science. This insight is critical to all modern science. The old paradigm is based on the Cartesian belief in the certainty of scientific knowledge. In the new paradigm it is recognized that all scientific concepts and theories are limited and approximate. Science will never be able to provide full and complete understanding” (Kapra, 2003).

It should be noted that the metaphor of a system in cognitive science and physical analysis of the microcosm quickly gives way to the metaphor of the network. The difference between the metaphors of the system and that of a network is first of all in the fact that the boundaries between the system and the external environment,
although considered permeable to impact, still exist as a separation of the system from the outside world. The metaphor of the network is more dynamic, it eliminates the problem of overcoming the boundaries and introduces a feeling of decentration of the studied space. Any interactions are equally possible in a network.

**Development of the metaphor of the system—autopoiesis.**

In Santiago theory of cognition, the authors of which were the biologists Maturana and Varela, the process of obtaining information in a system is closely related to autopoiesis – self-production of live networks. “The defining characteristic of an autopoietic system is that it undergoes continuous structural changes, while maintaining a web-like organizational model. The components of the network constantly generate and transform each other, and it occurs in two different ways. The first type of structural changes is self-renewal. Every living organism constantly renews its cells, dividing, build new structures, its tissues and organs renew their cellular composition continuously and cyclically. But despite these ongoing changes, the body maintains its complex uniqueness, or organizational pattern” (Капра, 2004).

The second type of structural changes in a living system covers those that create new structures, – establish new connections in network. These changes are not cyclical, but linear, they occur continuously being caused either by environmental influences, or the internal dynamics of the system. The body stores the memory of the previous structural changes, and any structural change affects the future behavior of the organism, so the behavior of a living organism is dictated by its structure. In Maturana’s terminology, it is “structurally determined”. Living systems react to external stimuli autonomously, by structural rearrangements, that is, changes in the structure of their relationship with the environment. According to Maturana and Varela, one cannot control a living system – one can only exercise a disturbing influence on it. Moreover, not only does living system determine itself its future structural changes, it also determines what external stimuli will cause them. In other words, a living system has the freedom to decide what to notice in its environment and what to react to. This is the key point of Santiago theory of cognition. Structural changes in the system are acts of cognition. Determining what kind of impact of the environment will cause its changes, the system sets the limits of its area of the known, in the words of Maturana and Varela, it “gives birth to the world”. The authors suggest that autopoiesis is a universal pattern of organization; it is the same for all living systems, regardless of the nature of their components.

**The theory of autopoietic systems of social communications of N. Luhmann**

N. Luhmann, a modern author of the theory of systems in sociology, developed a very detailed theory of “social autopoiesis” (Луман, 2004). At the same time, he strangely believes that, although social networks are autopoietic, they are not living systems.

G. Ritzer identifies four characteristics of the autopoietic system according to N. Luhmann (Ритцер, 2002: p. 221-222). Autopoietic systems
create basic elements, which, in their turn, constitute a system;
organize themselves in two ways: they organize their own boundaries and organize their internal structures (they organize their boundaries distinguishing between the system and the external environment);
have a self-directed character;
are closed systems (meaning that there is no direct connection between the system and the external environment, which is an obvious contradiction to Santiago theory of cognition of Maturana and Varela).

N. Luhmann explains the idea of the closeness of a social system as operational closeness, that is – recursive creation of opportunities for its own operations by means of the results of its own operations.

In my opinion, the main problem of the systemic approach of N. Luhmann is in the attempt to create a non-classical theory, using the classical (as defined by F. Kapra – Cartesian) thinking. Indeed, the very idea of closeness is necessary for N. Luhmann to explain how, several parallel operations can be performed simultaneously in the same space / time without mixing, but rather, being autonomous. Such autonomy is regarded by N. Luman as closeness.

But what it is especially strange, compared to Santiago theory, is N. Luhmann’s idea that a “closed social system is different from the individuals who seem to be its constituting elements” (Ритцер, 2002: p. 223). In N. Luhmann’s system an individual as a person and a biological organism is part of the environment in relation to the social system of communication. This is probably the most extreme case of a theoretical description of the idea of alienation of an individual, but not from his/her own nature, but rather from the social world.

However, the obvious merit of N. Luhmann’s theory is that it determines not an individual, social group, or a social institution, but communication as the basic element of the social system. I would like to emphasize that even in the conception of P. Sorokin a process of social interaction was considered to be the basic unit of the society, but the concept of “communication” is broader/wider than the concept of “social interaction” and allows us to simultaneously consider social reality in a variety of contexts. Repeating itself due to countless feedback, communication generates a common system of beliefs, explanations and values – the common semantic context – that is continually maintained by further communications. “Through this common semantic context, individuals acquire distinctness as members of a social network – in such a way the network is building its own border. It is not a physical boundary, it is a boundary of expectations, confidentiality and loyalty, constantly maintained and revised by the network itself” (Капра, 2004). When researchers consider social systems as communication ones, they take into account the dual nature of human communication.

The metaphor of a communication network

“For centuries, Western scholars and philosophers used the metaphor of the building in relation to knowledge, with its numerous architectural metaphors. In scientific discourse one spoke about fundamental laws or fundamental principles, the basic building blocks or bricks of objects of cognition (Капра, 2003). In the
new scientific thinking the metaphor of a building is replaced by the metaphor of a network. “Since we perceive reality as a network of relationships, so our descriptions form an interconnected network of concepts and models in which there are no bases” (Капра, 2003). For most scientists the idea of knowledge as a network – without any solid foundations – is very inconvenient, and today it cannot be said that it is widely spread and accepted. But as the network approach is spreading in the scientific community, the idea of knowledge as a network will undoubtedly find more supporters.

The notion of scientific knowledge as a network of concepts and models, in which no part is more fundamental than another one, was formulated in the 1970s by a physicist Geoffrey Chew in the form of the so-called bootstrap theory. “Bootstrap philosophy not only rejects the idea of the fundamental building blocks of the matter but does not accept any fundamental entities – neither fundamental constants, nor fundamental laws or equations. The material universe is seen as a dynamic web of interrelated events. No single property of this web is fundamental, all of them are derived from the properties of other parts, and overall coordination of their interrelations determines the structure of the entire web” (Капра, 2003).

The specific features of social networks are the following:
✓ reason as purposefulness in creation of new networks or maintaining the existing ones in connection with the realization of a certain intention;
✓ cultural context of social networks;
✓ power as a pattern of interaction in the network;
✓ symbolic structures of organizing meanings in social networks.

Consideration of social reality in terms of reason inevitably involves consideration of a huge number of inter-related characteristics. The cultural context of a social network is manifested in the following way: “on the one hand, the network continuously generates internal images, thoughts and meanings, on the other – it constantly coordinates the behavior of its subjects. Complex dynamics and interconnectedness of these processes leads to the emergence of an integrated system of values, beliefs and rules of behavior, which we associate with the phenomenon of culture” (Капра, 2003).

People’s behavior is shaped and limited by their cultural identity, and this, in its turn, strengthens their spirit of belonging. The culture is woven into the lifestyle of people; and its penetrating ability is such that our consciousness does not even notice it. Culturally, the power relations are determined by the agreements about the authority that are part of culture-specific rules of conduct. Such agreements seem to have appeared at fairly early stages of human evolution – with the emergence of first communities.

As the community grows and becomes more complex, the positions of power within it strengthen. In complex communities, conflict resolution and planning of activities can be effective only if the authority and power are organized within the framework of administrative structures. This need for coordination and distribution of power in the long history of human civilization led to the emergence of many forms of social organization. Power, therefore, plays a key role in emergence of social structures.
In biological systems, all structures are material. Processes in biological networks are the processes of producing of material components of the network, and resulting structures are material embodiment of the organizational pattern of the system. All biological structures are constantly changing, so that the process of materialization is continuous.

Social systems produce both material and symbolic components. The processes that support a social network are the processes of communication which create common meanings for the members of the network and the rules of conduct (the culture of the network), as well as the general body of knowledge. The rules of behavior (both formal and informal) are called social structures.

The metaphor of the social network of communication is now primarily used in the sociology of the information society in the analysis of global communication networks. In the philosophy of postmodernism in the 70s of the twentieth century another metaphor was created, which has not yet received further development in social sciences because of a rather vague (in terms of scientific language) substantiation. It is the metaphor of the rhizome and nomadology as a model conception where this metaphor is a key one. I think the rhizome can act as the ideal type of an open system / network and serve as the development of Geoffrey Chew’s idea of decentration of reality.

**Rhizome as the metaphor of social reality in postmodernism**

The term “rhizome” was introduced into philosophy in 1976 by G. Deleuze, F. Guattari in their joint work “Rhizome” – in the context of developing of the basic principles of nomadological project of postmodernism. The concept of “rhizome” expresses the fundamental postmodernist idea about the presumption of destruction of the traditional ideas about the structure as a semantically-centered and firmly defined, as a means of marking a radical alternative to closed and static linear structures. Rhizome is modeled as a non-balanced integrity, without organizational orders, characterized by permanent creative mobility. The main feature of the rhizome is that in relation to it “a clear differentiation of the external and internal to the process of monitoring and research is impossible: rhizome develops, varying, expanding, grabbing, clutching, taking root, constituting its internal by means of the external” (Усманова, 2001).

Nomadology (from European – nomad) – is a model conception proposed by Deleuze and Guattari, where rhizome is the main metaphor for describing reality. In nomadology a fundamental postmodernist idea was introduced about rejection of presumptions characteristic of classical metaphysics, such as: “a) the presumption of rigidly structural organization of existence; b) space as discretely differentiated by means of semantically and axiologically defining points; c) understanding of determinism as forced causality, causation from outside” (Можейко, 2001). Postmodernists argued that the project of classical Western science and philosophy exhausted the potential of interpretation of the modern processes and put forward a nomadological model of reality to replace it.

The authors of the nomadological project used the concept of “rhizome” instead of the traditional category of “structure”. “Rhizome is essentially procedural – it “does
not begin and end. It is always in the middle ...” (Усманова, 2001). Nomadological project implies in this context a fundamentally new understanding of organization of space. Using the games, typical for the respective cultures, as expressing specific to these cultures ways of dividing space, Deleuze and Guattari oppose chess, on the one hand, and the nomads’ game (go) – on the other. Chess involves coding of space (the organization of the clearly defined space of a game board as a “system of places”) and a rigid determination of correspondences between the figures of constant value and their possible positions – points of placement in a confined space. In contrast, go involves the dispersal playing pieces of undifferentiated value on an open surface (throwing pebbles on the sand lends the figures situational value at each moment of time and situational certainty to configuration of space).

Interpretation of rhizome as a decentralized media turns out to be its interpretation as having creative potential of self-organization. The source for transformation of reality in this case is not external factors, as in the case of the metaphor of a closed system, but the internal potential of constant variation of the rhizome. Chaotic processes leading to constant change are the essence of the rhizome, like a static structure is the essence of the system. The objectification of potential possibilities, the degree of probability which is constantly changing, creates moving forms of self-organization of the rhizome, constructing temporarily relevant relations – “plateaus” between its components. A specific cause of formation of a dissipative plateau is the so-called “paradoxical element”, virtually embodying randomness as such. The essential point of processuality of the rhizome is principal unpredictability of its future states. Such unpredictability forces us to abandon static research models and requires willingness of researchers to track the metamorphosis of the object under study, constantly comparing theoretical models with the data of reality. The principle of postmodernism – anything is possible, is embodied in the metaphor of the rhizome. In the nomadological project of postmodernism it is a model of reality that continues to shape and deepen in the process that develops, improves, renews, every time presenting a new version of its existence.

**Conclusion.** Transition from the metaphor of the organism to the metaphor of the system, and then to the metaphors of the network and rhizome in theoretical sociology can be compared with the general destruction of substantial views of the world in the modern scientific theories. The metaphor of the organism hindered the development of classical sociology for a long time, because it did not allow researchers to study the dynamics of the society itself, without describing the static structure of the society.

In non-classical sociology the social structure and its elements are replaced by the concept of processes and trends of social reality. The metaphor of the system allows sociologists to realize that all the processes taking place in social reality, are not random, they are interlinked and demand description of the context. The metaphor of the network allows us to see the permeability of the boundaries of social groups and communities in the modern world, and in many ways challenges the idea of closeness of cultures and civilizations from one another. The metaphor of the rhizome is the least developed, rather philosophical and artistic than a scientific metaphor. Its cognitive capacity lies primarily in the idea of removing the boundaries between the
inside and the outside in the analysis of both individual and mass consciousness. The metaphor of the rhizome is convenient not as a working concept for sociological research, but as the image of extremely dynamic and scholastic reality, which creates metamorphoses and blurs the boundaries between the world of objects. In addition, the metaphor of the rhizome can be used in the analysis of literary and philosophical texts, which were written under the influence of postmodernism. The basis of such texts is the play with the classical meanings and senses.

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The paper analyses the peculiarities of the development of Ukrainian sociology in the context of social, historical, ideological and political transformation of Ukrainian society from the end of the 19th century up to the current period. It is argued that contentious historical heritage of Ukrainian sociology and its struggle for its own institutionalization from the end of 19-th century and through the Soviet period still has the impact on the character and issues of modern Ukrainian sociology. On the basis of historical-sociological studies, the author characterizes historical stages, social logic, contemporary problems and achievements in the development of Ukrainian sociology within the framework of social-political transformation of Ukrainian society. It is maintained that the study of the development of national sociology in its historical context could be helpful as not only theoretical experience in understanding national sociological tradition, values and standards of sociological community. Contextual research of the history of sociological thought also turns out to be historical-sociological study of various social factors that have conditioned the corresponding sociological orientations and approaches.

Keywords: sociology, Ukrainian sociology, historical tradition, cultural context, political transformation, institutionalization.
The study of history of sociological thought and traditions involves historical research of social conditions, social, structural, economic and cultural reasons and factors influencing sociological orientations and approaches in a certain national framework. This is true with regard to Ukrainian sociology. The research of its development implies studying the complex historical aspects of its historical heritage as well as understanding the whole challenging path for its recognition and institutionalization. The analysis of historical and ideological contexts can also be helpful in explaining the historical logic of formation and peculiarities of the development of modern Ukrainian sociology with all its current achievements, but also problems. And it is also true the other way around. The development of Ukrainian society can be studied and objectively interpreted if one is grounded on sociological understanding (especially, historically determined and interpreted by the sociology of that time) of previous social traditions, institutional, political, cultural and structural remnants of the past. Those inert social and historical phenomena are manifested in the value orientations, political culture, ethos and practices of the everyday life. It means that since its beginning sociology has been formed and developed as a historical and socially contextual science.

Sociology develops when the social need in objective self-understanding of society and of its development appears. The need becomes especially acute under profound social transformations, like historical transition from traditional to modern society in the end of the 19th century in Europe. The beginning of the 21st century in Ukraine, characterized by many-sided transformations, presents the similar stimulus. And national sociology has good chances for its further development, recognition and institutionalization. However, the development of science is not a straight forward process. Manipulation with public opinion, commercial effect on the science, usage of sociology as a politically manipulative tool, parodying it in far from professional studies — all those can cause social prejudice against sociology. How must sociology meet those challenges? Will Ukrainian sociology use its good chance? Will it become a full member of the world sociology? To a large extent, the answer to these and other questions will depend on the sociologists themselves. However, even marking and updating these topics is useful in this regard.
The studies on historical roots and traditions of Ukrainian sociology are the research sphere which still attracts active scholarly attention. Even though many works and studies have already been done in the sphere recently ¹, and even corresponding teaching courses at a University level have been elaborated, this is still a vital research task for Ukrainian sociologists. This research interest could be understood as an important aspect of the process of institutionalization of modern Ukrainian sociology. And this process involves the theoretical self-reflexivity of national sociology, its search for its own historical roots and identity.

The established approach to the study of historical stages in Ukrainian sociology is the division into proto-sociological, academic, early Soviet, Soviet and modern periods of its development. Since the beginning of 1990-s, when Ukrainian sociology had been established as an independent branch of scholarship, the above-mentioned approach has been meeting the need in own sociological history, traditions and of self-identification of national sociology. At the same time, this historical scheme also embraces the problems of futility and consistency in the development of the Ukrainian sociological tradition. At least this tradition is not articulated in a clear and classically recognized way as it is in the cases of France (A.Moss, E.Durkheim), Germany (M.Weber, W.Sombart, G.Simmel), Poland (F.Znanetsky) or the United States (Chicago School, J.Mead, T.Parsons). Moreover, due to historical, political and ideological circumstances, one should admit the rupture and decline of the national sociological tradition in Ukraine in the 1930s-1950s.

However, this does not mean that Ukrainian humanitarian knowledge was historically isolated from the world social studies and European ones in particular. In the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries, when in Europe sociology was established as a full-fledged science, Ukrainian social thought actively perceived sociological ideas of that time. It is impossible to overestimate what Mykhailo Hrushevsky (who admired ideas of A.Komte, E.Durkheim and W.Wundt) did for introduction, popularization and adaptation of European sociological ideas to the national humanitarian knowledge. Those efforts are presented in his work “The Beginnings of Citizenship, or Genetic Sociology” published during his emigration in Vienna in 1921. Also, it is worth recalling sociological approaches and socio-political ideas developed by M.Dragomanov, S. Podolynsky, O.-I.Bochkovskyi, M.Tugan-Baranovskyi, B.Kistiakivskyi, V.Lypynskyi and other Ukrainian social scientists. Ukrainian social knowledge boasts about serious achievements in ethnography and ethnology, for example, works by M.Ziber, M.Sumtsov, M. Kovalevskyi,
F. Vovk. One has to mention that namely this knowledge — within the tradition of cultural anthropology — was a powerful incentive to the development of European sociology, British in particular.

Thus, sociology in Ukraine was historically formed as a part of a common sociological, in particular European, tradition from the end of the 19th century. Historical formation of national sociology in its close interaction with European sociological schools and directions should be understood literally. M. Drahomanov, M. Hrushevskyi, B. Kistiakivskyi, V. Lipinskyi and other Ukrainian thinkers were not only well acquainted with the progressive achievements of European sociological thought of their time, but many of them also maintained personal contacts with the founders of European sociology. For example, M. Hrushevskyi was personally acquainted with E. Durkheim, and B. Kistiakivskyi kept the letter correspondence with M. Weber. The doctoral dissertation by B. Kistiakivskyi “The society and a person”, which he wrote in German and defended in Strasbourg at the end of the 19th century, received the great resonance among European sociologists of that time. Almost simultaneously with V. Pareto and G. Moska V. Lipinskyi developed his theory of elites. The works by M. Tugan-Baranovskiy on social aspects of co-operation and cooperative forms of labor organization have largely outstripped their time and developed a perspective that is now being updated in the sociological concept of social capital.

At the same time, Ukrainian sociology was formed as a national-cultural theoretical reflection and the form of self-knowledge of Ukrainian society with its social problems at different stages of historical development. When answering the question of what are the original features of Ukrainian sociological tradition, it is worth emphasizing, first of all, its close connection with socio-political problems and with the historical task of achieving the national statehood. Hence, political ideas, the problems of the state and of social self-organization were an important component in the structure of national sociological tradition. It also involves national-cultural issues, the problems of the elite and of human rights. Sociology at its early stage of development in Ukraine was considered by many national social thinkers as a priority work, which, according to M. Hrushevskyi’s argument, would precede the “positive improvement” of Ukrainian society through sociological knowledge. The task is still relevant today.

Saying about historical “Ukrainian sociology” and “national sociological tradition”, one should also clearly understand two important points. Firstly, the term “Ukrainian sociologist” cannot be taken in its ethnic connotation, but rather in meaning of one’s civic Ukrainian belonging and in terms of a thinker’s actual orientation to problematic of Ukrainian cultural and political community. This is just due to the historical fact that not all Ukrainian sociologists were ethnic Ukrainians. For example, O.-I. Bochkovskiy, V. Lypynskyi and V. Starosolskyi were ethnic Poles and Catholics. However, their academic and public activity was focused on the issues of development of Ukrainian statehood and of forming Ukrainian political nation. And secondly, because Ukraine during long historical periods did not pose its own statehood and it was split historically between the neighboring empires and states, an Ukrainian sociologist in that period could work not necessarily within territorial Ukraine but in various places – for example, in Krakow (V. Lypynskyi), in St.
Petersburg (B.Kistiakivskyi), in Prague (O.-I.Bochkovskyi, M.Shapoval) or in Vienne (V.Starosolskyi, M.Hrushevskyi). In addition, the communist political regime that was finally established in Ukraine in 1922 was not favorable for many Ukrainian sociologists who emigrated from the country.

Anyway, some efforts in institutionalization of sociology in Ukraine were also undertaken in the brief historical period of democratic independence, before the Soviet rule in Ukraine. Sociology (and more widely - the sociological range of problems) was defined as an important and necessary field of knowledge within the organizational activities on foundation of the National Academy of sciences in 1918, before the Soviet rule. In various proposals on the structural organization of the Academy a sociological direction was clearly defined. In particular, the sociological research direction appeared to be the most concrete in the final proposal by M.Tugan-Baranovskyi. According to his plan, the structure of the national Academy would consist of three branches: the historical-philological, physical-mathematical and social sciences. It is this structure that became the basis for the functioning of the Ukrainian Academy of sciences in the Law on its foundation from November 14, 1918. And the academician M.Tugan-Baranovskyi was elected the Head of the Department of Social Sciences of the Academy. These attempts of academic institutionalization of social studies and sociology proved the successful progress and some achievements of national sociological thought, which had already been worked out at that time. Academicians Hrushevskyi, Kistiakivskyi and Tugan-Baranovskyi played an important role in the formation of scientific foundations of sociology in Ukraine. They also made the most active personal attempts in institutionalizing sociology as a separate scientific discipline and field of research within the framework of the National Academy of science.

However because of predominantly political factors, these attempts did not entirely succeed. In general, one can say that the first initiatives on the institutionalization of sociology in Ukraine were interrupted politically and administratively. And the first national sociological institution — Ukrainian Sociological Institute — was established by M.Hrushevskyi not in Kyiv but in Vienne in 1919. Later M.Shapoval (1882–1932), a scientist and public activist who should be mentioned among the first Ukrainian professional sociologists, founded another sociological institute in Prague in 1924 — Ukrainian Institute of Citizenship.

In Ukraine, however, consistent development of European sociological tradition was interrupted under the Soviet rule since the early 1930s. But even in this way, of somewhat broken historical sociological tradition, sociological ideas developed by M.Hrushevskyi, B.Kistiakivskyi, M.Tugan-Baranovskyi, V.Lipinskyi, M.Shapoval and other Ukrainian sociologically oriented thinkers could be actual and even relevant in many aspects to the study on the issues of modern Ukrainian social transformation and nation-state building.

Sociology in the Soviet period: from annihilation to “rehabilitation”

Early Soviet period (from the 1920s to the early 1930s) is characterized by efforts to make sociology a fully institutionalized science and by successive
decline in sociological research as sociological approaches transformed from the Western positivism and neo-Kantian paradigm to the Marxist-Leninist doctrine. The last was considered to be the only truthful social knowledge. It seemed that this extremely controversial and special period did not leave any useful legacy and destroyed all achievements of the pre-Bolshevik era. However, over a decade (until the end of the 1920s) sociology in Soviet Ukraine fought for its own recognition by developing in two parallel directions: as sociologically oriented social knowledge (those who represented that direction tried to make the European classic sociological tradition institutionally organized in Ukraine) and as a Marxist sociology.

Despite of all unsuccessful efforts by M.Hrushevskyi to relocate Ukrainian Sociological Institute from Vienne to Kyiv, in this period, the first network of sociological centers was created within disciplinary framework of various academic departments, particularly historical ones. For example, within the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, there were founded chairs and commissions that worked according to the plans of Ukrainian Sociological Institute: Section of Methods and Social Substantiation of History at the Department of History (headed by O.Germaise); the Center of primitive culture supervised by the same chair and headed by Katerina, M.Hrushevskyi’s daughter; Commission on Cultural and Historical Heritage and History of Songs at the History and Philology Department of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences (Кондратик, 1996: p. 25–31). Sociological research and studies focused on sociological methodologies also developed during this period in related disciplinary areas, in particular in demography. For example, the Ukrainian Demographic Institute at the Ukrainian Academy of sciences used sociological approach in its studies of “biosocial processes”. Among the works of this institute there were the studies on the numerical composition of the population of Ukraine in 1897-1920 and on the mortality rates in Russia and Ukraine by Academician M.Ptukha, on the demographic characteristics of the Ukrainian population in the 20th century by P.Pustokhod, on the birthrate by M.Trachevskyi, the case study on suicide in Kharkiv by I.Kovalenko and other sociologically oriented research. However, of course, this was not a proper institutionalization of sociological science. And as N.Chernysh notes, “the functions of a sociological institute actually began to be performed by the Association of Cultural and Historical Studies, formed during the 1926-1927”. It held 24 meetings, at which 51 reports were delivered in the line of the sociological method (Черниш, 2004).

At the same time, Marxist sociology was under development and started to dominate in Ukraine. Its main centers were located at various departments of studies on Marxism-Leninism in Kharkiv. In 1921 another institute was founded in Kharkiv — All-Ukrainian Institute of Labor ruled by F.Dunaievskyi. It studied and coordinated the work of labor laboratories related to industry and transportation on various aspects (from psycho-physiological to social and organizational). So, the institute’s activity formed a kind of basis for the further development of sociology of labor in the former USSR and Ukraine in particular. It was a direction of Soviet sociology research that dominated in the 1960s–1980s.
However, political and ideological circumstances of that time were not favorable for sociology oriented classic European tradition. Revolutionary society of the early Soviet period, being ruled according to the communist political and ideological design and party directives, did not need sociology as an objective science of social development. That is why inspiring organizational efforts of M.Hrushevskyi aimed at strengthening sociology in Ukraine did not obtain any support, while in the early 1920s in communist Russia P.Sorokin became “undesirable” as well. In that period humanitarian and social sciences found themselves under obtrusive political and ideological control of the ruling communist party bodies. The only social science allowed in that period had to be Marxist-Leninist. And it was not surprising that the communist authorities’ commission on activity of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in its report of the late 1920s came to a predictable conclusion about “undeveloped social and economic departments, where economy, finance and Soviet laws are not studied at the necessary level” and “ideological aspect of works has no connection to the new Marxist sociology” (Stepanenko, Rybshchun, 2011). In practical terms such a conclusion meant the ideological precondition for folding any further initiatives for development of sociology in Ukraine.

It is difficult to predict the further possible development of Ukrainian sociology if the sprouts of European tradition and early attempts of institutionalization of sociology in the 1920s, would be continued and the first academic efforts could grow into their own original theoretical concepts. Discussing the developing stages of the world sociology, I.Wallerstein points out that soon after the Second World War, because of objective need, regional and area studies were activated again in the USA, and this brings doubts about the dominating perception about sociology as a science on the “typical” western society (Wallerstein, 1999). Unfortunately, by that time in the USSR even the term “sociology” had been already forbidden.

However, in the end of 1950-s in the former USSR the need in objective social knowledge had appeared. The phenomenon of the Soviet sociology can be assessed differently but it is the fact that modern Ukrainian sociology was also formed in the Soviet period. Even though formally the national sociology as a science oriented to various aspects of Ukrainian social and cultural community was finally legitimized since the declaration of the state independence in 1991, it would be naïve and wrong to assume its sudden appearance from nothing. Sure, modern Ukrainian sociology did not appear unexpectedly. Previously it developed as a part of the whole Soviet sociology and the early stage of successful institutionalization of sociology in Ukraine from the end of 1980-s was possible due to the research experience accumulated in the Soviet period. In particular, since the 1960-s, the first sociological research units were created in the former USSR and the implementation of rather large-scale sociological projects was launched. Sociological research centers were created and mostly concentrated in large cities, including Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk (now Dnipro), Odessa and Kharkiv.

Various reasons explained the growth of interest in objective sociological knowledge and its partial somewhat “rehabilitation” in the USSR since the end of
1950-s. There appeared the need in a kind of feedback from the society to the powerful omnipotent ruling center. And all kinds of control over social life became objectively more complicated; they could not be limited by dogmatic schemes of communist administrative and political planning any more (Альберг, 1994: p. 88–114). It became also evident that perpetual re-interpretation of ideological dogmata could hardly be considered as the knowledge needed for analysis, planning and prognoses of social development. And finally even in the USSR the social and humanitarian sciences made some headway and somehow perceived the world tendencies in development of social knowledge and of sociological one in particular. Thus, after the Second World War the logic of partial rehabilitation of sociology in the USSR can be explained by combination of the following social factors, processes and actors: 1) the growing demand for objective social knowledge; 2) perpetual resistance of this knowledge to ideological control; 3) the Western influence on the development of social sciences and sociology in particular; 4) the activity and practical expertise of those people who chose the way of scientific sociology and supported (even if subconsciously) its autonomous and self-sufficient scientific status.

At that time Soviet sociology developed in two main directions: 1) as an academic discipline that, however, was subordinated to methodology of historical materialism and formed mostly in academic centers of the country and 2) as a special empirical research especially oriented to sociology of labor or as so-called industrial or “factory sociology”. Namely sociological aspects and issues of labor, of labor motivation and of professional orientation determined, at least for two Soviet decades (1960–1980), the main direction in development for theoretical and applied research of the whole Soviet sociology and Ukrainian in particular. The studies on ideological and practical aspects in the formation of new stimulus within socialist economy was an official demand of the Soviet state to sociology and sociologists. But in a way this not only legitimized the very existence of Soviet sociology but also made possible for the first Soviet sociologists to improve theoretical, methodical and empirical tools of their science. New tendencies in social studies kept spreading in the Soviet republics and in Ukraine particularly. In 1960 in the Institute of Philosophy of Academy of sciences of Ukraine the first group for sociological research in Ukraine was organized. And that year it began the sociological study at one of the plants in Kyiv. Since then such studies and surveys have become more and more popular they have been a base for scientific articles, books published in 1960-s and in which the data of sociological research were widely used (Stepanenko, Rybshchun, 2011).

The paradox of the situation in which the sociology of the Soviet era turned out to be, was determined by the fact that, on the one hand, the most pressing social problems stimulated the need for objective sociological knowledge, and, on the other hand, sociology was supposed to be subject to a systemic political and ideological framework (Marxist-Leninist doctrine and historical materialism as a part of it) that constantly slowed down its development. As numerous examples of the subjects of sociological research of that period demonstrate, Soviet sociology often had to adjust its conclusions to predetermined schemes-directives such as “erasing social differences” between city and village, mental and physical labor, on “the growth
of the social homogeneity of Soviet society”, on “the formation of a new historical
community – the Soviet people” and so on. However, even in the Soviet period
sociological research carried out professionally and honestly revealed numerous
disparities and contradictions between the ideologically idealized and declared
picture of the socialist society and the real social reality. Another thing is that the
results and objective findings of such studies had little chance of being published.
Anyway, the sociological studies began, the term “sociology” itself was legalized
and the most important – there appeared the people who identified themselves to
be “sociologists”. Even though in the official structure of Soviet social knowledge
sociology was not the central discipline, and communist ideologists used to be
suspicious and distrustful to sociology, the further logic of its development had
inevitably bring the results sometimes unpredictable even for those who initiated
sociological research in the Soviet period.

The somewhat ambivalent institutional and methodological positions of
sociology in the Soviet period led, on the one hand, to the practice of theoretical
and methodological “contraband” of sociological techniques and methodologies
taken from the accumulated practical arsenal of the world empirical sociology,
and, on the other, this legitimized the acquaintance with Western sociological
theories and methodologies. Usually such a reception of the Western sociological
knowledge took the format of Marxist-Leninist “critique of bourgeois sociology”. In
Soviet times, to criticize Western sciences was an obligatory special direction for
all social and humanitarian disciplines. And Soviet sociology was not an exception
in that regard. However, it is precisely the “critique format” (as often a rather ritual
procedure used to be in the forewords of Soviet scientific publications) became
perhaps the only possible and ideologically allowed way of communication of
Soviet sociology with the world sociological science, its entry, albeit deformed,
into the world sociological context, and hence – it was necessary and important
phase of own development of that sociology. In fact the “critical format” in a
certain way fulfilled the function of latent education for Soviet sociologists: at
least their sociological and humanitarian outlook was getting wider.

But despite of all the promising signs of come-back for sociology under
liberal conditions of the 1960s, sociological science has not been formed
consistently and smoothly in the USSR. The main reason for that were political
and ideological obstacles and the power striving to prevent from crash of one
of the Soviet ideology bases – historical materialism. When Soviet ideologists in
power understood what the real danger sociology could bring as an objective
science, they began to strengthen their ideological control upon sociology partly
by limiting its subject and methods and hierarchy subordinating it within the
structure of the Soviet social sciences.

The early 1970s was the period when ideological repression against sociology
came back: the rout of the Institute of Concrete Sociological Researches in Moscow,
persecution of the most active researchers, ending of studies in certain research
directions. It was the beginning of “dullness age” in Soviet sociology, according to V.
Shlapentokh, a Russian immigrant sociologist (Батыгин, 1998). It was the time when
to study theoretical and methodological aspects of sociology was even dangerous –
dogmata of historical materialism were implemented by powerful methods inherent in the Soviet political and administrative system. Ideological persecution of one of the leading Soviet sociologists of that time Yuriy Levada, on account of his “theoretical freedom of thought”, was typical for that time.

Institutionalization of modern Ukrainian sociology in the 1990s-2000s

Since the mid-1980s, when the liberal reforms, known as the “rebuilding” (perestroika) began in the former USSR, Ukrainian sociology had also been undergoing profound and mostly positive transformational changes. During that period, there were also some signs of new methodological turns and accents in the development of sociological knowledge in the USSR and also in Ukraine (Stepanenko, Rybshchun, 2011). This methodological turn could be summarized as follows:

– rethinking (if not total abandoning) the Marxist social paradigm, particularly in its possible convergence with the world social theory, the growing number of publications devoted to theory and methods of sociological research;
– the growing interest in socio-psychological problems and issues of social adaptation of a person in everyday life – this trend was particularly characteristic of Ukrainian sociology development at least from the 1970s;
– sociologists were turning to the study of the issues of politics and political, the state, of individual rights and freedoms and of moral issues (even though established by that period problematic of Soviet sociology, such as persons’ needs, interests and workers’ motivations, the youth’s professional orientations, individual free time and family socialization still kept their strong position);
– the signs of ideological de-indoctrination could be seen in the fact that the share of publications devoted to the critique of “bourgeois sociology” and the usage of various ideological clichés such as “bourgeois propaganda”, “communist upbringing”, “class struggle” etc. have been considerably reduced – in these terms, the perestroika period really brought new liberal trends in the development of the still formally Soviet social knowledge, including sociology.

This was also the important period of the early stage of institutionalization of sociology in then still Soviet Ukraine. Institutional sociological structures were actively forming – as in academic sphere (the establishment of the Department of Sociology within the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine in 1984) and in the non-state sector – the foundation of the first national sociological survey structures with their own networks, namely the KIIS (Kyiv International Institute of Sociology) and the sociological centre SOCIS in the late 1980s. And from the mid-1980s, Ukrainian sociologists began to develop methodological tools and formed statistical samples for the nationwide surveys. In particular, the first professional sociological survey with the all-republican sample of 5000 respondents was methodologically prepared and conducted in 1982 by the group of sociologists headed by M.Churilov, within the framework of the then all-Soviet study The way of life of a Soviet person under the leadership of T. I. Zaslavskaya. Then there were other important investigations, in particular the number of sociological surveys initiated directly in the area of the Chernobyl
nuclear disaster in 1986. And this research line had been actively developing during the next twenty years, already in the independent Ukraine.

Thus, by the 1990s the development of Ukrainian sociology, having successfully established its structures, institutions and developing the professional sociological networks, entered into the stage of its institutionalization. The important manifestations of that period were the establishment of Institute of Sociology within the system of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine in the fall of 1990 and the organization of the National sociological association. The legalization and institutionalization of sociology as a professional science and academic discipline in this period has been also proved by the creation of the School of Sociology at the T.Shevchenko Kyiv State University and then in other Universities in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa and other cities.

There is also another important circumstance that characterized the process of institutionalization of Ukrainian sociology in the 1990s. And this was connected with the newly established institutional and political arrangements, namely the declaration of Ukrainian state independence in 1991. In fact, for the first time in its complicated and dramatic history national sociology began to operate within a classical sociological macro-object – a sovereign nation-state, exploring the problems of its society. And for the first time, after almost 150 years of historically established, interrupted, rehabilitated and revived tradition of its development, Ukrainian sociology got the opportunities to realize its own right to be scientific, professionally objective and socially responsible knowledge. Moreover, sociology played its important historical role in the declaration of the state independence of Ukraine. This was due to fact that the sociological polls conducted before the referendum on the state independence revealed the wish of the vast majority of citizens to live in an independent country. These results, known to the politicians, gave them an additional powerful argument for the political decision regarding the referendum. And its successful official results in favor of the state independence had also confirmed previous sociological data.

As already established scientific discipline, Ukrainian sociology in the period of the state independence obtained new opportunities for its development but also faced with new challenges related to that and mostly associated with further institutionalization, professional self-realization and recognition under the new circumstances. However, contrary to sociologists of the “Soviet rehabilitation” era, Ukrainian sociologists of the early 1990s did not have to start from scratch. They had at least an initial basis for the science functioning, including the institutional structures that appeared and professional experience that was accumulated within the framework of Soviet sociology with all its achievements and problems. The new task demanded to rethink over this heritage, to transform sociology from its complex legacy into an actually objective social science, free of dogmata and ideological prejudice, to develop sociology into the knowledge whose scientific potential could be relevant and adequate in studying a complex post-communist society under transformation. The involvement of national sociology in the world sociological context was and still is an actual component of these above-mentioned tasks.
As it was argued, modern Ukrainian sociology has been continuously developed from previous Soviet sociology rather than from its original historical tradition that was mostly interrupted and destroyed in the Soviet period. And because of this historical heritage this sociology has also acquired some characteristic features of the late Soviet sociology. These were the predominant empirical approach, understanding sociology as a mostly empirical rigorous science and corresponding suspicion and even skepticism towards theory (that could be partly explained by defensive reaction of sociologists against total domination of omnipotent Marxist –Leninist theory). At the same time, contrary to ideological dogmas and theoretical reflections post-Soviet sociology also inherited humanistic orientation, active interest by sociologists in actual living world of society and person.

In the 1990-s, like as its late Soviet prototype, post-Soviet Ukrainian sociology has been seriously influenced by rather positivist, American, in particular, sociological canon than European sociological traditions and “understanding sociology” in particular. The latter was often, even talking about a discipline, regarded as belonging to “social philosophy”. Although such an empirical trend of the late Soviet and post-Soviet sociology could hardly be considered as a unique one. Because of inert adaptation of world sociological knowledge and approaches, the late and post-Soviet sociology happened to be more affected by significant influence of more developed and historically dominant in the after-war period American tradition of structural and functional analysis, associated with T. Parson’s school, and so by the positivist approaches and ideas about this science.

Also, having retracted dogmata of Marxist methodological paradigm and manifesting prejudice against theoretical generalization, post-Soviet, including Ukrainian, sociology found itself especially vulnerable under universal processes of methodological crisis of sociology, when its modern theoretical paradigms are too numerous and scattered, and the modern world sociology suffers from development problems, like a gap between sociological theory and practice, contradictions between micro- and macro-level approaches, problems of theoretical synthesis and renewal of classic traditions and others (Танчер, 1993: p. 77–88). On the other hand, it proves that reception and recreation of the developmental problems, common for the world sociology, by the national one means its successive, though rather slow, integration into the world sociological space and common professional context.

However, having gained a valuable experience of its institutionalization in the framework of the independent country, Ukrainian sociology from the early 2000s, step by step, have been leaving the unified standards of Soviet sociology, gradually overcoming its shortages and successfully struggling for the official and public recognition. The best way to see these is to summarize the most significant achievements of modern Ukrainian sociology by the early 21st century:

1) The initial important stage was successfully completed in institutional realization of sociology as a field of scientific knowledge, scientific discipline and community of professional sociologists (there appeared schools and specialization for preparation of sociological specialists at universities, as well as sociological
nomenclature of the Higher Attestation Commission; Sociological Association of
Ukraine was founded; there have been published special sociological journals, in
particularly “Sociology: Theory, Methods, Marketing”, scientific and theoretical
bilingual edition founded by the Institute of Sociology at the National Academy
of science (NAS) of Ukraine in July 1997, scientific sociological works and so on
(Резник В., Резник О., 2004: pp. 22–46);

2) Professional principles and values for sociological community and
sociologists’ activity were determined, like the Code of Professional Ethics
for Sociologists developed by Natalia Panina and other leading sociologists of
Ukraine (Панина, 2004: pp. 5–8).

3) A network of the professional all-national sociological centers for public
opinion polls has been established and still actively working (SOCIS-Gallup,
Kiev International Institute of Sociology, Social Monitoring Center, Ukrainian
Sociological Service, sociological service at the Razumkov Center and others).

4) Systematic empirical studies on transformation of Ukrainian society have
been carried out. In particular, there is the unique project by the Institute of Sociology,
NAS of Ukraine, “Monitoring of Ukrainian Society”, which has been conducted since
1992. This and other long-term sociological projects as well as the surveys studying
Ukrainian society and the public opinion of the country in various dimensions formed
an empirical basis for a whole complex of the middle-level theories for transforming
society developed by modern Ukrainian sociologists.

5) Comparative international sociological surveys were developed and held
with the participation of national sociologists. A comparative research project on
the issues of political culture of society in 1990 was one of first international projects
in which Ukrainian sociologists were involved. The methodological toolkit and
the sample of this study, in which two nationwide surveys were conducted, were
developed by Mykola Churilov and Natalia Panina. In 2004-2005, Ukraine as a
country-participant and national specialists were for the first time involved in a
large-scale European comparative sociological survey (European Social Survey), in
which over 20 EU countries took part. Since then there were four waves of this
study, in which Ukraine and national sociologists were involved – in 2004-2005,

6) Modern Ukrainian sociology has been successfully learning and
adapting the world sociological knowledge and advanced theoretical trends. At
least since the 1990s there are no ideological obstacles and artificial blockages
in learning modern and post-modern sociological theory represented, for
example, by works of A. Giddens, P. Bourdieu, U. Beck, Z. Bauman, J. Alexander,
I. Wallerstein and other leading modern theorists. In their studies our sociologists
have been actively using and adapting modern approaches developed in various
sociological spheres, including sociological conflict theory, sociology of culture,
the word-system analysis, studies on globalization and new communication,
transformation of social structures, new institutionalism, the network-society
theories, sociological aspects of civil society and others.

7) A qualitative level of sociological research has been raised and the
subject field of the national sociology has been substantially broadened. These
include history, theory and methods of sociology, social structures and institutes, social transformation, sociology of culture and mass communications, electoral sociology, political sociology, economic sociology, agricultural sociology, ethnosociology and others. Qualitative transformation and development of the research field of our sociology not only confirms its successful realization as an actual and important scientific discipline but also reveals the logic of its development related to the study the corresponding complex dynamics of the society under transformation. The latter from 2014 includes also the complex problems of social consequences of the annexation of the Crimea and the war in Donbas.

8) And finally, the proofs of achievements of national sociology are the signs of its official recognition during this period. Among these there was the Decree by the President of Ukraine “On Development of Sociological Science in Ukraine” from April 25, 2001. The degree was aimed at “creating favorable conditions for development of sociological science in Ukraine, increasing its role in social, economic and political reforms, strengthening of democratic basis of society and provision of reliable prognoses for social processes”. Even though many good statements of the decree remain still declarative, like the one about financial support of sociological studies by the government, it was at least the symbolically principal move of official recognition of the importance of sociological knowledge and its development. In 2014, the team of sociologists from the Institute of Sociology, NAS of Ukraine (V.Vorona, M.Shulga, E.Holovakha, O.Vyshniak, O.Zlobina, N.Kostenko, S.Makeev, Yu.Sayenko, M.Churilov and N.Panina) were awarded with the State Prizes of Ukraine in the field of science and technology for their scientific achievements and advanced results in working on the long-term project Measurement of social changes in the Ukrainian society. Sociological monitoring (1992 - 2013).

However, in the framework of mostly successful institutionalization of modern Ukrainian sociology the body of issues seems to be no less significant for its development in the 1990s-2000s. To understand these issues and elaborate the vision for their solution are pressing tasks for the contemporary professional Ukrainian sociologists. One may point to some of these issues which could be mostly characterized as the “problems of growth”, though they are still vital for the national sociology.

First of all, the country’s public opinion as a principal subject of sociological surveys has not yet institutionalized as a real factor which would have its important social impact on policy-making. The public opinion is rather dispersed in many aspects and it is not yet articulated clearly, particularly regarding the people’s political attitudes. In the similar way Ukraine’s civil society in the framework of still unconsolidated democracy is also in the process of its own institutionalization. The country’s complex transformation after the 2013-2014 Euromaidan became even more complicated and now aggravated with the social consequences of the annexation of the Crimea and military conflict in Donbas. These complex circumstances also create additional challenges to the public’s demand on objective social knowledge. And this demand could be the most favorable and steady ground for the development of sociology as well.
Despite of the significant progress in accumulating empirical data through the creation of various informational resources (banks of sociological data) and also the valuable continuous efforts in their systematization and analysis in the recent period of time, the national sociology is still lacking attention to theoretical generalization and sociological theory as a whole. To some extent this could be treated as a still remaining methodological stereotype about sociology as a pure empirical science, which should not be overloaded with conceptual theoretical supplements and whose role could be reduced to supplying empirical and statistical “raw material”. However, this is still the common issue of the whole post-Soviet sociology. In this regard V. Yadov, an authoritative Russian sociologist, among the factors influencing on tendencies of the post-Soviet sociology development, pointed at the “traditions of Soviet sociology”, in particular, the way of explaining empirical data from certain mono-theoretical positions and then developing practical recommendations (Ядов, 1995: p. 5). Modern Ukrainian sociology has not yet gotten rid completely of such “Soviet complexes” as well.

Following the previous, the need for the elaboration of own theoretical conceptualization is still a vital task and challenge for Ukrainian sociology. Describing similar issues in modern Russian sociology, S. Barsukova (Барсукова, 1999: p. 106) fairly characterizes some restraints of post-Soviet sociology shared by modern Ukrainian sociology as well. She argues that, firstly, some social links and social processes “go to the shadow”, and those “shadow” (even in the real sense) social and, especially, political and economic processes objectively impede studying and analyzing them; secondly, Soviet society was much more stable, while the post-Soviet is more dynamic in all aspects. So, sociology meets the problem of “late effect”, and this makes it less practically efficient (Барсукова, 1999: p. 106). Indeed, sociologists do not have to limit themselves with just explanation of social processes and their dynamics. At the current stage of society, when the deep social transformation has not been completed, scientific prognoses of social processes are of extreme importance.

By-side consequences of market commercialization also have some contradictory impact on the development of sociological science and expertise. Dilettantism and lack of professionalism of numerous pseudo “sociologists”, who suddenly come into view, particularly during political electoral campaigns, the lack of theoretical and methodological grounds for studies, subjectivity and possibilities of manipulative usage of sociology, above all in political purposes – all of these are the side-effects of commercialization. In the above-mentioned article V. Yadov says about the contradictory issues of involvement of post-Soviet sociology in market relations: “Positive aspect is a competition of professionalism. Many decent researchers get a deserved support in a way of scientific grants and commissioned studies, while those, who are less professional, have either to catch up with them or leave the job and find something else. The negative consequence is a direct result of the current spontaneous economy. Like in business, in the community of sociologists, there appear ‘corporations that develop their product from nothing’, but manage to flourish until their clients find out forgery” (Ядов, 1995: p. 6).

The only way to minimize and to some extent neutralize the risk of appearances of unprofessional, biased and manipulative sociology is steady
following and keeping to sociologists’ professional and ethic standards, the maintenance of sociological principles and values, which were elaborated and declared by the Code of Professional Ethics for Sociologists. Recently one can see a significant progress in practical implementation of the Code’s principles, particularly through self-regulating practices of professional sociological community. However, the task of keeping to and maintaining professional and ethical standards in sociological surveys and research is still an actual challenge for modern Ukrainian sociology.

And the special issue for post-Soviet sociology, particularly modern Ukrainian sociology, is its complex relations with the authorities. The problem of relations between sociology and the power is not new and exists not only in post-totalitarian societies. As it was said, during the Soviet period of time the communist state mostly determined the whole way and directions for the development of sociology that used to be functionally subordinated to political and ideological control by the authorities. During the period of Ukrainian independence, the problem of relations between sociology and authorities could not be avoided as well. However, this problem became now much more complicated and nuanced than it used to be in the Soviet time.

On the one hand, the Ukrainian government and national sociology understand more and more their objective interdependence: effective management has to be based on objective analysis and prognoses developed by the science, while the science cannot exist without support (material, resource, symbolic, status and other) of the power bodies. The latter also recognizes that – for example, in the abovementioned Decree by the President of Ukraine “On Development of the Sociological Science in Ukraine” from 2001. On the other hand, social knowledge used by the power often serves as a tool for control and manipulation in order to maintain and recreate the current social order and ruling system. The power and politicians often perceive sociology in the utilitarian way — as a new effective means for manipulation of public opinion. As Natalia Panina fairly argued “in present-day Ukraine, like in most countries, the authorities are interested in sociology very specifically, characteristic features of the interest are a ‘seasonal nature’ (interest in sociology vanishes after they have fixed in power), a ‘personal nature’ (interest is concentrated on measurement of political ratings) and ‘publicity’ (interest in the results provided by sociologists reveals only after their publication)” (Панина, 2005: p. 146). Doubtful role of pseudo-sociology as a manipulative political tool is particularly obvious in the periods of electoral campaigns. In such situations, fragile conventional borders between science and politics, truth and interest, moral and unfair play become especially vulnerable.

However, in Ukraine (unlike, for example, in present-day Russia) professional sociology has been gaining its special public status and as well as recognition. Sociology not only proved ahead the convincing positive result of the referendum on the country independence in 1991. In fact it also became the powerful factor of democratization of Ukrainian society. This is particularly true regarding the already established practice of professional electoral exit-polls in new political history of independent Ukraine. And it is worth noting that the
first professional exit-poll, which was methodologically prepared and realized by the team of leading Ukrainian sociologists (M.Churilov, V.Paniotto, N.Panina and Ye. Holovakha), was successfully conducted during the presidential electoral campaign of 1999. Since that time sociological exit-polls, whose basic idea is to serve as a means of publics’ control upon electoral process, became a customary routine and fully legitimated practice in Ukraine. These were the sociologists who first revealed the fraud and manipulations during the dramatic presidential campaign of 2004. The substantial discrepancy between the sociological exit polls’ results which showed the victory of the oppositional candidate and the officially announced election results declaring the victory of pro-authoritarian candidate triggered and in a certain way justified the wave of mass popular protests known as the 2004-2005 “orange revolution” in Ukraine.

The abovementioned confirms the fact that in transforming society the role and social functions of social (and sociological, in particular) expert knowledge could be really important. This knowledge has twofold potential: it really might work in favor of social and public emancipation, democratize a society, widen its public sphere and fulfill its right to the truth and information; at the same time, being used by corruptive authorities and unscrupulous politicians it also might serve as the tool of social control and manipulations with public opinion. These risks pose the perpetual challenges before sociologists, particularly in the society undergoing its complex social-political transformation. The issues of social, moral and also professional responsibility of sociologists as experts who elaborate and publicly spread social knowledge became especially vital and important. And this demands from sociologists to follow the classic Enlightenment ideal combining rational knowledge, civic virtues and moral values.

**Instead of conclusion: the prospects for development of sociology in Ukraine**

The prospects for further development of Ukrainian sociology as an expert knowledge and professional science with its own voice in the world scientific context depend not only on personalities practicing sociology, its institutional structure and the authorities’ attitude to its development, but also on social needs and public demands on objective social science. Will the national mass consciousness be able to leave the remains of mythological perception of social reality? Will it overgrow the state of social feelings and moods and become the *public opinion* in its full value? To what extent will the authorities and society need objective information and knowledge about themselves? The future development of the national sociology will be essentially determined by positive answers to these and other important questions.

The current tendencies in Ukrainian social development give a hope. Most sociological indicators reveal that more people gain “sober” attitudes and the will to live in the real world. The real scientific sociology is able and has to contribute to it. Also, the features of national psychology, like traditional inclination for common sense and developed feeling of reality, can work in favor of the further spreading
and strengthening of objective sociological knowledge in Ukraine. When processes of public self-organization “wake up”, political culture of population grows, the social need of self-studying, objective information about the nature and mechanisms of the power and society functioning appears, then the national sociology gets real tasks to solve for its further development. However, the science itself does not ensure that a certain problem will be solved. Its goal is to make an objective diagnosis and prognoses on social processes, as well as to develop possible ways for their solution. Of course, under such conditions the role of sociologists as social experts in proposals to the power and society has to grow obviously.

The national sociology is still a rather young science, despite its active development in independent Ukraine. As mentioned above, many of its problems relate to “difficulties of growth” and complicated processes of optimization and transformation in scientific knowledge and its role in the new social and political situation. The strategy of the national sociology development in the future, its involvement in the world scientific context might include three interconnected directions.

The first one deals with revival, thorough reconstruction and modern adaptation of the best achievements of its own interrupted historical European tradition as well as the comprehension of the complex Soviet sociological heritage. These historical roots have a lot of things still meaningful, especially if one takes into account that these were developed in the national and cultural context. Historical studies of sociological traditions and their own theoretical self-reflexivity are the important aspects of institutionalization of any sociology, including also Ukrainian. And in this field there are still many prospects for further research, in particular, into studying new or not yet fully investigated Ukrainian scholars (e.g., S.Podolynskyi, O.-I.Bochkovskyi, A.Zwonicka and others) and their historical sociological ideas. Moreover, this is also true for the Soviet period as well as for the period of the 1990s (of the early state independence period). Indeed, these important periods by themselves are already becoming the own original history of national sociology.

The second direction relates to the study and adaptation of the current world sociological tendencies, elaboration and development of our own theoretical approaches. In other words, to turn sociology into the science of full value, our national scholars have to be more open to various ideas and opinions, develop not only receptions and adaptation of sociological knowledge, but also actively participate in world communication and exchange of ideas with their foreign colleagues. Formation of its own “sociological voice” and activity for representation of it on the world sociological arena, organizational attention to international cooperation, development of international projects, involvement in the activities of the world sociological community — all that is very important for the realization of this strategy.

The third direction of the development of Ukrainian sociology implies the active research activities and full use of unique possibilities in studying the conditions and circumstances of the society under complex transformation. This transformation after the 2013-2014 Euromaidan became even more complicated and now aggravated with the social consequences of the annexation of the Crimea and military conflict in Donbas and hence with newly actual issues of sociology of war and of conflict related to it. The alive and changeable conditions of transformation
of Ukrainian society in its complex and recently dramatic dynamics give to the sociologists not only the possibilities of their direct life experience, observation and first-hand knowledge but also open the opportunities in developing own theoretical conceptualization intertwined into the global social context.

And finally it is worthwhile to outline another important direction for the development of modern Ukrainian sociology. It is connected with the transformation of sociology into a socially responsible expert knowledge and updating various public formats for the representation of it for the whole society. It is objective sociological knowledge that can provide the necessary practical communicative connections between the authorities and society, as well as within horizontal interactions of the very society. The lack of these connections, as the current socio-political practice proved, could lead to deep systemic crises and harsh conflicts in the country.

Sociology aiming at unbiased social analysis, elaborating objective knowledge and prognosis about the consequences and alternatives of public policy in many spheres could also effectively enhance the political process towards its increasing transparency, consistency and predictability as necessary conditions for democratic social development in Ukraine. Both totalitarian political regime and authoritarian society do not need objective sociology because it objectively contributes to the development of responsible, active and competent civil society and also to the formation of a responsible democratic government which is subjected to public control.

The government attention to development of sociology as an indicator and stimulus for democratization, the creation of conditions for healthy competition in sociology, the meritocratic approach to its development, support of young professionals, wide range of new ideas and approaches at the national sociological market, further involvement of national sociology in the world sociological community, maintenance of ethical and professional norms in sociological studies, care about improvement of sociological culture of the power and society, strengthening intellectual property rights on sociological research achievements — all of these should be important aspects in further development of sociological science in Ukraine.

Ukrainian sociology, as it used to be from its historical origin at the beginning of 19th century, continues to play its important social role, which, according to M.Hrushevskiy, is in the task of “positive improvement” of Ukrainian society through sociological knowledge. And such features of the national historical sociological tradition, as its close connection to socio-political problems, with the issues of establishing democratic statehood and the development of social self-organization, seem also rather relevant for the present-day Ukrainian society.

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GENEALOGY OF THE IDEOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT IN THE POST-LENINIST UKRAINE*

Pavlo Kutuev (Kyiv)

Post-Leninist societies in general and Ukraine in particular are facing a challenge of reformulating their respective ideologies of development in terms of liberal democracy and capitalism. Ukraine has witnessed the formation of partisan and partial ideologies of development. None of them have been capable of incorporating relevant insights elaborated by their opponents. The article analyzes the structure of the ideology of development in terms of the interplay among equity, efficiency, and participation. It is argued that the project of development under current circumstances cannot be reduced to economic growth and should be accompanied by institution building in the realm of political and civil societies as well as social welfare. The emergence and successful implementation of the ideology of development in the post-Leninist Ukraine depends on its major political actors’ ability to promote – instead of circumscribing – the creative potential of democracy.

Keywords: Postleninism; ideology of development; modernization; Ukraine; democracy.

Social scientists in the post-Soviet countries freed from the rigid control over the choice of their theoretical orientation have been all too happy to embrace Western influences and ideas. More often than it has not been making them dealers in second hand ideas. Postmodernism is a case in point. Postmodernist thinking alleges that it has driven a final nail in the coffin of the concept of ideology viewed as essentially modern society project. By the same token, the concept of modernity is rendered obsolete in theory and useless in practice. The extinction of Leninism both as a way of life and ideology seemed to confirm these conclusions. Yet, despite being repeatedly buried, modernity, development and ideology are alive and kicking as social phenomena. These issues are not merely academic debates. Ukraine’s future is currently being developed and it faces two alternatives. It has a potential of either becoming the next Eastern European giant following example set by South Korea in East Asia or following the path of underdevelopment embodied by Brazil, the country blessed with natural resources, but suffering from staggering inequality and dependency. In this light postmodernism concerns posteconomic and nonmaterial values as a new orientation of social action as well as endless debates of discourse and identity are far removed from Ukraine’s mundane problems.

The postmodern thinking in general social theory has found its match in postdevelopment paradigm in the field of developmental studies. Scholars associated with this school of thought view the development exclusively in negative terms and consider it as the infringement of the West on quiet and harmonic eco-social order of premodern communities. Thus, according to champions of postdevelopment, the project of modernity has no value whatsoever and the demonstration effect it has had on ‘the Rest’ can only be harmful. It is interesting to note that authoritarian leaders in many post-Soviet states have often employed the same ‘nativist’ style of reasoning defending their autocratic polices and rejecting Western ideas of participation, transparency and accountability with the reference to unique legacies of their

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1 I have borrowed this concept from Radhika Desai (Desai, 1994).
2 I have employed Ken Jowitt’s (Jowitt, 1992) term ‘Leninism’ to designate societies under the rule of communist parties as more adequate and penetrating in comparison with ‘communism’, ‘socialism’, etc.
3 On South Korea development see insightful discussion by Alice Amsden (1989).
4 For the renewal of classical statement on dependency see (Rocha, 2002).
5 The latter statement is, in no way, intended to be a wholesale rejection of postmodernist thinking; it is only an attempt to restrict its relevance to an appropriate context.
6 I have analyzed this approach in (Kyryev, 2003a).
respective societies. Contrary to the assumptions of the postdevelopment approach I am of opinion that the vast majority of the countries in a contemporary world is badly in need of access to modernity and is unlikely to suffer from its abundance.

I subscribe myself to Machiavelli-Weber’s idea of prudence which entails realistic and cautious approach to both promises and challenges offered by social transformations. Both, left radicals condemning the consequences of the globalized capitalism and neoliberal orthodox promising smooth upgrading of social system undergoing the market ‘transition’, are equally erroneous. Perhaps, the greatest breakthrough achieved by Weber was the understanding of impossibility of formulating universal logic of the societal development. This methodological assumption goes against the conceit of evolutionary versions of liberal modernization theory and vulgar Marxism as well as their claim to possess the solution of the history’s riddle. Therefore, both modernization and world-systems’ theories have offered only partial explanations / interpretations of the social reality. Yet, this statement does not render them useless, on the contrary they are highly relevant analytical tools provided that their inherent limits are acknowledged and transcendent.

Instead of experiencing the convergence of ideologies under the auspice of liberal capitalism or its total end, the contemporary world has witnessed a worldwide resurgence of ideologies, especially of radical and militant bent (e.g., the religious fundamentalism). Successful development scenarios have often relied on cultural legacy to fostering social change and supporting ideology developed by the ruling establishment. This makes the issue of ideology and its role in social development as acute as ever.

Clifford Geertz [1973] in his seminal essay has rejected the reduction of ideology to the mere cunning and the Machiavellian struggle for power. Ideologies can also play a critically important role in “identifying (or obscuring) social categories, stabilizing (or upsetting) social expectations, maintaining (or undermining) social norms, strengthening (or weakening) social consensus, relieving (or exacerbating) social tensions. Reducing of ideology to the weapon in guerre de plume gives the warming air of militancy to its analysis, but it also means reducing of intellectual compass with which such analysis may be conducted with the constricted realism of tactics and strategy” (Geertz, 1973: p. 202-203). Therefore, the development of ideology promoting the feature which Alexander Gerschenkron has termed as “new deal in emotions”, and thus promulgating the commitment to new values and mode of social action is a critical prerequisite of the development itself.

7 The glorification of the local, informal as opposed to the universalistic claims of modernity is a double edge sword. Claus Offe has observed that so-called new social movements that can be viewed as an institutionalization of postmodernist ideas “are far from having developed even the outlines of a program of social transformation with the same degree of consistency and comprehensiveness that characterized the earlier sociopolitical movements. I find another rupture in that (sic) in their critique of modernization – with thoroughly emancipatory intent – these new social movements are not entirely immune from the temptation to revert to unmistakably premodern ideals and to base their critique on particularistic, communitarian, libertarian, anarchistic, ecological, or similar fundamentalism (Offe, 1996: p. 20). I have discussed the resurgence of neo-traditionalist socio-political forms in Ukrainian context in (Кютюев, 2001).

8 The Leninist extinction has rendered the ideas of revolutionary transformation, let alone delinking from the obsolete theoretically and irrelevant theoretically world-system.
Hereafter I will discuss the link between major social / political forces in Ukraine and their discourses of the development. The essay combines description with analysis and interpretation while avoiding prescriptions. The argument presented in this article runs counter the popular underestimation of the role of culture and ideology in the formation of a nation’s politics and policy. I also reject an equally dangerous temptation to replace purely instrumental theorizing by an idealistic one. Neither ideology as a cultural system nor Weberian concern with domination and conflict, or world-systemic preoccupation with structural global inequality should drop out of our conceptual picture.

The development is viewed here as a society’s drive to upgrade its technological infrastructure, economic, political, and state institutions in an attempt to tackle the issues of equity, efficiency, and participation. Although it is useful to distinguish conceptual development and modernization, these processes remain tensely intertwined. Development is instigated by the “developmental state” (Кутуев, 2002: 2003b) and is usually a response to external challenges. Thus, development is a transformation by way of imitation and emulation. Obviously it is also a process of reshaping of the local cultural patterns coupled with the adjustment of the policy to existing sociocultural environment. Modernization is a process of establishment of the modern society launched by endogenous values promoting active attitude to the world (this suggests that modernization cannot be spurred by external threats / challenges / opportunities, most notable in Japan). While the development can and should be promoted, the modernization is rather a self-regulatory, autonomous process. The development takes place on the level of the structures’ change – economic and political – thus leading to the transformation of social composition of the society. The modernization is rather a (by)product – often unintended – of the features which are intrinsically inherent to the cultural patterns (e.g., Weber’s ascetic Protestantism). The developed one does not always mean modern (e.g., Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union during Stalin’s day), yet it may lead to modernity over the long run. Although the modernity as an ethos can be removed from the development, the institutionalized modernity has a closer elective similarity with the development. To sum up, development and modernization often – but not always – have symbiotic relationship.

The US president George Bush once remarked that politics was a visible thing. But visions cannot be built only on the intuition: they require more solid scientifically valid basis (e.g., thoroughly examined concepts), especially in the controversial

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9 Jeffrey Alexander and his neofunctionalist research program is a good example of how idealistic bias in theory-building can bring about the total failure at the attempt of conceptual synthesis.

10 The ‘original’ modernity “developed in Europe and combined several closely connected dimensions. In structural terms, these included differentiation, urbanization, industrialization, and communication...; in institutional terms, they included the nation-state and the rational capitalist economy; in cultural terms, they allowed the construction of new collective identities bound up with the nation-state but embedded in a cultural program that entailed different modes of structuring the major arenas of social life” (Eisenstadt and Schluchter, 1998: p. 3). Taking into consideration that the rise of modern society in the West was far away from being purposeful activity, it is more productive to call this process ‘the formation of modernity’ instead of ‘modernization’ for the latter to presuppose goal-oriented activity.
realm of societal development. While adopting ideas which were or are famous in the West, Ukrainian politicians tend to devoid them of their meaning, making these structures useless as analytical tools and policy goals. Another side of the same coin is that being unfamiliar with well-established concepts, the Ukrainian policy-makers have to reinvent the wheel over and over. For example, in major policy speeches of the president of Ukraine we can trace the intuitively grasped understanding of the importance of the state in fostering the development in the post-Soviet context and the irrelevance of the neo-classical minimalist doctrine of the state. At the same time, the elaborated conceptual lexis of the developing state is not being employed, although its usage could assist in formulating feasible goals of public policy which implementation would bring tangible benefits to the public at large. As a result, the development of the ideology of development has been still arrested in Ukraine.

My position goes beyond limits of developing state paradigm and world-systems’ theories, providing for a synthetic combination of relevant assumptions and findings of both schools of thought. Unlike world-systems’ theorists I presume that national development does have a chance to occur under favorable international conditions and conducive domestic situation (as the US President Bill Clinton once said “combination of good values and good policies”). Both Japanese miracle and the rise of Asian Tigers can only be partially explained by actions of the US inclined to containment policy and thus interested in the reconstruction of these countries as their powerful allies in a clash with Leninist regimes. Contrary to Huntington’s classical idea which links the authoritarian rule with the ability to push through the reform agenda (Huntington, 1968), I propose that development can and ought to be promoted by the state with a democratic agenda, thus using the creative potential of a voluntarism as a social action in Parsons’ sense. This is the reason why the impressive economic performance of East Asian countries cannot be unconditionally glorified – their take off was often based on authoritarian policies and involved significant human costs and political repressions. Nonetheless, the idea of enlightened and benevolent authoritarianism featured prominently in the ‘ideology’ promoted by a number of post-Soviet intellectuals. Authoritarian fad experienced revival in pseudo-academic form in the West as well. Paul Kubicek’s writings (Kubicek, 1997) who in spite of hard facts of social involution of Ukraine under the president Leonid Kuchma named the last a “pragmatic technocrat”, exemplify this trend as infamous for its complete misunderstanding of the post-Soviet reality.

The critical role of culture in social development and modernization can be highlighted by the following example. In 1970s the average annual workload in Germany was 1860 hours, while South Koreans worked 2800 hours. The latter worked more hours even in comparison with their counterparts from developing countries. There are two possible explanations of this dramatic difference between developed and developing nations. One hypothesis emphasizes the superexploitation of workers on the periphery. An alternative insight – which I personally share – points to the culturally determined predisposition to intensive work. It should be noted that the latter explanation does not exclude the reality of exploitation.

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11 World-systems approach is associated with the name of Immanuel Wallerstain but for the sake of simplicity of my argument I include world system – without hyphen and singular theorizing – advanced by Andre Gunder Frank in the same category. For more thorough discussion see (Кутуєв, 2003 б).
The above-mentioned underlines the importance of a link between the development and its ideological basis. Thus, Ukraine needs a secular ideology of development capable of identifying the nation’s place in the world, outlining the desirable effects of the post-Leninist social transformation and providing legal framework for the unity of the nation. I deliberately avoid using the language of “goals” since the latter is intimately connected with excessively rationalistic world-view inherited from the Enlightenment and Marxism. Contemporary version of such style of thinking is a transitology with its naive belief in feasibility of goals of social development once they have been stated. Instead of focusing its research agenda on the collapse of the old social order and struggle for the new one, transitology was confidently preaching about a smooth passage from one stage of social development to another, a higher one. Inspired by Fukuyama’s optimistic liberalism bordering the prophecy, transitology also sub-consciously invoked old-fashion explanatory schemes of classical modernization theory with its vision of an irreversible, progressive, linear, evolutionary path to the institutions of liberal-democratic capitalism. An escape from Leninism and fight against post-Leninism have proved a far more difficult task for Ukraine than originally expected. It was also discovered that peculiar modes of extrication from Leninism, chosen by different countries, depended dramatically on how long they had experienced Leninist governing and to what degree their regimes had been committed to a revolutionary breakthrough and system building. Thus, it is not surprising that the transition of Ukrainian society to a realm of market, democracy and civil society by leaps and bounds has not been occurred. Ukrainian way was like a zigzagged path, it was neither East European nations’ revolution nor China’s gradual reform which resembled Vladimir Lenin’s phrase: “one step forward, two steps backward”. These factors underline the crucial importance of the ideology of development capable of providing a vision of the future as well as instigating and motivating “new deal in emotions”. At the same time, if the ideology of development is confined to narrowly defined ‘elite’, it cannot alone ensure the country’s success towards the development. Ideology of development has to find its match in the actions of the developing state and seek the support of the wider spectrum of society. The combination of the ideology and state committed to the development pursued in a democratic environment plays an important role in identifying desirable direction of social change and realistic policies required to follow the chosen path (hopefully, it is more feasible than a “shining path” to “feasible socialism”).

Let us look closely at the genealogy of ideas of development in the discourse of major Ukrainian political forces and their social constituencies. It should be noted that none of them has exhibited a commitment without mentioning the ability to elaborate ideology of development with a mobilizing potential and maintain it with collective actions and / or policies. This weakness of collective political actors is structurally embedded in Ukrainian society. Therefore, I am in favor of going beyond the analysis of the state actions / policies and their impact on the development. This type of the discourse – a paradigm which embodiment is a state-centered approach – naturally tends to be elitist and has to be complemented with bringing society back in a sociological analysis of the development.

12 I have examined the theoretical and ideological assumptions of classical modernization paradigm in my article (Кутуєв, 2003 a).
It is useful to construct the ideal types of the three most influential political actors in Ukraine: this will allow us to elaborate models of their respective visions of the development within the context of their broader world views. These are the ideologies of the left, the right, who are also often referred to as national democrats, and the so-called center. The left is represented here for the sake of simplicity and analytical clarity by the Communist Party of Ukraine. Within the community of discourse of the Ukrainian law, the center of influence has shifted from the Rukh, founded by Viacheslav Chornovil, to Victor Yushchenko’s umbrella organization Our Ukraine, which is also often referred to as national democrats. The center has been a veritable mish-mash of political forces with lack of distinct ideological identity and combined by their links with ruling political establishment, on the one hand, and political capitalists, on the other.

It should be noted that in reality the boundaries among these political actors are fuzzy, and their actions are often determined by short-term considerations of micro-rationality and tactical gain. Yet, it does not render this typology useless since, according to Weber’s formula, it is necessary to take into account the interplay of interests and ideas to reconstruct the motives of the social actors.

Each of the political actors tend to have an elective affinity with the particular social group which serves as its constituency. Taking into account that property relations in Ukraine remain fuzzy, and the rule of law is still a distant ideal, the entrepreneurial activity heavily depends on business of private favors rendered by state managers. It makes political and economic forms of capital (using Pierre Bourdieu’s terms) – appropriated mostly by state managers and the nascent class of political capitalists respectively – easily interchangeable. These two social subcategories form the major factions of the ruling establishment with the state managers performing the function of the intermediary between local and global capital. Taking into account the precariousness of this group’s position in a society – population at large is distrustful towards the state as well as its managers and suspicious of entrepreneurs – the vague mixture of moderate centrist sounding ideas has been chosen as its ideological wrap. The strategy of dealing with ideological identities – in a new situation of a society’s commercialization – in a manner resembling a treatment of trademarks / brand names by their owners turned out to be an asset in a volatile conditions of the societal transformation. It has allowed political actors to borrow the elements of ideological visions of the development defended by their opponents on the left and on the right without bothering them to maintain compatible policies.

The social basis of the Ukrainian law is an imagined middle class which tends to share the values of its Western counterpart, but has no economic resources and social status of the latter.

None of the above-mentioned political actors has shown the ability to elaborate the ideology of development with a nation-wide appeal and mobilization potential.

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13 This is perhaps the most striking feature of the divergence of the developmental trajectories of East and Central European countries on the one hand, and most post-Soviet states, on the other. For the succinct discussion of the Central European case see (Eyal, Szelényi, Townsley, 2000).
The most influential political players have tended to waste their resources on turf wars with their opponents and have failed to identify society’s urgent agenda while the society has been subjected to fragmentation and chosen the withdrawal from public life.

For example, the resurrection of the communist party (after a two-year ban, a “new” communist party was registered in 1993) has not happened along reformist, “social democratic” lines. Instead, it has reproduced even more rigid ideological outlook than before. By advocating the restoration of the Soviet Union and thus challenging the legitimacy of the Ukrainian statehood, communists ruled out the chance of less antagonistic mode of interaction with the other two major camps.14

Ideally-typically, the national democrats have been primarily motivated by ideas and ideal interests, to revoke Max Weber’s vocabulary again. The center is a successor to the Leninist political establishment who has seen independence as a chance to ensure its own autonomy as state-builders while forging beneficial ties with nascent capitalist class (which also predominantly consists of former regime’s proxies). This group is, therefore, predominantly guided by material interests.

At the same time, political actors in general and elected state managers in particular have been under the combinations of pressures – mild domestic ones, coupled with more vigorous persuasion on the part of Western powers – to act within the framework of (formally) democratic rules. That means periodically held elections, participation in which, in turn, requires an ideological wrap. Taking it into account, it is useful to identify two political subcategories within a ruling block – using Antonio Gramsci’s term – which emergence was determined by the necessity to compete for the office of the nation’s president15 and unicameral legislature respectively. Comparative-historical data on the modernization processes in postcolonial “new states” suggests that the best platform for capturing the presidential office is a mildly nationalist ideology – compatible with the above-mentioned centrism. Within the framework of this ideology, the head of state is represented as a bipartisan umpire of a nation and a guarantor of an organic solidarity bringing citizens together. Being above the political fray meant that the president could not identify him/herself with more specific ideologies and their supporters. Only the whole nation was perceived as an appropriate reference point and a source of legitimacy for the institution. This explains why successful campaigning for the office of the president in Ukraine did not require a party affiliation (unlike established practices in countries with presidential regimes, like France and the US). It remains unclear if current arrangement can be replaced by new rules requiring more articulate political formula.

A different configuration has been formed at the level of the competition for the legislature. Electoral competition under first-past-the-post system, initially used in Ukraine, was not conducive to the development of parties with distinct Weltanschauung. The transformation of the purely majoritarian system into a mixed arrangement combining the elements of proportional and majoritarian rules provided a boost for a party-building and reinforced the need for ideological self-identification.

14 This, of course, does not exclude the possibility of shifting tactical alliances among these forces.

15 Although the Constitution of Ukraine defines the president only as a head of state, the holder of the office is effectively a chief executive as well.
Considering that the majority of the Ukrainian parties’ cadre underwent political socialization under the auspices of the communist party or party sponsored organizations (e.g., komsomol, trade unions, state apparatus), the institutional format of the parties they established after the fall of ‘communism’ has tended to resemble the structure and centralized decision-making process of the Leninist party (this does not imply the substantive similarity in terms of goals and policies). Party-building strategies modelled on a Soviet example have led to the emphasis on a core membership and the creation of umbrella associations with no clear action plan and rationale behind their existence.

These developments have resulted in a striking discrepancy between parties’ declared ideological goals and actual policy as well as their social composition.

While being an effective tool for providing votes via clientalistic arrangements in first-past-the-post constituencies, the treatment of ideology as a mere technicality backfired during the last parliamentary elections in March 2002. If politicians allied directly or indirectly with the ruling block captured most of the single constituencies, the right and the left forces with more distinctive ideological features would seize their chance to capitalize on their competitive edge and share votes under the proportional system.

Each of the three above-mentioned camps has certain elements of the true picture but has failed to combine it into a synthetic vision and a common plan of action. The communists’ calls for social justice and condemnation of the realities of primitive accumulation as well as the appeal to end Ukraine’s dependence on external centers of power are met with skepticism not because of their conclusions, but due to the unacceptability of assumptions (hard line of the Marxist analysis) and prescriptions (e.g., the restoration of the USSR, Soviet structure of power, and planned economy). The ruling power block has monopolized the job of state-rebuilding, but while doing so, it failed to act in a manner responsive to broader societal interests. National democrats have opted for the promotion of a contradictory scheme. They have vehemently supported the radical economic reforms while advocating the preservation of distinct national culture. Being inspired by simplistic interpretation of liberal tradition, they have overlooked the fact that unleashing impersonal forces of unrestricted market has both creative and destructive consequences. The task of defending national identity, while participating in a ‘global gamble’, using Peter Gowan’s phrase (Gowan, 1999), is far from being realistic. It is no surprise that mutually exclusive and particularistic nature of all three approaches to country’s societal development has precluded them from winning minds and hearts of the people’s majority.

The ruling power block, which could hardly encourage cooperation among political actors transcending ideological boundaries for its politics, had a striking resemblance to Charles Tilly’s notion of “state-building and war-making as an organized crime”, using the title of his brilliant essay (Tilly, 1985). Yet, pure utilitarian interpretation of these developments seems to be neither adequate nor sufficient. Michael Burawoy has called for the antecedent conditions to be included into conceptualization of the post-Leninist transformation. Taking into account the

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16 Outsiders having represented former dissidents and / or intellectuals were quickly marginalized and mostly driven outside the political mainstream.
success of the Soviet Leninist regime in destroying autonomous institutions of the society and alienating population from public life, it would be unrealistic to hope for the Ukrainian counterparts of Vaclav Havel to come out of the civic scratch left after the downfall of the regime. The late party Leninist cadres’ decadent morale reflecting the clash of charismatic, rational, and traditional elements within the regime itself could hardly be an environment which contribute to forging politicians committed to the ethic of responsibility based on convictions. This Leninist legacy is an important factor which shapes current state managers outlook and hampers the elaboration of responsible ideology of development that will become a basis for policy-making.

The resumption of an economic growth in Ukraine seems to alter the situation significantly. The growth provided a rationale for the ruling block who could legitimize its grip on power not only by references to law and order (which stability have been questionable to many), but also citing the nation’s impressive economic performance. At the same time, it is doubtful that the growth has been beneficial to many. Again, comparative-historical evidence shows convincingly that the growth alone cannot solve social problems unless it takes place in a framework of competitive political society based on a state’s participation and deliberation and welfare. Brazil can serve as a useful point of comparison in this respect. This country’s growth rates in 1968-1974 averaged 10 percent, and that led many scholars to believe that they were witnessing an economic miracle based on Brazilian model. Yet, the growth launched under export promotion policies was heavily dependent on external demand. Once the world crisis hit the core of the capitalist world-system in 1974, the Brazilian miracle was brought to an abrupt end. It is also worth mentioning that a spectacular economic growth in Brazil has happened against the backdrop of severe political repressions and deterioration of living conditions of popular classes.17

Ukrainian ruling establishment has been keen on revoking – probably subconsciously – the experience of Asian Tigers whose authoritarian rule and repression against political opponents and labor were forgiven in a light of their economic performance. Power block’s attempt to make growth rates the source of its legitimacy18 fails to note a critical difference in international and domestic situation between Ukraine and Asian Tigers. The open violation of human rights and democracy by the latter could be tolerated in a world divided into two political camps – liberal and Leninist ones. Both ‘systems’ were competing for the loyalty of developing nations and thus raising the level of their allies’ domestic stability at any cost. Ukraine, being a geographical center of Europe, cannot afford the luxury of ignoring signals coming from major centers of the Western powers (tough attitude of the West towards domestic political scandals that have been rocking Ukraine recently is a case in point). Thus, Ukrainian leaders have been motivated to keep up democratic appearances. But soon it may not be enough for both domestic and external reasons, and politics in Ukraine

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17  For more details see penetrating analysis provided by Andre Gunder Frank (1980).
18  That economic growth itself cannot ensure an equity and participation sounds like a trivial statement. Astonishingly, but even international academic and policy communities seem to have been mesmerized by Ukraine’s growth pace. Though such terms as overheating and bubble economy are widely used in discussions of the performance of US economy, they are not applied to Ukraine. The fact that bubble economies often bust with devastating implications for the society is ignored. The problem of uneven development is not addressed either.
will have to switch its operational mode from conflicting and alienating to conciliatory / inclusive one. Some of the authoritarian politically but successful economically East Asian countries have already made an effort to adopt democratic institutions and procedures. Developmental authoritarian fad, which sought its legitimacy from the rate of capital accumulation, seems to be over, particularly in the part of the world where Ukraine is located.

It is also crucial to realize that Ukrainian post-Leninist political capitalists’ pattern of action differs dramatically from that of industrial capitalists of the West during “great transformation”. If the latter were primarily concerned with the production and thus creation of the wealth via the exploitation of the working classes, the former are chiefly operating in a sphere of the exchange, where the most effective mechanism of accumulation is a redistribution of already existing wealth via a loot. There can be identified several strategies of accumulation in Ukraine favored by local political capitalists (this is hardly a complete list): tax evasion, however state managers have a stake in this; capital drain; money laundering; export of raw materials and semi-finished goods produced by public enterprises – which bear the costs of production – at artificially depreciated prices with subsequent alienation of the offshore accounts’ profits; soliciting unjustified subsidies from the government.

The development is a complex concept implying a multidimensional social change, affecting – ideally in a positive manner – not only the political-economic establishment, but the society at large and occurring in a participatory political environment, thus avoiding rigidity of authoritarian developmental state. Taking into account that three main strands of political thinking / actions which have been evolving along independent trajectories in Ukraine, every force tends to emphasize only separate elements of the holistic ideology of development.

Breaking down the ideology of development into three major components – equity, efficiency and participation – we can assess every ideal-typically identified political actor against these criteria. It turns out that the left has been focusing on the equity, while ignoring efficiency and participation, the center has been advocating a precarious notion of efficiency while paying only a lip service to the participation and the equity, and the right has been advocating participation and efficiency, treating an equity as a residual category. The ruling power block’s moderate centrist language appears to be a self-interested hypocrisy in a light of its real policy agenda and practices of political capitalists tolerated / encouraged by the state. The ruling block’s lack of credible ideological convictions has been compensated by what Gramsci called ‘volunteer actions’ (the term ‘volunteer’ is somewhat confusing since Gramsci’s term really meant arbitrariness). According to Gramsci, “volunteer action and passivity go together better than we think. The solution of involving volunteer action is a solution of authority from the top down, formally legitimized by consent, as it is claimed, of the “best” elements (italics is mine. – P.K.). But the ‘best elements’ are not enough for constructing a lasting history; the vaster and more numerous national-popular energies are needed” (Gramsci, 1998: p. 203).

Institutional dynamics of power is crucial for the emergence of the ideology of development. Power is understood here in terms of Talcott Parsons’ concept

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19 For the insightful criticism of the rationale behind developmental authoritarianism see (Stark, Bruszt, 1998).
with its stress on broader society’s consent to political system’s goals and social support. Only under such arrangement the legitimacy of the political decision to mobilize resources can be ensured. Clifford Geertz’s interpretation of Parsons’ ideas is particularly instructive and relevant to the case of Ukraine: “The growth of a modern state within a traditional social context represents… not merely the shifting or transferring of a fixed quantity of power between groups in such a manner that the gains of certain groups or individuals match the losses of others, but rather the creation (italics is mine. – P.K.) of a new and more efficient machine for the production of power itself, and thus, an increase of the general political capacity of the society. This is much more genuinely “revolutionary” phenomenon than the mere redistribution, however radical, of power within given system” (Geertz, 1973: p. 270). Instead of power production the Ukrainian ruling political establishment has been engaged from the onset of country’s independence into power redistribution (not unlike its symbiotic partner – the class of political capitalist which has been primarily concerned with wealth redistribution).

As it has been repeatedly shown by scholars with diverse orientations, the emergence of the ideology of development and its translation into the reality of developmental policies instigating economic growth, social justice and citizens’ participation may be facilitated by the presence of conducive culture coupled with an supporting institutional framework see (Clegg and Redding, 1990: p. 18). The presence of both “inner-world”-activity culture and stimulating structural conditions is doubtful in modern Ukraine. The dominant worldview encourages the adjustment to the world instead of transforming it. The ethic of responsibility compatible with the rational bureaucracy ethos has not developed in Ukraine.20

This vicious circle creates bottlenecks hampering the emergence of the state institutions while reinforcing existing culture of adjustment to the hostile environment.21

Leninist extinction and events of September 11, 2001 in the USA have inaugurated the period of new world disorder. The boundaries among levels of the world-system tend to become more flexible in a time of global turmoil. Chaotic environment provides both a challenge and opportunity for newcomers. Ukraine may seize upon a chance and further integrate itself into the world-system, while rejuvenating democracy, posting a good economic performance and promoting the equity at home. Whether these potentialities will be realized depends on several conditions. It is of critical importance that decision-making will take place in a manner compatible with the above-mentioned Parsons’ model of power. Achieving this task requires more consensual political action on the part of major political forces. However, none of them has exhibited the willingness to make concessions to their opponents so far. The ability of state managers and politicians to learn from both successes and failures of countries which began their journey on a road to development earlier is also crucial. Yet, Ukrainian leaders are inclined to ignore lessons of history. Failure to address these requirements will make the chance of the emergence of a synthetic ideology of development compatible with the vision of modernity in its ideal-typical

20 For the elaboration of both points see (Kutuev, 1997; 2000).

21 Ukrainians have mastered the strategy of getting by without government, the phenomenon has been insightfully termed by Richard Rose (Rose, 1994).
Western embodiment rather slim. Ukraine is poised to become a paper tiger unless it takes the challenge of developing the ideology of development seriously.

Developmental state action does matter even under conditions of world-systemic reassurances, yet the ability of the state to plan rationally and carry out its actions depends critically on the presence of the ideology of development linking the public and “power elite”. Under the regime of extended accountability, the taming of foreign capital and local strongman is possible without detrimental effects on the democracy.

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DOMINANT CONJUNCTION IN THE STUDY OF STRATIFICATION ORDERS: POSITIONS & DISPOSITIONS

Natalia Kovalisko (Lviv)

The article considers social inequality as a certain set of stratification orders that are constantly reproduced in every society. In the study of stratification orders the dominant one is the conjunction of “position & disposition”, which makes it possible to identify and explain the specific behaviour of individuals and communities operating in one way or another because they represent the bearers of a certain habitus (as a set of dispositions). Thus, stratification orders are positions that are hierarchically ordered on the basis of a set of inequality criteria determining which of the agents (individual, group, stratum) occupies the highest and which the lowest place for the social splitting of society. Dispositions are the product of past experience and take place in social agents as patterns of perception, thinking and action. The position of communities in the social structure is formed on the basis of the entire set of stratification orders that are methodologically and methodically substantiated by the researcher within the framework of a certain theoretical paradigm or approach.

Keywords: social inequality, stratification order, conjunction of “position & disposition”.

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The social inequality that a sociologist represents in the form of a definite set of stratification orders is constantly reproduced in any society and the character of reproduction is unstable. This is the very circumstance that supports researchers' interest in stratification processes, stimulates the search for new institutional or purely situational grounds for the emergence and approval of new varieties of inequality.

The idea of a class stratification order, that is, the order of prepotency and domination, the reduction of social structure to the class structure is peculiar to Marxism. Nowadays, the empirical study of class inequality is based on the rather strict methodological constructions of E. Wright and J. Goldthorpe. The most intensive conceptual development of the notions of non-class stratification orders took place within the framework of M. Weber’s “understanding sociology”, as well as structural functionalism, where the necessity and inevitability of stratification are justified and where it is interpreted as an uneven distribution of material wealth and public prestige, which is determined by the functional importance (significance) of the position. In the framework of the functional approach, it is proposed to consider the basic stratification order of positions, where material and symbolic remunerations of different quality and volume are built into the positions themselves. In this case, the individual or community at the same time has different statuses within the various stratification orders (income, age, position, origin, power, education, prestige, etc.). The cumulative status is called the status (stratification) profile. Individuals with similar status profiles form social strata, which are characterized by a certain subculture, more frequent contacts between their members, a similar lifestyle, a way of consumption, social practices and a more or less distinctive distance separating one stratum from the other.

In the study of stratification orders, that is, in the attempts of sociologists to discover and explain the specificity of individual or group behaviour, the unconditional dominant belongs to the conjunction of “position and disposition”. Several content strata or measurements can be distinguished within this variety of scientific and intellectual practice. Thus, classical and modern interpretations of the notions of “social space” state the existence of a final set of “places”, discrete localities that are not the same in meaning and quality and capable of forming heterogeneous configurations by condensation or, conversely, rarefaction. In fact, here we mean different dimensions of the discreteness of social space, for the definition of which the general term “positions” is used. In other words, stratification orders are hierarchically ordered positions.
K. Davis and W. Moore in their works, which at the time reasonably claimed the status of “stratification theory”, insisted on “embedding” into such positions quantitatively and qualitatively unequal schemes of material and symbolic remuneration. Hence, firstly, individuals starting independent life, allegedly have an objectifiable motivation “before them” to make efforts to achieve higher and better remunerated places of work, and also have greater or lesser chances to take attractive positions for them or are doomed to unattractive. In addition, according to popular opinion, people are given a sense of their own position in the social space to various extents (the ability to define it in terms of “above–below”, “closer–further”, “between”, etc.), and are able to develop an awareness of the limitations and opportunities inherent in their self-localization or attributed to other individuals or institutions of localization.

According to P. Bourdieu, positions are rather constellations of different types and sizes of capital, which, in fact, structure and hierarchically organize the social space as a whole, and individuals are given certain chances to control the individual or group space: “...the ability to dominate in the assigned space, primarily due to the assignment (by material or symbolic way) of those scarce goods, which are distributed there, depends on available capital” (Бурдье, 1993: p. 43]. Moreover, capital constellations (aggregated position) are incorporated, that is, transformed into a system of personal qualities, intentions and willingness to act in a certain way: the incorporated position he calls habitus (set of dispositions).

In modern literature there is no conceptually convincing description of the process by which positions are “entered into subjectivity” (P. Bourdieu). Probably, it is impossible as a matter of fact – everything is mostly limited by links to the primary and secondary socialization. However, this does not prevent the conjunction of “position & disposition” to be dominant both in the identification and interpretation of stratification orders by themselves, and in explaining the behaviour of individuals and communities acting in a certain way because they are carriers of certain habitus (a set of dispositions).

Let us consider in more detail the content of each component of this pair, although in this case it will not be possible to completely abstract from the conjunctivity. After all, this kind of impossibility is created due to the “nature” of social artifacts. It is worth recalling that, according to Marx, they are “sensually-super-sensitive” formations, and E. Durkheim, for example, insisted that sociology has collective representations, that is, “objectifiable supra-personal subjectivities” as its object.

**Positions**

As it has already been mentioned, the term “positions” is used as a kind of “umbrella” to define discrete parts of social space differentiated by quality, as well as associations of such parts as results of classification, taxonomy or clustering operations. Since the economy is one of the most important spheres of society, and
employment is a crucial condition for the reproduction of the living conditions of individuals, so far as in sociology under the positions people often understand the position in the existing division of labor. And it means a few things to which the term is appropriate to apply in the singular.

Thus, the smallest position in the division of labor will be the workplace. In economics, it is customary to consider jobs (positions) separately from the people who fill them. According to the criterion of complexity of work in a separate workplace, they all form a stratification order, since they require different content and terms of preparation of applicants for jobs. The characteristics of the workplace are also interpreted as positions: profession as a separate dimension of the division of labor into physical and mental, position in the structure of the authority of the organization or enterprise, industry affiliation of the workplace and, finally, a place in the distribution of property.

In sociology, the researcher assumes that the positions are filled, and he observes individuals on certain positions, then he unites those individuals into definite categories – a number of respondents occupying similar positions in a number of parameters. For sociologists the largest unit that the researcher receives after the aggregation procedure is a class - there are simply no more common generalizations in our discipline. However, the obvious ideological values and meanings that are associated with this concept make the major part of specialists to use the more neutral term “strata”. Indeed, for K. Marx, the founder of the conflicting version of the reproduction of the stratification order of society, the class position is homologous to the class disposition – collective awareness of the life situation and readiness to act with the aim of “redefining” this situation. The class indirectly becomes the subject of social action, uniting into trade unions for the protection of economic rights, and to political parties with a certain program (ideology) for the protection of civil rights. In other words, the structures of justification and substantiation (dispositions) are the immediate basis of social action.

G. Goldthorpe, on the contrary, in his theoretical and empirical works, disregards the conjunctivity of positions and dispositions, fully focusing on the structural inequality of the life chances of those who belong to certain classes. Careful fixation of the characteristics of the position that an individual occupies in the social and technological division of labor, as well as a well-developed technique for grouping similar positions, gives the classes, he distinguishes, a purely classificatory character. These are the positions with which certain inequalities are associated, which are to be established in the course of purposefully planned studies. The subject of observation and study is the structure of inequalities, and not the causes of the actions of individuals or communities.

However, the conjunction “position & disposition” can be easily read in the notion of “status”. The wide variability of values and definitions of the term in modern scientific literature concerns few people today. The epistemological relativism, according to which one can tell about phenomena and processes in different ways (in accordance with the selected conceptual paradigm) is almost universally accepted, and therefore almost no one already denies the instrumental
nature of interpretation. The range is defined by two polar status interpretations: a) as the place of an individual (a group) in the distribution of rights and responsibilities at different levels of society organization (state, enterprise, family, circle of friends); b) as a position on a constructed scale of social recognition, i.e. collective perceptions of prestige, respect, dignity and honour.

The legal interpretation of the individual status, by which its legal position in society is determined, perhaps, has the longest history (Çapov, 1990: p.331). But the relevance of this interpretation is not lost, since the phenomenon of emigration and temporary work outside nation states are becoming more widespread. Hence the issue of a status as an access to economic, political and civil rights remains pressing and is even focused on in many countries, such as of the European Union. In addition, legitimation, i.e. gaining status (inclusion in an existing stratification order) is also needed for new social movements and communities that were formerly discriminated or even prosecuted. Hence appears the persistence of interest in similar topics and subjects by researchers and governmental structures of national and supranational levels.

In sociology, the most influential one is the tradition laid down by N. Weber in the fragment “Class, Status, Party”, which was published in the posthumously published book “Economy and society” (Вебер, 1999). Influence, however, does not prevent experts from abandoning attempts to reinterpret the ratio of “class” and “status”. The fact is that the relationship of the two concepts is mentioned in two other, like the previous one, fragments of the book (“Status Groups and Classes” and “Distribution of Power in the Political Community”) that are still unfinished by M. Weber, a new reading and comparison of which can reveal the hidden meanings of the classic interpretation of sociology of the specifics of social as a subject of science (Гане, 2005).

However, the basic provisions are well known and should be recalled. For M. Weber status is an element of the social system, that is, the position in the distribution of honour and glory (in another formulation – prestige). In other words, status is a social, legitimate or authoritative assessment of honour and dignity. At the same time, status groups are real communities (“real groups”), which are based on a clearly conscious sense of belonging – in contrast to the classes, as designed by the researcher of the General position of a certain number of individuals in the labor market with similar chances of obtaining income. In our context, M. Weber’s interpretation of the status as “state”, as well as the tendency of status groups to “closeness” is not so significant. While the process of reproduction of status groups as elements of social stratification order by cultivating a separate lifestyle (in fact – the relevant practices of consumption and spending free time), on the contrary, is directly related to it.

Those who belong to the status group can clearly perceive its limits, distinguishing between “their” and “strangers”: those who have the same status are respectable persons, worthy, friendly. At the same time, the reproduction of one’s own status is at the same time the reproduction of a group status, having as its purpose not so much an individual benefit as a collective one. The modern
researcher is sure that G. Merton in his works on the history of science actually considered scientific collectives as status groups (Barnes, 2007).

The majority of textbooks in sociology contain R. Linton’s distinction of statuses attributed to social origin, gender, age, marital status and statuses achieved by individual efforts. According to P. Berger and B. Berger, the achieved statuses are objectified goals of ambitious individuals to improve their position in the social hierarchy. In stereotyped ideological interpretation, American society is a society of open opportunities in which all social statuses can be achieved without exception (Бепреп, 2004: p. 173).

The basic intuitions and motives concerning the status as position and disposition are also presented in modern sociological literature of Russia. V. Radaev and A. Shkaratan note that the social status is determined by the prestige of a profession, the income level, the duration and quality of education, the scope of authoritative powers and the size of property, i.e. it unites the positional and dispositional components of the conjunction (Радаев, Шкаратан, 1996: p. 28). According to V. Ilyin, the social status is a combination of rights and duties, social expectations, forms and amounts of material and moral rewards and stable normative forms of behaviour. The status is formed on the basis of law, administrative acts, customs, morality, religion, public opinion etc. (Ильин, 2000). The author proposes to delimit the real status and status on paper. The totality of rights and obligations existing in formal normative acts but not fulfilled in real public life is a status on paper. The real status is manifested in the form of repeated practices. Both certain individuals and communities behave in the same under similar circumstances regularly reproducing the same-type forms of behaviour – social practices. I recall that M. Weber allowed the existence of identical collective reactions of individuals to the same situation in the labor market – a class response to the general conditions and conventionalities of existence. Although the distinction between formal and real status proposed by V. Ilyin is based on real observations (for example, in the study of small groups the phenomenon of formal and informal leadership has been discovered and described a long time ago), nevertheless it is more useful for propaedeutic purposes but not for organizing the study stratification orders of the society.

If the status represents a structural aspect of the heterogeneity of social space, then its dynamic aspect is represented by the concept of “role” - an essential element of culture, according to R. Linton. This means that statuses are positions in which schemes of expectations and actions are built in routine of everyday situations – a certain amount of cultural samples (attitudes, norms, values, rules of behaviour). Each status corresponds to a role or several roles (role complex), and everyday interaction of a person with others is a permanent change in position and roles (Линтон, 1999: p. 32). In other words, in this tradition of structural analysis, the “position” is actually recognized as a “status-role complex”, which, in fact, determines the behaviour of individuals, which is derived from such a complex in typical everyday domestic and labor situations.

Obviously, such a derivative has a probabilistic character, because there
are always deviations from the norm or the rule – in the coexistence of people’s harmony there is not more space left than for disharmonies. From this it is logical to make an almost trivial conclusion that different types of status-role complexes with different rigidity attribute the form and sequence of actions of a specific subject (a set of subjects). Not least as a result of the selective attitude of individuals to the content of prescriptions: they not only make selections, but also add to them, resorting to a kind of social and structural self-activity. However, finding out how this happens requires a separate study. Here it should be reiterated that the status-role complex as a “position” is simultaneously visible and invisible, because without the empirical observation available to the subject, he has to be judged on a limited number of mediated features.

**Dispositions**

Only in military affairs, the term “disposition” (lat. dispositio – location) mainly refers to objects: this is what they say about the deployment of military formations or about the prepared plan for their deployment on land or at sea. However, here we are talking not only about the structural organization, but also about the readiness and order of possible action. In literary criticism this term is used to describe the organization of a work of art, and in the legal sciences it means part of a legal norm that contains the rights and obligations of the subject of the action. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the term “social orientation”, close in meaning and meaning to disposition, is affirmed in sociology and social psychology.

Below, in a brief review of the evolution of this term, I will draw on the materials of G. Andreeva’s book “Social Psychology”, the first edition of which was published in 1980, and was later reprinted repeatedly (Андреева, 2006: p. 375). The history of the concept is set forth, beginning with the classical text of W. Thomas and F. Znaniecki “Polish Peasant in Europe and America.” In the preface to the first volume, the authors formulate the methodological prerequisites from which they emerge and which will be adhered to in the analysis of the collected empirical material. For them and, accordingly, for sociology as a whole, society is an indivisible unity of everyday situations and conscious or unconscious skills and readiness to act in order to change the situation or adapt to it. The dichotomy “objective – subjective” eliminates such indivisibility, which confirms its obvious harm to discipline.

To characterize the objects forming a particular situation, W. Thomas and F. Znaniecki suggested the term “social value”, which denotes the concept where there is no discrepancy between individuals of the same group or between groups in interpretation of the content and value of individual and collective life, and that “defines the situation”. Individuals’ orientation towards social values, instead, is called “attitudes” (deriving from the English “attitude”, which is usually translated as “social setting”). In other words, it is not only a state of consciousness or a psychological state, but also a reaction to the objects of the situation (social values) as a readiness to act in a certain way, in accordance with
the norms, constraints, and behavior patterns acquired and learned in the process of socialization. According to W. Thomas and F. Znaniecki, “attitudes” will remain incomprehensible structures if they are not brought into correlation with situations, where individuals find themselves. At the same time, the situations are not a static state for them, but always and exclusively a state of action. The so-called W. Thomas’ “theorem” expresses the inseparable interrelation between values and attitudes in a state of action – what is defined as real has real consequences. The science dealing with this interrelation is called social psychology.

The interaction between the European (F. Znaniecki) and American (W. Thomas) traditions stirred up a wave of research aimed at measurement and empirical study of both “values” and “social attitudes” in the USA. For example, a contemporary researcher suggests that the methodological introduction was written mainly by F. Znaniecki, and the publication of the first volume in English for the first time, perhaps, introduces to American social scientists the issues of values as regulators of social action (Чеснокова, 2008). In 1935, G. Allport wrote a digest based on reports published in the scientific periodicals and counted 17 definitions of an attitude. Then, developing his own psychological concept of personality, he described an individual as a bearer of certain heterogeneous characteristics, traits, and later called them “dispositions”. The latter constituted a sort of hierarchy: cardinal dispositions, central and secondary dispositions, which are formed gradually and change over time. The shift in focus on the structure of identity weakened the interrelation with “situations”, but did not deny it completely. Some psychologists (M. Smith) distinguished a cognitive component in the structure of the attitude (realizing the object of the social attitude); an affective component (emotional assessment of the object, the manifestation of feelings of sympathy or antipathy to it); a behavioral (connotative) component (consistent behavior towards the object).

Attitude measurement with the use of scales has become a separate branch of scientific research as well. One of the first scales was proposed by L. Thurstone in 1927 in the article “The Measurement of Attitudes”, and two years later in the book (in co-authorship) with the same title. In 1932 R. Likert published the article “Technique for the Measurement of Professional Attitudes” with the schematics of a Likert-type scale. Thurstone’s and Likert’s scales are quite common in mass surveys, although in their later work they used more complex methods, factor analysis in particular.

According to the textbook by G. Andreeva, the improvement of research techniques on mental and emotional states within the framework of social psychological approach to the personality has resulted in the loss of considerable fragments of social context that could be neither taken into account, nor fully reconstructed during laboratory experiments and tests. However, a wealth of the collected empirical evidence required new theoretical and methodological perspectives. The need of creating a sociological concept of social behavior regulation was increasing. In the Soviet sociology, a corresponding dispositional concept was developed by V. Yadov.
Atitudes, different in quality and content, are organized into a hierarchy: “...the human has a complex system of various dispositional structures that regulate his or her behavior and activity. These dispositions are organized hierarchically, that is, their inferior and superior levels can be distinguished” (Ядов, 1975). What is virtually the most important point, the sociologist postulates the compliance of the structural composition of situations with the structural composition of a subject. The hierarchy of situations (generalization of a multitude of positions) is formed by four levels, distinguished by the consistency criterion or by the institutionalization degree. The lowest level is represented by the subject situations, which change rapidly and are relatively short. The next level includes the situations of group actions and interactions as a consequence of an individual’s belonging to real communities and groups. More sustainable circumstances and schematisms, as well as samples of the activities existing in the sphere of work, leisure, everyday life, form the third level of situations. Finally, the most long-term, institutionalized conditions and conventions of activities are inherent in the situations of an individual’s functioning on the level of economic, political and social structures of society.

Each level of situations corresponds to the level of needs: situations both reproduce the needs and serve as resources for their satisfaction. Hence the hierarchy of needs: elementary needs, which are subject-reproducible in the nearest social environment; group needs, which are generated and met in small groups; needs at the level of the spheres of labor, leisure, culture, consumption in the broad sense of the word; needs at the level of generalized structures of society. Dispositions are also formed when there are needs in corresponding situations, which was demonstrated in the laboratory by D. Uznadze (Узнадзе, 1966).

Thus, in the concept of V. Yadov there are four levels of dispositions:

a) the first level is formed by elementary fixed atitudes that are formed on the basis of vital needs and in simple situations, in the context of the family environment and in the lower “objective situations”;

b) the second level consists of more complex dispositions, which are formed on the basis of a person’s need for communication and are realized in a small group, accordingly, social fixed atitudes;

c) the third level fixes the general orientation of the interests of a person with respect to a specific sphere of social activity, or basic social atitudes;

d) the fourth, highest level of dispositions is formed by a system of value orientations of the individual that regulate his or her behavior and practices in the most significant situations of his or her social activity.

The hierarchy of dispositional formations performs the function of an individual’s behavior regulation. At the first level, the immediate reactions of the subject to the actual subject situation (behavioral act) are formed. The second level of dispositions regulates an act, which is carried out in ordinary, everyday situations. The third level regulates certain systems of actions. Finally, the fourth level regulates the integrity of behavior, that is, an individual’s activity itself (Ядов, 1975).

In modern scientific literature, the tradition of understanding the status as a disposition is also reproduced. It is described in detail in the comprehensive
monograph “The Language of Social Status” by V. Karasik (Карасик, 2002). According to the author, the status is, first of all, public evaluation that establishes a status stratification order. At the same time, status evaluation suggests: a) stratification evaluation – determination of the status in the social stratification system; b) remote evaluation – the status position of a person at a superior, inferior or equal level; c) role evaluation – the correspondence of an individual’s behavior to the status norm (Карасик, 2002: p. 70). Status evaluation (E. Durkheim would say “collective representation”) forms certain expectations concerning an individual’s possible behavior – a set of dispositions different in content.

However, P. Bourdieu suggests radical reconsideration of the “position & disposition” conjunction in the works, within the framework of his principle of habitus in particular. In the presentation of his point of view, I will rely both on the translations from his works and on the informative article on the habitus in the sociological theory structure by N. Shmatko, an energetic propagandist of the French sociologist’s research practices in the post-Soviet area (Шматко, 1998). The rupture with structuralism – the most influential intellectual movement on the European continent in the 1950s and 1970s – was presented in his works in the form of ideas and statements about the structure of the social world, which were actually extended in a theory. The thesis that individuals’ actions and their perception of the situation were conditioned by social structures is known to have been conventional in structuralism. A structuralism proponent viewed the world from the perspective of structures (positions) and interpreted what he saw accordingly: individuals were epiphenomena of the structure. P. Burdieu proposed to change the observer’s location: not from the perspective of structures, but from the perspective of the subject. In that way, the potential of an activist’s attitude to the world was returned to the subject, who was no more a puppet of “rules”, “models”, “structures”, and became, according to P. Bourdieu, an agent, an acting substance (Бурдье, 1994: p. 21-23).

What is important here is the fundamental difference from M. Weber’s position: the action is generated and structured by the chances, opportunities, values or goalsexisting not outside the agent and supposedly presented uniformly to everyone, but initially existing in the agent, organically immanent to him or her by a multitude of operators of activity (Бурдье, 2001: p. 122-124). What completely annihilates the passivity of the subject, which turns him into an agent, is called habitus. Then the sociologist’s attention is focused not on structures, not on individuals ready for action, but on their practices, intentions or attitudes that are realized in space and time. The first volume of Bourdieu’s research “Practical Reason” is called “Critique of Theoretical Sociology” – sociology that abstracts from the practices of social agents (individuals, their groups, classes), from their practical relation to the world.

The habitus, therefore, is a certain set of cognitive and motivational structures. The corresponding quote gives an almost exhaustive definition: “Determinations associated with a special class of the existence conditions produce the habitus – systems of stable and portable dispositions, structured structures that are configured to function as structuring structures. That is, as principles that generate
and organize practices and representations, which can be objectively adapted to their purpose, but do not assume a conscious focus on it and the indispensable mastery of the necessary operations to achieve it. Objectively “following the rules” and “structured”, they are, nevertheless, by no means a product of subordination to the rules and thus, although collectively managed, are not a product of the organizing influence of any conductor” (Бурдье, 2001: p. 102).

Nothing else can be discovered about the structuring of these multiple dispositions because the focus is shifted to another context. In the strictly genetic aspect, people’s practical activity is performed by two objectifications. One of them is in the form of social institutions (more or less general conditions and conventions of coexistence, materialized practices), an external, always present necessity which cannot be ignored or avoided. The other one is in the form of habitus, peculiar individual and collective mental structures with a high energetic potential of action and coercion with respect to individuals. According to P. Bourdieu, there is a correspondence between them: “positions” (in the broad sense) “possess” individuals, and since the structures are built or implemented into subjectivity, the individuals, in their turn, are “agitated” by positions, they react to them.

Conditions of existence (objectified practices) are presented to agents as necessities, but it is not obligatory that individuals think or perceive them as necessities, they are often either not known or not perceived (they are “natural”). What is more important, they set a certain lifestyle. P. Bourdieu says that in France, people who drink champagne are more likely to buy antique furniture, play golf, ride horses, visit theaters than those who drink whiskey or red wine. All these are projections of the habitus to different social fields.

Thus, the habitus is a product of history (of the past experience) and is present in social agents (individuals and their associations) as patterns of perception, thinking and action. It is through them that the history continuity is realized through the past in today’s world and tries to be present in the future. If a multitude of dispositions were purely the incorporated past, the mass “here and now” would be the phenomenon of hysteresis (inertia, delay, archaism, P. Bourdieu provides Don Quixote as an example) (Бурдье, 2001: p. 121).

This seems to be what L. Thévenot meant in one of his interviews. In the retelling close to the original text, his reasoning comes to the following. Among the difficulties that we face when translating French terms into English, there is the translation of the concept of “dispositifs”. It is very difficult to translate (although it was previously used by M. Foucault), it is a very meaningful word in French, since it contains the element “dispos” (“inclination”) and, therefore, has a common root with the term “disposition”. Thus, the French “vous êtes disposé à faire quelque chose” means “you are inclined to do something”. Bourdieu proceeded from the reference to the fact that the disposition was incorporated in the individual, tied to him or her for a lifetime. In other words, it is unchanged in all situations and not very dynamic. No doubt, it is a very good idea for the reproduction theory, but it represents the man in a very poor light, because according to this theory, people simply implement the same scheme in all life
situations. L. Thévenotsuggests the opposite: in the framework of the same order / dispositif (that is, the situation structure), there is a great variety of dispositions (Тевено, 2006).

However, the authoritative researcher substantially simplifies Bourdieu’s position. The latter would have turned out to be a good theoretician if he had charged the habitus with a simple work to reduce new circumstances to the obsolete and invariable schemes of perception, interpretation and reaction! The habitus is actually as much the “art of ingenuity”, according to the scientist, as the instance of reproduction (Бурдье, 2001: p. 108). A multitude of dispositions is extensively reproduced in the course of interaction with a problem situation revealing spontaneous characteristics of the habitus, which generate modified practices without breaking with the historical tradition. Solutions to the problem situations are being found and the relevant practices are being incorporated – in this way the boundaries of the possible, the impossible and the probable, of what is “for us” and what is not are being transferred and re-established.

Consequently, L. Thévenot either read P. Bourdieu’s works inattentively, or forgot his concept. According to the latter, habitus is an open system of dispositions; he mentioned several times that they have a “sense of the game”. They play (implement their practices) in real situations and, at the same time, enrich the habitus, adopting the practices. P. Bourdieu’s example is a tennis player who, as a result of intensive training in a game with a rival, reaches the ball in time and hits it more often than it could be in a random way. Moreover, the habitus is also a potential of the possible, a system of dispositions that is open not only for the present, but also for the future. It is in this context that it is the “art of ingenuity”.

In “Practical Reason”, the author claims: “Thus, it is possible to understand what the habitus is only in case of correlation between the social conditions under which it was formed (in the meantime developing the conditions for its formation) and the social conditions under which it was “triggered”. In other words, it is necessary to conduct scientific research to determine the connection between the two states of the social world that are realized by the habitus and establish this connection by means of practice and in practice” (Бурдье, 2001: p. 109).

According to P. Bourdieu, agents depend not as much on the external, “objective” circumstances as on the meaning they impart to their past, present and future. Here both the French tradition (E. Durkheim, M. Moss), and F. Znaniecki and W. Thomas’s views are completely evident. Continuous activity of the habitus does not leave him any opportunity for hypocrisy, habitus does not “imagine itself any different” (E. Goffman) and does not manipulate the ideas about itself. Objectivism, which interprets the social world as a play, is the theoretical position that P. Bourdieu tries to dissociate himself from as clearly as possible: this is how the third chapter, “Structures, Habitus, Practices”, of the book “Practical Reason” begins (Бурдье, 2001: p. 100).

Thus, the differences in the interpretation of some concepts concerning social stratification seem to impart strongly eclectic nature to their whole complex.
However, what is also indisputable is that the diversity of traditions, approaches, trends and schools expands the theoretical and methodological database of the analysis as well as the possibilities of constructing more sophisticated research techniques. As Yadov notes in the preamble to his recent work, “the multiplicity of theoretical approaches is not unprofitability, but the wealth of sociology” (Ядов, 2006). The latter means that the multivariate analysis in the context of the conceptual triad of “positions & dispositions & practice (activity)” becomes a relevant strategy for the research on stratification orders.

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MODERN MIGRATION STUDIES: IN SEARCH FOR NEW THEORIES AND CONCEPTS*

Iryna Prybytkova (Kyiv)

The author believes that internal and international migration and population mobility in the contemporary world have acquired in essence a new character and quality. Scientific community faces today the problem of re-thinking the theoretical heritage and founding the constructive and efficient metatheory. The author makes an attempt to generalize some theoretical conceptions and methodological principles worked out before and to advance the concept of spatial self-organization of population as an initial point in theoretical interpretation of latent sense of migration. Territorial movements of population are proceeding in a certain socio-spatial continuum, the every point of which is characterized by some set of vital goods. The totality of all these points (regions) form the space of human activity potentialities, which are opened within it and serve as objects of choice. The author debates also an issue on phenomenon of power functions redistribution between ruling and marginal groups of population in USSR at the moment of the Soviet system collapse that initiated a radical rebuilding of socio-group organization of societies in the former Soviet republics. And in conclusion, the author discussed the principles of migration flows regulation under conditions of armed conflicts, ethnic collisions, structural economic crisis, growing unemployment and a lost identity that have exerted immeasurably greater influence on directions and intensity of migration flows.

Keywords: spatial self-organization of population, space of potentiality, space of stimuli, quality of life, nature of post-soviet migrations, rebuilding of socio-group organization of society, change of identity.

Introduction

The Programme of Action, adopted at the International Conference on Population and Development in September, 1994 in Cairo, has emphasized the necessity of scientific research in order to extend comprehension of causes and effects of internal and international migration and population mobility in the contemporary world that is undergoing rapid changes (Chapter XII, item 12.25). It is asserted in the same document that in spite of progress made during two last decades in the sphere of methodology and technology of data collection and analysis, the quality of information base, its completeness and continuity are unsatisfactory. It is noticed as well that the system of analytical instruments for measuring of migration parameters is the least reliable and inadequate, especially at the regional and international levels (Chapter XII, item 12.1).

Though the research works in the sphere of internal and international migration are gaining in number at a rapid pace and their subjects are getting more and more various, urgency of elaboration the theoretical and methodological approaches for scientific explanation, estimation and forecast of the prospective development of modern migration processes has become a major task.

The disintegration of the USSR has become the turning-point in the run of migration flows on the boundless spaciousness of the collapsed empire. Migration processes assumed in essence new characteristics, migratory priorities have changed. Transformation of the directions, structures and intensity of contemporary migration flows attract a great attention of the politicians, lawyers, governments. At the same time migration events of the recent years have distinctly proved the unreadiness of the post-Soviet science to work out the theoretical and applied tasks in the sphere of modern migration. The gold fund of scientific knowledge, the sources of research culture and erudition: theoretical conceptions, methodological principles and approaches, elaborated in the USSR during last thirty years by a few generations of soviet scientists, are insufficient today for explanation contemporary migration realities and prediction of future migratory trends. Scientific community faces today the problem of re-thinking the theoretical heritage and founding the constructive and efficient metatheory.

The author makes an attempt to generalize some theoretical conceptions, approaches, hypotheses and methodological principles worked out before. The reader is proposed terminology glossary, sociological interpretation of the newest patterns of the post-Soviet migratory movements.
Necessary theoretical prerequisites for modern migration studies

Migration of population is a complex research object. Its multiplicity, versatility and sociological nature predetermine the necessity of complex, comprehensive study. Interdisciplinary approach to the theoretical and applied researches is today one of the most important methodological demand. The research strategy inherent to complex, interdisciplinary approach is based on the next methodological principles.

Definition of a general theoretical conception and elaboration of notions and categories, passing through the entire investigation, are the starting-point of a study and ensure the unity of approach to the research object. Initial theoretical conception is based on the basis of the postulates, notions and categories, borrowed from disciplines including into research process. Specific research methods and findings are borrowed from the same disciplines as well. Theoretical conception has to be coordinated with empirical findings. Analysis of the separate aspects (sides) and relations of migration processes is carrying out on the basis of mentioned above methodological principles (Заславская, 1980: p. 11).

The developing of migration theory is bound up with the forming of an appropriate conceptual definitions and terminological glossary. The aggregate of conceptual definitions reflects evolution of the theoretical notions on a subject and the contents of migration theory. The search of common approach to conceptual definitions of migration theory and the main related categories is essentially important. Key terms using today in modern migration studies are: potential migration, migration attitude, migration motivation, migration behavior, migration factors and stimuli, migration situation, migration mobility, migration flow, adaptation, deep-rooted inhabitancy, accommodation, migration policy and others.

Potential migration – a psychological state of readiness for departure from the present place of residence (country). It is characterized by made but unrealized decision concerning the removal. It is measured by indicators of migration attitude structure: by share of persons, who have made but unrealized decision about departure, and by portion of the rest of inhabitants who did not intend to leave for somewhere (in per cent).

Potential migration is one of the important characteristics of migration mobility of individuals.

Migration attitude – a psychical regulator of behaviour, predisposition of individual, determinant of coordination of action, stipulated by positive or negative attitude towards change of the place of residence and living conditions. Migration attitude reflects the readiness for certain result of migration behaviour. Migration motivation is the incentive component of the migration attitude.

Migration motivation (migratory motives) – a psychical state of individual, stimulating him/her to achieve the personal objects of economic, social and psychological character by means of removal to a new place of residence. Migration
motives discover the qualitative aspects of individual needs of a change the place of residence, conditions of work, the realization of certain life prospects.

Migration behaviour – the whole complex interconnected actions and relations, aimed at implementation of migration plans of individuals or giving these prospects up. When studying the migration behaviour, socio-psychological aspects of individual, group and mass attitude towards changing the place of residence are examined.

Migration mobility – intensity of the movements of population related to a change of the place of residence. It is measured by frequency of individual movements through the internal, regional and international borders with the object of migrating forever, for a long time or for a short time.

Migration factors – the whole complex of economic, social, ethnic, political, ecological, family and other conditions having an influence on size, intensity, directions, trends and other parameters of migration processes.

Migration stimuli – circumstances stipulated by economic, social, political, ethnic, ecological and other conditions. Infringing upon the interests of potential migrants, migration stimuli become subjectively significant motive power. Certain change of circumstances or outer conditions of vital activity of individual is regarded as an external stimulus; reaction of individuals to the change of these outward circumstances – as internal stimulus. The connection between stimuli and motives is determined by the structure of personality and needs of potential migrants, their life experience, system of values and world outlook. Realizable migration motives are under the impact of appropriate external stimuli though are not identical with the last.

Deep-rooted inhabitancy – characteristics of the final stage of migration process. It is regarded simultaneously as a process and as a result of accommodation of migrants to a new conditions of life and satisfaction their requirements of vital importance at the present places of residence. The notion of deep-rooted inhabitancy is bound up with two other concepts – adaptation and accommodations. The former means the adaptation of individuals to objective conditions of their vital activity at a new place of residence, the latter – the remaking of these condition in accordance with needs of new-settlers. The unity of these processes predetermines the effectiveness of deep-rooted inhabitancy.

It is possible to measure the depth of rooted inhabitancy by means of such indicators as a proportion between number of new-settlers and old residents in the given place; distribution of new-settlers depending on time of their arrival; share of those remained at the moment out of a whole number of new-comers in the definite year. Deep-rooted inhabitancy can be also characterized by average duration of the permanent residence (in years) in the given place. These indicators can be calculated for persons of different sex, age, ethnic group and so on.
Adaptation – a socio-psychological and psycho-physiological process. It is a slow, usually unconscious modification of individual or social group activity in adjustment to new conditions of social and cultural surroundings in the places of present residence. The major component of adaptation is the correspondence of self-appraisals, expectations and claims of individuals with their resources and circumstances of life in the places of a new residence. The adaptation is proceeding simultaneously at the physiological, biological, psychological and properly sociological levels. Adaptation to new surroundings and mode of life does not exhaust in full the phenomenon of turning the new-settlers into old-timers. Sometimes such a transition is rapidly completed but as a rule it is a rather protracted process which can be complicated by difficulties of accommodation. Very often the adjustment of living conditions to the needs of new-settlers proved to be the most important for their deep-rooted inhabitancy.

Accommodation – the process of overcoming the differences between the levels of welfare of new-settlers and old-timers. In case of organized removal of individuals the state provides them with credits and gratuitous pecuniary aid; reimburses the travelling expenses and other charges; lends them the assistance with allocation of dwelling or purchase of live-stock. As a rule, accommodation requires certain time, more or less than time necessary for adaptation. The deep-rooted inhabitancy of new-settlers is not achievable without adaptation as well as without accommodation. When talking about duration of transition period from status of new-settler to status of old resident, it is mentioned the average term of eight-ten years. This time is supposed to be quite enough to reach the living standard and income-level of old-timers.

Integration (reintegration) – the process of gradual disappearance of any observable distinctions which set new-settlers apart from old-residents, particularly in terms of their socio-economic and legal status. Integration (reintegration) can be also regarded as a process which enables new-settlers to enjoy equal rights in the domain of physical, social, legal and material security and national protection. The latter one is manifested most clearly in the maintenance of the rule of law and an absence of social or political violence; in effective law enforcement mechanisms and impartial judicial systems; in constitutional, participatory and non-discriminatory form of governance; and in the equitable distribution of resources and access to public services. The concept of “reintegration” is generally used in the humanitarian vocabulary of UNHCR – the world’s leading refugee organization. This term is usually used, when speaking of repatriation of persons formerly lived in the country and left it against their will (refugees; deported people; internally displaced people).

Migration situation – the state of migration processes: directions, dimensions, dynamics and structure of migratory flows and the whole complex of economic, political, demographic, socio-psychological, ethnic and ecological factors having influence on their development in spatial and temporal dimensions.
Migration flow – the totality of single migration movements united by common directions, which are determined by areas of departure and arrival of migrants during certain calendar interval of time.

Migration cohorts – the totality of migrants united by common calendar period of migration in a certain populated area. It is marked out on the basis of population census data on duration of new-settlers residence at the places of arrival. It should be distinguished a number of factual and a number of living till now migration cohorts at present place, so long as the factual cohorts are reduced in view of subsequent migration and mortality of new-comers. The action of these factors is growing with increase of sojourn duration.

Forecast of migratory events – scientific provision of the main parameters of migration mobility and prospective migration situation.

Migration policy – the totality of measures directed at the regulation of intensity, structure and directions of migration flows on the whole and migration mobility in particular.

Quality of life – a significant regulator of migration mobility. This is the estimate of the aggregate conditions of physical, mental and social well-being in the comprehension of each taken individual or social group. The main point for estimation of the quality of life is the correspondence of current circumstances (needs and possibilities) to the expectations of individuals, their abilities and vital requirements as they see it. The different weights could be given to the human wants: the basic needs of individual are bound up with survival, then the social requirements closely associated with security and inter-course are followed. And, at last, this rank is ended in needs tied with human Ego and his self-affirmation. After satisfaction of the vital requirements the individuals expect for a certain level of security, freedom, equality, social identification, solidarity, comradeship, free access to information, participation in public life, government and distribution of resources.

Conception on spatial self-organization of population

Migratory flows which we observe as a phenomenon of everyday life present only the external side of migration processes. However, the implication of migration events, their latent essence are not usually obvious. Owing to diversity and interlacement of functions which migrations perform, it is very difficult to explain its essence in the framework of the common, universal and comprehensive definition. We propose to use the conception of spatial self-organization of population as an initial point in theoretical interpretation of latent sense of migrations. The author has worked up this conception in the early eighties of the past century. It was confirmed many times by empirical data.

Territorial movements of population are proceeding in a certain socio-spatial continuum, the every point of which is characterized by some set of vital goods
such as the potentialities to be employed, to be educated, to gain a dwelling, to have access to sapid leisure, inter-course and rest. Every point of this continuum has as well another ecological situation, guarantees of political stability and personal security, observance of human rights. The totality of all these points (regions) form the space of potentialities or space of stimuli, within of which the principle “a man is looking for the best” is acted with inexorability of a law.

The space of potentialities is characterized by dynamics, diversity and different levels of human activity in various spheres. The potentialities of human activity are opened within it and serve as objects of choice. The formation of preferences towards different parts of this space reflects the reactions of individuals on certain totality of characteristics of their surroundings. These reactions are stipulated by economic, social and psychological reasons.

The movement of population in the space of potentialities is a self-organizing process of public behavior directed by system of preferences. The spatial self-organization of population is expressed in selective attitude of individuals towards territory of their inhabitancy; their concentration at some places and de-concentration at others in the result of the movement of population in the space of potentialities.

Dimensions of population number (or its density, or its dynamics) are integral indicators reflecting the combined effect of many factors, which really attract the people to different places. Therefore, the dimensions of population, its density or its dynamics can be regarded as indicators of attractiveness of these places for certain social and ethnic groups of population. Nowadays the economic, political, ethnic and confessional factors exert significant influence upon a spatial self-organization of people.

Thus, the selective attitude of people towards places of their inhabitancy can serve as a criterion for quality of life at any place within the space of potentialities on the one hand; on the other hand, it can be regarded as a significant sign for identification of latent groups of population with specific social organization, behaviour, claims and purposes.

The phenomenon of spatial self-organization of population is consonant with behaviour model described by S. A. Stouffer in his well-known theory relating mobility and distance (Stouffer, 1940: p. 846, 847). According to his hypothesis on intervening opportunities the migratory choice rests on the logic of a person, who wants to increase the earned income, to improve the conditions of life, work and recreation, to ensure the individual security and future of own children.

Discussion on nature of post-Soviet migrations

There exists a widely spread opinion that the ethnic emigration predominated in the structure of post-Soviet movements of population. It is not a quite accurate affirmation. Any emigration has always the ethnic component as every person, who leaves the country forever, belongs to a certain ethnic community and identifies himself with it.
Paraphrasing the old Soviet ideologeme “national in form, and socialist in content” (for example, literature, culture, architecture and so on), we can say about emigration from spaciousness of the collapsed empire that it is ethnic in form, and post-soviet in content. All emigrations we could observe in CIS countries have the common roots: the space of potentialities narrowed to a critical point. The possibilities to live and to die with dignity, to educate the children in the native language; to affiliate to the citizenship, to work by profession; to believe in his Own God and pray him for an aid; to protect the human rights; to have guarantee of peaceful life, were getting worse and worse in the former republics of the Soviet Union.

The answer has followed immediately. The departure to the “national quarters” became the characteristic feature of early post-Soviet migrations. The Russians and Belarusians departed to the Russian Federation and Belarus. The movement of Ukrainians from the CIS and Baltic countries is continuing till now. All these flows are united by ancestral feature, common for all post-Soviet migrations. It is a loss of group identity by real and potential Russian-speaking migrants in the CIS and Baltic countries.

In the Soviet times Russians and Russian-speaking people lived outside of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine were incorporated into the ruling group in nominally sovereign Union republics, while the native population belonged to a marginal, subordinate group. The collapse of the soviet system meant at the same time a failure of the communist ideology which ensured a firm basis for social and ethnic inequality of those two groups. The events of August, 1991 initiated the fulminent inversion – redistribution of a power functions between them and a radical rebuilding of socio-group organization of societies in the CIS countries.

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The USSR was not only the totalitarian state but also the colonial system, succeeded the Russian Empire. V. Kliuchevski asserted that “Whole history of Russia is the history of country which is colonizing”, “colonization of country is the main lesson of Russian history “ and “the periods of Russian history are the main moments of colonization” (Ключевский, 1956). The movements of population and migration policy were investigated in Soviet times in the State scientific-research institute for colonization studies established in 1922 in Moscow. At the beginning of collectivization in the early thirties, the Institute was closed and research works were stopped. Then the prerogative to pursue the migration policy was given under the control of People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs.

The mass movements of Russian-speaking population from Soviet republics has a striking likeness with escape of “black-legged” Frenchmen from Algeria, numerous army of officials and their families from British Administration in India and many others examples from the world history of the second half of the XX century.
Principles of migration flows regulation: definition of problem

Stochastical character of migration limits to a considerable extent a choice and a set of instruments for regulating of spatial movements of people.

Migration is a self-organizing process of social behavior of individuals which is directed by system of preferences. Purposeful self-organizing activity of migrants is determined not only by dimensions of earned income but also the other factors of vital activity. The totality of migrants, forming migration flows, is characterized by a common group function of preference since they belong to the same model of vital activity. As the whole of self-organizing social processes, migration is amenable to regulating from the outside only in indirect way since the migrants optimize their activity according to their own interests.

Migratory choice of preferable variant from many of others is a result of interaction of potential migrants with a space of potentialities (stimuli). In other words the migration preferences are determined by certain aggregate of qualitative advantages of this space. The fixing of quantitative characteristics (parameters) of these qualities constitutes the content of indirect managing actions. Changing the meanings of these parameters, one may obtain the forming of migration preferences corresponding to a goal of managing.

Characteristics of a number of the vital goods in different points of a space of potentialities, which can be planned and changed by means of directive decisions, should be regarded as factors regulating migratory flows. Such regulators can have administrative, legal, socio-economic, ethnical, political or ecological character. The administrative and legal conditions of changing the residence: registration, citizenship, employment, entry or exit visa and so on, have an influential but not exhaustive character. Economic, ecological, ethnical, political and socio-psychological factors have an influence on decision-making concerning the change of residence to an even greater degree.

Armed conflicts, ethnic collisions, structural economic crisis and growing unemployment as well as a lost identity have exerted immeasurably greater influence on directions and intensity of migration flows in CIS and Baltic countries. It is precisely those factors that determine nowadays dimensions and character of modern migration processes. These factors have a decisive importance when regulating the directions, structure and intensity of migration flows. However, in practice it is a rather difficult task because of absence of necessary means, imperfection of legislative base, juvenile age and inexperience of migration services and other reasons.

Nevertheless these difficulties cannot cancel the principle of regulating itself. Only changing the external conditions of potential migrant life, it is possible to regulate the process of spatial self-organization of people and its intensity so as to ensure the necessary directions of migration flows with an optimum structure and minimum economic and social losses.

When prognosticating the migration flows, it is expedient to use the mathematical modeling. Diachronic models, taking into account the factor of
self-organization of population, are the most perspective. Descriptive models are applicable for description and explanation of quantitative regularities of migratory flows and forms of interaction between factors having influence on the trends of migration developments. When elaborating the managing decisions, it is expedient to use the normative models, permitting to choose and to recommend the most effective variants of migration flows from a position of optimum.

It is impossible to decide the problem of managing the migration flows by means of a single economic or administrative maneuver. It is necessary to use the system of measures and first of all economic, legal and political instruments.

**Conclusion**

Successful development of theoretical notions on the essence of migration is connected, first of all, with elaborating of a common strategy and tactics of interdisciplinary research of this many-sided process. Such an approach enables to integrate the research efforts in order to create more fruitful conceptions and more effective methodology.

Scientists from different spheres of knowledge involved in migration studies, as a rule, lean upon traditional research techniques, use specific scientific languages with a strict meaning of terms, create special conceptual constructions, based on exactly fixed corporative “guild” notions.

The appearance and vital capacity of a new hypotheses and directions of scientific search in the migration sphere, the creation of effective analytical instruments for investigation of complicated migration issues at the joint of economic, demographic, sociological, political, socio-psychological and other analyses depend on abilities of research to understand and adopt to scientific approaches, methods, conceptions and language from adjacent fields of knowledge.

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THE SPACE AND THE EVERYDAY LIFE*

Svitlana Romanenko (Odessa)

This article deals with the study of virtual space as a new human habitat. The main task of the article is a definition of what constitutes “virtual space”, what are the technological and social conditions for its emergence in a modern form, and what its impact on the everyday life is.

The everyday life is viewed in terms of A. Schütz’s phenomenological sociology, namely, as a routine human activity process, carried out in a familiar, conventional environment on the basis of the obvious expectations. Characteristics of everyday life are non-reflexivity, lack of personal involvement in the situation, typological perception of participants of interaction and motives of their participation (Іонін, 2008: р. 283).

The author focuses on the shifts in everyday life caused by the inevitable immersion of a modern individual in virtual space. These immersion and penetration fundamentally change all the special constitutive elements of everyday life.

Current sociology is increasingly turning to the consideration of space problems. This can partly be linked to the extraordinary popularity of spatial themes at the everyday level. The concepts “political space”, “interior space”, “music space”, “virtual space” and so on are widely used due to their expressiveness. From our point of view, such a frequent use is symptomatic: it indicates some metamorphoses taking place with a habitual physical space and with our perception of it.

Classical sociology assumed the immutability of concepts about space-time. Its provisions were axiomatically based on the fact that human is both a biological individual holding a certain position in physical space and a social actor placed in some point of social space simultaneously. Social relations were included in the complex of territorial relations (Капсуц, 1993) directly related to the notion of place and time. The phenomenological model of A. Schütz was also based on the object-corporal fixation of everyday life in the physical world (Шюц, 1988) that composed the dominance of everyday life in contrast with other spheres of human experience which he called “finite provinces of meaning”.

This approach resulted from the fact that our concepts of space have been based on reviewing it as an objective reality that human learns and conquers. The expansionist activity of humanity seemed to have no limits. The conquest of land was replaced by the conquest of water, air, space. Humanity had been systematically creating its web gradually linking together and consolidating dominance over all varieties and manifestations of physical space. However, this did not stop “wars for space”. They were transformed into a war for independence from space and against attachment to any particular territory. Development and expansion of global computer network had created a new kind of physical space – cyberspace allowing humanity to conquer not only real but also imaginary worlds.

Cyberspace is characterized by its elements existing outside of spatial dimensions. Its appearance made it impossible to separate people by physical obstacles, borders or time distances nowadays. Mediated by computer monitors, the difference between “here” and “there” has lost the meaning (Бауман, 2004: p. 31) allowing us to speak about the compression and even the disappearance of space. This process of compression affected only the habitual physical four-dimensional space. The point of ultimate compression has become simultaneously a point of access to multidimensional space whose dimension everybody selects independently. Cyberspace as a set of electronic communication devices and a constantly circulating flow of digitized data has become a connecting bridge,
a zone of transition between physical space and space of imagination which traditionally used to be called “virtual”. One of the unexpected functions of cyberspace has become the objectification and structuring of virtual space. It provided an opportunity to attach to the material world, to embody fictional, virtual worlds of books, games, dreams, fantasy, science, even mental illness in the physical reality.

All this has given rise to a renewed understanding of “virtual space”. The new “virtual space” (cyberspace + traditional virtual space / space of imagination) enables us to explore finite provinces of meaning with the same means as everyday life. It has become possible to talk about the interaction between these incompatible in real space and time concepts, about penetration, physical contact between the real world and virtuality.

The relevance of virtual space study in such a broad sense is determined by the fact that it is almost impossible to exist outside of it today. With the wide dissemination of electronic communication (computer, telephone, television, etc), the logic and laws of virtual space (in fact, this is an absence of logic and any strict laws) has penetrated the real space and significantly transformed the lives of people who practically do not interact with a computer or cyberspace directly. If we know the smallest details of the Instagram star’s appearance and her lifestyle better than our neighbor’s face and mindset, then significant changes are taking place in our everyday life and this warrants attention by sociologists.

In that regard, the purpose of the article is to give a holistic idea of what is meant by “virtual space” today, to describe its characteristics and to consider its impact of modern man on the everyday world.

The first question we would like to formulate is why has virtual space appeared in its present expanded form right now, what are the social preconditions for this emergence? “The development in computer technologies” in this case is not a sufficient answer to the question since “development” has headed in the wrong direction than it was intended to be originally. The theorists of the Informational Society (D. Bell, A. Toffler, A. Touraine and others) assumed that computers and robotics would almost completely displace manual and mechanical labor. “Electronic cottages” as control centers of organizations and production capacities will solve the problem of city’s overpopulation and traffic, thereby reducing environmental risks. The primary mission of a man freed from manual labor will be a constant advancement of his own intellectual capacity and accumulation of scientific knowledge as the main engine of progress. Despite the fact that developed countries already live in the informational society on basic indicators, this model has remained being a utopia.

Surprisingly, the scientific advances in robotics do not arouse such enthusiasm and revival on the stock exchange as, for example, the launch of a new social network do. Increasing the computer capacity, building up the amount of memory (RAM and ROM) are necessary to make more impressive, spectacular and interactive games, the Internet environment, etc. We can say that the development of computer technology has followed the path of improving
the tools of virtual reality which was originally regarded only as a pleasant by-product of technologies.

From our point of view, the reason is not only that the further development of computer technology is impossible, although it turned out to be not as simple as it seemed to be. The emergence of a global virtual space has changed the real world and the direction of its further development. It provided an opportunity for the social existence out of real social groups and norms, enabled to implement the postmodern idea of individualization in a limit value when even things that others do not recognize as normal are considered to be normal. Modern mass existence based on the principle “alone is not scared—the more the merrier” set itself the objective of a global safety and control resulting in the development, sprawl and fullness of the megacities.

According to Z. Bauman, the city originally founded for the safety of its citizens has become a potential source of threat to those living and entering it. Continuously increasing population density of large cities, fierce competition between its inhabitants for the residence, seats in urban transport, on the street, in a store, at work, etc. have resulted in the creation of not so much external as the internal enemy-competitor image. Today’s urban environment is an environment of fear, caution warnings, fences, locks, total control, prohibitions and restrictions. Isolation from “others”, individualism is not a whim of the postmodern but a necessity for survival (Бауман, 2004: р. 71). The space around each of us is compressed to the limits of an apartment, office, car so the possibility of its safe expansion by accessing to virtual space becomes attractive and partly explains the “will to virtuality”.

Another reason lies in the logic of virtual interaction. Cyberspace gives the opportunity to touch and use what is not, and often does not exist at all. As a result, the logic of everyday life changes due to the assumption of possibility of an impossible.

The simplest and closest to our daily existence example is virtual money. Dissemination of bankcards relegates a person from the physical act of receiving money and using it as a means of paying for goods and services. Today we can spend from the card not only earned money but also that money people will earn in the future. At the macroeconomic level, it may be argued that all including the largest financial transactions take place in a virtual form (Giddens, 2003: pp. 9-10). Using virtual money (valid or falsified) one can prove his creditworthiness. As a result, the economy is changing drastically. The production of a real product, goods or services is pushed into the background. Today the existence of not only corporations but even entire states producing and selling nothing considers as normal, understandable, logical and legitimate but, anyway, they continue to carry out monetary transactions: payment of salary arrears, acceptance of payments, etc. This is but one example that illustrates the intrusion of logic and laws of virtual space into physical space.

Another example is more remote from real space and physical human existence. The world of books has always been considered as one belonging to the space of imagination and referring to the “finite provinces of meaning”
that exist out of the everyday life. The reversion from this area to real physical existence involved some efforts related to the rethinking of the location from the individual. The attempts to materialize this virtual world, certainly, are not new, they have always existed. Illustrations, theatrical performances, screen adaptations of popular fictions gave the audience a chance to penetrate their makers’ imaginary world and to compare with their own. Depending on the results of such a comparison, a verdict on the value of one or another fictional work was presented.

Today’s situation has changed not only through the emergence of another method of visualizing and objectifying the world of books, namely, a computer game and all sorts of toys, attributes packed full of electronics. The reason does not even lie in the fact that through the Internet one can communicate with like-minded people, also deeply immersed in virtual space. Games based on bestsellers appear much earlier than the related screen adaptations and have superiority in the battle for the minds of the readers. Many books and their screen versions have appeared shortly after popular computer games emphasizing the close link and unification of these previously autonomous virtual spaces. The crucial thing is that now the access to virtual space does not require a compulsory and final return to the real space. In the morning, the child may well go to school to study physics not only believing but also knowing that the magic Harry Potter’s world exists. The second half of the day he spends time at Hogwarts, endlessly wandering in its labyrinths and experiencing magical adventures. Through cyberspace, the virtual (imaginary) and real worlds cease to be antagonistic, peacefully coexisting in one brain.

By the way, it provides an opportunity to emphasize the distinctive feature of contemporary bestsellers and one of the reasons for their popularity that are closely linked to the spatial issue. The books of earlier times got us to thinking about the existing physical reality: they described real or fictional events, adventures that either occurred or could occur in real physical space. If we have remembered fairy tales, science fiction or fantasy, then the books of these genres were also directly related to the real world. For example, a fairy tale usually began with “once upon a time.” Then all sorts of incredible things happened to its characters. However, with the help of magic, the protagonist pursued realistic goals: Ivan the Fool (a stock character of lucky fool who appears in Russian folklore) married the princess, the beggar made a fortune, the terminally ill came back to life. In the end, everything came full circle, - a return to the real world was necessarily predetermined by the final phrase like “and they lived happily ever after,” or “I was there ...”. Fantasy books, as a rule, used to describe the world existed before ours and where the magic characters lived. Supposing this world existed long time ago and has left nothing but distant memories in fairy tales and legends or it was crumbling as a result of the real catastrophes. Sci-Fi implied the world of the future based on scientific achievements of that moment.

If we talk about the current super-bestellers, then for example, the story of Harry Potter begins with the fact that he is an ordinary boy who lives next door to us. Gradually it turns out that there is a world of wizards parallel to ours, which everyone
can contact, where all the phenomena, unexplained by modern science, can be fully explained. Letter by letter, JK Rowling creates a virtual world that complements the physical world familiar to us, and does not come into conflict with it. Neither the end of the first book nor the end of the last seventh does not provide a way out of this world. There is also no explanation that this was once upon a time or only will be. This world exists right now next door to us! Try to prove the opposite!

In “The Da Vinci Code” and “Angels and Demons”, Dan Brown also constructs a different reality with no magic there. But another interpretation of real historical facts and events affects the foundations of the present Christian civilization’s existence, makes it possible to construct and successfully exist in a world where the events were set the same way with all the ensuing consequences. There is no explanation or at least a hint of a garbling or a hoax at the end.

Thus, a new virtual space has introduced the logic and laws of virtual (previously only imaginary) reality into our everyday life which now includes not only a single world, but also plurality of worlds existing simultaneously and not coming into collision with each other. This substantially changes the logic of everyday life and introduces virtual features into it. Paraphrasing the slogan of the Yandex search engine “Everything will be found”, one can describe the current everyday life in words “Everything is possible!”

The upbringing of younger generation from an early age tends to happen with the assumption of this multitude worlds’ existence. For example, SpongeBob and other beloved characters live in a space similar to the real one. For some reason, the fundamental laws of physics (most often the Law of Gravity) do not act there or act but not always and not immediately. Moreover, the design and an order of specialized children’s channels’ broadcasting provides for the simultaneous existence and consistent immersion in certain virtual world: from SpongeBob with his problems to Peppa Pig, etc.

Such a multidimensionality is technologically embedded in the new virtual space. Actually, dimension is one of the basic properties of space. If the location of any object in the physical space is described by four coordinates: abscissa, ordinate, applicate and time point, then virtual space involves a multiplicity of them. The place (topos) or point in virtual space is determined by the address taking into account the type of data transfer protocol, the selected service, the name, numerous extensions of the domain name system, the country. In addition, a constant change in the coordinate system is possible here. A new starting point (access to virtual space by another search engine, service or computer game) changes the space around. In practice, this generates an idea of the unlimited dimension of virtual space.

However, let us get back to the consideration of the everyday life’s problems associated with spatial transformations. In A. Schütz’s phenomenological sociology, the world of everyday life is being formed taking into account the experience based on the fact that this is a world of objects with certain qualities, a set of values that need to be interpreted to find support in it (Шюц, 1988: p. 131). The commonality of space and time forms the basis for further interpreting and understanding of other people’s actions. Nevertheless, everyday life is the mental
basis for understanding of the world around us. A. Schütz distinguished six constitutive elements of everyday life: 1) labor activity; 2) specific belief in the existence of the world; 3) tense attitude towards life; 4) special experience of time; 5) the specificity of the personal certainty of the acting individual; 6) a special form of sociality (Ionin, 2008: p. 283).

Schütz considered labor activity to be the primary one of these characteristics as always and everywhere human daily life was connected with productive labor (Ionin, 1997: p. 327). Such labor activity was aimed at the transformation of space, the production of a new product occupying a certain place and performing the required functions in the physical space, as well as the exchange, mediation in the distribution of the real product.

Today we see an increasing virtualization in labor activity. Moreover, it is not just a question of working with a computer, software, networks or using a computer. There are a great amount of things produced, sold and bought there which generally have only virtual value or that are valuable only in virtual space. For example, the Internet providers charge quite real money for access to virtual space and for provision of place and services in it. If this example affects material things to some extent: place, time (virtual one), then the work of an image-maker or advertising professional is a work carried out by virtual services: through images, signs and symbols. The production and sale of various stickers for web applications or equipment for on-line games can also be added. All of this points to virtualization of the basic component of everyday life.

Another important feature of everyday life – belief in the existence of the world – is also undergoing a change with the advent of a new virtual space. The conclusion about the uniqueness, perfection and inviolability of our world (Ionin, 1997: p. 331), as noted above, is currently irrelevant and disproved by the actual existence of many worlds, as well as a multitude of explanations and interpretations of the existing world.

According to Schütz, the vital activity, intense active attitude towards life is inherent in everyday life and associated with the conquest of physical space and overcoming challenges. The appearance of access to virtual space provides the opportunity not to solve the vital life’s problem but to bypass it. At the global level, modern attitude towards environmental problems can serve as an example. Since an optimal and cheap technological solution cannot be found, it is just necessary to report regularly on new discoveries (clean energy sources, cancer and AIDS drugs and almost battery-operated powerful electric motors) that will turn the world over and correct all the mistakes tomorrow. It is possible to create more spectacular and real pictures of the planetary apocalypse with the help of games and cinema. At the state level, there can be the programs for democratization, the development of the country that can be available as symbols and signs because they cannot be implemented in the real life. At the individual level, it is much easier: one can find a virtual world calming the thirst for vital activity and live immersed in it.

The special experience of time, namely, objectivity, standardization, simultaneity in virtual space should be discussed separately and more detailed.
However, here we can specify several approaches. On the one hand, time in virtual space is even more standardized because the interactive medium, for example, the Internet implies the moment to be treated as “now”, not sooner or later. On the other hand, the question of passage and duration of time is strictly individual. Many “visitors” and constant “inhabitants” of virtual space notice that time flows much faster there than in the real world and we have got only milliseconds in games. It is also worth noting that the computer game and many other applications do not provide real-time observation by the user, therefore, the immersion into virtual space occurs according to the laws of own time, slightly corrected by the user’s biological clock.

The personal certainty of the acting individual, the involvement of the individual in everyday activities in virtual space is not simply alienated (Ионин, 1997: p. 343) but disappears altogether. Some authors have predicted fragmentation, stratification of personality in virtual space. From our point of view, it is more correct to talk about the plurality of personal plans in virtual space and, therefore, the relativity of personal involvement in this world. Also, virtualization as a process of borrowing logic and laws of virtual space is gradually transferring this detached attitude to the real world. The phrase from the popular film: “Nothing personal – it is just business!” – can be considered as the slogan of our everyday life.

The last component – a special form of sociality – implied the inter-subjective nature of everyday life. A. Schütz spoke about the typification of phenomena and objects which are deprived of unique individual traits in the process of interaction and acquire universal, typical and impersonal features of sociality (Шюц, 1988). The multidimensionality and multiplicity of virtual worlds, embodied in the new virtual space, enable the person to defend one’s individuality, to keep one’s character, to maintain one’s uniqueness and originality in the virtual world, even though it cannot yet be accepted in the real world. Gradually, this wave of individualization has spilled over into the real world. It is sufficient for the person to say about his/her unique features in the virtual space when suddenly there will be found like-minded people who will keep on upholding the right to be oneself in the real space.

Pluralism and individualism have aroused significant changes in all institutions of society from the institution of the family to the institutions of politics and government. Today individuality is valued much higher than typicality; it becomes the main factor of moving up the social ladder and leaves a stamp on social interaction, both virtual and real one.

The examples provided confirm the close connection between everyday life and space. Schütz’s everyday life is a product of a long historical development closely linked with space and time. Any changes in space arouse significant changes in everyday life. Penetration into the real space of logic and laws of virtual space has caused “virtualization” of everyday life, has allowed “to attract” and to fix the finite provinces of meaning in the daily routine existence and has practically blurred the lines between these recently opposing worlds. Labor
activity is increasingly concentrating on the production of symbols. Creative non-standard approach is valued higher than the standardized and the routine one. The picture of the universe is not unique and immutable in the perception of modern individuals and admits plurality and even inconsistency of the world’s pictures. Schemes of the social world objects’ typification experience multifacetedness, ambiguity and non-obviousness of social interactions’ forms. Routine forms of social practice are painted with bright colours due to the penetration and fixation of finite provinces of meaning. The opposition of weekdays and leisure, holiday; reality and ideal models, everyday routine and creative forms of activity is reduced. On the other hand, fixed changes in everyday life once again indicate the transformation of visions about space. Thus, the consideration of the spatial aspects of the mankind existence is necessary in social theories designed to understand and explain modern society.

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This article deals with the phenomenon of cultural security and its role in preservation of cultural heritage, of providing the maintenance and development of new ideas in spiritual life in a society. The questions of the building up of cultural security system, fundamental principles of the theoretical framework of its functioning and of its investigation, a contextual role issues related to the function of cultural security, meanings of the key notions and terms are discussed. Special emphasis is made on its importance for ethno-cultural diverse societies and turbulent situations. The question of cultural security management is being considered.

*Keywords*: cultural security, structure of cultural security system, mobilizers of cultural security, «cultural security dilemma», cultural security management.
GENERAL REMARK

According to Erik Nemeth the usage of «cultural security» as a phenomenon and as a term defining this phenomenon started a century ago, when the phrase first appeared in 1916. Its usage dynamics was the following: beginning in 1930, the relative frequency of use started to increase and peaked in 1944 and then declined in 1951 before assuming a steady increase in the 2000’s.

«In the millennium, the phrase has appeared as a term in various contexts internationally, and the usage seems to fall into three categories: preservation of an indigenous culture, protection of a national culture, and «power» of national culture in the global economy» (Cultural security: the Evolving Role, s.a., 2013).

CULTURAL SECURITY – AN ACTUAL REQUIREMENT

The attention to cultural security in theoretical and practical senses can be explained by the following circumstances: 1) globalization of contemporary flows of cultural items and thoughts concerning culture. It occurs due to the energetic development of transport and communication means and intensive interchange of ideas in the process of continuous deepening of direct and indirect contacts between peoples; 2) existence of numerous ethno-cultural communities on the territory of one country; 3) active migrations of bearers of different cultural traditions, customs, ceremonies, lifestyles and ways of thinking.

These circumstances may cause: 1) losses of cultural items, their thefts, damages during the flows and exchanges; 2) transformations of the cultural way of thinking under the pressure of other cultures causing the weakening of traditions of own cultures and changing of attitudes of the bearers of the ethnicity (ethnophors) towards their own cultures; 3) violation of cultural rights of ethnophors of diverse traditions.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS: BASIC STATEMENTS

To embrace the parameters of the concept of cultural security phenomenon and to comprehend its sense several statements should be noted.

First. The cultural security is a socio-cultural phenomenon. The reasons for such an approach are the following: 1) the term cultural security relates to
the culture in its various manifestations; 2) the culture exists and develops in a variety of environments one of which (the most influential and the most powerful in formative sense) is the social environment. The latter in broader conception, as Elizabett Barnett and Michele Casper write, «encompasses the immediate physical surroundings, social relationships, and cultural milieus within which defined groups of people function and interact» (Barnett, 2001: p. 465).

The phenomenon of «cultural security» originates: 1) spontaneously (without interference from outside, motivated by inherent desire for preservation of habitual milieu of a group or of an individual); 2) under the influence of outside forces (political, business etc.) interested in the cultural development of a group, a country with the aim to take a worthy place in the system of international relations, in particular in the cultural spheres. This way of forming of the system of cultural security is dominating, suggesting the phenomenon to be a socio-cultural construct.

Second. The most productive ways of the construct analysis are socio-cultural and organizational (structural) perspectives. The former enables to look at its qualitative contents, its interactions of the components filling up these contents; the latter reproduces actually the structure of the cultural security. The comprehension of the latter is very important for the maximization of its functioning. Socio-cultural perspective opens way to understanding the role of the phenomenon in accumulation of social capital (resources based on group membership, relationships, networks of influence and support) and cultural capital (forms of knowledge, skills, education) [Bourdieu, 1986] which form the base for successful existing and development of cultural aspects of the activity of a group or a society.

Third. Deriving from the above-mentioned considerations a conclusion can be made that the most successful way for understanding the phenomenon of «cultural security» is to look at it from the standpoint of its function (how it functions under different circumstances). It means that one has to examine how the structure functions, which are the aims of cultural security system as a constructed phenomenon (what is constructed for the cultural security system?), in other words, the question is about the instrumental role of the cultural security system. In our opinion in this case the broadened meaning of the notion «cultural security» («cultural security system») is needed, which can reflect other groups of attachments that include: 1) subjects in which cultural security functions (cultural environment) or subjects related to (cultural heritage, cultural survival, cultural memory, cultural practices, cultural participation, ethno-cultural identity, development of ethnic marked cultures); 2) the ways of forming of thinking and behavior modus concerning the culture items and cultural actions and as to building up an efficient system of cultural security itself (cultural management, cultural competence, intercultural education).

Fourth. Litmus papers of the state and the quality of cultural security system are: 1) the level of the realization of cultural rights of individuals and groups; 2) the level and prospects of cultural development of a group or a society.

Fifth. The evaluation methodology must be applied as an instrument for the measurement of the state of cultural security system and for defining the possibilities of its impact upon the cultural developments of a society.
HOW KEY TERMS OF THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK CAN WORK

How to put into work the proposed theoretical framework in order to come to understanding of the phenomenon of cultural security and to build the efficient system of cultural security? In this case the operationalization of terms used in this investigation can help to find the way. The latter can be understood as «a process of defining the measurement of a phenomenon» [Operationalization, s.a.]. In our case it means that the quality of cultural security system can be measured through understanding of the subjects in which cultural security functions or is related to the above mentioned.

But before the discussion we need to clarify the key terms which build up the basis of the investigation.

Culture: According to A. Kroeber und C. Kluckhohn there are 164 definitions of the term «culture» (Hyatt, 1999: p. 25) based on three traditional approaches - the classical French notion of culture is centered on the idea of creation of the work of art; the German notion is closer to the idea of civilization and includes values, representations, symbols and patrimony as shared by a community at a moment in its history; the Anglo-Saxon sense, more anthropological, includes modes of living, lifestyles, common knowledge, images and myths. Another definition of the notion «culture» was given on the 1982 Mondiacult Conference in Mexico City and in the Universal Declaration On Cultural Diversity, UNESCO: «In the largest sense culture today can be considered as the set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features of society or a social group and that it encompasses, in addition to arts and literature, lifestyle, ways of living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs» (Tardif, 2002, s.a.). This remark is very important in the case of ethno-culturally diverse societies.

In context of cultural security one has to keep in mind the availability of other approaches which include into definition more elements addressing language, aesthetics, education, religion, attitudes and values, social organization [What Are Examples, s.a.]. The definition by UNESCO was chosen because of two reasons: 1) it includes the three approaches mentioned above; 2) it embraces the framework within which an individual can realize oneself as an intellectually developed human being. Among the variety of cultural characteristics the following are very important to discuss the aspects of cultural security formulated in this article: spiritual, emotional features, lifestyle, ways of living, value systems, traditions and beliefs, especially ethnic marked. The importance of material items (material culture) in the life of peoples and the threats for them to be stolen, to be damaged, finally to be lost are taken into account. In my opinion, these aspects are more explored and they are intensively discussed in complex of international (interstate) relations (Nemeth, 2015; Ziętek, 2013; Yu, 2002). My proposal is to argue more hidden agendas.

Security: In my case of study the broader sense of the notion cited by Jean Tardif is quite relevant: «the capacity of a society to conserve its specific character in spite of changing conditions and real or virtual threats: more precisely, it involves the permanence of traditional schemas of language, culture, associations, identity and national or religious practices, allowing for changes that are judged to be acceptable.
This notion of security is rightly seen as a fundamental concern for every society, including cultural matters, as well as the central question of international relations that must be addressed in present conditions» (Tardif, 2002, s.a.).

**Cultural security:** It is to be stated that the notion is developing now. Its contemporary understanding includes such components as freedom of thought, conscience, language, life style, religion, and customs. The notion «cultural security» comprises two aspects: first one reflexes the state of the security of cultural values in broader sense (material and spiritual) and what the state power does for their preservation and development; another one represents a set of different actions taken by different actors involving in the process of building of cultural security system (Ziętek, 2015). But if we are looking at the activities of research centers dealing with certain aspect of culture we find another interpretations of the notion in discussion. It is connected with such topics as the political economy of art, the power of cultural heritage in diplomacy, the way in which art and culture influence foreign policy and security, interrelation of cultural property, diplomacy and international security (Cultural Security-Interrelation, s.a.). Certainly, to present the phenomenon as a system we have to take into consideration all the nuances of its manifestations.

**STRUCTURE OF CULTURAL SECURITY**

The article proposes to look at the phenomenon as at the socio-cultural construct with a special emphasis on ethnic markers. In this sense, cultural security will be presented at the same time as the structure that includes several integral components and actions (*cultural security system*) and qualitative characteristics of the phenomenon (*cultural security*). Australian researcher professor Julienne (Juli) Coffin has developed the following model of cultural security (2007): cultural awareness, cultural safety, cultural security (Social Justice Report, 2011: p. 126). In this context, it is related to an already accomplished structure. It is proposed to discuss this model in a broader sense as cultural security is a multifold phenomenon and it pertains to many issues of cultural life including cultural heritage, cultural memory, cultural survival, cultural environment, cultural practices, cultural rights etc. However, to reach the top of the model, cultural security, one has to secure the functioning of the all above mentioned issues under different circumstances.

The first component of cultural security *cultural awareness* is in a general sense an ability of a person to perceive, to interpret and to estimate own culture as well as the culture of others in the process of communication to avoid misunderstandings in using own meanings for evaluating «otherness». One has to take into consideration that cultural awareness is «the ability of standing back from ourselves and becoming aware of our cultural values, beliefs and perceptions», «cultural awareness becomes central when we have to interact with people from other cultures», «misunderstanding arise when I use meanings to make sense of our reality» (Quappe, 2005, s.a.). It is a foundation wall of cultural security, building up of which begins with the
understanding of the state of the cultural environment in which an individual or a
group exists, its values, its quality and possibilities for its development.

The second important component of the structure cultural safety is to be understood as the level of comfort of cultural environment for activity of an individual or a group, a community. At the same time this component of cultural security indicates that the people feel safe, solid in their cultural identity and it is a good platform for cultural revitalization.

The third component of the proposed structure is actually cultural security. Its contemporary understanding includes such components as freedom of thought, conscience, language, life style, religion, and customs. It should be underlined that the notion «cultural security» comprises of two aspects: first one reflexes the state of the security of cultural values in a broader sense (material and spiritual) and what the state power and other actors do for their preservation and development.

**ISSUES RELATED TO THE FUNCTIONING OF CULTURAL SECURITY: CONTEXTUAL USAGE**

Among numerous issues that affect the functioning of cultural security itself and cultural security system in general, it is proposed to pay attention to several of them, which are likely to influence the phenomena most.

**Cultural environment** The functioning of cultural security and building its structure (its system) and defining ways of the future of cultural development of a group or a society organized in compliance with the ethno-cultural principles, or where these principles play significant role as the key condition. Analyzing the role of cultural environment following definition was used: «A cultural environment is a set of beliefs, practices, customs and behaviors that are found to be common (in our version, understandable) to everyone who is living within a certain population. Cultural environment shape the way that every person develops, influencing ideologies and personalities. Cultural environments are determined by the culmination of many different aspects of culture that influence personal choices and behaviors» (What Is a Cultural Environment, s.a.).

**Cultural heritage** is another very important component that characterizes the level of cultural life of a group or a society and it is at the same time the object of concern for cultural security system. This concern has to do with tangible (monuments, buildings, books, works of arts, artifacts) and intangible (folklore, traditions, language, knowledge) attributes that are inherited from the past as natural heritage. Because of the focus of present investigation the detailed analysis of the role of each component of cultural heritage is not performed. The intangible ethno-culturally marked objects are under the question and in further investigations; the functions are contextualized of the above-mentioned components. First of all, operating in new cultural climate of values, traditions, customs, aesthetic and artistic expressions, spiritual beliefs, languages of ethnic groups being in different situations, including emergency will be taken into consideration.
Cultural survival is a state of continuing to conduct cultural activities in spite of difficult circumstances. This phenomenon relates to the indigenous peoples, the history of which was the struggle for survival. Cultural component in this struggle is a very powerful one. Survival of cultural surrounding is a good starting platform for preservation, maintenance and development of inherent cultural characteristics of a group or a community, for not only indigenous people but also ethnic minorities and immigrants throughout.

Cultural memory as a domain of individual and collective experience takes an important place in building up of the system of cultural security. Based upon the researches of (Assmann, 2013; Connerton, 1989; Erll, 2011; Nora, 2002; Stewart, 1993; Terdiman, 1993) and other authors the most suitable description of the cultural memory is the phenomenon containing information about cultural elements accumulated and contained in different objects – souvenirs, art items, photographs, stories/narratives, obelisks, even human body. Adding to this – the role of bearers of ancient historical cultural information in today’s cultural environment, as Richard Terdiman, is «present past» (Terdiman, 1993).

Cultural practices: there are several approaches to define the subject: 1) cultural practices include a broad range of activities, such as religious and spiritual, art, medical treatment and customs, diet, interpersonal relationships and child care (What Are Examples, s.a.); 2) ordinary processes of remembering and transmission can be understood as cultural practices by which people recognize a lineage, a debt to their past, and through which they express moral continuity with the past (Cultural Memory, s.a.). One can combine the main elements of these approaches to have an operationalized definition for our case which illustrate how cultural security functions in this field: cultural practices are the activities of a person or a group connected with different cultural aspects of their vital functions which manifest singularity of bearers of ethno-cultural traditions and ethnically marked communities in general and at the same time are directed to the maintenance of cultural and historical heritage, satisfaction of the special needs connected with ethnic origins, providing of the access to cultural heritage of the whole society for everyone, development of the creative potential of a person and a group, encouragement of positive developments of ethno-cultural diversity of a society. Cultural practices generally are closely connected with traditions, customs and behavioral patterns; but today they include new issues of contemporary intercultural communications first of all from youth environment (computer games, for example).

It is to be stressed that cultural practices interact productively with other functional aspects of cultural security – cultural environment, cultural survival, cultural heritage, cultural memory – stimulating their revival and development.

Cultural participation includes «cultural practices that may involve consumption as well as activities that are undertaken within the community, reflecting quality of life, traditions and beliefs. It includes attendance of formal and foré fee events, such as going to a movie or to a concert, as well as informal cultural action, such as participating in community cultural activities and amateur artistic productions or everyday activities like reading a book. Moreover, cultural participation covers both active and passive behavior. It includes the person who is listening to a concert and
the person who practices music. The purpose of cultural participation surveys should be to assess overall participation levels, even though it may be difficult to distinguish active from passive behavior. For example, in some festivals, individuals may be performers (active, creating and inspiring others) or be a part of the audience (passive or seeking inspiration). Cultural participation does not concern activities carried out for employment purposes; for example, cultural participation would include visitors to a museum but not the paid guide» (The 2009 UNESCO, 2009: p. 45).

Ethno-cultural identity as a constructive component of the cultural security system comprises two aspects – 1) concerning whole polyethnic society; 2) concerning certain ethnic community.

**MOBILIZERS OF BUILDING UP OF EFFICIENT CULTURAL SECURITY SYSTEM**

To have an efficient system of cultural security one has to build it. There are several factors which can help to stimulate this process: evaluation of cultural security, cultural management, intercultural education (including intercultural competences).

**Cultural security evaluation.** The usage of the following definition of the phenomenon is proposed: evaluation of cultural security is a process of systematic determination of its state, merit, worth, significance, modus and the results of its application and prospects for its development. It can be divided in two parts: 1) estimation of the state of cultural security; 2) maintenance, accompaniment of actions directed to improvement and development of system of cultural security. For the last aim different training models can be applied, for instance «Kirkpatrick’s Four-Level Training Evaluation Model» (Kirkpatrick’s, s.a.).

**Cultural management:** based upon the general definition of management (function of coordination of the efforts to accomplish goals and objectives by using available resources efficiently and effectively (Management), we propose to choose this approach concerning the sphere of culture with a special accent on the values, beliefs and norms which influence the behavior of people as towards the own culture and towards culture of others too. One differs cultural resources management (CRM) - the vocation and practice of managing cultural resources (the arts and heritage) and as a part of the first cultural heritage management that is concerned with traditional and historic culture. In broader sense cultural resources management encompasses rather current culture than traditional forms of culture.

**Intercultural education** refers to any form of education or teaching that incorporates the histories, texts, values, beliefs, and perspectives of people from different cultural backgrounds (Multicultural Education, s.a.).

**Cultural competence,** according to James Green, is a process-oriented journey of learning how to perceive others through their own cultural lens, knowledge of certain cultural beliefs, personal comfort with difference, willingness to change one’s ideas and ability to be flexible (Green, 1998: p.75). Such an approach is relevant to our case of study as ethnic cultures do not exist in «closed container», they interact with each other. That’s why one can speak
about an intercultural competence the core sense of which, according to Altay Manço, are «psychological capacities that enable individuals or groups, and in particular members of immigrant communities, to «confront», with some degree of efficiency, the complex situations arising of contact between cultures in an inegalitarian socio-economic and political context» (Manço, 2006: p.161).

THE LITMUS PAPERS OF CULTURAL SECURITY SYSTEM

The analysis of cultural situations in different countries, in particular culturally and ethnically diverse, led us to the following statement: litmus papers of functioning of cultural security system are: the realization of cultural rights at individual and group levels and condition for cultural development.

Summing up numerous interpretations of the phenomenon and basing upon the above chosen definition of notion «culture» the most relevant to this investigation is the following presentation of cultural rights: these are rights related to art, culture and the way of thinking and behaving based on cultural traditions. In this broad interpretation the notion of cultural rights includes, according to Janusz Symonides, the right to cultural identity, the right to participate in cultural life, the right to education, the right to creativity and to benefit from the protection of the moral and material interest resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production, the right to information, the right to benefit from scientific progress and its application, the right to cultural heritage, the right to international cultural cooperation (Symonides, 2000: p.186-195). The rights related to language, to intellectual property can be added to this list. The importance of cultural rights as an integral part of human rights has been underlined by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in January 2012: «The right to take part in cultural life is - and shall be recognized as being - pivotal to the system of human rights. Those deprived of this right also lose the opportunity to responsibly exercise their other rights, through the lack of awareness of the fullness of their identity. Moreover, access to the arts and free artistic and cultural expression contribute to the development of critical thinking, to enhanced mutual understanding and to mutual respect. Thus, they contribute to reinforcing democratic citizenship and social cohesion, a ‘harmonious living together and peace between peoples’».

Cultural development is at the peak of the structural pyramid of cultural security system: it signifies that the system operates successfully and all components mentioned above have provided a base for the future of cultures under new conditions. Cultural development is seen as a dynamic process of changing the state of cultural situation in direction of accumulation of new cultural information, including virtual information.

STATE-OF-THE-ART

In spite of the fact that the problem of cultural security from the beginning of the 1990’s has turned into top theme of theoretical discourse and practical activities one has to state a lack of researches and publications in this direction. Investigating
the subject with consciously programmed accent on Ukrainian realities, we will base upon following sources, scientific literature and publications:


b) among scientific works the following authors are to be mentioned: Janusz Symonides, Will Kymlicka, Annamani Laakonen which observe the cultural rights in context of human rights and «making culture accessible»; Rauf Ceylan analyzes the socio-cultural heterogeneity, ethno-cultural conflict constellation, cultural hierarchy, problems of ethno-cultural living together, cultural otherness as factor provoking the threats for a society; Agata Ziętek, defines parameters of analysis of cultural security, predominantly in the sphere of international relations; Yu Xintian with colleagues tries to analyze the cultural impact on international relations; Volker Gransow pays a special attention to the cultural aspects of human security; Jean Tardif writes about the role of intercultural dialogue in the cultural security; John Cotter develops the idea about the importance of cultural security dilemma, especially in the competitive situations and in situations of interethnic conflicts (like in Georgia); Adam Childs pays attention to cultural theory in determining security strategies in broad humanitarian sense; in recent times many researchers (for instance, Vladimir Baboi, Susanne Keuchel) deal with the problem of «cultural security in migration contexts»; Jenny Hyatt and Helen Simons try to evaluate the specifics of cultural codes in Central and Eastern Europe with the aim to bring us closer to understanding of intercultural interdependences in this region where Ukraine belongs too; James Banks, Sonia Nieto, Allison Cumming-McCann, Werner Wiater develop the models of multicultural education; Janina Dacyl brings management of cultural pluralism into discourse; Nicolai Petro discusses the cultural basis of European security with an accent on Ukrainian realities; a very interesting problem of deculturalization in the context of sociocultural, political and historical developments is the subject of investigation by Joel Spring; many subjects related to the content and building up of cultural security system are discussed in the works of Jan Assmann, Connerton Paul, Astrid Ettl, Pierre Nora (cultural memory), James Green, Stephanie Quappe and Giovanna Cantore, Per Rudling, Giamarco Savio and Gabriela Gonzalez-Vaillant (cultural awareness), Will Kymlicka (cultural autonomy and minority rights), Altay Manço (intercultural competences); the discourse of the role of intercultural dialogue in realizing of cultural rights in different dimensions starts (Leszek Korporowicz, Volodymyr Yevtukh).

c) as a very important source (especially in evaluating the practices of cultural security) are: the numerous informative communications from the virtual space (the Internet); proceedings of conferences, for instance «Immigrants and Cultural Security» (2010), «Pan-European Conference on International Relations (2013)»; information about activities of various NGOs dealing with cultural rights as a part of human rights.
TURBULENT SITUATIONS AS A SPECIAL FOCUS OF THE STUDY (THE CASE OF ETHNICALLY DIVERSE SOCIETY)

Studying cultural security there should be put an emphasis on the changes which occur or may occur in various unexpected situations (in our research we call them turbulent situations) caused by war activities, ethnic conflicts, migration crises and decentralization processes – phenomena which are relevant for many countries as well as Ukraine.

Special attention will be paid to the aspects of understanding of cultural security based on the notion of culture including spiritual, emotional features, lifestyle, ways of living, value systems, traditions and beliefs, especially ethnically marked. That’s why exploring the cultural security phenomenon we have to keep in mind what happens in turbulent situations with ethno-cultural heritage of various ethnic groups, how the cultural rights of ethnic minorities can be observed (possibilities to support and to develop unique patterns of ethnic cultures) and how immigrants, especially «visible immigrants», can build up their cultural life under the conditions of the threats to cultural values caused by mass flows of immigrants – so called «visible immigrants» (people from African, Arab and Asian countries). It should be mentioned that this term has been used for a long time in the theory as well as in practices of ethno-national development of Canada, in particular in the censuses. According to the Employment Equity Act 1995 «visible minorities» are «persons, other than Aboriginal people, who are non-Caucasian in race or non-white in color» (Employment, 1995, s.a.). Such accents arose from the situations in Ukraine of the last 3 years when provoked threats to ethno-cultural developments and the loss of cultural items and to heritage of ethnic communities became a reality (war actions, forced resettlements from territories where ethnic cultures were entertained, division of ethnic communities, worries at the multiethnic frontier areas).

The above mentioned circumstances led to the search for models of preservation, support and development of different cultures and appropriate structures of security to build up with the aim to secure cultural identity of different ethnophors and preconditions of non-conflict coexistence in new regions, to guarantee contacts between the divided parts of ethnic communities, to solve problems on the borders of our country.

«CULTURAL SECURITY DILEMMA»

In the relations between the different ethno-cultural groups, including immigrants, the «security dilemma» arises as a key problem for cultural security because efforts of one group to strengthen its cultural security are almost always offensive or threatening to other groups who respond with their own demands for cultural preservation and eventually for autonomy» (Cotter, 1999, s.a.). This dilemma is especially obvious in turbulent situations. The «cultural security dilemma» is determined by various factors, but, first of all, by factors, which
determine the possibilities of perception and understanding of a culture (cultural elements) of others. Note that the axiom is that cultures are formed under the influence of several factors, an important role among which, in particular, play social events. The meaningfulness of these factors and their contents is different for different ethnophores (bearers of certain ethnic features), which predetermines the ethno-cultural diversification of the modern world. Especially noticeable it is in the conditions of the coexistence of ethno-cultural communities within one and the same ethno-political organism (state) (Етнічний довідник, 1997: p. 60) or ethno-social organism (ethnos) (Євтух, 2012: p.135-136).

The level of cross-cultural distance of bearers of different traditions (cultural, customary, ritual), which for various reasons are in contextual interaction with each other because of living in polyethnical milieu (Yevtukh, 2015, s.a.), is important. The ethno-cultural distance: the difference in the level of development and differences between the cultures of human communities, which is based on such factors as ethnic origin, ethnic customs, traditions. Ethno-cultural distance is emphasized (consciously or subconsciously), first of all, in the process of interethnic dialogue and especially is visible under the circumstances of Ethnic Renaissance, when the representatives of one or another community attach much importance to its ethnic origin, actively allocate themselves in the system of inter-ethnic relations. Excessive accentuation of the differences in the culture of one ethnic group from another under unfavorable conditions may determine (especially when it is carried out purposefully and consciously programmed) the opposition of ethnic groups (Євтух, 2012: p. 84-85).

These differences, the situations when the representatives of one cultural tradition do not understand and do not perceive those of others cause tensions between them that doesn’t stimulate their cultural and social security. Sometimes these tensions generate negative attitude of Ukrainian citizens, for example, towards the representatives of «new ethnicities»: the language of enmity (hate speech), the charges of immigrants in violation of moral norms of coexistence in the Ukrainian society, restricted admission to entertainment establishments; extreme form of negative attitude is the use of force, attacks, murders.

Under such circumstances the problems related to culture and all the more to cultural security are not in the list of priorities by three parts of process – by enforced re-settlements, by authorities, by researchers. It presents the catastrophic situation for the perspectives of maintenance the ethnically marked heritage, customs, traditions and their practicing in everyday life and their development.

**EFFICIENT CULTURAL SECURITY MANAGEMENT NEEDED (INSTEAD OF CONCLUSION)**

What is done and what may be done to secure cultural heritage, cultural thinking and to develop cultural activities in different situations and especially in turbulent ones? There are two levels of the problem: state level and civic (voluntary, individual participation) level. Analyzing the Ukrainian case Ella Libanova
considers expedient to elaborate two individual programs for the re-settlers – one for those who wants to return to the places of their previous domiciles and second for those who decides to stay permanently in new areas of Ukraine, paying adequate attention to questions of socio-humanitarian and cultural-educational character (Лібанова, 2014, s.a.). Taking into account such a proposal one must build two types of cultural security the following terms are proposed «cultural security system of first needs actions» and «cultural security system of long-time operation».

In the first case one has to dwell preferential attention to such issues of cultural security as cultural awareness (from the structure of cultural security) and cultural memory, cultural survival, elements of cultural heritage, cultural practice (subjects related to the functioning of cultural security system). In the second case all the components of the structure of cultural security system (cultural awareness, cultural safety, cultural security) are important as well as subjects related to the functioning of cultural security system (I propose such a succession of the concentration of efforts of those who is obliged to deal with the cultural security and who does it on the voluntary basis: to carry out cultural evaluation, to build up cultural environment, including reanimation and enforcement of cultural memory, conservation of cultural survivals and elements of cultural heritage, everyday cultural practices, maintenance of cultural activities; to build up efficient cultural management on the basis of intercultural education, cultural competences and relations with the all the parts of divided communities).

Taking into account all mentioned circumstances and hard spadework can help to form conditions, which ensure the cultural development of holders of different ethno-cultural traditions and cultures, living in polyethnict areas and stimulate to realize their cultural rights. The last is the index of successfully functioning of the cultural security system in the concept presented in this investigation. So far as the system of cultural security in many countries is at the start of its building up and functioning one has to look attentively at the experience in this field. Ex altera parte building up the cultural security system can provide instruments for overcome severe obstacles in development of different groups of ethnically diverse population, can help save their ethnic heritage, strengthen their cultural memory, their ethno-cultural identity, activate their cultural practices, stimulate their participation in cultural activities in old and new areas. In result, they can be strong partners of intercultural dialogue under new socio-political conditions.

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THEORETICAL ASSUMPTIONS OF CULTURAL CONSONANCE MODEL

Kateryna Maltseva (Kyiv)

The relationship between social status, stress and health has generated a wide literature in social sciences. Its extensive coverage includes empirical research on social gradient in health, as well as the impact of social comparison, relative deprivation, discrimination and social stress on health status. Building on these explorations, recently there has been much interest in the mechanism underlying the social gradient in health (the negative relationship between morbidity/mortality and socioeconomic status). It is one of the points of investigation in biomedical research at the moment.

The present article offers an overview of one of the most successful theoretical frameworks in biomedical research on interactions between society and health – cultural consonance model. Formulated by William Dressler as a result of two decades of empirical research on health disparities in the United States and Brazil, cultural consonance offers insight into the relationship between individual’s inability to live up to a societal standard in their behavior or lifestyle, and negative health outcomes. In the present publication the intellectual roots, up-to-date key findings and current directions in cultural consonance research are discussed.

Keywords: sociology of health, health disparities, theory, cultural consonance
The relationship between social status, stress and health has generated numerous scientific papers in social sciences. Its extensive coverage includes research on social gradient in health, subjective social comparison, relative deprivation, and discrimination and stress (Deaton, 2001; Fahey, 2010; Lee, Turney, 2012; Marmot, Wilkinson, 2005). Building on these explorations, recently there has been much interest in the mechanism underlying the social gradient in health (the negative relationship between morbidity/mortality and socioeconomic status). Due to the fact that the conventional factors such as diet, exercise and access to health care do not account for the entire amount of variation in physical and mental health, over the course of several past decades the empirical evidence has been consistently linking health disparities to the psychosocial stress associated with one’s social position, the processes of sociocultural change, migration and social disintegration (Adler, Boyce, Chesney, Folkney, Syme, 1993; Berkman, 1995; McGarvey, 1999; Waldron et al., 1983). It is one of the points of investigation in biomedical research¹ at the moment.

More specifically, individual congruence with normative culture is a prominent theoretical nexus in current biomedical research. One of the most successful models addressing these issues is cultural consonance theory (Dressler, Bindon, 2010). Cultural consonance represents a biocultural² approach to health disparities (Dressler, 1995) and seeks to connect the emergent variation in health to the stress generated by the socioeconomic inequality. It is thus an invaluable empirical source for the researchers studying poverty, inequality and illness within sociology of health, applied medical anthropology, transcultural psychiatry and social psychology. However, despite the usefulness of this framework and the wide-spread knowledge about it among medical anthropologists, it is scarcely known beyond its specialized research niche. As a result, it has not been connected to similar studies in modern sociology or psychology, evaluated or tested by the representatives of other disciplines, nor did it have the strengthening advantages of interdisciplinary criticism, both theoretically and methodologically.

As it can hand us tools necessary for understanding the full impact of inequality on human condition, cultural consonance is a model of a high practical

¹ Biomedical research is based on the assumption that the disease has the biological origins and involves agents and vectors of physical existence, thus, it cannot be regarded as a socially constructed subjective experience of suffering or a reflection of the society’s ideology.

² Representing humans as organisms capable of inheriting both biological and social information, and receptive to influences from both of these sources.
value. The present article focuses on the analysis of the theoretical foundations of cultural consonance as a model, and reconstruction of its intellectual roots. The goal of this publication is to connect the evidence accumulated by this theoretical framework to the existing studies on health disparities and their psychosocial causes. My intention is to throw into sharper relief the range of issues connected to the cultural consonance model, and to make its contributions more available to the interdisciplinary audience beyond medical anthropology, such as specialists in sociology of health and illness, psychologists, students of transcultural psychiatry and other social researchers interested in understanding the effects of culture and inequality on the emergence of health disparities and particularly subclinical variation in mental health. While focusing on this task, I shall refrain from any substantial critical review, which will be at the core of a separate publication.

What is cultural consonance?

Cultural consonance is defined as “the degree to which individuals approximate, in their own beliefs and behaviors, the prototypes for those beliefs and behaviors encoded in shared cultural models” (Dressler, Bindon, 2000; Dressler, Balieiro, Ribeiro, Santos, 2009). Cultural consonance thus emphasizes the negative health outcomes in individuals failing to match a cultural standard (Dressler, 2007a). Its central empirical claim posits that one’s failure to match a socially desirable standard encoded in a cultural model (i.e. lack of cultural consonance) results in the decrease in individual physical and mental health (Dressler, 2007b).

Conceptually this model integrates collective culture with individual cognition, and links them to behavior and health, which is a separate strong point of this framework in assessing cultural influences on individuals. The conceptual map of cultural consonance recognizes that individual cognition, behavior and perceived social difference have a different nature in comparison with shared collective knowledge (culture), although all of them can have outcomes for individual health.

In other words, cultural consonance is presented as both a theoretical orientation and a methodological model facilitating the study of the relationship between the society and health, and the specific role of culture (conceived of as a measurable variable) in generating the psychosocial stress affecting human condition (Dressler, 2005).

A cultural model is a presupposed, taken-for-granted model of the world that is shared within a society and plays an enormous role in its members’ understanding of the world and their behavior in it. Cultural models reflect the cultural regularities in cognitive organization of collectively shared experiences. These regularities are reflected in logical connections people make, and as such are accessible for analysis and interpretation (Quinn, 2011).
The development of the idea of cultural consonance

The general preposition embedded in Dressler’s theory has emerged from the empirical material published during the interval from the 1980s till 2000s, thus making cultural consonance an inductively formulated model. Most of the observations in its background concerned cardiovascular health, high blood pressure, and (later) depression, and were originally published in outlets for physical anthropology.

The foundation of cultural consonance is connected to its empirical origins in epidemiology and sociological research on social change and community structure (Cassel, 1976). The first step towards the development of the theoretical premises of what will later be termed as cultural consonance was Leighton’s research into the community organization in Canada, namely the degree of community disintegration (levels of poverty, family stability, and “confusion of community’s cultural values”) (Leighton, Leighton, 1967). This research has initiated systematic studies of sociocultural processes (e.g., modernization, migration) and health, mainly focusing on psychological distress and cardiovascular disease. The general hypothesis it generated, was linking the increase in the blood pressure to the process of modernization.

The new emphasis on the external factors in the process of stress (i.e., sociocultural stressors) has stirred more theoretical work in social psychology (Lazarus, 1966), focusing on modernization, migration and social change. While these formulations would presently be regarded as theoretically and terminologically vague (Dressler, Balieiro, Ribeiro, Santos, 2005; Dressler, Borges, Balieiro, Santos, 2005), they provided a new vector for the development of scientific reasoning about the range of factors affecting the individual health. These studies have established a baseline in research on sociocultural factors in health, mainly focusing on the role of culture as a stressor and how a social support network can differ from one society to another (thus changing the effects of stress) (Dressler, Balieiro, Ribeiro, Santos, 2005, 2007a, 2007b).

In this context, the specification of the statistical model was at the discretion of the researchers’ sensitivity to the ethnographic context they explored (Chin-Hong, McGarvey, 1996; James, 1990). Dressler observes that in order to truly investigate the involvement of the cultural factors in health, culture was to be conceptualized more precisely to transform it into a quantifiable variable suitable for the research design that would measure the effects of culture on health. He therefore used the cognitive theory of culture focusing on shared collective knowledge (culture consensus model, see below) and connected it to the self-reports about individual behavioral practices and measures of individual health (mainly cardiovascular health).

Cultural consonance and its cognitive roots

Methodologically cultural consonance stems from cognitive anthropology and has Romney’s model known as culture consensus for its methodological foundation (Romney, 1999; Romney, Batchelder, Weller, 1986). The methodological assumptions of culture consensus are derived from the principles of the distributive
model of culture (Schwartz, 1978 cf. Romney, 1999), which supposes that, despite the substantial overlap in knowledge due to shared socialization, the distribution of this knowledge within a community is uneven and the individuals vary in terms of what they know about a domain. Romney termed the degree of individual’s approximation to the collective knowledge as cultural competence and developed a methodological procedure to measure it. Culture consensus is a quantitative technique that allows computing cultural competence for each participant. The closer one’s degree of cultural competence to the shared collective knowledge (the group’s profile), the more competent the individual is with respect to the domain in question.

Building on this premise, Dressler points out that individuals, whose behavioral correspondence to the collective profile is low, tend to display negative health consequences proportionate to the size of the gap. Roughly speaking, in Dressler’s conceptualization, the cultural consonance effect describes the outcomes of individual deficiency in re-enacting their cultural competence (e.g., the essential phenomenon addressed by cultural consonance is technically cultural dissonance4). It should also be noted that over time the definition of cultural consonance began to explicitly articulate the component of congruence as occurring “in person’s own beliefs”, thus stressing the importance of the favorable evaluation of self-society congruence in individual’s own perception5.

Conceptualizing cultural consonance as a measureable phenomenon and using culture consensus to estimate it for each individual informant within a particular domain, Dressler’s model further adds measurements of health (symptoms of cardiovascular disease, blood pressure or depression), and the typical research design involves regressing the measures of depression on those of cultural competence and other additional demographic variables of interest (Dressler, Borges, Balieiro, Santos, 2005). It should be noted that the methodology is a specific instance that is not unanimously agreed upon by different researchers and oftentimes attracts criticism at conferences etc.; a special section is dedicated to the discussion of the cultural consonance research design. The present publication is limited to the presentation of ideas of cultural consonance and their genetic interconnectedness; while the evaluation of particular aspects of methodology and application of different theoretical components will be a subject of a separate article.

Also added by Dressler’s framework is the extension of the reasoning from the shared collective meanings (the collective culture) to the actual individual behavior that reenacts those meanings or fails to do so. In other words, for Dressler consensus represents knowledge and ideations of the collective culture, while cultural consonance gauges the actual individual behavior [Dressler, 2005, 2007a].

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4 Social psychology has an entire range of scientific papers on culture-personality clash, which discusses this instance of lack of congruence between individual characteristics and socially desirable traits (Maltseva, in press).

5 However, the effects of self-deception and coping have never been explicitly tested empirically. The role of these factors as potential buffers against cultural consonance deficiency is to be determined.
Evidence and major findings

Dressler’s ambition originally was to unconfound the effects of culture from those of ethnicity and class (which were similarly conceptualized in the then-current theory). By working out a new definition of culture, Dressler’s framework was focusing on its properties and its ability to affect human health. Research in Brazil and the United States has shown that one’s failure to realize cultural models in one’s behavior is experienced as stressful and is associated with greater psychological distress, higher arterial blood pressure, and greater body mass (Dressler, 1991, 2004; Dressler, Ribeiro, Balieiro, Oths, Santos, 2004; Dressler, Santos, 2000). It explains why most of the applications of cultural consonance so far connect it to the research on poverty and use samples from economically disadvantaged communities in the American South and Brazil.

The most general finding links low cultural consonance to the negative health outcomes (more severe symptoms of depression and cardiological problems). Tests with a sample from Brazil have shown that cultural salience of the domain (in the collective knowledge) plays an important role in cultural consonance: the higher the culture consensus for a domain is, the greater the effect of change in cultural consonance in that domain on depressive symptoms will prove (Dressler, Balieiro, Ribeiro, Santos, 2007a, 2007b). These effects were also found to be independent of stressful life events, which altogether points to cultural consonance as a chronic stressor producing generalized psychological distress (Dressler, Balieiro, Ribeiro, Santos, 2007a, 2007b).

The foundation of the published evidence available for cultural consonance rests on the cardiovascular health and elevated blood pressure, and the effects are particularly strong for the domains of social distinction and affiliation (Dressler, Balieiro, Ribeiro, Santos, 2005, 2007a, 2007b). The results are more interesting, even if somewhat incomplete, for mental health, as for the most part only the relationship between the individual consonance and negative mental health has been assessed. Higher cultural consonance in the cultural domains of lifestyle, national identity, food and social support was associated with lower psychological distress in several samples from the U.S. and Brazil (Dressler, Balieiro, Ribeiro, Santos, 2007a). In terms of negative mental health outcomes (measured as depressive affect by using Beck’s Depression Inventory), cultural consonance had an inverse effect on depressive symptoms independent of the occurrence of stressful life events (a well-known risk factor for depression) in a Brazilian sample, and the effect was detectable after a 2-year test-retest period (for example, (Dressler, Balieiro, Ribeiro, Santos, 2007b).

In other words, there is evidence that an individual deficit in cultural consonance increases likelihood of negative mental health. The picture appears to be more complex with respect to explaining the effects of cultural consonance on positive mental health (subjective well-being, SWB), as it cannot be satisfactorily predicted by cultural consonance alone (Maltseva, 2015a, 2015b, in press).

Furthermore, the mediating effects for social support have been found: in a study of a Black community in Alabama, under the conditions of social change,
social support from kin worked as a buffer for the older informants while non-kin (peer) support worked for the younger participants (Dressler, 1991). It would be interesting to explore what other buffering factors exist for low cultural consonance, and how effective they are at providing protection against distress.

**Methodological choice and sampling sites**

Cultural consonance is a quantitative model which mostly collects and relies on quantitative data; qualitative data are also collected but in a very brief manner and their role in construction of cultural models is described as rudimentary. During the past few years cultural consonance research has been using sequential mixed designs while continuing to employ extensive direct medical measurements, including blood pressure and more recently DNA samples (Dressler, Balieiro, Ribeiro, Santos, 2008, 2009). Overall, late cultural consonance inquiries are moving in the explicitly biological direction, on the border with genetics (Dressler, Balieiro, Santos, 2012).

As such, the cultural consonance model has operationalized the mismatch between the cultural standard and the individual behavior as reflected in the lifestyle. It, therefore, only uses the material elements of lifestyle (possessions, kinds of foods, and items of prestigious consumption that designate the cultural meanings of a “good life”) to measure the degree to which one is consonant with the society.

The data typically come from the urban areas in the American South (Alabama) and Brazil where William Dressler and his co-authors work and/or conduct ethnographic fieldwork. The process of data collection is described as a brief qualitative reconnaissance followed by a quantitative survey in which the data are extracted by means of stimuli in English (in the U.S.) or Portuguese (in Brazil) languages.

**Future directions**

There are still a few conceptual problems that are left without attention in the current formulation of the model. For example, we know that, according to Dressler’s findings in the U.S. and Brazil, a mismatch between the standard lifestyle and that of an individual is likely to result in suboptimal health outcomes physically and mentally. We do not know, however, if it will be the case in different societies (i.e. less stratified, more secular, less individualistic, more protected by the welfare state etc.). Nor do we have any information whether there are any significant gender differences in cultural consonance and if so, what patterns it creates in different societies. It is also unclear what will happen if an individual whose behavior does not match a society’s standard is not culturally competent (for instance, immigrants, poorly enculturated individuals lacking consistent ideas about how the society works, culturally estranged persons etc.). The model does not consider the possibility of any buffering effects other than social support (e.g., personality traits fostering social life) and coping
strategies as possible factors intervening in cultural consonance and diminishing its direct effects. Finally, – and it is perhaps the most complex problem, – we do not know about the actual mechanism of cultural consonance, and, because of that, we are unable to account for the degree to which culture and genetic predispositions affect one’s (negative) response to the culture-lifestyle mismatch. These are some directions in the cultural consonance research that could bring the model to further fruition and generate further useful results.

Culture is now recognized as a powerful stressor within sociological, psychological, anthropological and medical studies (Balieiro, dos Santos, dos Santos, Dressler, 2011; Dressler, Balieiro, Santos, 2012). Despite widely circulating ideas about the interference of cultural variables in the research on health, the extent and exact mechanisms of their participation in psychological processes evade most large-scale studies and are not addressed directly (cf. (Hopper, 2008). Exploration of the ways cultural prescriptions modify our mental habits, emotional needs and their expression in behavior to affect the quality of life is one of the most intriguing directions in psychological and medical anthropology and sociology of health and illness. I conclude with the hope that more empirical research will follow to clarify the relationship between the society and individual health, and the mechanisms by which one affects the other.

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METHODOLOGY AND METHODS OF SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH
UP-TO-DATE VIEW ON THE CRISIS IN SURVEY METHODS AND WAYS TO OVERCOME IT*

Volodymyr Paniotto (Kyiv)
Oleksandr Perverzyev (Kyiv)
Natalya Kharchenko (Kyiv)

As we can see in last available research ESOMAR Global-Market-Research-2017, Face-to-face interview method worldwide yields its positions first to CATI (phone surveys with computer assistance), and then to the Internet-surveys. If we assume that orders for 3 main survey methods are 100%, then amount of money spent on interviews in 2016 made 15%, CATI — 17%, and online researches made 68% of all orders. As for Ukraine, Ukraine still has Face-to-face interviews on their dominant positions, while phone and the Internet-surveys are used much less often. The problem is that level and character of Ukrainian telephonization blocked spreading of CATI, while level of the Internet covering gives no chance to run the Internet-surveys which will be representative among Ukrainian population. In present, only 20% of population has landline phones (92% use mobile phones) and only 2/3 of adult population use the Internet. Maybe that is the reason why Ukraine in differ to other countries has transition to mixed-mode surveys as the most promising method instead of transition from Face-to-face to CATI. Article ends up with exposition of some ideas of survey development in Ukraine.

Keywords: quantitative methods of data gathering, Face-to-face, Internet-surveys, CATI, mixed-mode surveys.

* The paper is update of В.Паниотто, Н.Харченко. Кризис в методах опроса и пути его преодоления. – Социология: теория, методы, маркетинг, 2012, N.1, c. 3-20.
Public opinion polls are a way to gather information, which is often associated with sociology. Most likely, significant part of population don’t even have a clue that sociologist can be busy with anything but making public opinion surveys. Survey technologies were constantly improving and it seemed that pollsters could look into the future with optimism. However, life appeared to be much more complicated.

History of surveys

History of surveys has its origins in the XIX century; first two documented surveys were made in USA in 1824. Since then, during almost 200-year history of surveys, survey development was steady, its methods were improved, data quality raised and the whole progress continued until early XXI century.


Stage one: 1789-1824. Emergence of political, social and informational premise for probing voters’ opinion in America. Carrying out of the first so-called straw-surveys (surveys made by simplified patterns with unrepresentative selections that reduce the quality of gathered information). Such definition is associated by analogy of such a survey and a straw thrown into air to show in which direction the wind blows.

Stage two: 1825-1936. Period when straw-surveys for electorate are dominating.

Stage three: Since 1936 to the present day. Emerging and domination of Gallup’s technology (representative selections, strict procedures of surveys conducting), gradual awareness of real possibilities of different survey technologies and search of optimal research strategies, emerging of post-Gallup’s technologies.

It is interesting to compare chronology of public opinion study in the USA and the USSR. Below is a fragment of the table presented in B. Doctorov’s report (Докторов, 2004).

As we can see, the first public opinion surveys in the USA happened in the period of Decembrists movement and regular use of proto-straw-surveys was at the same time when serfdom was abolished in Russia. Clearly, level of survey methods in the post-USSR countries including Ukraine was far behind the Western countries. However, it is appeared that Western survey technologies also encountered some problems. Unfortunately, the late XX century — the early XXI century appeared with some difficulties in survey development and first of all in development of personal interview “face-to-face” (or F2F). Share of people who answered the interview comparing to all people who were in the selection (response rate or RR) was
reducing constantly. “Face-to-face” interview was more often replaced with other survey methods. We can’t say for sure what caused such problems but among those causes we select such as growth of population mobility, growth of advertising and communications that ends up with people trying to avoid excess of annoying information and with rise of privacy value. Also increasing crime rate affects people’s will to open doors for an interviewer.

In Ukraine the first (local) surveys were conducted in the late 1960's — the early 1970's. And the first representative surveys appeared only in 1991. We can say that

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chronology, periods, years:</th>
<th>Processes, events</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>Russia – USSR - Russia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1824</td>
<td>Begin of proto-straw-surveys era</td>
<td></td>
<td>Alexander I (1801–1825); Nikolay 1 (1825–1855)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second half of the XIX century</td>
<td>Abraham Lincoln (1861–1865) – the 16th president of the USA, proto-straw-surveys</td>
<td></td>
<td>Alexander II – Liberator (1855-1881)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1932</td>
<td>Straw-surveys as an element of election campaign control</td>
<td></td>
<td>Collectivization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>Founding of Gallup’s Institute</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mass repression period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1936</td>
<td>Birth of scientific system of conducting public opinion surveys</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The First World War period</td>
<td>Public opinion and the president Franklin Roosevelt (1933-1945). H. Cantrill as the first president’s consultant on public opinion.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthening of Stalin’s cult</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The middle of the XX century</td>
<td>Regional probing of public opinion, improvement of survey technologies.</td>
<td></td>
<td>“Cold war” began. Strong criticism of everything from the West and actual cessation of all contacts with the West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second half of the 1980’s – the early 1990’s</td>
<td>Emerging of online surveys</td>
<td></td>
<td>The first nationwide systems of public opinion research emerged: RPORC, ROMIR, POF. First electoral researches and forecasts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End of the XX century</td>
<td>Birth of a scientific online system of public opinion study (1998)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The early XXI century</td>
<td>The first online survey for enriched public opinion</td>
<td></td>
<td>Wide network of nationwide and regional centers of public opinion researches</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Three-stage process assumes basic questioning of respondents, and then “enrichment” of those opinions with organization of discussions, expert meetings etc. And finally, the main survey, which shows the results of “enrichment” (see: Doctorov B. Public opinion – http://www.preudology.org./Gallup/Enriched_PO.htm).
Public opinion surveys emerged in Ukraine (as in the USA) because of the need for democratization and election forecasting. Besides, market economy development at that time is related to the appearance of marketing research surveys. Ukraine (and the USSR in general) had almost no experience in conducting F2F interviews. There were no standard methods of sample development. However, the first international researches conducted in Ukraine and foreign clients’ orders let the gap to be eliminated quickly. In 1991-1992 the first pollster’s companies (KIIS, SOCIS) emerged. They made regular representative public opinion surveys for Ukraine.

**F2F interview crisis**

Unfortunately, when processes that had started in other countries arrived in Ukraine in the XXI century, RR began to fall. (see Pic. 1).

Reasons, most likely, are the same as they were in other countries. In addition (unlike other countries) if in 1990’s sociological researches were conducted rarely, now respondents are “sick of” sociologists. According to our survey data¹, 13% of respondents took part in some sort of a survey in 2011. 87% didn’t participated (if we consider 0.87 as probability of not taking participation in survey for a year, then it means that in 5 years only half of the adult population of Ukraine didn’t take a participation in any sort of surveys. Another half was interviewed at least once). Response rate for regular KIIS surveys is near 41% for the last 4 years, which is

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¹ National-wide survey was conducted by Kyiv International Institute of Sociology in November 2011. 2037 respondents were personally questioned according to stochastic selection, which is representative for population of Ukraine aged over 18 years old. Statistical error (with probability 0.95 and with design-effect 1.5) for indexes close to 10% is not more than 2.0%. Question “did you have any participation in surveys for the last 12 months? IF YES, then how were you questioned?” Available answers (there was an option to choose several of them): (1) interviewer came to me, (2) by phone, (3) outdoors, (4) via traditional mail, (5) using the Internet, (6) I didn’t take any participation in surveys.

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**Pic. 1. Response rate dynamics in KIIS research**
almost 19% less than for the previous period. Especially complicated situation is in the capital and in other large cities, where RR makes 25-35%. As KIIS conducts a lot of surveys (60-70 per year, i.e. 200-300 for this four years) and pays special attention to research methodology, we assume that data we have is statistically stable and situation in other centers is not much better than we have. Situation is disguised by fact that lots of companies (especially in marketing research field) make lots of surveys with quoted selection and publish cooperation rate instead of response rate (i.e. not the percent of interviewed people against all selection, but the percent of interviewed people against those who was found by interviewer). Sometimes even while using stochastic selection calculations are made not with using experts’ recommendations, but with formulas which incorrectly rise RR. Inaccessible for interviewer neighborhoods are not included in equation’s denominator.

In this way, the worldwide crisis of F2F data and 5-7-year lag has appeared in Ukraine.

**Approaches of solving F2F interview crisis in the world**

Transition to phone surveys using computers (CATI — computer assisted telephone interview), was sociologists first response to worldwide F2F interview. As we can see in Table 2, quantitative methods make majority of researches (83% in 2005, 80% in 2009, 72% in 2014 and 70% in 2016). Phone survey dominated over others in 2005 (19%) while the Internet-surveys had their 16% and F2F interviews had 12%. The Internet-surveys took their leading positions in 2009 with their 19%, number of phone surveys lowered to 14% and face-to-face interviews reduced to 11%. Since then percent of phone surveys and F2F continues to decrease while part of the Internet-surveys keeps growing.

As we can see, the USA almost refused to use F2F interviews while, for instance, in Turkey or Georgia this method is still dominating.

Certainly, this process went off differently in different countries (see Table 3). Data for Russia (and especially for Ukraine) shown in this table is unreliable, because Russia has only 36 companies which are members of ESOMAR and Ukraine has only 9 (other countries have much more of those and their representatives’ answers show rate of used surveying methods more precisely, for example, the United Kingdom has 124 of such companies and Germany has 142). Thus, for Ukraine we use data which was collected by special research which includes survey of a few hundreds of organization representatives who order and execute surveys. In Table 4 we show only rate between 3 main surveying methods (so all percentage is recalculated for only those methods).

If we use the term “revolution” not in the strict scientific meaning but as a metaphor and consider it as a revolution in data gathering methods and transition

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from domination of one method to another method, then we can talk about three such revolutions:

1) transition from straw-surveys to Gallup’s technologies, F2F standard interviews with stochastic representative selection;
2) transition from F2F to phone surveys (CATI);
3) transition from CATI to online researches.

### Table 2

Part of survey methods used in 2015 and 2016 years over the\(^3\)
(by amount of orders for those methods), %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Face-to-face interview</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phone survey</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet survey</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>32*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail survey</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other quantitative methods**</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qualitative methods</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\* Quantitative online surveys – 27% and 5% online surveys on mobile devices (phones and smartphones)

\** Other quantitative methods, such as using devices to track TV channel - people meters, dairy panels etc.

### Table 3

Structure of using data gathering methods in some countries, 2016, %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>Face-to-Face</th>
<th>Telephone (CATI)</th>
<th>Online quantitative research</th>
<th>Mobile / Smartphone online research</th>
<th>Online traffic / audience measurement</th>
<th>Automated digital / electronic</th>
<th>Mail</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total quantitative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^3\) ESOMAR Industry Reports: Global market research 2010-2017 (reports of customers surveys and survey executors and marketing researches, made by the largest association of pollsters and marketologists — European Society Opinion and Market Research.)
The world has had three of those revolutions and some experts think that the beginning of the fourth one, post-survey measuring, is happening right now, then in Ukraine there has been only the first one.

As we can see, percent of F2F interviews is reducing while CATI and the Internet-surveys keep growing. At the same time online surveys growth rate is faster than CATI’s.

It looks like tendencies of survey methods development in Ukraine are the same as in the world. But it is only related to a further perspective. In the nearest future such a development is barely possible because our (and other countries’) infrastructure and in particular phone and the Internet-communication level is not capable of following the Western tendencies. It is unclear whether we ever will have CATI domination as it was in the Western countries ten years ago or we will use non-survey methods bypassing intermediate stages. Let’s look at the features of Ukrainian situation in detail.

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* It includes retail audits and media measurement, as well as I.V.R. (interactive voice recording) interviews.

** It includes mainly syndicated services for which breakdowns are not available.


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4 The world rates are taken from ESOMAR reports for 2010 and 2015 years. For Ukraine – data gathered during special interviewing of 500 (2008) and 255 (2010) international representatives and Ukrainian companies that order researches. Interviewing is executed by marketing association and InMind company using next methods: F2F, B2B and CAWI B2B.
Tendencies and limitations in development of phone and the Internet-surveys in Ukraine

Table 5 shows results of KIIS surveys which demonstrate how many of our compatriots have landline and mobile phones.

Table 5: The share of people who have phones among adult Ukrainian population, 2018, %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phone type</th>
<th>Whole population</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Village</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Have mobile phone only</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have mobile and landline phones</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have only landline phone</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have no phone</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have landline</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have mobile</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As we can see, only 20% (and 12% for village) of people have landline phone. That is why phone surveys based on landline phones can’t replace face-to-face interviews as it was in the Western countries, where almost 100% of neighborhoods had landline phones. Also, there is no reasons to believe that level of landline telephonization will grow even with help of technical capabilities. Ukrainian neighborhoods refuse to use landlines. If in 2011 55% of adult population had landline phone, then in 2015 - 37% and in 2018 - 20% of all Ukrainian adults had landline phones in their households.

But mobile phones were always unevenly distributed among age groups: a few years ago 100% of people aged 19 to 29 years had a mobile phone and only 50% of people older than 70 years (see Figure 2). Now the situation has improved, but still only 70% of people older than 70 years have a mobile phone.

Also creation of such a selection for mobile phones is a complicated and undeveloped process. However, phone-based survey can’t replace F2F interviews.

Maybe the best option is to combine surveys with use of mobile and landline phones (dual frame phone survey). In fact, there are some problems too. Firstly, 4% of adult population don’t have phone at all. Secondly, selection for combining landline phones and mobile phones is even more complicated than for mobile phones only. And finally, mobile phone surveys can’t be a full replacement of personal interviews as far as they have significant limitations of complexity of questionnaire (some of survey types, for example, with the graphic materials, such as advertising pictures or videos evaluation, are impossible at all).

The Internet surveys, unlike phone surveys, can fully replace traditional interviews and as we can see began to dominate in the world and made such a replacement (Table 6).

It seems that the same will happen in Ukraine in future. However, how soon? Growth of mobile phone users was quite fast and described by S-shaped curve (slow growth in the beginning, fast and exponential then, and finally very slow after market saturation). If the same thing had happened to the Internet, crisis...
would have been defeated. Unfortunately, we have to admit that growth of the Internet users number is going slower than we expected. Forecasts in different years since 2003 by E. Bolshov, N. Kharchenko, V. Zabuzova and V. Paniotto were made by S-shaped curve methodology (Modis, 1992) and appeared to be unnecessarily optimistic (Паниотто, Большов, 2006). Hypothesis of the Internet users’ exponential growth isn’t confirmed yet. Cheap communication and mobile phones and providers competition contributed to mobile communications development. It is important that people have a large experience of landline phones usage. As we can see, situation is very different for the Internet. First of all, communication here is provided majorly by computers and mobile devices, which are more expensive than average mobile phone. Second of all, surveys require some minimal computer literacy, which limits the Internet usage. Such literacy is more difficult to learn than handling mobile phones. The Internet users quantity (Pic. 3) grows significantly slower than quantity of mobile phone users. To be honest we should notice that the Internet usage is most popular in Ukraine through home PC or laptop (54%), while 42% of adult population of Ukraine is using mobile Internet once per month or more often (majorly on smartphones) (Kharchenko, 2017).

**Table 6**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rate of the Internet users in European Countries (2011) and average weight of the Internet-surveys among other survey methods, 2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of Internet users</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5 The Internet-penetration data source: Internet World Stats — http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats4.htm. The calculated Internet-survey data is based on Global market research report (2010) which contains information for 2009 (as we have noticed before, data related to Ukraine is non-representative). It is worth consideration that the International telecommunication union uses definition of the Internet penetration proposed by Internet World Stats (IWS) in global meaning as a rate of the whole population who use the Internet, while the Internet users are considered to be people who have ability to use the Internet in certain moments.
It seems that imitational modeling (agent modeling in particular) is more adequate approach to forecasting the Internet users quantity. Such a model is developed by A. Grushetsky and considers the next two processes: the first is aging of population, deaths and gradual replacement of old people who have low rates of using the Internet with younger and “Internet-advanced” people; the second is annual growth of the Internet users in each cohort (as our data shows, younger cohorts have not only more quantity of the Internet users, but also faster rates of its growth.

Results of modeling data this way based on KIIS surveys are shown on the Picture 4. According to this model, rates of the Internet users quantity growth will be lower than if we use S-shaped curve, but higher if we use linear models.

The Internet users quantity forecast results show that in the nearest 8-10 years we can’t talk about full replacement of F2F interviews with the Internet surveys.

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\[6\] This model was presented at VIII International conference “ReMark — Marketing researches in Ukraine” (Kiev, September 28, 2011) in V. Paniotto’s and A. Grushetsky’s report “Exponential growth of internet users quantity. Dream or reality?”
Combining survey methods (mix-mode surveys) as the most perspective approach to data gathering in Ukraine

While phone surveys and the Internet surveys can’t replace interviews as they did in other countries and quantity of interviews is lowering, we can assume that the most suitable for Ukraine approach is combining F2F interviews with phone and the Internet surveys. Also we assume that if in the present time we have mix of F2F with CATI as the most perspective, then in the nearest future it would be a combination of F2F with the Internet surveys or CATI with the Internet surveys.

Let’s take as an example combination of interview with phone survey (CATI) using total approach to survey errors (Weisberg, 2005) (see Table 7).

Such a combination can be achieved in two ways at least. The first one is different methods for different aggregations of respondents. For villages, where RR is quite high, F2F interviews are applicable, while CATI would be used for cities. Another option is to use them both for two representative sub-selections of the same major selection (below there is an example of a survey executed in Kiev, when a half of selection’s participants was questioned in F2F interview and the other half – with CATI). Both methods complement each other well. Huge CATI coverage error (because of low telephonization level) is compensated with lower coverage error of F2F. Conversely, high non-response errors of F2F are compensated with lower level of CATI due to its high RR. Phone survey shown below has errors related with non-responses of respondents.
Comparison of errors of F2F interview and CATI using total approach to survey errors (table cells contain nominal qualitative estimation of error amount)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of error</th>
<th>F2F interview</th>
<th>CATI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sampling error</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coverage error</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-response error at the unite level</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-response error at the item level</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measurement error due to respondent</td>
<td>medium</td>
<td>medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measurement error due to interviewer</td>
<td>medium</td>
<td>medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postsurvey error</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, the experience that we have contradicts with these theories. In May 2008, one and a half months before Kiev mayor election, which was on the 25th of May, 2008, KIIS executed a survey among voters in Kiev based on two representative selections: 500 respondents were interviewed with F2F method and 500 with CATI.

Survey data (Table 8) shows that despite our forecasts (which were made two weeks before the election) CATI surveys results are closer to election results than combination of CATI and F2F. Root mean square deviation of survey answers compared to election results for each of nine candidates equals 3,6% and 1,8% and 4,2% and 2,3% for the combined research.

We assume that it is not an evidence of futility of combining different methods. Rather it tells us that methods combination is a non-trivial task. Influence of a number of certain circumstances is probable here: first, the impact of a specific situation in Kiev, where almost 100% of the population have telephones and therefore the coverage error of CATI is not greater than for F2F interview. Second, survey is quite simple, so F2F interview advantages are insignificant on this stage: interview does not compensate phone survey faults but loses to phone interview in all meanings. Finally, we’ve combined F2F interview and CATI data in one file mechanically. Perhaps for mix-mode surveys we need a more sophisticated way of combining data, we need a mathematical model to integrate data from two surveys regarding each survey errors and combining data in such a way that overall error is minimized.

Table 7

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For F2F interviews, selection is stratified by population amount in each of 10 Kiev districts. Random selection of post districts, neighborhoods addresses and respondents in each house is done later. RR = 36%. For CATI random number generation is used. RR = 56%.
Discussion about perspectives of data gathering methods development. Alternative thoughts

Further estimation of perspectives of data gathering methods development is based on generalization and reconsidering results of scientific discussions: the 4th ESRA conference in Lausanne, July 18-22, 2011, ESRA conference in Rejkjavik, July 13-17, 2015 and «Crisis in surveying methods and ways to overcome it” conference Kiev, October 28-30, 2011 and author’s thoughts about development directions of data gathering for sociology.

1. In the first instance, discussion revealed that not everybody agrees with thesis about existence of this crisis. Some of thoughts asserted that there is no such a crisis, but essential growth of requirements for results reliability and validity. It seems to be related with the fact that academic directed researches with big and complex surveys have no alternatives for F2F interviews. Even though high costs are making this method usage more complicated, personal interview is still known as “data gathering king” and used as a preferred method for comparison and evaluation of alternative data gathering methods (Edith desire de Leeuw). It makes sense to consider this situation of surveying methods separately for 3 cases: governmental or academic researches with complicated surveys; public opinion surveys (electoral and social surveys in particular); and marketing researches which often consider representativity not for the whole population, but for several targeted groups. It is unlikely that remote communications will fully replace F2F interviews; many of surveying types can’t be replaced with remote communication. In addition, F2F interview problems appear mostly in those cases where respondent does not receive any payment. Paying respondents, of course, isn’t an ultimate solution and stimulates only those respondents who are interested in money. But the fact that paid surveys have higher response rate can’t be ignored. Internet can not only replace F2F interviews, but also is to help F2F further development. Interview can be done through Internet already (for example, by use of different messengers: Skype, Viber, WhatsApp etc.).

2. Response rate is lowering for interviews, but it’s not a disaster yet. We shouldn’t idealize this index. Data quality also depends on other facts, such as difference between respondents’ and non-respondents’ characteristics. If this difference isn’t huge enough, then data quality will be high even despite low RR. It is necessary to have full system of indexing that estimates data quality and to aim for gathering non-respondents’ characteristics. This data allows thinking through gathered information and compensating RR fall. Mostly, this strategy is suitable for panel research of neighborhoods. Development of the approach described earlier is about idea of “reacting design”. Such a design consists of two or more stages. On the first stage (which is much like methodological experiment), additional information is gathered, so-called para-data, that is used in the next stages. For example, the first stage uses different methods of information gathering for different sub-selections or different survey versions (short and long) or different number of calls. In addition, information about interviewers’ experience, information about area, where research will be executed (uninhabited buildings, infrastructure characteristics, threats for
interviewers etc.) and different characteristic of interviewing process (time of day, day of week, time needed to reach the place etc.). This data is used then for estimation of probability of executing interview on the next stage. All this data is for changing research design and adapting it to the survey circumstances and further correction, thinking through the survey data.

3. Insufficient development of the Internet doesn’t mean that we have nothing to replace F2F interviews. It is true that our IT is lagging compared to the Western countries: only 2 of 3 adults in Ukraine can be reached via the Internet, but that’s plenty already. We have such categories of people almost all of which are using the Internet and they can be interviewed without interviewers and phone calls. These are people who live in large cities, youth and many professional groups. Same for marketing, when some rare population groups (such as people who used to drink “Stolichnaya” vodka but now drink “Gorilka with pepper”) is needed to be found and nobody talks about representativity, the Internet surveys are indispensable. That’s why KIIS actively develops its own online panel InPoll (https://inpoll.org) by recruiting the participants mainly during planned F2F researches. As our experience shows, online surveys are demanded for long-time researches of customer behavior (dairy researches), multimedia content testing, expert groups surveying, demand for online-services researches and media-consumption that is slowly migrating to the Internet.

4. Combination of landline phone and mobile phone surveying (dual-frame mode) is quite perspective but has a lot of problems (in which proportions and in which way should both bases be combined, how to link mobile phones with territories and how to reduce number of calls to non-existent numbers etc.).

5. Combination of different mixing types, such as: 1) combination of methods of communication with respondents; 2) usage of different methods for different sub-selections. The problem is to measure method’s effect on survey results, so the first method is less risky. It is important to inform the research initiators about design choice features and estimation of results risks.

6. Combination of surveying data gathering methods with non-surveying methods, most of all, in combination with big data research and with social networks analysis. For example, for KIIS researches of Donbas population demand for different types of humanitarian help interview was used on Donbas territory that is under control of Ukraine, phone surveying – for occupied part of Donbas and social network analyzes – for both parts of Donbas.

Perspectives of Big data usage require a separate and detailed discussion. They are often discussed at sociological and marketing conferences and sometimes are considered as pollster threat. The question arises: will polls be needed in the future?

Social researches use big data arrays which have non-survey origins, generated by everyday practice and more often established by modern technologies. Typical example of such “raw data” is the Internet activity (for example, site visitation patterns, search requests, online shopping, mobile app activity, participation in loyalty programs, geolocation, original content in social networks etc.). For example,
according to KIIS data, that at the time of spring 2018, half of adult people haven’t been using any social network for a year while 40% used them at least once per day or few times per week. There are over 10 billion of user profiles created in Ukraine, that keep exchanging various content (private social-demographic information, images, video, music, preferences, links etc.). In addition to that, banking operations, sensor data, trafficking info and many others can be used as a source of this kind of information. While people-meters weren’t invented, surveys were needed, but now television viewing notes are in the past. The same thing is happening with price researches. Barcode scanning replaces SKU (Stock Keeping Unit — combination of brand, variety and packaging) that used to be done by interviewers. Countries where people often use credit cards and where creditworthiness is checked, have information about working places, shopping, places of visiting, money spending, magazine preferences and many more for lots of people. In addition, brain activity scanning during advertising, eye pupil capture while choosing merchant in markets and browser history storage are worth mentioning.

Expansion of digital technologies to every aspect of a modern person’s activity and appearance of fundamentally new data sources force researches to talk about the turning point for social sciences that is similar to one that happened in the previous century with selective research methods and usage of statistical analysis (McFarland, Lewis, Goldberg, 2015) and creation of preconditions for digital sociology development.

Big data opens big perspectives. Gathering and analysis of monumental amounts of various information accumulated from various sources at great speed due to modern processors and data processing algorithms for search of hidden patterns allow to build explanation inductively instead of making assumptions based on social theories and checking research hypothesizes.

At the same time, we can hear critics from sociologists and statistics more often. Does big data usage fit science research methods and how much themes can be explored in such a way and finally is such data usage ethical for researches where people participate?

Let’s skip position and argumentation of sociologists who think that Big Data is nothing more than a tribute to fashion or an erroneous way to “old good sociology” as the true science about society. The majority of researchers consider that revolution of informational technologies will end up with principal changes of empirical sociology (Шенбергер, Кукьер, 2013). First of all, we are talking about the following vectors of changes:

- Refusal from selective research because of an opportunity to process digital data that is constantly gathered as by-product of practices and cultural-institutional interaction of people. This data allows to study the whole social phenomenon instead of individual aggregations;
- Speed of analysis is much better than data and conclusion accuracy because collected data is changing and becomes obsolete every moment;
- Refusal from causation search. Accent is now on data correlation instead. Correlations can’t say why some events happen, but they reveal new knowledge,
and this is often enough to form a reasonable judgement. Therefore, for sociology we have “end of theory” (Anderson, 2008) and analysis of “data flow” as proper alternative for theorizing and cause-and-effect dependencies researches.

Such a revolution can be considered as a “tough call for sociological professional community” and even as death of empirical sociology as unsustainable science that is based on thoughts of small and narrow selections of people who hide or distort facts and motives of their behavior (Savage, Burrows, 2009).

Sociologists who are more positive see Big data as a new tool that can help them to continue their research activity better than before. Big data is considered not as an ultimate solution that can reform the science but as a usable scientific tool, “this is another part of scientific repertoire of methods” (White, Saylor Breckenridge, 2014). The main hope relies on interdisciplinary synthesis of sociology with computer sciences and multimethodicity which will allow to integrate approaches, concepts and sociologists’ theoretical developments in modern models and data analysis algorithms. Once the rapture of new perspectives of big data fades and demand for this information is fulfilled, concern about data quality and transformation of data into systematic experience of social patterns cognition will intensify. Renaissance of attention to sociological theoretical and methodological experience will happen then.

Big data promises a lot for scientists, business and government but it is doomed to disappoint society if such statistical lessons of the past are ignored («The Literary Digest» surveys, for example). Those lessons are so familiar to social sciences representatives (Harford, 2014). There are lots of dangers related with data that are only getting worse with data growth. The following ones are mentioned more often:

1. Big data forces scientist to assume that the whole social interaction is fixed and clear for analysis. It encourages apophenia practice – seeing relationships in random or meaningless data, because lots of data can suggest any relationship. Therefore, it is important to raise questions through analytical assumptions, methodological basics and statements that fit Big Data phenomenon (Boyd, Crawford, 2011).

2. Every “Big” data set is usually some sort of single “diving” into a single digital platform and is a single aspect of social activity (for example, social network friendship or emotional sayings in Twitter). In addition, those data sets are often made of directed selection of people who have access to certain technologies and devices and use them often (extraverts as an example) and people who generate some types of data (scientists who write articles instead of books). Thus, there is no reason to distribute those results to the whole community and we need to clearly define bounds of the found patterns. Data verification by comparison of content, generated by the same subjects on multiple online-platforms and contexts can be a solution. But essentially such an attempt causes huge processing, legal and ethical calls (White, Saylor Breckenridge, 2014).

3. Ethical aspects of Big data usage. Sociology has accumulated the significant experience of research participants’ rights observation, which is based on learning researchers about human rights, checking tools and research protocol by IRB, obtaining written agreement of respondents for being researched and protection of participants’ privacy, confidence, anonymity. Most of Big data is collected without
knowledge and agreement of subjects. Of course, it is unreasonable to ask for an agreement to analyze forum talks or social network courtship (Boyd, Crawford, 2012). But it becomes more obvious that people’s digital activity is being studied for an advertisement profiling, pharmacological sales, financial marketing and product manufacturers who use this data to inflict the respondents’ choice. Potentially, it can limit competition of products giving preferences to those data owners or richer corporations. Moreover, there is a question of acceptability of using confidential data in a political fight.

Thus, more attention is paid to clarity of Big data usage. An example of such an attention is Mark Zuckerberg’s interrogation in the U.S. Congress about Facebook usage of data for development of strategical communication and influence on elections by Cambridge Analitica company.

Public discussion of those questions will force owners and analyzers of Big data to base their work on principles of clarity of personal information processing, accountability of their usage, to develop user-friendly data protection for their products and services and to be more responsible for things they do (Meeting the challenges of big data, 7/2015).

Simon Chadwick, editor of ESOMAR, believes that whether we want it or not, the world we live becomes irreversibly mobile and digital, so research approaches just can’t stay unalerted (Chadwick, 2011).

What will we do in 2025? To interview a few volunteers who will have some time and willing to open their bunker’s door to participate in survey? Make the first Internet-survey that would be representative for the whole county? Switch to passive web-observing in social networks, biometrics and instant mobile surveys? Or will survey participation become civic duty, and everybody who is randomly selected will be free from work for half of a day and will be forced to answer all sociologist’s questions (now randomly selected people in the USA must participate in the jury trial)? We’ve noticed some tendencies in surveying methods development, but now it’s hard to say for sure which of them will dominate.

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WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR INDIVIDUAL WELLBEING?
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF MASS ATTITUDES IN DIFFERENT TYPES OF EUROPEAN WELFARE REGIMES*

In the article we estimate empirically a difference in mass attitudes to welfare regimes, state protection of individual well-being and perception of social risks for wellbeing in dependence on typological welfare state groups in European societies. In correspondence with G. Esping-Andersen’s classification (1990), we compare three empirical cases as the empirical referents of basic types of welfare regimes in Europe with three empirical cases of post-Socialist societies, including Ukraine. We use the European Social Survey database of the Round 4 (2008-2009) for empirical comparative analysis which is conducted in a three-dimension space of social expectations, attitudes, and estimations of individual welfare state support. Using a linear regression model we also test the influence of institutional, cultural and structural factors on individual expectations and attitudes to state social responsibility for individual wellbeing. The main research findings are the following: (i) social attitudes to welfare regime correspond highly with the three main dimensions of social expectations, assessments, and estimations of state social responsibility in the Western European countries. Particularly, the ‘three welfare regimes’ theoretical model clearly describes the differences in attitudes between Great Britain, Germany and Sweden; (ii) as it was theoretically expected, the empirical profiles of social attitudes to welfare regimes in the post-Socialist countries contain substantial mismatches. The welfare attitudes in Ukrainian and Russian societies remain more dependence on the paternalistic values; (iii) the popular thesis about determination of welfare attitudes by the social cleavages is not justified in our research.

Keywords: social responsibility, welfare regime, social attitudes and expectations.

Introduction

At the threshold of the 21st century European societies were challenged by societal transformations, the collapse of former state socialism and crises of capitalism. These processes sparked the emergence of new forms of inequalities, mass protests, institutional changes and the growth of mass discontent with the state and social policy. Neoliberalism spread across the world with its attendant ideas of the market regulation of social wellbeing and, as a consequence, the interconnected concepts of ‘welfare state’, ‘social state’, ‘good society’ were ejected out of mainstream intellectual, scientific and public discourse in the beginning of the 2000s. While note, these changes appeared in parallel with the deep crises of welfare practices in Europe (Svallfors, 2003; Esping-Andersen, 2004; Pierson, 2001), which manifested in the several features, namely:

– the ‘warping’ of the market as a result of a cost-based welfare state. This ‘strangled’ the market through its requirement for a level of taxation high enough to ensure the maintenance of social programs, as well as a decrease in labor motivation and various stimuli designed to increase capital accumulation and investment;

– the long-term effects on the welfare state sparked by the aging of the population; these effects are connected to increases in the financial load that working people and social infrastructure as a whole must bear;

– the undermining of traditional models of social solidarity; changes in family values;

– challenges to the new global economy in terms of ineffective governance and non-competitive economies;

– technological displacement of the middle class under the current economic crisis.

But as recently as several years later, under the new global economic crisis of 2007-2009, the pendulum of public and academic attention started to shift backwards, strengthening the state responsibility for regulation of different social issues. In 2009, the United Nations General Assembly established the World Day for Social Justice as a special date in the calendar. In the UN’s resolution, the following claims to the modern states were declared: eliminating poverty, guaranteeing full employment, ensuring the provision of worthwhile and meaningful jobs, welfare and social justice for all people, and equal rights for men and women. One of the
The new economic crisis of 2007-09 caused a destructive effect on the middle classes (through inflation and the closure of credit programs, a slump in the financing of education and science etc.) as well as on the different vulnerable groups (through inflation, the growth of unemployment and the elimination or scaling down of social programs). The crisis stimulated mass protests across the world. As a result, old and new elaborations of welfare state theories come again into the focus of public and academic interest and discussions. What kind of welfare state regime would be more successful in times of crisis and in a rapidly-changing world? What methods of state regulation of social risks and individual wellbeing would be more effective? What indicators do better measure this effectiveness? Recently many scientists and politicians have fixed challenges of the welfare state and made contribution to the renewed debate on modern welfare policy and a role of a state in individual welfare support.

Although the numerous signs of welfare state in Europe appeared later of the 1800s, the welfare regimes had been developed as “the heart of the institutional structure of all European societies” (Bable, 2011: p. 571) just after the WWII. According to the EuroStata data, if in 1960 the median level of social outlay was 10 percent of GDP in Western European countries, then at 2011 the social protection expenditure in the Euro Area-17 had already risen to 30 percent of GDP, and in EU-28 was 29.1. However, this median level masks substantial variation among EU countries, ranging from 16-17 percent of GDP in Estonia and Bulgaria to more than 33-34 percent in France and Denmark.

A diversity of welfare regimes were formed on the bases of national varieties of social insurance and redistribution systems. The regimes were designed as “a collective piggy bank” (Barr, 2001) to protect the individuals against the social, vital, intergenerational, and class risks (Esping-Andersen, 1999: p. 40-43). The all welfare regimes have three common components:

(1) a system of various forms of social protection against the individual risks (like infirmity in the older age, or disadvantages caused by social origin/status); (2) a state-funded tax regime sufficient to purchase a fairly expansive set of public goods; (3) a regulatory policy aimed at restriction of the negative externalities caused by markets (unemployment, marginalization, falls in wages, etc.). Also note, that the development of the Western welfare regimes after the WWII was a response to state socialism with its social policy of mass protection and, finally, the effect of a “positive class compromise” (E.O.Wright, 2012) between the capitalist class and popular social forces. The socialist welfare
regime was developed as a principal feature of the state socialism. This regime was unique in some ways and left a unique legacy for post-Socialist states. Under the state-socialism, well-developed patronage system of wide social protection was established. However, this system was being coupled to employment status of the individuals, sometimes even more tightly than in the Western European social protection systems (Therborn, 1995). The patronage type of social protection institutes were embedded into the socialist societies, affecting everyday social life. State enterprises, as a rule, became the centres for welfare provision, especially caring about the social and medical services. Social policy under state socialism suggested the wide social support and protection programs such as “heavily subsidized foods and rents, full employment, the relatively high wages of workers, and the provision of free or cheap health, education and cultural services” (Deacon, 2000). The state socialism welfare institutions were developed under a strictly centralized economy with limited financial resources. The serious consequences became the exclusive standardization of living conditions, an extremely low quality of services, and meet the needs of only a small part of population (Boutenko, 1997: p. 145). Despite this, for several decades of the life under state socialism the individuals used to enjoy a guarantee of full employment, social protection (based on employment, or more narrowly, on occupation), subsided public goods and services, a developed social infrastructure and care by the state and enterprises. People became accustomed to relying on the state in protection against the multiple life risks. The patronage approach in welfare protection divides individual interests along the lines of clientele. Public-opinion polls bear this out, showing the post-socialist citizens, unlike their West European neighbours, expected much more role of the state both in economy and social protection (Boutenko, 1997). As an outcome, the state socialism welfare regime formed an occupationally-fragmented system of particular social rights (Therborn, 1995: pp. 89-97) in contrast to Western European welfare regime variations that are based mostly on social care and promote a development of a general system of universal social rights. Although the social-democratic path for welfare regime transformation was considered by many scientists as the most suitable for the post-socialism development, but the social-democratic welfare model had not being implemented in European post-Socialist states. Instead, during the 1990s these states turned primarily to the liberal and conservative social policy advocated by the Washington Consensus (Inglor, 2008; Fenger, 2007).

After the collapse of the state socialism, under rapid institutional changes, market transition and the disruption of the state-guaranteed system of employment and corresponding social protection (based on employment), the socialist welfare regimes destroyed. Fairing the market intrusion and state restriction in social policy, the public social spending in post-Socialist states at the middle of the 1990s had been significantly declined in percentage to GDP. This negative tendency was strengthened by the factors of low GDP per capita and tax revenue, high poverty, shadow economy and the ‘state captured’ (the
World Bank term) by oligarchic interests. People faced the high level of uncertainty and insecurity, experiencing a mass psychological trauma syndrome. However in Ukraine, along with many other post-Socialist states, since the threshold of the XX-XXI centuries the state social security and protection expenses have been extremely rising. So, public social spending share in the master budget of Ukraine increased up to 37.04 % in 2011 comparing with 21.3 % in 1996. For international comparison, public social spending an average estimated 21% of GDP across the 35 OECD countries in 2016, staying at historically highest levels in many countries (Society at a Glance, 2016: p. 108). The ratio was the highest in France, at 32% of GDP, followed by Finland, at over 30% of GDP. Belgium, Italy, Denmark, Austria, Sweden, and Greece devote more than a quarter of their GDP to public social spending. At the other end of the spectrum are such countries, as Latvia, Turkey etc. which spend less than 15% of GDP on social protection and support.

Some of the post-Socialist states partially renovated the occupational insurance system with orientation at the European Continental welfare regimes as a template. This fact allowed some researchers to term the newly-developed welfare models as a ‘post-communist conservative corporatist’ model (Deacon, 2000). At the same time, in 1996 and later in 2002, G. Esping-Andersen rejected the idea of the emergence of a new type of welfare regime under post-socialism. He suggested that the differences between these countries and three specific European welfare regimes, the existence of which he defined, ‘were only of a transitional nature’ (Esping-Andersen, 1996). These emerging regimes, as he concluded later, were influenced by the models presented by the World Bank (Esping-Andersen, 2002). This conclusion was confirmed by M. Sengoku (2009) using an institutional-oriented approach. But Sengoku also noted that, in post-socialist countries, external drivers only functioned as catalysts. In the study of classification of the post-socialist social policies within the Esping-Andersen’s typology of welfare regimes (Fenger, 2007), H.J.M. Fenger argued the important conclusion about the large difference between post-Socialist and Western welfare states, which is greater than the differences between the countries within any of other European typological groups. The main differences concern the variables of social and institutional trust, principles of social programs and the social risks. This conclusion approves a hypothesis about appearance of a specific post-socialist type of welfare regime, which is internally heterogeneous, but at the same time which differs from all other European regimes. However, in many post-Socialist countries, including Ukraine, a search for effective welfare model as well as the guidelines of an appropriate policy-making is continuing till now. This is why the estimation of a chance for the certain welfare regime types being developed in a country, as well as a correspondence between the post-socialist social policies and the welfare regime typology, remains the pressing challenge for empirical research.
‘Weak’ and ‘strong’ approaches to welfare development strategy

Two main approaches to welfare model development could be recognized: so-called ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ ones. Using the ‘weak’ approach, justification of choice of a welfare model should be based either on normative orientations, or on the better empirical patterns which function successfully in the states. As a rule, such orientations reflect subjective and ideological-based ideas about a better social order. Implementation and further development of the normative model through the policy-making depends essentially on acceptance and legitimization of the model by mass consciousness, or, in other words, to meet mass expectations and value orientations. Social processes are shaped by culture, social structure, institutional capacities, and social agency. Social policy and political regime which are ‘unrooted’ in a society can be suppressed by mass dissatisfaction and protests. Thus, the forced adaptation of any normative welfare model can be effected in unexpected outcomes such as social exclusion, alienation and social parasitism, decline of confidence in social and political institutes.

In contrast to the logic of the ‘weak’ approach (and populist declarative support by some political forces the normative-oriented welfare reforms), the ‘strong’ approach to welfare strategy and policy-making is based on empirical evaluations of social needs and institutional as well as societal capacity of accepting the welfare model.

Accordingly within a ‘strong’ approach, a choice of the better welfare regime concerns not only identification of the better institutional norms and rules for political regulation of individual wellbeing. The embedding and developing of institutional regime depends significantly on its mass support, or on correspondence between institutional rules and mass expectations. Therefore, for identification of more appropriate welfare regime for a society, we need to evaluate popular expectations concerning the public regulation of individual wellbeing.

Research tasks and design

In our research we will test empirically the correspondence between mass attitudes to state support of individual wellbeing in Ukraine and other European countries, and ideal types of welfare regimes. Based on G. Esping-Andersen’s classification of welfare regimes under the Western capitalism (1990), we consider three ideal types of welfare state, which historically developed in Europe. In correspondence with the ideal types, we made a choice of several European countries as the empirical cases for comparative analysis. Comparing mass expectations and attitudes to the state support of individual wellbeing in Ukraine and in the selected European countries, we intend to get justification of correspondence of welfare mass expectations to certain ideal type of European welfare regimes.
Our research is based on the 4th wave of European Social Survey data collected in 2008-09 in European countries. This wave of survey contains a special module developed by St. Svallfors (2005), W. van Oorschot, P. Taylor-Gooby, C. Staerkle, and J. Goul Andersen which measures attitudes towards welfare regime.

The goal of our study is framed by the following tasks and research design:
1) specification of the principal empirical features of three typical welfare regimes in western capitalism and identification of their empirical referents in European societies. Based on the Esping-Andersen’s welfare regime typology, recently elaborated by Ebbinghaus (Ebbinghaus, 2012: p. 14), we selected the following three countries as referents which represent more properly the welfare capitalism types; - Great Britain with its liberal (more market and individualistic) model; Sweden with a social-democratic (‘solidarity’) model; and Germany with a continental (‘Christian-Democratic’, more subsidiary) welfare model.

2) For specification of the post-Socialist welfare development, other three countries with newly-emerging welfare regimes under post-Socialism – Ukraine, Poland, and the Russian Federation – are selected for further comparative analysis. Application of a comparative method allows us to define the differences in social attitudes which, with a high probability, reflect the differences between empirical welfare regimes. If we identify empirically the theoretically valid patterns of welfare social attitudes, so this will be a weighty argument in favour of the variables selected for comparative analysis which can serve for description of the welfare patterns basic features. Cross-national comparison will allow us to receive the research findings concerning the mass support of the certain welfare regime in societies selected for comparison;

3) we expect significant correlation between social attitudes and expectations concerning welfare regime, and class cleavages, perception of social risks and social policy effectiveness, social and institutional trust. The empirical testing of correlation between the social structure factors and social attitudes to welfare regime in different nations will allow us to justify the explanatory models of structural fragmented mass support of welfare regimes.

Who are responsible for individual wellbeing in a society?

The concept of the welfare state is closely related to a wider concept of social responsibility which recently has been drawn into the ‘civil society’ and ‘social state’ theories from the new economics of business [McBarnet & Campbell, 2007]. Interpretation of welfare state with application of social responsibility concept allows, first, to overcome the firm instrumental frame of welfare state concept, defined as a combination of social insurance, market regulation policy and a tax regime, and, second, to outline the principal dimensions of a welfare state, rooted
historically and appeared in intersectionality of family, state, market and society concerning individual wellbeing. In this intersectional relations, and in terms of responsibility for individual wellbeing, a state can play different roles: from a laissez-faire with non-interference into individual life (when the individuals or their families are responsible for own wellbeing) to a role of active interference, support, control and regulation of individual wellbeing. Taking into account this variability, the social responsibility of a state appears as a kind of relationship between a state and families or individuals connected with obligations to benefit individual and social wellbeing, to deal with topical social issues, supporting social inclusion and solidarity in society.

Recent studies of welfare regimes and social responsibility of a state have contributed significantly in development of conceptual approaches to interpretation of welfare state and policy. Let us underline the following approaches which enriched the renewed understanding of the welfare concept:

(1) a ‘good society’ approach in the neo-Kantian tradition, developed since the 1960s-70s by Rawls, Habermas, and later proposed the ‘binary discourse’ of universalism (communitarianism) vs. particularism in interpretation of a good society and achievement of social wellbeing. The sociological communitarian version of a good society by A. Etzioni (1996), and the ‘moral civil society’ vision by J. Alexander (2000; 2006) justify their focus on a moral quality of a community (Etzioni), on citizenship (J. Alexander), and on morality and solidarity in explaining the principal sources of individual wellbeing and civil society efficacy. On the basis of research of ethnic migrants and their survival practices, A. Portes (1987) involves the concepts of ‘bonded solidarities’ and ‘civil engagement’ in explanation of success societal adaptation of the migrant community. The crisscrossing affective social bonds, the moral quality of values and mores proposed as a conceptual frames for understanding of the individual wellbeing foundations as an effect of intersectionality of the community, citizens, individuals and a state;

(2) an institutional and political-economy approach, newly developed by the ‘New Constitutionalists’ such as W. Anderson, St.L. Elkin, Ph. Green, etc. (Soltan & Elkin, 1996; Elkin & Soltan 1999, etc.), and by G. Esping-Andersen (2002), which underlines the significance of ‘citizen competences’ (in interpretation by the ‘Constitutionalists’) as well as the role of ‘good’, norm-oriented institutional design resulted in effective democratic citizenship and welfare state;

(3) a ‘community-driven development’ and ‘social accountability’ approach, widely promoted through the World Bank reports since 2004, which underlines the idea of a citizen involvement (the critical point for enhancing democratic governance) in improvement of service delivery; the ability of citizens, civil society organizations and other non-state actors to hold the state accountable (Ellison, 1997; Carnwall, Gaventa, 2000; 2001) and make it responsive to their needs. The “Demands for Good Governance’ principles (The World Bank Report,
Kutsenko Olga, Gorbachyk Andrii. Who are responsible for individual wellbeing? Comparative analysis of mass attitudes in different types of European welfare regimes

2013) are designed to strengthen the capacity of NGOs, local communities and the private sector so they can hold the state (authorities) accountable for creating higher levels of wellbeing. Interpretation of a welfare state on this theoretical basis is focused on demand-driven mechanisms which are operated from the bottom-up and create the social accountability of the state (authority and decision-making). Social accountability can play an important role in the development of collaboration between the state (government) and civil society and help public institutions to meet the expectations of society;

(4) an ‘assets and capability approach’ developed by A. Sen (1999; 2009) emphasizes a notion of universal human rights in evaluating various states with regard to justice; it recognizes that formal and informal institutions can facilitate or constrain efforts to secure people against poverty and social exclusion. Based on a person-centered institutional interpretation, A. Sen emphasizes not only the importance of assets, but draws attention to their returns – or how those assets translate into improved wellbeing for poor people. To ensure those returns, institutions must allow assets to be used productively and freely, promoting ‘capabilities’ (in a term by Sen).

G. Esping-Andersen (1990; 1996), Svalfors (2003) developed the welfare regimes concept making a stress on a system of institutional arrangements, and analytically defined three basic models manifesting within the market economy, wiz.: (i) the ‘liberal’ welfare model; (ii) the Scandinavian welfare model; and, (iii) the continental European welfare model. All these models are embedded into capitalism (with liberalism or social democracy political order), but not all of them have an equalizing effect due to a dependence of social protection on income security rather than equality principles. In the 2000s these models have faced challenges from the crisis of capitalism as well as the impact of emergence of the welfare state per se (Kaufmann, 2010). All these models move towards adaptation the new challenges of social contracts between a state and different generations as well as the vulnerable social groups. The updated models are more oriented on social inclusion and cohesion policy via employment and the generational contract. The former socialist welfare states, under the impact of liberal democratization and free market capitalism, and after the dismantling of their previously-strong social patronage institutions, have partly kept or revived their old traditions of social insurance, as well as partly recreating new forms of social protection. After the breakdown of state socialism systems, the post-Soviet countries did not follow the Scandinavian road to universalism but rather the Continental method of introducing occupational social insurance. At the end of 2010, welfare policy in post-soviet countries is even more employment-related than in Western Europe (Inglor, 2008; Bable, 2010: p. 576). As a result, according to Th. Bable, J. Kohl, and Cl. Wendt, the new ‘layered’ complex welfare systems in Eastern European countries do not easily fit into the typologies developed on the basis of ‘varieties across Western Europe’ (Bable, 2010: p. 580). However, there have been few quantitative analyses of advanced welfare regimes (including the post-Soviet countries), partly due to their situations as transforming
states (Abrahamson, 2010) as well as to the absence of good national-level statistical data. Despite the scale of challenges to welfare state, the majority of comparative, institutional and sociologically oriented studies have flagged up various degrees of change such as the recalibration, recasting, renewing or reforming of welfare states, but have concluded that these changes have led to the survival of the welfare state (Clegg, 2007; Drahoukoupil, 2007; Castels, Obinger, 2008). The outcomes of two-decades of research into welfare systems by different researchers allows us to assert that the ‘regime-typology’ approach in comparative analysis remains useful for conceptualizing the differences between welfare states, as well as classifying the empirical similarities between them, taking into account national historical legacies. However, the conceptualization of empirical variations of welfare regimes needs further development with the inclusion of the post-Soviet welfare cases and cultural parameters such as social attitudes and expectations.

**Macro-parameters of the selected countries**

The selected countries differ significantly in terms of quality of life (see Table 1) and social expenditure of the state (see Table 2). Components of life quality define the risk to individual wellbeing and thus can be used to support identification of the preconditions of social attitudes to the welfare state, to social protection and to the need for social assistance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected indicators of quality of life in six countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ukraine</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Russian Federation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Poland</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sweden</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Germany</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Great Britain</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


---

2 The table consists of data relevant to 2007-2010 as institutional background for the ESS-4 research into social attitudes for which data was collected in 2007-2008.
According to the indicators of quality of life, Ukraine ranks lowest in the set of countries under comparison, with the exception of life expectancy, the Gini index and social expenditure, which are lower in Russia. Russian society in 2007 was more polarized and had less welfare than Ukraine. There is significant difference between life expectancy, HDI and GNI per capita between the post-Socialist countries and the Western European countries selected for analysis. Some positive trends in the social-economic development of post-Socialist societies in the first decade of the 2000s (decreases in absolute poverty, as well as increases in life expectancy) have not remarkably impacted overall quality of life in a cross-national perspective. Moreover, in the 2000s the tendency towards the aging of the population sped up and was attended by an increase in the emigration of more educated youth from post-Socialist countries. These structural features increase the social risk to individual wellbeing which is felt by citizens; they impact social demands and public expectations of the state.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Social Expenditure as a proportion of GDP (%), 1980-2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1980</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources: OECD (2012)*

* national and international statistics do not include an interpretation of the meaning of the indicators

In relation to state responsibility, we distinguished three referent models – a ‘liberal’, a ‘social-democratic’, and a ‘continental’ model. We investigated the fitness of these models for describing society and examined how legitimate they are.

Each of the models differs from the other in terms of state social responsibility: from less responsibility in the ‘liberal’ model to a penetrating level of responsibility in the ‘social-democracy’ model. However, state penetration into a society and private individual’ or families’ life can bring both positive and negative social effects. The likely positive effects are decreases in social tension in society, poverty and social inequality. At the same time, negative effects can arise due to the huge social commitments of a state which impact the economy, slowing down economic growth and weakening social ties and solidarity in a society, as well as decreasing an individual’s responsibility for their own (and their family’s) wellbeing.

We analyze social attitudes to the welfare state in a three-dimensional space of: (1) individual and class-based expectations about the state’s capacity for social protection, or the social responsibility of a state; (2) a social assessment of the utility of the welfare state; and, (3) social estimations of the risks to social development of a welfare regime.
It is assumed that the inclination of citizens for a ‘social-democracy’ model will be characterized by expectations for strong state social assistance and a presumption of the high utility of the welfare state in combination with the expectation that there is only a small risk that the welfare state will negatively impact the development of society. In contrast to this case, it is supposed that the inclination of citizens towards a ‘liberal’ model will appear in mass desire for a weak form of state social assistance (due to the prevailing idea that social responsibility means citizens taking responsibility for their own wellbeing and that of their families), as well as of the weak utility of the welfare state, alongside presumptions that a welfare state presents a high risk in terms of its negative impact on social development. Meanwhile, it is assumed that the supporters of a ‘continental’ model will have moderate expectations concerning the welfare state and its utility and assume it will have modest negative social consequences. It is moreover supposed that such an assessment of the utility and risk of a welfare state can explain strongly expectations about the social responsibility of a state. The generalized expected profiles of commitment to these three basic welfare state models are presented in Table 3.

**Table 3**

**Generalized expected profiles of commitment to different welfare state models**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Citizens’ attitudes</th>
<th>Liberal</th>
<th>Continental</th>
<th>Social-democratic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assessment of social responsibility of state</td>
<td>-+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment of utility of welfare state</td>
<td>-+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk assessment of welfare state</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The symbols “+” and “-” designate theoretically-expected (relative) expressions of strong attitudes (“+”), and weak attitudes (“-”).

These theoretically-expected profiles were tested on empirical data about mass attitudes in six European countries. This procedure allowed us also to define empirically the location for each country under scrutiny along the dimensions of three basic models. We assume that the countries with well-developed market capitalism and a long-term history of a welfare state regime will display the criteria described in the corresponding model of mass disposition as measured by social attitudes and expectations. The analysis of the profiles of post-socialist countries with institutionally changed welfare states, the reform of which are still in progress, allow us to outline the inclination of a society towards a specified welfare model. The conversion in our analysis from generalized indices (or aggregated data) measured at a country level to group-level analysis (at a social class, gender, age etc. level, or at the individual level) will allow us to define the factors that influence the inclination of citizens towards a certain welfare regime.
Social attitudes to welfare regimes: some finding from comparative empirical analysis

The questionnaire used in the ESS-4 (2008-09) contains a module designed to measure public desire for state assistance in relation to the following social issues: health protection, employment security, support of a family and elderly people (questions D15-D20). The questions and indicators correspond with the main dimensions of a welfare state. In order to calculate an additive index on the basis of the indicators mentioned above, a one-factor solution (using principal component analysis) was created for each country under scrutiny. The one-factor solution for each country ranges from explaining 47% of the variation for Great Britain to 57% for Ukraine and the Russian Federation. This is an important finding that supports the validity of the one-dimensional concept ‘social expectation of a social responsibility of a state’. The appropriate additive index, calculated as the mean of variables D15-D20, strongly correlates with the one-factor solution ($r > 0.9$ for every country). For the pooled data of six countries the one-factor solution explains 55% of general variation and also strongly correlates with the appropriate additive index ($r = 0.996$). The reliability coefficient Cronbach’s $a$, which characterizes the internal consistency of the additive index, is rather high for each country and varies from 0.76 (for Great Britain) to 0.84 (for Ukraine), and is 0.83 for the pooled data. On the basis of this preliminary analysis, an index of citizens’ expectations about the social responsibility of a state (named StatResp) was calculated as a mean of the variables D15-D20. The index varies from 0 to 10, where ‘0’ means the public expectation that the state will not interfere in either individual or family wellbeing (the minimum social responsibility of a state), and ‘10’ means the opposite – the full (maximum) social responsibility of a state. The index’s means are compared for all six countries under study. The means of the index manifest essential and, what is important for us, theoretically-expected (for Western countries) differences in values that allow us to consider this index to be a good measure of the key subjective characteristics (‘estimation of social responsibility of governance’) of the empirical welfare state models. Accordingly, this index can be used as a dependent variable for further analysis. The means for the six countries are presented in Table 4.

In line with theoretical expectations, Swedish society with its ‘social-democratic’ model of welfare state manifests higher social expectations than British society with its ‘liberal’ model. The differences in means are significant at $p < 0.05$. The difference between index means for Germany (the ‘continental’ model) and for Great Britain is not significant (at $p = 0.05$); that is, is not consistent with theoretical expectations (see Table 3). Poland, according to this index of social expectations, inclines towards the ‘social-democratic’ model (the difference in mean values for Poland and Sweden is not significant at $p = 0.05$). The highest

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3 See the wording of questions D15-D20 on pp.67-68 of the source: https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/round4/survey/ESS4_appendix_a3_e05_4.pdf
Social expectations can be observed in the Ukrainian and Russian data and can be explained by the strong claim for social assistance from states which were formed under state socialism. Let us note that the mean of the index in Ukraine is significantly higher than in Russia, but even in Russia’s case the mean of the index is higher than for the other countries under study. The question now follows: what factors influence social expectations (at the individual level)?

We constructed two other indices, viz. an index of the utility of a welfare state and an index of the social risk presented by a welfare state on the basis of questions D21-D295 of the survey questionnaire⁴. The two-factor solutions (principal component analysis) for each country’s data have very similar structures and interpretations and explain a similar amount of variance. The second factor may clearly be interpreted as an assessment of the utility of a welfare state and the first one should be understood as an estimation of the social risk that arises from the welfare state (on the development of society). In order to supply the further cross-national comparison, the final factor analysis was done on pooled (six country) data. The two-factor solution allows the same clear interpretation and explains 62% of general variation (see Table 5).

The estimated factor values were linearly transformed, allowing us to create the following two indices: an index of the assessment of the utility of a welfare state (BenfSS) and an index of the estimation of the social risk that a welfare state presents (RiskSS). Both indices vary from ‘0’ (minimum assessment of utility as well as minimum estimation of social risks) to ‘10’ (maximum estimation). The means of three indices for the countries under study are presented in Table 6.

According to the data in Table 6, the ratio of mean values of the indices of the utility and social risks of welfare state for Great Britain, Germany and Sweden fully correspond to theoretical expectations (see Table 3). In Great Britain (the ‘liberal’ model), compared with the other countries under study, individuals estimate social risks to be highest (or, in other words, display the highest level of fear concerning the negative consequences on social development of a welfare state) as well as the lowest assessment of the utility of public social programs. The

<p>| Index of social responsibility of governance (StatResp, means for six countries) |
|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>8.67</td>
<td>1845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>8.30</td>
<td>2512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>7.76</td>
<td>1619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>7.74</td>
<td>1830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>7.23</td>
<td>2352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>7.20</td>
<td>2751</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

⁴ Wording of questions D21-D29 is presented in Table 5.
Estimation of social risks and the utility of a welfare state: two-factor solution for six countries (pooled data, principal component analysis, varimax rotation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>To what extent do you agree or disagree that social benefits and services in your country...</th>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>...make people less willing to look after themselves and their family?</td>
<td>0.849</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D27... make people lazy?</td>
<td>0.843</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D28...make people less willing to care for one another?</td>
<td>0.843</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D21...place too great a strain on the economy?</td>
<td>0.661</td>
<td>0.103</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D25...cost businesses too much in taxes and charges?</td>
<td>0.630</td>
<td>0.127</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D23...lead to a more equal society?</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>0.821</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D22...prevent widespread poverty?</td>
<td>0.106</td>
<td>0.797</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D26...make it easier for people to combine work and family life?</td>
<td>0.117</td>
<td>0.765</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentage of variance 38% 24%

Swedish data (the ‘social-democratic’ model), in contrast, includes the highest assessment of the utility of a welfare state and the lowest estimation of social risks. The consistency of the empirical profiles of the welfare regimes of these three countries supports the validity of the specified three-dimensional space of social attitudes towards welfare regimes.

Comparison of Western and Eastern European countries brings up some rather unexpected findings. The greatest (relative to other countries’) desire for the welfare state in post-Socialist Ukraine and Russia is combined with the lowest assessment of the utility of the welfare state, as well as with the lowest estimation

| Table 6 |

Empirical profiles of six countries in a three-dimensional space of attitudes to welfare state

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Expectations about social responsibility of state (StatResp)</th>
<th>Range 1</th>
<th>2. Estimation of social risk of welfare state (RiskSS)</th>
<th>Range 2</th>
<th>3. Assessment of utility of welfare state (BenfSS)</th>
<th>Range 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>8.67</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.27</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>8.30</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>7.76</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.51</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>7.74</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.95</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>7.20</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.43</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>7.23</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6.04</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
of social risk. In summary, assessments and estimations both in Ukraine and Russia do not correspond to any of three basic welfare regimes. As a result, this evidence only partially confirms the typologies of welfare regimes elaborated by Fenger (2007) and Ebbinghaus (2012) with the institutional-oriented approach. So, if institutionally the welfare regime in Poland is a closer fit to the ‘continental’ regime of Germany (for example), the composition of relevant social attitudes and expectations is closer to a ‘social–democratic’ model. As a consequence for policy development it appears that attempts to implement any of the models which were historically developed and rooted in Western Europe will not find social support in post-Soviet societies, and such social policies will probably be ineffective.

What determines social attitudes to welfare regimes?

Why do different societies demonstrate such diverse attitudes to the welfare state and desires about the social responsibility of a state to act to secure an individual and the family’s wellbeing? Or rather, what factors (at the individual level of analysis) influence such attitudes?

The index of expectations about the social responsibility of governance (StateResp, as described earlier) is used as a dependent variable in the regression model. It introduced (see Table 5) two orthogonal (uncorrelated) indices – an index of the assessment of the utility of the welfare state (BenfSS) and an index of the estimation of the social risk of a welfare state (RiskSS), which both describe well the differences between empirical welfare state models (represented in the social consciousness of citizens), and which both can influence significantly social attitudes to the welfare state.

We assume that social attitudes to a welfare regime and to the social responsibility of a state are a complex function of the institutional, cultural and structural parameters of the social interaction of individuals with a state and its institutions. As Shalev (2001) has put it, the argument is that welfare regimes should be seen as a limited number of qualitatively-different configurations with distinctive historical roots. Real long-term social policy and politics can affect strongly citizens’ social attitudes, expectations and assessments of a state; on the other hand, perceptions and expectations about the social responsibility of a state can differ according to social group and classes that have diverse access to resources that are unequally distributed across a society. On the basis of this reasoning in our explanatory model we include variables (illustrated in Table 7) that describe the factors which potentially determine citizens’ expectations about the social responsibility of the state for individual and family wellbeing.

The complex effect of the interaction between individuals and welfare regimes is subjectively represented in individual experience. This ‘effect’ can
be measured using four parameters: (1) a personal assessment of the utility of a welfare state (BenfSS index); (2) estimation of the social risks of a welfare state (RiskSS index); (3) personal evaluation of the national social system (SSEval additive index); and, (4) personal trust in public institutions (Trust additive index).

The second potential group of factors contains an ideological and cultural dimension of social attitudes towards a welfare regime, presented at an individual level. In the analyses we use only one additive variable to measure attitudes to social justice supported by the state (Equality).

The third group of factors presents the parameters relevant to social structure. We take into account in our analysis that there is substantial evidence that social cleavages drive the politics of welfare state reform. As C.de la Porte and K. Jacobsson (2012) note, different national patterns are embedded in social policy and help to shape distinct national varieties of capitalism with appropriate social structures. If in fact welfare states are deeply integrated into national variants of capitalism, one can expect that employers’ attitudes toward welfare state will be complex. This helps to explain why employers have often been more half-hearted and internally-divided over policy reform than many political economy theories anticipate (Shalev, 2001). Highlighting the connections between social policy arrangements and socio-structural change, or the variety of cross-cutting lines of social conflict that emerge during the transition to a post-industrial or market economy (in the case of post-Socialist countries), allows for greater precision in identifying the social legitimizing of the welfare state that can generate the greatest discontent about welfare policy and its efficacy. We test two structural-sensitive models for explaining the social expectations of citizens – one based on taking into consideration social class cleavages (between employers and employees, for example – see the variable Employer in Table 7), and the other structural parameters such as gender, age, education, type of residence and personal social network (see Table 7). One of the questions that we are interested in answering is how influential social class cleavage is in explaining expectations for social responsibility in different welfare models.

**Table 7**

### Potential factors for explaining citizens’ expectations of social responsibility towards governance

Subjective effects of interaction of citizens with a welfare regime and social systems per se (institutional factors)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BenfSS</th>
<th>index as described above</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RiskSS</td>
<td>index as described above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSEval</td>
<td>- evaluation of the social system of a country; single factor solution for D11-D14, six countries’ pooled data, principal component analysis, 52% of variance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D11.</td>
<td>What do you think about the standard of living of pensioners?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D12.</td>
<td>What do you think about the standard of living of people who are unemployed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D13.</td>
<td>What do you think about the provision of affordable child care services for working parents?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Ukrainian Sociology in the 21st Century: Theory, Methods, Research Results**

**D14.** What do you think about the opportunities for young people to find a job? (0 means «extremely bad» and 10 means «extremely good»)

- trust in public institutions; index is constructed as mean of B4-B8 and varies from 0 (no trust) to 10 (high level of trust); Cronbach’s alpha is about 0.9

How much do you personally trust each of the following institutions...

(0 means “do not trust an institution at all” and 10 means “complete trust”)

| B4 | ...country’s parliament? |
| B5 | ...the legal system? |
| B6 | ...the police? |
| B7 | ...politicians? |
| B8 | ...political parties? |

2. Individual values of equality and social justice

| D1. | Large differences in people’s incomes are acceptable to properly reward differences in talents and efforts. |
| D4. | For a society to be fair, differences in people’s standard of living should be small (1 means «agree strongly» and 5 means «disagree strongly») |

3. Social structure belonging

- class cleavage under capitalism; dichotomous variable that identifies a select group of

| Employer | employers (‘capitalists’, ‘small employers’ and ‘skilled managers’ according to the class scheme by E.O.Wright) defined in opposition to ‘employees’. |

- type of employability; dichotomous variable that identifies a select group of employees (=1) in contrast to those who have their own business or who are self-employed; calculated on F12, dichotomous variable

| EmplType |
| Gender |

- dichotomous variable that selects men (=1)

| ag_25 | - dichotomous variable that selects people of 18-25 years old (=1); selection of this age group was done on the basis of empirical calculations of the significance of different age groups in the linear model |

- education; the number of years that a respondent has spent in full-time education

| Educ |

- dichotomous variable that select residents of cities and suburbs (=1)

| City |

- dichotomous variable on F32 that selects families with low incomes (first three deciles of family income in the country = 1)

| LowInc |

- availability of social support from surrounding people (as an indicator of personal social network);

| Reciprocity |

F34. If you were in serious financial difficulties and had to borrow money to make ends meet, how difficult or easy would that be? (1 means «very difficult» and 5 means «very easy»)
The mean values of the key institutional and culturally-sensitive parameters for six countries selected for modeling are presented in Table 8. The data illustrates the significant differences between countries with Western European welfare state regimes and post-Socialist states, including Poland, the Russian Federation and Ukraine. In particular, in Ukraine and in Russia the high level of expectations of social support (StatResp) and the high level of support for income redistribution by the state to foster greater material equality between citizens (Equality) are combined both with a low estimate of the risk of the negative effects of social benefits and services that are provided by a state to the economy, and to morality in a society (RiskSS) and with a low estimate of the state utility of social support (BenfSS) as well as with a low appraisal of the effectiveness of the social system in general (SSEval). This mismatch in Ukraine corresponds to the extremely low level of trust in public institutions (Trust).

Table 8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Great Britain</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Russian Federation</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>StatResp</td>
<td>7.23</td>
<td>7.20</td>
<td>7.74</td>
<td>7.76</td>
<td>8.30</td>
<td>8.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RiskSS</td>
<td>6.04</td>
<td>5.43</td>
<td>4.95</td>
<td>5.51</td>
<td>4.15</td>
<td>4.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BenfSS</td>
<td>5.27</td>
<td>5.59</td>
<td>6.14</td>
<td>4.93</td>
<td>4.43</td>
<td>4.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSEval</td>
<td>5.75</td>
<td>5.82</td>
<td>6.13</td>
<td>4.68</td>
<td>3.88</td>
<td>3.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>4.58</td>
<td>4.86</td>
<td>5.57</td>
<td>3.31</td>
<td>3.57</td>
<td>1.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality</td>
<td>4.52</td>
<td>4.73</td>
<td>5.02</td>
<td>4.98</td>
<td>5.57</td>
<td>5.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The mismatch in the social attitudes in post-Soviet societies is evidence of the catastrophic shortage of the state in the social sphere during the market transition which resulted in a mass negative experience of the interaction between individuals and the state. The long-term negative social experience led to mass discontent with the state and the public’s alienation from it.

Below, two regression models are described which estimate the influence of different potential factors (see Table 7) on the level of expectation for the social responsibility of governance. The first model includes the variable Employer that was introduced into the model to facilitate investigation of any class cleavage between employers and employees (see Table 9).

According to the class-specific model for all six countries, the strongest factor is the culturally and ideologically based variable ‘individual attitudes towards social justice’ (Equality), which corresponds with the redistribution policy of a state. It is interesting that this factor has more influence in West European societies with different welfare regimes (as well as in Poland) than in post-Soviet countries (especially Ukraine). This finding matches the general conclusion, recently stated by Swallfors and Kulin (2012), that “the links between values and attitudes are generally stronger in more materially secure and privileged classes [and
societies]. However, the relative strength of the associations varies substantially across countries. Where inequality is smaller and poverty less prevalent, the link between values and attitudes becomes less class-specific”.

### Table 9

Class-specific model of citizens’ expectations about the social responsibility of governance in six countries. Standardized OLS regression for each of the six countries. StatResp is a dependent variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Great Britain</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Russian Feder</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RiskSS</td>
<td>-0.094*</td>
<td>-0.120*</td>
<td>-0.100*</td>
<td>-0.111*</td>
<td>-0.164*</td>
<td>-0.140*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BenfSS</td>
<td>0.065*</td>
<td>0.042*</td>
<td>0.135*</td>
<td>0.102*</td>
<td>0.078*</td>
<td>0.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSEval</td>
<td>-0.134*</td>
<td>-0.131*</td>
<td>-0.041</td>
<td>-0.144*</td>
<td>-0.253*</td>
<td>-0.231*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality</td>
<td>0.294*</td>
<td>0.307*</td>
<td>0.320*</td>
<td>0.324*</td>
<td>0.283*</td>
<td>0.115*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>0.066*</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>-0.042</td>
<td>0.071*</td>
<td>-0.094*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employer</td>
<td>-0.049*</td>
<td>-0.017</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.074*</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>-0.101*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* - coefficient is significant at the level $p < 0.05$

A negative assessment of the risk of a welfare state (or negative perceptions about the likely provision of social benefits and services to the economy and morality in a society) – RiskSS – is significant in all countries, but the most influence this factor has in the post-Soviet countries. At the same time, the effect of trust on public institutions (Trust) is much smaller and is significant only in three countries – Ukraine, Great Britain and the Russian Federation. It is interesting that in Ukraine, in contrast to Great Britain and the Russian Federation, the influence of Trust is negative. Concerning class cleavage (Employer), this has a weak effect on expectations about the social responsibility of governance only in Ukraine, Great Britain and Poland: employees have higher expectations about the social responsibility of governance than employers. But in Germany and Sweden, with their stronger social-democratic welfare regimes, the influence of a class cleavage is not significant. In the Russian Federation the link between the class variable and expectations for socially responsible governance are not significant, but tend to be positive. This may be interpreted in terms of their undeveloped social contracts.

The other (‘structural’) explanatory model also includes institutional and cultural factors and is oriented at a wider set of social structure factors, excluding social class. The replacing of the factor ‘class cleavage’ with another set of social structural factors (age, gender, education, income stratification, type of residence and social network) does not significantly increase the explanatory power of the model (see Table 10). The basic structure of the influence of the institutional and cultural factors (which were also included into the first model) remains the same. The model demonstrates an essential nationality-based character. In comparison with the other
structural parameters, only the factor *Education* has a stable and significant influence on social expectations in most countries (except in Ukraine and Sweden): less educated people more strongly call for the social responsibility of governance.

Other structural factors manifested as significant in 1-3 countries. For example, the factor youth (18-25 years old) is more significant in the explanatory model in Poland and has weak significance in Great Britain. In contrast, in Sweden, being older (belonging to an older age group) better (but also weakly) explains social expectations concerning the welfare state. Theoretically, it was expected that there would be more significance given to having a personal social network (*Reciprocity*) in explaining social attitudes to welfare states in post-socialist countries with unstable welfare regimes. But, as a negative factor (decreasing expectations about social support from the state), it was significant for only two western countries – Great Britain and Germany. It is interesting that only in the post-Soviet countries (Ukraine and Russia) was more social support from the state expected by people who dwelled in less urban territories (*City*). The factor economic stratification (income) manifested its significance only in post-socialist countries. In Russia and in Ukraine people with lower incomes expect more social support. The *Gender* factor is significant only in Sweden and Poland where females manifest more desire for social support from governance.

### Table 10

| Structural-specific model of citizens’ expectations about the social responsibility of governance in six countries (without a class variable). Standardized OLS regression for each of the six countries. StatResp is dependent variable |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Great Britain | Germany | Sweden | Poland | Russian Feder. | Ukraine |
| RiskSS | -0.108* | -0.142* | -0.103* | -0.107* | -0.167* | -0.164* |
| BenfSS | 0.079* | 0.052* | 0.140* | 0.099* | 0.062* | 0.000 |
| SSEval | -0.114* | -0.094* | -0.028 | -0.172* | -0.213* | -0.197* |
| Equality | 0.269* | 0.271* | 0.287* | 0.274* | 0.256* | 0.140* |
| Trust | 0.056* | 0.015 | 0.030 | -0.037 | 0.111* | -0.121* |
| Reciprocity | -0.059* | -0.106* | -0.037 | 0.000 | 0.006 | 0.034 |
| EmplType | 0.060* | 0.023 | 0.006 | 0.023 | 0.006 | 0.038 |
| Gender | -0.018 | -0.038 | -0.108* | -0.080* | 0.039 | -0.052 |
| ag_25 | 0.050* | 0.000 | -0.059* | 0.112* | -0.001 | 0.004 |
| Educ | -0.078* | -0.076* | -0.035 | -0.176* | -0.067* | 0.072 |
| City | 0.010 | -0.018 | -0.041 | 0.007 | -0.095* | -0.082* |
| LowInc | 0.041 | 0.035 | -0.003 | -0.065* | 0.069* | 0.108* |
| R² | 0.16 | 0.19 | 0.18 | 0.25 | 0.22 | 0.16 |

* - coefficient is significant at the level $p < 0.05$
Correspondingly, the models are found to be more influential for post-socialist Poland and Russia than for all the other countries, and the influence of the structural model is a little better than the class-specific one for all the countries under scrutiny.

Conclusion and points for discussion

The empirical analyses of the three-dimensional space of social attitudes to welfare regime, as well as the causation model that explains the influence of a complex of factors on social attitudes, lead us to the following conclusions.

First, social attitudes to welfare regime and the social responsibility of a state for individual and family wellbeing manifest themselves clearly in the three-dimensional space of social expectations, assessments, and estimations. The ‘three welfare regimes’ theoretical model clearly describes the differences in attitudes between West European countries like Great Britain, Germany and Sweden. The corresponding tools (indicators and questions) used in ESS Round 4 are sensitive enough for measuring the empirical differences in these models.

Second, social attitudes to the welfare regime diverge significantly when examined using a country comparative perspective. The attitudes (in the analyzed variables) correspond to social macro-parameters of the social quality of societies and the welfare regime state of development. Two types of welfare regimes are distinguished: (1) welfare regimes historically embedded into capitalism, the market and civil society; and, (2) emerging welfare regimes under post-socialist transformation. The empirical analyses of social attitude profiles in Great Britain and Sweden indicate the correspondence with these profiles to the theoretical models of ‘liberal’ and ‘social democratic’ welfare regimes, respectively. However, the social attitude profile of Germany displays somewhat of a shift away from the expected ‘continental’ model toward a more liberal one. This indicates more liberal attitudes and a higher level of personal responsibility for individual and family wellbeing. One can assume that this empirical shift is the aftermath of the essential changes in social policy and welfare regime in Germany in the 2000s (Häusermann, 2010; Butterwegge, 2012).

As was expected theoretically, the empirical profiles of social attitudes towards the welfare state in post-Socialist countries contain substantial mismatches. From the post-Socialist countries examined, only Polish society manifests clear correlation between the indicators of social attitudes and assessment; these indicators also suggest an ‘inclination’ towards a ‘social-democratic’ model of welfare regime. This conclusion does not agree with the placement of Poland in the ‘welfare regimes map’ developed by Ebbinghaus (2012) according to the institutional data for the regimes. One can assume that this inclination is a legacy
of state socialism, and is also related to a decrease in the traumatic stress caused by the market transition in Poland in the 1990s due to appropriate social policy that allowed individuals to adapt better to new market institutions.

Social consciousness in post-Soviet Russian and Ukrainian societies remains more dependent on the paternalistic values and attitudes which dominated late Soviet society. These paternalistic attitudes manifested themselves on a background of an undeveloped sense of individual responsibility and social activity, as well as on the inability of societies to foresee the negative consequences of the welfare state on economic development as well as on the moral and social cohesion of society. The social consciousness of the Ukrainians is rather paradoxical: the very high expectations for the welfare state are combined with the lowest (in a comparative perspective) assessments of the utility of social policy, as well as with the lowest trust in the state, governance and other public institutes. The social attitudes manifested in post-Soviet Ukraine and Russia do not match those underlying any basic European welfare state models. Thus none of the models represented can be rooted in culture and social structure via social political reforms in the foreseeable future.

Thirdly, using the linear regression analysis an empirical model of institutional, cultural, and structural determinants of social attitudes to a welfare regime was justified. One can assert that the social attitudes and expectations of citizens depend essentially on individual interactions between the individual and policy institutes, as well as a social system as whole. The more positive the individual appraisal of the current system of social security and protection (in terms of education, health care and social support during unemployment) are, the lower the expectations for social support from governance. On the other hand, the greater the perceived risk of social policy, the lower the expectation for the social responsibility of governance.

The assumption that level of family income is the most influential factor in determining attitudes to the social responsibility of governance is not justified. Individuals earning an amount which places them in the first three (lowest) deciles of income (LowInc) are more liable to have greater social expectations only in post-Soviet countries like Ukraine and Russia (in Ukraine this effect is more pronounced).

Stratification according to education (Educ) appeared as more or less significant factor in influencing social expectations. Ukraine is an exception where there is no effect of education on social attitudes to the welfare state. One can suppose that individuals of all levels of education in this country experience similar social risks and feel a more or less equal need for social support from the state.
The very high social expectations for a welfare state in combination with very low level of trust in public institutes, as well as a low assessment of the utility of a welfare state are paradoxical characteristics of the post-Soviet countries under study. It is especially in Ukraine that this paradox is most salient and indicates the catastrophic insufficiency of the social responsibility of governance. During the twenty years of post-Soviet development, this insufficiency of governance has not been compensated for by social policy or by the activity of any other agents of social responsibility (e.g. civil society or local communities). Under conditions of social, economic and moral crises in society and rapid changes in social structure and value systems, this weakness of the state leads increasingly to social alienation and produces a deep cleavage in interests between the governing actors and governing elites, on the one hand, and society as a whole, on the other.

One of the unexpected results of our analysis is that class belonging (the employer vs. employee distinction that reflects industrial social cleavage) has a rather low or even insignificant influence on social attitudes to the welfare state. One can assume that this finding reflects the reality of modern capitalism in which capitalists, employers and managers adjust to the welfare state, and the welfare state adjusts to them. Over time, national welfare states become an important part of the institutional matrix that shapes practices at the level of the firm and influences broader efforts at national economic management. If in fact welfare states are deeply integrated into national variants of capitalism it is obvious that employers’ attitudes toward the welfare state will be more complex. This conclusion helps to explain why employers have often been more half-hearted and internally divided over welfare state than many theories of political economy might anticipate.

The popular thesis about social cleavages determining social attitudes is not justified in our study. In Great Britain, with its liberal welfare regime and long-term class-oriented social policy, structural factors empirically manifest themselves only weakly. Even in Sweden, where large-scale public sectors might be expected to generate such structural effects, we are forced to acknowledge that empirical support for the thesis is no more than modest. In an effort to determine if these hypothesized cleavages over the welfare state actually exist in public opinion, Svallfors concludes that public vs. private-sector employment does not seem to constitute a particularly important fault line (1997: 292; 2003). Our analysis also confirms that the differences in social attitudes are seldom statistically significant; they point in different directions according to different indices, sometimes showing, for instance, that public-sector employees are more in favour of redistribution and smaller income gaps than private-sector employees, although it is sometimes the opposite.

In conclusion, let us note that our empirical analysis fixes its gaze on the very unsteady process of welfare development and on searching for fitter forms
of social contracts in different types of European societies. Post-Socialist states are special ‘worlds’ in the wide European space, in which the post-Soviet states are a quite distinct family (Castels & Obinger, 2008: p. 321) of social systems and are constructing their own forms of social order. The development of better models of social responsibility that balance governance, market (family) and civil society using broad cross-class coalitions in support of major reform packages (Häusermann, 2010) and successfully modify their models to meet the social expectations of a country is a challenge both for Western and Eastern European societies. However, it is sure that any such development will not be effective without the humanization of societies, the strengthening of trust in governance and public institutes, the strengthening of the social responsibility of public servants, and without the accumulation of positive interactions between citizens and the state.

References


Kutsenko Olga, Gorbachyk Andrii. Who are responsible for individual wellbeing?
Comparative analysis of mass attitudes in different types of European welfare regimes


SUBJECTIVE RELIABILITY:
THEORY AND MEASUREMENT (*ISR)*

Yevhen Golovakha (Kyiv)
Andriy Gorbachyk (Kyiv)
Tetyana Lubyva (Kyiv)
Natalya Panina (Kyiv)
Viktoriya Sereda (Lviv)
Kseniya Ursulenko (Kyiv)

The paper provides a substantiation of the new procedure named “Index of Subjective Reliability” (ISR) based on a self-estimation of the respondents’ reliability in a survey. The authors define the following components in the concept of subjective reliability, which should be estimated: (1) understanding of an instrument or its part; (2) competence, sufficiency of knowledge to answer the questions; (3) interest in the topic of interview; (4) confidence in the choice of the most appropriate information; (5) stability of one’s own opinion; (6) independence of opinion; (7) possibility to answer sincerely the questions. The authors examine various aspects concerning respondents’ self-estimation of their own reliability revealed in the responses to single questions, sets of questions and to the questionnaire as a whole. The results of questionnaire testing and evaluation in a pilot and large-scale studies are also presented. Approbation of different modifications of the procedure was conducted in 2006-2007. The sample used in these surveys represents the adult population of Ukraine. Analysis of survey results showed that ISR could be regarded not only as a characteristic of instrument (comprehensibility of questionnaire, actuality of research problem for respondents, etc.) but as an indicator for credibility of the information obtained in the social research.

Keywords: index, subjective reliability, validity, response bias, social research, respondents’ self-estimation, questionnaire

* Translated by one of the authors Kseniya Ursulenko from the Ukrainian text “Sub’iektyvna nadijnist’: teoriya ta metod wymiryuvannya (ISN)”, Sotsiolohiya, teoriya, metody, marketynh, 2008, № 1, pp. 166–188.
Sociologists split into two opposition groups long ago. One group worship discourse and narrative, expecting to find a clue to understanding of social reality in their own imagination as well as in free stream of thoughts of other people. The other group are obsessed with the idea of “quantofrenia” and desire to verify the harmony of social order by means of algebra. Both of them have enough reasoning to prove the unsoundness of the opponents. But if for “qualitative sociologists” any criticism is not frightening by definition, as far as, following Protagor, they determine a human, not a number, to be the general criterion, for those who try to measure something in individual or mass consciousness correctly, blaming for inadequacy of measurement is rather annoying. So the experts in methodology and empirical research try to discover new possibilities to validate sociological information presented as quantitative data. Emergence of a correlation, factor and variance analyses supplemented with mathematical apparatus, which is needed for clear definition of biases in sampling studies, appears to be able to provide sufficient reliability of psychological and social measuring, based on scale ratings that are obtained as a result of application of different survey procedures. And if reliability were defined only by characteristics of scales, the essential set of reliability indicators that characterize reproducibility and consistency of data would suffice for identification of the extent of measurement reliability. However, stable and consistent data, obtained while asking questions, “obvious validity” of which evokes no suspicions, quite often turn out to have very little to do with social reality, which a researcher aimed to examine.

This is often connected with unreliability of an individual as an instrument for measurement of his own social characteristics and psychological states. A striking example of unreliability was given by G. Batygin, who conducted a survey among students. He asked them two questions: “Do you often perform immoral acts?” and “Do you often encounter immoral acts?” In the first case, the answer “often” was chosen by 3% of the respondents, in the second case — by 93%. (Batygin, 2000: p. 114-115). Similar result was obtained by Ye. Golovakha and O. Kronik, who asked young people what qualities they personally lacked and people surrounding them. It turned out that respondents themselves mostly lacked firmness, resoluteness and self-confidence, and other people — gentleness, kindness and fairness (Головаха, Панина, 1990: p. 108-111). The matter is that questions associated with morality self-assessment are not reliable because of their sensitivity. However, there are more reasons for unreliability of a person as an instrument of “self-measurement”. Even if the technical instrument of a
survey (a question or an additive scale) is reliable itself, the survey data may be
doubtful because of the personal characteristics, emotional and physical state of
the respondent. In addition, very often unreliability of instruments is determined
by social environment in which the research is conducted. Absolutely reliable
scale elaborated in definite sociocultural conditions can be unreliable regarding
people socialized in other culture. For example, some rates of the Bogardus scale
were unacceptable for many Ukrainians. That is why the adaptation of the scale
to new sociocultural conditions was needed.

The aim of this article is not to review all reliability factors. We confined
ourselves to describing the results of designing the method of “subjective reliability”
measurement based on self-estimation of respondents’ reliability. To attain this goal we
had to:

— Analyze the notion of “reliability” in a number of categories that clarify different
aspects guaranteeing quality and reliability of sociological information.
— Justify a new category “subjective reliability”.
— Build an additive scale for subjective-reliability-index (ISR) and approbate it in
probe researches and mass surveys.

The Reliability Category in Sociology

The reliability category in terms of measuring procedures connected with
collection of sociological data is used in different contexts. Among different definitions
of reliability that could be found in methodological literature, the most compact was
proposed by P. Alrek and R. Settle who consider reliability as freedom from random
errors (contrary to the validity, that is freedom from random errors and systematical
biases in sociological data) (Alreck, Settle, 1985: p. 64). The conclusion of J. Manheim
and R. Rich follows this approach to understanding of reliability, which is accepted
in western literature. They argue that, if in recent studies the measurement was
convincingly validated, we can use it without taking into consideration its reliability
(Мангейм, Рич, 1997: p. 111-112). This position is also supported by Russian
methodologist I. Deviatko, who empathizes that unreliable test cannot be valid but
valid test is always reliable (Девятко, 2003: p. 72). Consequently, if it is possible to
validate the measurement procedure following all the rules and not to worry about
reliability, why do we need reliability as such? There is only one assumption left:
if it is not possible to prove validity of measurement, at least it should be proved
that completely formally it is reliable even if it is not possible to identify what is
measured. Basing on the analogy from the field of sciences popular among social
scientists, we can ask a reasonable question: Why do we need a proper ruler to
measure length if we try to use it for temperature measurement? In other words —
why do we need to define a level of reliability if it has no use without validation and
after adequate validation it is no longer necessary?

The answer to those naïve questions can be obtained if we stretch the meaning
of reliability of measurement and do not to restrict it by characteristics of stability
and reproducibility (correlation between results of repeated measurements) and
consistency (intercorrelation for certain indicators of additive index) — which are very sensible. Let us examine the first kind of reliability connected with stability of the data in the course of time. According to the author of fundamental manual on the design of empirical social research D. Miller, the idea that test-retest index is the best way to measure reliability is widely spread among social researchers.

We can agree that for most psychological measurements characterizing personal features and fundamental attitudes, stability of data in time indicates reliability of measurement. But regarding measurement of psychological states that are variable and sensitive to the measuring situations, test-retest stability is rather an indicator of insensitivity of an instrument than its reliability. Moreover, stability may turn out to be inappropriate in those cases when it is about dynamic opinions, social estimations and preferences, which are studied, as a rule, by sociologists in surveys. Regarding the problem of “reliability — consistency”, this indicator, regardless of the choice of definite statistical procedure (division or correlation of particular variables with additive index), is related directly to validity of measurement (convergent validity), as far as correlations in these cases show that those variables measure the same phenomena from different perspectives. The above-mentioned Miller does not consider consistency (homogeneity) to be the feature of reliability. He defines it as a self-sufficient criterion of scale evaluation. But the spreading interpretation of reliability brings additional misunderstanding in the systems of notions that relate to the evaluation of quality of sociological information. Likewise, in the “Sociologist’s Working Book” which was intended to be the reference book of a sociologist-empiricist, stability of information was not the only part of reliable measurement, but also “rightfulness and reasonableness”. Reasoning of the reliability implied revealing systematical biases. In general, the process of validation represents a special case for proving reliability measurement (Рабочая книга социолога, 1976: p. 233-235). Such understanding of category of reliability in the Soviet sociology is connected with G. Saganenko’s and V. Volovych’s works (Волович, 1976; Саганенко, 1979). The same position is supported by the prominent Ukrainian sociologist V. Paniotto in his “Sociological Manual” where he defines validity as one of the main elements of reliability of sociological information (Паниотто, 1990: p.195).

Contradictory approaches to the definitions of reliability and validity lead to incertitude in understanding of what should be reliable: the procedure of measurement, the instrument (the scale) or the data obtained as a result of measurement. In methodological literature and manuals one can find all three interpretations of the term “reliability” or concentration on one or two its interpretations. In general, the controversy of understanding of the reliability category has a long history. In the middle of the last century Robert Merton appealed to European sociologists to pay more attention to reliability. He used this term regarding to the researching process and data analyses (Merton, 1964: pp. 449-453). Modern authors of some sociological dictionaries imply that reliability characterizes the collected data, instruments as well as procedure of measurement (Jary, Jary, 1991: p. 413; Marshall, 1998: p. 562). At the same time, according to some recent dictionaries of sociology, the matter concerns only the reliability of instrument (test, scale, etc.) (Abercrombie, 1994: p. 258; Jonson, 2000: p. 356).
As to Russian sociological literature, the authors contribute to terminological confusion while translating the term of reliability as “credibility” (Лоусон, Гэррод, 2000: p. 106). As a result, the definition of reliability in Russian translation of dictionary of D. Jary and J. Jary assumes absolutely inappropriate nature. It is assumed that credibility is reliability of either collected data or testing, evaluation of its collecting (Джери Дж., Джери Дж., 1999: p. 194). The wordplay that is not in compliance with the rules of the Russian language in this particular case very definitely reflects the common situation with the definition of reliability in the domestic methodological literature. For instance, V. Yadov, describing this situation, said that there was no common view in interpretation of the “reliability” term of sociological information. In his opinion, the main reason is that some authors understand the term “reliability” widely as a quality of entire research and its results consequently; and others, contrary to this point, consider reliability to be one or another way of its manifestation (e.g., stability of data, its adequacy to the aim of research, etc.). In strict sense, reliability of measuring should be related to the instrument of measuring but not to the data. With respect to data as well as to final conclusions of research it is more correct to say that they are credible (or relatively credible) (Ядов, 1987: p. 76). There are hardly any reasons not to support the position of the Russian sociologist in the issue of division between the categories of credibility of data and reliability of instrument of measurement. This position gives an opportunity to separate reliability from validity and credibility in such a manner: instrument of measurement (indicator, additive scale, test, etc.) should be reliable, procedure of measurement at all stages of research (including elaboration of instrument) should be valid and collected data should be credible.

Substantiation of the Subjective Reliability Concept

However, with such understanding of relation between categories of credibility, validity and reliability, there still exists the problem of the self-reliant meaning of reliability as far as creation of reliable instrument for unreasonable measurements has no sense and is even harmful (significant resources providing reliability could be wasted to obtain incredible data). It is not surprising that J.P. Robinson and P.R. Shaver, the authors of the fundamental manual about measurement of social attitudes, define reliability as one of the most vague terms of psychometrics (Robinson, Shaver, Wrightsman, 1991: p. 10). This happens mostly because the instrument of measurement in social research is often elaborated technically as a scale while the person who marks his opinions and estimations on this scale is an instrument (of measurement) himself even if it is very specific. We cannot say that this problem is not discussed. There are works investigating this problem. S.D. Khaitun concludes that in sociological or psychological measurement person is used directly as a “device” while being a respondent or an expert (Хайтун, 2005: p. 23). He implies that because of the human nature of this device weak reproducibility manifests itself in the results of social measurement of indicator value. It results in a number of problems concerning objective indicators of stability and consistency of data. But the human’s disadvantages from the point of reliability of measurement may be partially
compensated for by the unique capability of a person to estimate his own reliability. If the subjective estimations confirm objective indicators of reliability, there are additional grounds to state that the measurement was conducted with reliable instrument. This approach to understanding and measuring of reliability considers elaboration of methodological procedure that enables respondent to estimate his reliability in the course of interview. Of course, for a sociologist oriented on sample researches the question of reliability of respondent may seem an additional problem as far as any respondent, even if he is “reliable”, should have the same probability to be a part of the sample as an “unreliable” respondent. However, the necessity of subjective reliability measurement is caused not by the perspective to choose “needed respondents”, but by the possibility to create and correct questions, scales and tests that will give an opportunity to maximum possible amount of respondents to feel their self-reliability in the role of respondents.

It is commonly known that the credibility of sociological information received in surveys is greatly influenced by the factors which are connected with a respondent: his knowledge, will to cooperate, correct understanding of questions, ability to concentrate on tasks, to separate himself from obstacles and influence of people around him. The range of procedures was elaborated to find out particular indicators of the “reliability of a person” when he is a respondent. Tradition of studies of a respondent’s competence on the topic of research begins in 1950-ies when the Gallup funnel was invented. Then, the question filters were defined for a respondent’s reliability as a device able to produce formed opinion but not spontaneous reactions to the form or situation of an interview. It has become customary to survey services and academic centers (Оссовський, 1998: p. 42).

The special attention in methodical literature was paid to the usage of control questions, which in changed formulation hiding their original sense, are aimed to check the respondent’s sincerity (Рукавишников, Паниотто, Чурилов, 1984: p. 85). The level of sincerity of a respondent’s answers is examined on the basis of the non-response analyses (Назарова, 1999) or using the expert evaluation (Мятков, 2002). The latter method implies the estimation of a respondent’s reaction to the questions by interviewer: his freedom or tension while answering the questions, interest in the topic of the interview, his attitude to the situation of interview, etc. Expert methods are used not only to define the sincerity of a respondent, but also to estimate his interest and independence (from an interviewer’s hints) (Поросн, 1985: p. 98-99). Sometimes, the method of combined verification of a respondent’s competence is used. The main sense is that expert evaluations of interviewers are compared with the self-estimation of respondents (Manfield, 1971: p. 630).

Existence of knowledge necessary for answering the questions of interview is defined not only through questions-filters, but indirectly as well — basing on a denial answer to the question and choosing variants “I cannot answer”, “I don’t know”, “I am not interested”. “Opinionation index” can serve as an example that was counted for each respondent as a sum of his answers to the questions of questionnaire. This index correlates with the level of education of a respondent (Gergen, Back, 1966: p. 388).

The other strategy to verify the level of reliability of respondents includes the so-called questions about questions. They are used in sociology to estimate sincerity,
stability and adequacy of a respondent’s answers, sensitivity of questions, a respondent’s fatigue in the course of interview, etc. For instance, the respondents were asked to answer the same questions in two-three weeks after interviews. For the first time they were asked to answer with maximum sincerity (for themselves), later — as if they were not sure about confidentiality of the questions or they did not trust the interviewer (Мягков, 2001: p. 93). “Questions about questions” are especially popular in those cases, when the peculiarities of a respondent’s perception of sensitive questions are examined, that is, the questions about such topics, which may evoke embarrassment or negative reactions of the respondent (Bradburn, Sudman, Blair, Stoking, 1978: p. 224).

L. Sharp and J. Frankel used the set of questions to assess how much the Annual Housing Survey exhausts and fatigues the respondents. They distinguish two types of indicators of a respondent’s disinterest or tension: objective, which were recorded by the interviewer (number of the interrupted interviews, refusals to answer, choosing the response category “don’t know”, etc.) and subjective, which actually were questions about interview to be answered by respondents. On the basis of subjective indicators the interest of respondents to the interview was defined, as well as easiness of filling out a questionnaire, satisfaction with the interview, importance of the interview, etc. (Sharp, Frankel, 1983: p. 43). C. Cannel and M. Axelrod examined reactions of respondents to the interview in terms of accuracy of reported information. The research was held in such a way that after the interview a letter with 10 questions about communication with an interviewer was send to every respondent. Among these questions, there were: How interesting was the interview? Would you participate in the interview once again in future? Do you think that the questions in the questionnaire were too personal? etc. (Cannel, Axelrod, 1956).

One of the most considerable problems that are indirectly connected with reliability of survey results is that it is necessary to generalize individual experiences of certain respondents in the formulation of questions and to adjust them to the experience of large social groups. More generally, it is the problem of excessive generalization. Consequently, the experience of those marginalized social elements (persons or groups) is likely to be lost because their existence is “not noticed” against the background of macrosocial processes and official ideologies. The reason for it is that life experience of such elements is considered to be either insignificant or “inaccessible” for social research. Ability to hear the voice of marginalized groups (for example, ethnic or religious minorities) requires additional skills and forces from researcher and interviewer, as far as the experience of the members of such groups can hardly be included in general terminology or formalized questionnaire. The research process on the experience of marginalized groups includes such strategies of “listening” (that is special behavior of interviewer, methods of interview, formulation of questions) that enable to “hear” the answers of those who were deprived of their voice and who had to tell about their experience in the “language” of dominant group. However, a respondent may have not a good command of this language or there may be no means to articulate the suppressed experience of this person. This kind of research includes the analysis of frames that are formed by the researcher while defining the subject of scientific research and taking into account relevant difficulties as
well as matching the explanation models used by respondent and interviewer. These assumptions allow us to argue that there is a need to introduce a possibility for respondents to report about the problems they face during the interview. Test of subjective reliability can represent such a strategy. It can show not only the formal “unreliability” of a respondent (or some category of respondents) but also draw attention of a researcher to those problems that make the answers of some respondents unreliable due to their membership in marginalized groups.

Even if a sociologist succeeded to “hear” and describe the experience of marginalized groups, another problem arises: how to “translate” this experience into the language of scientific community? This is done by processing data, including coding, modeling, analysis and “montage” of results into scientific text taking into consideration that this text may be read by a wider audience. R. Hahn suggests that important preconditions of reliable results are: 1) using such questions about which every respondent is competent; 2) additional instrument, which gives an opportunity to define variations from person to person in each question (Hahn, 1990).

Another problem connected with subjective factors of subjective reliability is the inability of a respondent to answer correctly the question of the questionnaire. For example, when it is difficult to estimate the discussed phenomenon or when a person is incompetent in a problem and does not want to show it. The level of perception, reflection and sociocultural competence of a respondent may also influence his capabilities to formulate adequate answer. For example, American sociologist P. Blumstein found connection between the probability of concurrency of moral estimation of a certain activity and stereotype attribution of these actions to definite actors (Blumstein, 1973).

He corroborates a hypothesis, which states that immoral behavior of a “good” person gains more negative appraisal than immoral behavior of a “bad” one, and vice versa. So, estimation of the same behavior of different actors or social groups may cause significant differences in answers. However, describing the problem, the author lacks for explanations how sociologist may take into account such phenomena in analysis of the reliability of obtained data.

Another procedural problem that may affect reliability and consequently, should be taken into account by sociologists is motivation of a respondent to participate in the interview. R. Hahn suggests that the interview can be called successful if the participant is really interested in it. Sociologist should take into consideration different motives of participation in the interview, as far as they can cause differences in answers to the questions (Hahn, 1990).

R. Hahn proposes to replace standard questionnaire by a recorded interview-questionnaire in a form of a simple conversation. He suggests that researchers should pay more attention to “anthropology of communication” and use the technique of “thinking loudly about answer” during an interview. He supposes that such a method helps sociologists to understand difficulties in comprehending questions and in responses of respondents. However, this approach implies another problem - how to record these reflections of respondents and how to process and use obtained information in further researches?

M. Litvin proposes another strategy. He describes Shuman’s method in his work “How to Measure Survey Reliability and Validity?” (Litwin, 1995:}
This procedure represents using open follow-ups in randomized probing (an interviewer selects questions by chance). Sometimes researcher defines respondents or certain categories of the respondents who should answer additive qualifying questions, such as:

— Could you please tell me what your answer meant?
— Could you please tell what you were thinking about while answering the question?
— Could you please give an example?

Such probing gives an opportunity to find problematic questions and to define a group of people for whom the question was difficult to understand, that is, difficult to answer. This method helps to process and interpret obtained information.

At this stage we would like to summarize that the main idea of recent literature reviewed in this article is that a sociological research is conducted in regular interaction and communication between sociologist on the one side, and those individuals and groups that are in the focus of his attention on the other. At the stage of instrument elaboration a sociologist should constantly compare his theoretic-methodological scheme of measurement of the phenomenon with the subjective world of respondents. Imaginary dialog with respondents helps to work out a relevant instrument, which will be clearer and more open for respondent. This influences the accuracy of measurement of a social phenomenon. Nevertheless, while estimating reliability of the research, respondents and their thoughts are often not taken into account by the researcher. This blunder generates a need to include one more criterion in the estimation of reliability: to consider an opinion of a respondent, his subjective perception of objective phenomena. Supplementing this with skills of a sociologist to translate the opinion of a respondent into the language of sociological methodology allows providing what we call “subjective reliability”.

In scientific literature containing special estimations of respondents concerning interview, a great role belongs to the method of the “self-estimation of reliability”. The point of this method is that the respondent defines the level of self-competence, interest and readiness to cooperate with sociologists. But till now there is no procedure, which allows getting integral value of estimation of the phenomenon, which we propose to call “subjective reliability”, and which implies a respondent’s integral estimation of himself as a source of reliable information.

Review of the recent literature and generalization of great experience in social surveys allow us to define the following components in the concept of subjective reliability, which should be estimated: (1) understanding of an instrument or its part; (2) competence, sufficiency of knowledge to answer the questions; (3) interest in the topic of interview; (4) confidence in choice of the most appropriate answer from the whole number of answers to the question; (5) stability of one’s own opinion; (6) independence of opinion; (7) possibility to answer sincerely the questions. We assume that the measurement of the concept of subject-reliability is possible with regard to single questions, blocks of questions or the instrument as a whole.

Possibility of construction of the additive index of subjective reliability, which includes all mentioned dimensions, is grounded on the hypothesis, that if
a person has a responsible approach to the fulfillment of the task (interview, for example, is a voluntary fulfillment of tasks of an interviewer), he will find some interest in this task, try to mobilize his knowledge and skills, bring independence of judgments, concentrate on the task to such an extent to be sure in his answers at a certain moment (if the interview is repeated again). This hypothesis was a basis for construction of the index of subjective reliability (ISR). We checked this hypothesis during the pretest of our procedure, which was conducted in course of interview with 100 respondents having different levels of education (from elementary to higher), equal quotes of sex distribution and age adequate to distributions in population. For the pretest, two substantial questions were chosen: about self-identification and geopolitical attitudes. The scale to measure every component of subjective reliability concept was elaborated supplementary (see Appendix 1). The instrument of pre-test research included “lie scale” (L-scale) from the MMPI questionnaire. We assumed that the absence of significant correlations between values of L-scale and values of ISR may be an evidence for the fact that subjective reliability is a special indicator, which shows not the intentions of a respondent to demonstrate some level of “social desirability” but his possibility to estimate his self-reliability as a respondent.

Results of the pretest showed that Cronbach’s α for the additive ISR equals to 0.8 which we considered to be an argument for the construction of an integral index. Approbation of different modifications of the procedure for subjective reliability measurement was conducted in 2006-2007 as part of polls “Omnibus-2006” and “Omnibus-2007” that were launched by the Institute of Sociology of NAS in Ukraine and Center for Social and Political Investigations “SOCIS”. We used multistage random sample with quota selection at the last stage, which represents the adult population of Ukraine (above 18 years old) regarding sex, age and level of education. Sample size in each survey was 1800 persons.

**Construction and Statistical Analysis of the Index of Subjective Reliability (ISR)**

The questionnaire of 2006 included a block of questions about self-estimation of respondents concerning two rather different questions that had been used in pilot research (pretest). After each question respondents were asked to answer seven questions of the procedure for measurement of subjective reliability. Grounding on the answers of respondents, two blocks of dichotomic variables were constructed. One block measured the components of subjective reliability concerning the first question — about self-identification, and another block — about foreign policy orientations. Both blocks appeared to be rather consistent internally, which was a ground for construction of relevant indices (as a sum of dichotomic values for each block). Both blocks are characterized by the same value of Alpha (0.79). This value is high enough not only to be sure that there is a sufficient level of internal consistency but also to provide an opportunity to regard subjective reliability as a concept, in this case, concerning two substantial
questions. It is noticeable that the Alpha index is the same for both instruments of measurement, although the questions, about which ISR was measured, are absolutely different in a number of characteristics (subject; number of answer variants; difficulty, etc.). It is also remarkable that two indices of $ISR_1$ (indicator for the question about self-identification) and $ISR_2$ (indicator for the question about foreign policy orientations) highly correlate with each other: Pearson’s $r_{12} = 0.80$. This result confirms the statement that subjective reliability is not connected with a single definite question of the questionnaire.

Procedure is constructed in such a way that every question concerns both substantial questions: about self-identification and about foreign policy orientations. Analysis of estimation distributions shows that the majority of respondents (from 90% to 98%) estimate equally both questions. E.g., 91.5% of respondents estimated the difficulty in comprehension of both questions as the same, 93% — sufficiency of knowledge to answer both questions, 93% — interest in these questions. The fact that a respondent estimates simultaneously two questions can also serve as a ground for definition of correlations between values. That is why it is necessary to explore in what extent estimations of questions or blocks of questions that are hardly connected by meaning correlate with each other.

In 2006 the questionnaire included the block of questions concerning attitudes to NATO and questions measuring subjective reliability regarding this block of questions. The scale for measurement of subjective reliability in this case resembled a Likert scale (see Appendix 2). Self-estimations enabled to find values of ISR for the block of thematically related questions. Results of self-estimation had a high level of consistency (Alpha = 0.78). At this stage we computed additive index of subjective reliability for block of questions — $ISR_3$. Indicator $ISR_3$ correlates significantly with earlier constructed indicators $ISR_1 (r_{13} = 0.54)$ and $ISR_2 (r_{23} = 0.57)$. This, however, is a considerably lower correlation than the one between $ISR_1$ and $ISR_2$ (see above). These results could suggest that the increasing of “distance” between questions has a negative influence on the correlation of ISR for these questions. As far as the correlation between indicators of ISR for different questions (even for close ones) is not constant, we may preliminarily conclude that ISR characterizes not only a respondent but also the features of an instrument. In other words, the value of ISR is dependent not only on respondent but also on the instrument in the survey.

We have additionally examined the relationship between ISR and refusals of respondents to give a definite answer (choice of “don’t know” response). It is logically to assume that such an uncertain response is connected with low subjective reliability.

The list of answers to the question about foreign policy orientations included “I don’t know” answer, which was chosen almost by 11% of respondents. Results of the single factor analysis of variance show that the level of subjective reliability is significantly lower in the group of respondents who have chosen “I don’t know” answer to the question in comparison to other respondents (see Table 1). Within other groups, there are no significant differences in mean values of ISR, except the groups of respondents who support strengthening of relationships with CIS and the Alliance of East Slavs.
The mean values of ISR for the groups of respondents who answered the question “Which way for the development of Ukraine do you support?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>List of answers</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Mean ISR1</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
<th>Mean ISR2</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
<th>Mean ISR3</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First of all, to extend relationships within CIS</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>6.09</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>5.88</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>5.31</td>
<td>1.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To develop relationship mainly with Russia</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>5.83</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>5.21</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First and foremost, to strengthen the Alliance of East Slavs (Ukraine, Russia, Belarus)</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>6.28</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>6.28</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>5.54</td>
<td>1.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First of all, to establish relationships with developed western countries</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>6.36</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>6.10</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>5.45</td>
<td>1.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To rely on own resources and strengthen independence</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>6.10</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>5.99</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>5.25</td>
<td>1.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different regions of Ukraine should choose their own way</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>5.26</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>5.11</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>4.98</td>
<td>1.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>6.17</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>5.64</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don’t know</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>4.64</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>1.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1792</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>5.99</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>5.26</td>
<td>1.42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Similar results were obtained regarding ISR₁ and ISR₃ relative to other parts of the questionnaire (correspondingly, question about self-identification and block of questions about NATO). As Table 1 shows, the group of respondents who avoided answering the question about external political orientations was characterized by the lowest value of ISR for both substantial questions and block of questions. The respondents who chose “I don’t know” answer to the question about external political orientations, had the lowest values just of the ISR₂. In general, the mean value of ISR₂ was higher than the mean value of ISR₃. We made such comparison of means in the groups of respondents who chose the same answer to the question about NATO. As a result, the lowest values of all three indicators of ISR belonged to the respondents who hesitated to answer. The difference was better observed concerning values of ISR₃ in the case of answering questions about NATO. The results described above show clear and consistent evidence of relationship between uncertainty in answers and level of subjective reliability. Those who try to avoid answering question are characterized by lower values of ISR.
We investigated relationship between $ISR_3$ and number of choices of the response “I don’t know” in the block of questions about NATO. Considerably the high value of negative correlation ($r = -0.53$) shows that within the block of questions subjective reliability is associated with the choice of such variant of response as well. So, the higher subjective reliability is, the fewer intentions has a respondent to avoid a direct answer.

As it has been mentioned, we have three measurements of $ISR$: two — for separate substantial questions and one — for block of questions. All three measurements correlate with each other. This allows us to assume the existence of the subjective reliability concept irrelatively to form or sense of a single question and to measure it. Three correlated measures suffice to build a factor using factor analysis (principal components analysis method). The factor that appears as a result describes 76% of total variance (see Table 2).

**Table 2**  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>F1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ISR1</td>
<td>0.903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISR2</td>
<td>0.916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISR3</td>
<td>0.790</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The factor accumulates a considerable part of total variance for three measurements of subjective reliability. We evaluate it as an additional evidence for possibility of its consideration as an integral index, which is not connected with separate question or block of questions. On the other hand, this factor highly correlates with a simple sum of all three measurements of $ISR$, on the basis of which the factor was built ($r = 0.96$). Therewith, the whole range of indicators used for the construction of $ISR$ (14 dichotomy indicators and 7 indicators measured with the help of 5-point scale) is rather highly inherently consistent (Alpha for all complex of indicators = 0.85). All these reflections enable us to suggest that simple sum of three measurements of subjective reliability gives the same result as integral index, which is not connected with definite question or block of questions in questionnaire. Using simple linear transformations, we obtained an index with values range from 1 to 5 (higher value of index means higher confidence of respondent in his/her answers, as well as higher level of subjective reliability of a respondent as a source of information in social research).

Up to the present time, there is no experience in using this instrument (to discuss a dynamic of changes), consequently, we have no criteria for the constructed $ISR$. Our interpretations of index values could be based only on its distributions.

For the survey data in 2006 the mean value of the integral index was 4.22. Confidence interval is rather narrow (for confidence probability 0.95 it is $4.22 \pm 0.03$). Median value of index equals to 4.33 (half of the sample has lower value of the index and the other half — higher). Distribution of index values is skewed to the right (see Table 3).
Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decile 1</th>
<th>Decile2</th>
<th>Decile3</th>
<th>Decile4</th>
<th>Decile5</th>
<th>Decile6</th>
<th>Decile7</th>
<th>Decile8</th>
<th>Decile9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.29</td>
<td>3.67</td>
<td>3.95</td>
<td>4.14</td>
<td>4.33</td>
<td>4.52</td>
<td>4.71</td>
<td>4.81</td>
<td>5.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As we have mentioned before, sociological instrument in 2006 included L-scale from the MMPI questionnaire. Indicator of reliability for this scale is rather high (Alpha = 0.76). The index of “lie” has no statistically significant correlations with measured values of subjective reliability. We interpret this fact as an evidence for existence of the ISR concept, which differs substantially from the phenomenon that L-scale aims to measure.

ISR that was constructed while focusing on the data of “Omnibus-2006” has the following characteristics:

— There is no relationship between age of a respondent and level of subjective reliability ($r = -0.03$ and is not statistically significant on the level $p < 0.05$).

— The respondents who had higher levels of education showed commonly higher level of subjective reliability. ISR correlates positively with education of respondents ($r = 0.14$, $p < 0.01$).

— Respondents with higher level of income have higher values of ISR ($r = 0.1$, $p < 0.01$).

— Townspeople demonstrate higher level of subjective reliability in comparison with country people. Mean values of index differ significantly between appropriate groups on the level $p < 0.05$.

— Employed respondents have higher values of ISR than unemployed. Mean values of index differ significantly between corresponding groups on the level $p < 0.05$.

As for the subjective reliability concerning whole questionnaire, we also provided the analysis of non-response while choosing the answer “I don’t know” and refusals to answer the questions. This indicator characterizes difficulty of the questionnaire for respondent. The more answers a respondent avoids, the more difficult the questionnaire is. This difficulty may be caused by the topic of an interview, absence of one’s own opinion or lack of information about this topic, with inappropriate formulating of a question (too difficult, incomprehensible, etc.). If a respondent adequately estimates the difficulty of a questionnaire, there must be a relationship between his estimation of subjective reliability and difficulty of question or the whole questionnaire. This correlation was revealed in the data of 2006 ($r = 0.39$). In the survey “Omnibus-2007” we tackled the central problem of evaluation of subjective reliability of the whole questionnaire. The final part of the questionnaire included 6 questions that measured principal elements of the subjective reliability concept on the dichotomic level. These elements are: comprehensibility of questions, sufficiency of knowledge to answer questions, interest in the topic of interview, completeness of the range of answers, self-estimation of stability of one’s own opinion, self-estimation of independency of the opinion from people around (see Appendix 3). These six dichotomic variables
turned out to be rather consistent (Alpha = 0.68) to construct appropriate index on the basis of these indicators.

Using simple mathematical transformations, we obtained an index with range of values from 1 to 5, similar to the index described above.

Most questions from the questionnaire of 2007 are not the same as in 2006. But regarding the number of questions, difficulty of formulations and diversity of topics, these two instruments are very similar. Likewise, non-response analysis shows that these questionnaires are very similar in the number of refusals to answer and choosing “I don’t know” variant. In the data of 2007 the correlation between subjective reliability and difficulty of questions ($r = 0.35$) hardly differs from correlation between the same variables in the survey of 2006 ($r = 0.39$).

Both surveys were conducted on the basis of a similar sample. Even though in 2007 subjective reliability was measured with another procedure, the results of measurement in two questionnaires similar by their structure and difficulty were alike. Confidence interval for the mean value of ISR in the research of 2007 (confidence probability: $p < 0.95$, confidence interval: $4.26 \pm 0.04$) is rather similar to the confidence interval in the research of 2006. In 2006 and 2007 different people were interviewed, but the structure of sample is analogous in socio-demographical parameters. This fact allows us to assume that ISR is connected not with psychological features of individuals but with their social characteristics. For example, in the data of the “Omnibus-2007” ISR correlates with education of respondents ($r = 0.22$, $p < 0.01$) and the level of their income ($r = 0.12$, $p < 0.05$), as we have shown before on the data of 2006. Data analysis finds that in 2007, as well as in 2006, townspeople demonstrated higher level of subjective reliability in comparison with country people and employed respondents had higher values of ISR than unemployed.

We argue that two similar measures of the same concept in two similar questionnaires may be considered as an argument for reliability of constructed instruments and stability of ISR. The study of relationships between indices allows us to formulate a hypothesis about the structure of ISR. We imply that it is composed of two dimensions: 1) dimension connected with social characteristics of a respondent; 2) dimension concerning problem of research and peculiarities of the instrument of research. To test this hypothesis, it is necessary to provide further experiments. The problem of taking subjective reliability into consideration during the stage of data interpretation is also of theoretical and practical interest. For example, the methods of construction and using of special indicators of weight in the analysis can be elaborated with the aim to characterize subjective reliability of respondents concerning a single question or the questionnaire as a whole.

Subsequent methodological studies should be undertaken to provide methodological advantage of the measurement of subjective reliability. Growing experience in using such instruments would allow specifying the meaning of the concept of subjective reliability and, on the other side, to interpret more distinctly the intervals of the index values. Finally, ISR could be regarded not only as a characteristic of instrument (comprehensibility of questionnaire, actuality of research problem for respondents, etc.) but also as an indicator for credibility of information obtained in the process of a social research.
Appendix 1

1. Who do you consider yourself to be first of all? (Note one, the most appropriate variant of the answer)
   1 — A country-dweller, dweller of the district or town (city) where you live.
   2 — A dweller of the region (oblast or several oblasts) where you live.
   3 — A citizen of Ukraine.
   4 — A representative of the former Soviet Union.
   5 — A citizen of the former Soviet Union.
   6 — A citizen of the world.
   7 — Other (please write) __________________________________________

2. Which way for the development of Ukraine do you support? (Note one the most appropriate variant of the answer)
   1 — First of all, to extend relationships within CIS.
   2 — To develop relationship mainly with Russia.
   3 — First and foremost, to strengthen the Alliance of East Slavs (Ukraine, Russia, Belarus).
   4 — First of all, to establish relationships with developed western countries.
   5 — To rely on own resources and strengthen independence.
   6 — Different regions of Ukraine should choose their own way.
   7 — Other (please write) __________________________________________
   8 — I don’t know.

To help us improve the wording of our questions from here, please answer the following questions:

1. Can you say that you have comprehended the meaning of the above questions (No. 1 and No. 2)?
   1 — The meaning of the both questions is absolutely clear to me.
   2 — Only the meaning of the first question is clear (the second one is not completely clear).
   3 — Only the meaning of the second question is clear (the first one is not completely clear).
   4 — The meaning of the both questions was not absolutely clear.

2. Do you think you have enough knowledge to answer these questions?
   1 — My knowledge is enough to answer both questions.
   2 — My knowledge is enough to answer the first question (it is insufficient to answer the second one).
   3 — My knowledge is enough to answer the second question (it is insufficient to answer the first one).
   4 — My knowledge is not enough to answer both questions.

3. Can you say that it was interesting for you to answer these questions?
   1 — Answering both questions was interesting to me.
   2 — Only the first question was interesting.
   3 — Only the second question was interesting.
   4 — I did not feel any interest while answering.

1 Translated by Ol’ha Maksymenko.
4. Are you sure that you have chosen the answer reflecting your opinion best of all?
   
   1 — I am sure of the both answers.
   2 — I am sure only of the answer to the first question (I am not sure about the second one).
   3 — I am sure only of the answer to the second question (I am not sure about the first one).
   4 — I am not sure about the answers to both questions.

5. Can you say that your answers to these questions will not change if you are asked in several days?
   
   1 — I am sure that my opinion on the both questions will not change.
   2 — I am sure that my answer only to the first question will not change (the answer to the second one will change).
   3 — I am sure that my answer only to the second question will not change.
   4 — I am not sure whether my answers to the questions change or not.

6. Can you say that nobody of your surroundings had any influence on your opinion while answering the questions?
   
   1 — Nobody had any influence on my opinion when I was answering the questions.
   2 — Nobody had any influence on my opinion when I was answering the first question (I felt influence answering the second question).
   3 — Nobody had influence on my opinion when I was answering the second question (I felt some influence answering the first question).
   4 — Answering both questions I felt the influence of my surroundings.

7. Are there any circumstances that could prevent you from frankly answering these questions?
   
   1 — There were no such circumstances when I was answering both questions.
   2 — There were such circumstances when I was answering the first question (they were absent when I was answering the second one).
   3 — There were such circumstances when I was answering the second question (they were absent when I was answering the first one).
   4 — There were such circumstances when I was answering the both questions.

Appendix 2

1. What is your attitude to Ukraine’s entering NATO?
   
   1 — It is rather negative.
   2 — It is a difficult question.
   3 — It is rather positive.

2. Why do you support (do not support) Ukraine’s accession to NATO? (Note all appropriate variants of the answer).
   
   1 — It can bring economic advantages to Ukraine.
   2 — Ukraine’s membership in NATO will lead to additional state expenditures.
3. What is NATO in your opinion? *(Note only one variant of the answer).*
1 — A defensive unit.
2 — An aggressive military unit.
3 — A peacemaking organization.
4 — Other *(please write)* ________________________________
5 — I don’t know.

4. Would NATO defend Ukraine in case of aggression or aggressive threat on the part of a foreign state?
1 — It would be in any case.
2 — Yes, if we were NATO members.
3 — No, it would not.
4 — I don’t know.

*To help us improve the wording of our questions, answer the following questions, please:*

1. Tell us please, was it absolutely clear to you the meaning of the questions about NATO as a whole (No. 1–4):
   1 — The meaning of these questions was absolutely clear to me.
   2 — The meaning of these questions is rather clear.
   3 — It is difficult to say, whether it is clear or unclear to me.
   4 — The meaning of the questions is not quite clear.
   5 — It is not clear at all.

2. Was it interesting to you to answer these questions?
1 — Yes, it was.
2 — It was rather interesting.
3 — It is difficult to say whether it is interesting or not.
4 — It was rather uninteresting.
5 — It was not interesting.

3. Do you think you have enough information to answer these questions?
1 — I have enough information.
2 — Information that I have is rather sufficient.
3 — It is difficult to say whether it is sufficient or not.
4 — It is rather insufficient.
5 — It is not sufficient at all.
4. Are you sure or not that the answers you have chosen reflect your opinion in the best way?
   1 — I am absolutely sure.
   2 — I am rather sure.
   3 — It is difficult to say, whether I am sure or not.
   4 — I am rather unsure.
   5 — I am not sure at all.

5. Do you think your answers to the questions about NATO will change if you are asked in several days?
   1 — They will not change.
   2 — They will remain rather unchanged.
   3 — It is difficult to say whether they will change or not.
   4 — They are likely to change.
   5 — They will change.

6. Do you think your surroundings influenced your opinion when you were answering the questions?
   1 — They had no influence on me.
   2 — They almost had no influence on me.
   3 — It is difficult to say whether they had any influence on me or not.
   4 — They quite had some influence on me.
   5 — They did influence me.

7. Are there any circumstances that could prevent you from answering these questions frankly?
   1 — Such circumstances exist.
   2 — More likely YES that No.
   3 — It is difficult to say whether they exist or not.
   4 — Very unlikely
   5 — There are no such circumstances.

Appendix 3

1. Can you say that the meaning of most questions was clear to you?
   1 — The meaning of the most questions of the questionnaire is completely clear to me.
   2 — I cannot say that the meaning of the most questions of the questionnaire is clear to me.

2. Do you think you have sufficient knowledge for answering most questions of the questionnaire?
   1 — I have sufficient knowledge for answering most questions.
   2 — I cannot say that I have sufficient knowledge for answering most questions.

3. Can you say that you answered most questions with interest?
   1 — I answered most questions with interest.
   2 — I cannot say that I answered most questions with interest.
4. Are you sure that you have managed to choose answers to most questions which reflect your opinion in the best way?

1 — I am sure.
2 — I am not sure.

5. Can you say that your answers to the same questions would change in several days?

1 — My opinion concerning most questions would not change.
2 — My opinion concerning most questions would change.

6. Can you say that nobody of your surroundings had influence on your answers to the asked questions?

1 — Nobody had any influence on my answers.
2 — Yes, some people of my surroundings had influence on my answers.

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SOCIOLOGY IN TIMES OF CRISIS AND WAR: PROBLEM OF THE METHODOLOGICAL EFFICIENCY

Illya Kononov (Starobilsk)

The article studies the Ukrainian crisis and the war in Donbas which are considered as challenges faced by sociology. In the first place, they arose as problems facing the Ukrainian sociological community. The answer to the problems was complicated by the fact that empirical studies in our country are mainly oriented to the execution of some service tasks. Most often, they are executed for one or another faction of the ruling class. Therefore, the results of empirical sociological research are used for manipulative power technologies.

Ukrainian problems are a separate manifestation of global problems in the development of sociology. Due to the transformation of sociology into an instrument of democracy (election campaign support, referendum, monitoring of public opinion for government institutions and civil society), a methodological shift has occurred, which resulted in the loss of the unity of the theoretical and empirical levels. Statistics has become the general theory of empirical sociology in quantitative research, which in its turn has a mathematical justification. This provokes the proliferation of statistical functionalism and methodological nominalism. Qualitative empirical research based on theoretical preconditions has ethnography, social and cultural anthropology.

In order for sociology to respond to the challenges of today’s society, there should be a renewed unity of the theoretical and empirical levels with the domination of the former one. This requires a new theoretical synthesis, the basis of which should be world-system analysis, environmental sociology and the theory of the Second Modern.

In this light, the Ukrainian crisis and the war in the Donbas region will be plunged into the global context and explained by the contradictions of the modern world capitalist system, and not simply by the psychological inadequacy of a particular leader or, worse, by the ethnic factors. In this case, attempts to place responsibility for social disturbances on the inhabitants of the region will even lose sight of scientific knowledge and can be classified the way they deserve, namely, as manipulative technology in favor of one of the factions of the ruling class.

Keywords: crisis, war, sociological research, methodology, world-system analysis, ecological sociology, the theory of the Second Modern, theoretical synthesis
Deep socio-political crisis where Ukraine began plunging in since the end of the fall of 2013, and the Donbas war made the issue of adequacy of research strategies being implemented by domestic sociologists extremely relevant.

Sociologists had been working on Maidan (or Euromaidan) since the very first days. When analyzing its structure, they established prevalence of the young with higher education, the middle class and the non-party. On December 7-8 Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation along with Kyiv International Institute of Sociology were studying social structure and public sentiments of the Euromaidan. According to its results, the average age of the rally’s participants was 36. People with higher education were dominating (64%). Another 22% of participants had a secondary special education, and 13% - incomplete higher education. Sociologists noted that by occupation specialists with higher education (40%) were prevailing among Maidan participants, students were 12%, 9% entrepreneurs, 9% - pensioners, 8% - managers of different levels and 7% - workers. It is worth mentioning that 92% of the polled protesters said that they did not belong to any party, public organization or social movement (Соціологи опублікували, 2013).

It was suggesting rather optimistic generalizations. For example, Olena Zlobina wrote the following about Maidan: “Born in the process of manifestation of mass emotional upheaval under the influence of an emotional factor, it gradually transforms from a subject of social mood into a subject of social action. Although the emotional component of the action is much more variable than the rational component, one can not underestimate the power of emotional tension, which, at any moment, can cause an explosion of activity, which becomes a short-lived, but perhaps a fatal factor in social transformations “ (Злобіна, 2014: p. 326).

The conclusion made is quite logical, since it is based on the data obtained by methods recognized in the sociological community. It corresponds to the recognized methodological benchmarks such as the Theory of democratic transition. Though the real consequences of the Maidan turned out to be completely different. Sociologists did not catch a shift to the right side of the political spectrum in the country’s politicum, they did not consider that among the participants of the protests there were groups organized beforehand which eventually determined protests’ dynamics. In general, such a phenomenon of our
political life as a political mercenary, which has long been a means of livelihoods for large groups of people, were ignored by sociologists. It should be mentioned that formal party affiliation is not required for them. Attention was not paid to the struggle of clientele groups (which we usually call “oligarchic”), which from the very outbreak was channelized into outlaw streambed. Sociologists were not even surprised that, despite the slogans of European integration, there were no appeals to social justice on the Maidan, no programs were proposed to rebuild the country on the basis of humanism. The real slogan of the whole process was unalloyed power as it is.

The Maidan was created by intra-élite split and lack of mechanisms to harmonize interests of various factions of the ruling class of the Ukraine’s politics. The Donbas war became another consequence of this split. It is clear that the mentioned regional disorder turned into a war through the help of Russia, but the latter would not have dared to aggression were there no internal prerequisites for this.

Sociologists have been working in the zone of a military conflict in Donbas since the beginning of its outbreak. Though interesting is the focus of their attention which is shifting to the problem of regional identity. Some research organizations are firmly arguing that Donbas, as well as Crimea, is mentally different from Ukraine. Thus, the troubles of the region are considered as the fault of its inhabitants. There are expectations that the war will alter the Donbas identity, and inhabitants of the region will unite in a single identification impulse with the rest of the country. Such expectations effected integrity of the method. Otherwise, I cannot explain why in March - April 2015 the above mentioned Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation picked Siverodonetsk and Starobilsk for their research in Luhanschyna (Luhansk oblast (a type of administrative division of Ukraine, Belarus, Russia, etc). Back Then 995 respondents were interviewed (496 - in Siverodonetsk, 499 - in Starobilsk). The distribution of answers to some questionnaire questions showed a huge difference between towns. So, to the question “What measures should be taken to make peace in Donbas?” One of the answers was “Providing Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts with a special status within Ukraine”. In Siverodonetsk it was chosen by 19.2%, and in Starobilsk - 31.4%. Other differences were also received in the answers to this question. Thus the option “Cut financing of the territories occupied by the DPR (Donetsk People’s Republic) and LPR (Luhansk People’s Republic) (paying pensions, salaries, etc.)” was chosen by 8.5% of the respondents in Sivorodonetsk, and 33.7% in Starobilsk (Луганщина: потребности, 2015).

Based on these and other differences in the distribution of responses of respondents from these two places, the academic leader of Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation, Iryna Bekeshkina, concluded: “The survey showed that there is no consolidated Donbas. Different towns demonstrate different opinions of citizens. But there are certain common positions on a series of key issues “(Социологи показали, 2015). Such a generalization made on the basis of a survey in two towns can’t but wonder. The identified problem should be subjected to internal analysis
in the Foundation itself. It was necessary to check all stages of the research – starting from sampling formation and the number of respondents’ rejections to answer up to interviewers work in the field. The point is that in Siverodonetsk 70.4% of respondents abstained from responding to the specified question, and 35.5% in Starobilsk. But even if from the technological point the survey was okay, its data is not enough for the conclusion. Firstly, it is incorrect to compare selected towns precisely as representatives of the Donbas community. Starobilsk historically has belonged to Slobozhanshchyna. It joined Donbas only by entering Luhansk oblast. Banal is assertion that the oblast is not identical to the region. Secondly, these towns are different by population quantity. In Starobilsk there are fewer than 20 thousand people, and in Siverodonetsk - more than 100 thousand.

I have already noticed that Ukrainian sociologists in Donbas methodologically often have focused on the vague concept of identity, which is understood as a certain attributive property of the community. Iryna Bekeshkina has shown her commitment to this perspective fairly consistently. She recently said: “Donbas and the Crimea have always differed from the rest of Ukraine. If you look at polls of previous years, even then one could see difference of Donbas from, say, Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. It has been by many parameters closer to the Crimea. And when sociologists would unite Donbas with the east, to Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, and the Crimea - with the south - Odesa and Kherson, these differences were to a large degree rubbed out” (Социолог объяснила, 2016).

The above studies are used here as examples. Their number can be increased. I had to compare results of surveys of Ukrainian and Russian sociologists conducted on both sides of the line of contact, which were supposed to clarify public opinion regarding the desirable future of Donbas. They consistently would provide mirror-back results. On the territories of the LPR / DPR, the majority of the interviewed residents speak either for joining Russia, or for independence of these entities. On the free (government controlled) territories of Donbas, even residents of cities that at some time used to be under control of the LPR / DPR, see the future of their region with Ukraine (Кононов, 2015). What it is? Mimicry of residents who are afraid to give wrong answer? Rational choice in a particular situation (“The point of view is determined by the place of one’s stay”)? Ideological and political engagement of sociologists who deliberately or subconsciously put pressure upon respondents? Inconsistency of sociological means? Methodological insensitivity of sociology to a new situation? All of the above?

**Methodological situation**

It is worthwhile to start with an explanation of the general methodological situation in domestic sociology. Actually, when I write about national sociology, I do not apply a principle of methodological nationalism at all. Sociology as a science it is an international phenomenon. I mean the state of affairs in the Ukrainian sociological community.
After 1991 Ukrainian sociology completed its institutionalization by establishing the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, which separated out from the Institute of Philosophy (1990), and by founding academic periodical “Sociology: Theory, Methods, Marketing” (1998). Since 1992 the Institute of Sociology has been carrying out unique monitoring of changes in Ukrainian society.

At the same time, since then empirical orientation with theoretical approaches borrowed from abroad has dominated our sociology. In general, this indicates an extensive way of its development. A huge amount of data on our society has been accumulated, but in most cases it has been brought to the level of empirical generalizations. The profile of sociology is changing under the influence of intellectual mainstream, which also often comes from the West. It resembles the landscape of the Solaris by Lem, where structures are constantly form, and, after a while, collapse giving way to the same short-lived forms.

There’s been an unspoken agreement to recognize the marker’s status of the subject field of sociology by a combination of methods used by the sociological community. Though maîtres of our science avoid such a plain statement. But the hidden gets revealed in texts of young researchers. For instance, Lina Malysh writes: “Even a quick-and-dirty walkthrough of sociological texts makes it clear that the most fruitful way to find a demarcation line that would make it possible to distinguish sociology from non-sociology and non-science in general, is to describe specificity of its methods, since there is no solidarity among scientists in understanding the subject of science, its fundamental features which should determine the focus of analysis” (Malysh, 2016: p. 65-66).

However, those who recognized such an approach to the outline of the subject field of sociology should expect a side blow from the experts who are aware of the methodological situation in our science. Gennadiy Batyhin and Inna Devyatko defined the present situation as an “epistemological pile”, where “without burdening themselves with delimitation of possible meanings, the disputants usually choose not methodological positions, but sides of the epistemological pile” (Батыгин, Девятко, 1994).

It is worth noting that nobody in the sociological environment has ever intended to refute the Hegelian idea of science as an applied logic. The situation seems to be even more surprising.

Pavel Kopnin, a genius philosopher, wrote that sciences are not created by enthusiasts, or even by mere appearance of a new social need. “... Sciences do not arise through declarations, but as a result of discovery of fundamental laws, on the basis of which a method for analysing a large set of phenomena of vital importance is created“ (Копнин, 1974: p. 288). He further specifies: “Science is not a simple aggregate of all knowledge of an object, but a certain system of knowledge, on the basis of which arises the method of movement of human cognition. There are no all-inclusive sciences, but there is an all-inclusive study of some complex and important object by dint of methods and means of various sciences, which results in its comprehension in all various connections and mediations” (Копнин, 1974: p. 290).
Fundamental laws which become a basis for sciences, testify to systemic nature of the objects of study. Cognitive methods in one or another science must correspond to the nature of the system being studied. Gennadiy Batyhin was quite right writing “assumption about absurdity of the world makes the method doctrine unnecessary” (Батыгин, 1995: p. 4). The method is intended to make cognitive interaction with reality possible and become a way of creating continuously growing abstract-conceptual model, which is a theory.

Let’s try to understand in which way are research object, method and theory are related in sociology. For this purpose we will turn to the precedent texts by Vladimir Yadov and Gennadiy Batyhin.

Vladimir Yadov is an author of one of the world’s best textbooks on methodology and methods of sociological research, the textbook which had become an example for those who wrote on these topics after him. As contemporary Russian literature, according to the widespread expression of the French critic Eugène de Vogüé, came out of Gogol’s “Overcoat” so modern Ukrainian sociology largely came out of the Yadov’s “Strategy of Sociological Research”. One will agree with the opinion of the editorial board of the academic periodical “Sociology: Theory, Methods, Marketing”, which in the preface to the publication of fragments from correspondence of Vladimir Yadov and Dmitri Shalin wrote about the first: “It is difficult to overestimate his role in the formation of Soviet, Russian and Ukrainian sociology” (Из переписки Владимира Ядова, 2016: p. 126). I think sociologists from Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and other former republics of the Soviet Union could have said the same.

Example of Vladimir Yadov is interesting by other characteristics. His book, as a distinctive product, reflects global state of being of sociological methodological thought. It has fully become one of the fundamental texts of the paradigmatic nature in our sociology, since several generations of sociologists have been using it. Vladimir Aleksandrovich himself would regularly return to the text of the book, updating it with examples and fresh references. Not only was he a great scientist, but also an active citizen who, through sociology, wanted to influence social life with a view to its humanization. He could write without any diplomacy: “I feel hatred with Putin. Cruel and cynical, craving for power, despising his people, he also turned out to be a man who is seeking wealth and luxury” (Из переписки Владимира Ядова, 2016: p. 132). His methodological approaches made it possible to predict development of the situation in Russia. In 2010, he wrote: “...Trends here are colourful, but may well be represented by three vectors: a powerful flow of great-nationalism, a rare stream of liberalism and an increasing flow of neo-fascism. The first and the third may well merge together. Obviously, Putin himself created and continues to cement structures of “national democracy.” This is essentially a declarative democracy, like the one prescribed in the “most democratic” Stalin Constitution” (Из переписки Владимира Ядова, 2016: p. 127).

Vladimir Yadov believed that there are two projects of sociology being globally implemented at the same time. One of them is of European origin and is
subject-oriented, the second - emerged and is being developed in the US and is problem-oriented. The European approach to sociology involves study of social systems, integral social organisms, the American - study of mass social processes, mass behaviour of people. As a result, two paradigms have emerged: macro-sociological and micro-sociological (Ядов, 2003).

The scientist himself was trying to formulate a synthetic understanding of the subject of sociology. Without resorting to a special justification, he postulated the decisive role in self-propulsion of the social whole of the social community. Because of this, a social community was supposed to play a leading part in defining sociology. Due to its extensiveness the definition turned out to be difficult, tautological, contradictory and unproductive: “... Sociology is a scientific study of genesis, development, changes, and transformations of social communities, their functioning and forms of their self-organization: social systems, social structures and institutions. This is the study of social changes caused by activity of a social subject; the study of social relations as mechanisms of interconnections and interactions between diverse social communities; the study of regularities of social actions and mass behaviour”(Ядов, 2003). This definition listed the subject field segments which at that time were actively explored by the sociological community. The definition did not define the law unifying this subject field therefore it is impossible to understand further development of sociology on its basis.

It is revealing that V. Yadov distinguished two types of research, which he called “theoretically applied” and namely “applied”. That is, any empirical sociological study must serve something else, contribute to solving a problem that has already developed either in theory or in public practice. An outer stimulus from the social request is needed for marking out and analysing any problem. This very stimulus makes the object and subject of research possible to be highlighted. The scientist wrote: “Usually the subject of the study contains a central issue of the problem associated with the assumption of possible determining objective laws or a central tendency in it. Formulation of such a question - the source for suggestion of the working hypothesis”(Ядов, 2003).

The hypothesis gives an opportunity to work with facts that a sociologist receives through a variety of methods. V. Yadov clearly, skilfully and in details analyses methodological arsenal of sociology, what makes his textbook so useful. Collected primary sociological information in quantitative research exists in the form of observation records (questionnaires, observation forms, encoding cards, etc.). Then the analysis of the collected data begins. V. Yadov considered namely this stage of research to be the most exciting. Initially, data are categorized and classified. “All subsequent analysis operations are based on the study of organized data” (Ядов, 2003).

The scholar understood that this is just the starting point for analysing quantitative data. Typological analysis should rise from properties-indicators to the concepts that relate to them. He wrote: “... The method of theoretical typology leads to an explanation that is formulated in hypotheses that emerge from the
given theory, while empirical typology assumes only description of the data obtained and their interpretation, which allows us to formulate more general hypotheses and promotes research toward the development of the theory. In the first case, “input theory”, in the second case - “output theory” - as a result of the analysis of empirical data (“Ядов, 2003). By the way, the sociologist drew attention to the fact that “thanks to the development of computer technology empirical typology took the lead in social studies” (Ядов, 2003).

The theory which a sociologist has to deal with in empirical studies relates to the Mertonian middle range. V. Yadov noted: “The preliminary system analysis of the subject of research - is, in fact, a “modeling” of the research problem, that is, its decomposing and detalization, which can further formulate the general and more separate hypotheses of the study” (Ядов, 2003).

The work of Vladimir Yadov introduced at the highest level a dominant line in the development of sociology in the world. Ability to respond by means of standard methods to the various problems that arise in the theory and in public practice has always been its advantage. Though such a response involves investments. On the theory side, they cannot be too powerful in sociology. The nomenclature of social sciences correlates each of them with certain groups of the population, who can act as customers for producing of new knowledge. Economic studies are associated with owners and managers, Theory of state and law - with rational bureaucracy, Political science - with political class, that is, the named social sciences represent interests of different factions of the classes ruling in modern societies. Sociology is an exception where the public is its social base. This is the reason why economic and political sciences are better financed than sociology. The latter, moreover, constantly has experienced pressure by the ruling classes of society who fear its critical potential. Because of this, they have always tried to turn development of sociology in the direction of service providing.

There is another feature of this development model. Problems in society are extremely diverse. That is why sociologists are forced to conceptualize public life fragmentarily and in an extremely wide range (from electoral preferences to coffee brands preferences, from value orientations to birth control pills). All these conceptualizations are created ad hoc. Unlike experiments of physicists, who step by step approach to solving problems of the world order, most sociological studies do not affect understanding of society. In the best scenario they become prerequisite for manipulative technologies by politicians or advertisers.

In professional associations of sociologists from different countries, sometimes there is an idea to dissociate themselves from pollsters. From my perspective, if this happens and the pollsters were expelled from a certain sociological association, then those who teach future pollsters would remain in it. Maybe there would be found some more people involved in the theory. Tiiffs between sociologists and experts in commercial surveys experts for political parties and other interested organizations have constantly occurred. For example, during the round table “Independent
Sociology: myth or reality”, which took place within the framework of the 1st Congress of the Sociological Association of Ukraine (Соціологічна Асоціація України) (October 16, 2009), to the remarks of David Rotman that many sociological services in Ukraine are working on certain political parties or movements, Yevhen Holovakha reacted very emotionally: “These are pollsters! These are business entities, it’s their job. We are talking about sociologists” (Независимая социология, 2011: p. 117). In fact, dominance of pollsters with all the consequences is conditioned by the fact that sociology is constructed as a motley collection of theories of the middle range, which are united into a certain whole by a combination of methods for obtaining primary information.

The service nature of sociology found a highly intellectual justification in works and textbooks by Gennadiy Batygin. He divided history of sociology into three periods: sociological doctrines, social surveys and sociological research. Scientific character is distinguished only in the last period.

Gennadiy Batygin believed that sociological doctrines are imbued with a personal beginning and are full of prophetic pathos. They merge with personalities of their authors and others are not capable of reproducing them. The most important is the following: “The common feature of sociological doctrines is their world-view setting. Unlike scientific research, doctrine focuses on ideas of marginal significance, say, the latest truths of being” (Батыгин, 1995: p. 10).

According to G. Batygin, social surveys were inspired by the desire to learn everything about society. They did not have any strict methodology, and therefore were slipping towards “parascience.”

In fact, sociology becomes a science only by means of sociological research. “The turn from social surveys to sociological research is almost imperceptible: the initial interest is caused not by information about life and “publicity” of the project, but by a universal connection between stand-alone variables. Having accepted mathematical and statistical apparatus, sociology also accepted norms of experimental science “(Батыгин, 1995: p. 22).

G. Batygin spoke about distribution of sociologists’ roles in the continuum from an independent researcher to an employee of a patronage service of a political party or a private individual. From this analysis, he drew a strange conclusion: “… To preserve the integrity of a research program of sociology it makes sense at least sometimes to move away not only from a gender, but also from theoretical beliefs (to the extent where beliefs have grown into interest)” (Батыгин, 1995: p. 28). He continues: “What is left? There are some rules of a scientific discourse - a matrix of knowledge, beyond which it is impossible to talk about reasoning and understanding “(Батыгин, 1995: p. 28). This is already a way not just to service, but simply to servility, as sociology, reduced to this minimum, is deprived of any critical potential.

It’s worth noting that such a way of analysing society was also substantiated by some Soviet intellectuals. Pavel Kopnin believed that sociology as a separate theory of social life was not needed. He proceeded from nomenclature of the Soviet social
science, where the main sciences were: historical materialism, political economy and scientific communism, while the Marxist philosophy, namely dialectical materialism, was their methodological basis. The Soviet philosopher was sincerely wondering: what will sociology be occupied with as a general theory of society? According to him, it would be doomed to repeat what had been said by philosophy, political economy and scientific communism. In addition, he believed that there was a higher form of knowledge about society: “Materialist understanding of history in a certain respect is scientific sociology. It does not seek, as former sociology, to unite all knowledge about society, to replace all the sciences about it (“Копнин, 1969: p. 72). Therefore, his conclusion was quite opinionated: “Which general theory of social development is yet possible; from what side should it characterize this development? It is thought there is no place left for the one” (“Копнин, 1969: p. 73).

Pavel Kopnin was not at all a retrograde. He would put forward a position that seemed to him to be quite logical, but at the same time spoke for the development of “social studies”. Let me cite a rather long polemical passage: “Though it does not mean there no longer exist problems of social studies development, methodology and techniques of conducting them, the target of these studies, first and foremost, is development of the Marxist-Leninist theory of society, all its constituent parts. Conceptual apparatus, created by philosophy, should serve as a guide in the study of modern society, but the data of specific social studies give material both for its enrichment and its replenishment (“Копнин, 1969: p. 73). The Soviet philosopher highlighted that social research should not be restricted to factories and collective farms. The country was experiencing lack of accurate knowledge of social processes. Mathematization of this knowledge was needed. But then he returned to his idea: “Social studies is not a replacement of the sciences dealing with society: philosophy, political economy, scientific communism, but the way of their development, they can serve as a means of developing modern social thinking, a means of combating its dogmatism” (“Копнин, 1969: p. 73-74).

Pavel Kopnin even expresses heretical thought for a philosopher: “First of all, philosophy itself and for its purposes should conduct social studies” (“Копнин, 1969: p. 73-74).

I will no longer be distracted by this interesting subject matter, which deserves special research. I will conclude it with research program, which Pavel Kopnin formulated for those who would be engaged in “social research”: “Logical and epistemological analysis of social research methods (questioning, interviewing, observation, etc.), revealing of nature and specificity of a social experiment, working on problems of modelling of social processes, peculiarities of constructing sociological theory and ways of its verification, studying of up-to-date methods of received data processing, etc. - this is the task for those dealing with methodology and methods of social research (“Копнин, 1969: p. 76).

The textbook by Vladimir Yadov looks like implementation of this program. Gennadiy Batygin, in fact, also did not escape it. He just did not believe in any theory.
The subject landscape of modern sociology is similar to archipelago of islands. Though these islands are not surrounded by clean sea, but swamp. The ground either rises up, or drops down, connecting strips appear between islands, some islands fall apart and then disappear under turbid water. The islands have blurry contours and unstable locations. They can move along the surface, crawl one over another, or even form complex multi-storey configurations.

Due to the fragmentation of the subject field of their science, most sociologists would remain aside from the fourth scientific revolution. Study of self-developing objects is the basic methodological guideline for modern science. The idea of self-development is associated with concepts of co-evolution of society and biosphere along with cosmism (Стёпин, 2006: p. 346-348). Whereas a significant part of sociologists have so far utilized concepts of closed systems of mechanical nature, to which various “social technologies” can be applied. Dominating empirical sociology functionalism, to the nature of which we will later return, is based on these concepts.

This does not mean that the world sociology is hopeless and we have nothing to rely on in our methodological efforts. We will later talk about future trends as well.

**What theory are sociological methods associated with?** To understand modern methodological situation one should turn to works by the “mastodons” who created sociological doctrines, which, according to G. Batygin, were called to discover “the last truths of being.” With a closer look at these doctrines, the picture is changing. One of their authors, Max Weber, in his report “Science as profession or vocation,” told to his students: “Today science is a profession which is put into life as a special discipline and serves self-awareness along with cognition of actual relationships, but it is not at all a gracious gift of seers and prophets which brings salvation and revelation, and not a part of the reflection of the wise men and philosophers on “sense of the world” (Вебер, 1990: p. 731). For sociologists, he promised even more severe life comparing to other scientists: “... Every sociologist should be prepared for the fact that one, being at old age, for months maybe scrolling through dozens of thousands of absolutely trivial arithmetic tasks. While an attempt to completely shuffle off the solution of the problem on mechanical ancillary labour does not go scot-free and the final result is often negligible. But if the researcher has no well-defined idea about the direction of one’s calculations - about the significance of individual results, then even this scant result will not be achieved “(Вебер, 1990: p. 709). Thus, the pursuit of scientific sociology, which is based on methodological accuracy, has accompanied our science from the very beginning. G. Batygin, by the way, on the subsequent pages of his lectures expressed great respect to Max Weber and recognized his methodological position as quite modern (Батыгин, 1995: p. 102-107). Why then did he contrast “sociological doctrines” with “sociological research”? Is there any problem here?

Scientists, who made sociology a respectable science, were engaged mainly in the problem of modernization transition from traditional to modern society...
in Europe. They would support subject studies by continuous methodological reflection. Let’s say, Emile Durkheim, having written the work “On the division of social labour” recognized the need to explicitly outline position of his research method. Adequate understanding of his theory of social life depended upon understanding of methodology.

The French sociologist, like nobody before him, made a contribution to substantiating understanding of society as a special reality that cannot be trimmed down to psychophysical reality of individuals or to reality of nature. This position in the structure of sociology hit place of the fundamental law, which outlines its subject field.

Emile Durkheim several times harked back to its wording. In “The Method of Sociology” he wrote: “... Society is not just a number of individuals, but a system formed by their association and represents reality of sui generis, which invested with its own special properties. Of course, collective life implies individual consciousness, but this necessary condition is not enough. This consciousness needs to be associated and combined, and what is more, combined in a special way. Social life arises from this very combination, therefore this combination explains it. Sticking together, complementing each other and penetrating into each other, individual souls establish a new being, mental one, if you will, which represents the psychic reality of another kind (“Дюркгейм, 1995). In the preface to the second edition of “The Method of Sociology” the French researcher pays special attention to fundamental significance of this position for the very existence of sociology: “This science, in fact, could be born only on the day when a premonition came around those social phenomena, not being material, are real objects that allow for research (“Дюркгейм, 1995).

Methodological vision is logically derived from the ontological vision of the Durkheim sociological realism. The author subsequently keeps elaborating them. He formulates his most famous rule, which, at its time, caused a storm of disagreement: “The first and the main rule is that social facts must be studied as things (“Дюркгейм, 1995). Emile Durkheim has to explain that under social facts he understands any modus operandi able to exert pressure upon an individual, such as beliefs, aspirations, and customs of the group. He writes: “A social fact is recognized only by external compelling ascendance that it has or is capable of having over individuals. And the presence of this ascendance is recognized, in its turn, either by the existence of any sanction, or by resistance this fact offers to every attempt to counteract it by an individual (“Дюркгейм, 1995).

Objective and compulsory nature of social facts in regard to an individual imply external approach to them. A sociologist approaches objects of research same way as a scientist-naturalist: “So, we need to study social phenomena by themselves, separating them from conscious and imaginative subjects. They need to be studied from the outside, as external things, because we come across them in such capacity (“Дюркгейм, 1995).
It seemed to the French sociologist that the undisputed conclusion follows from this: “The first corollary is the following: it is necessary to systematically eliminate all pre-concepts” (Дюркгейм, 1995).

Now I will not dwell on the well-known rules which Е. Durkheim proposed to distinguish between normal and pathological in society, as well as those relating to construction of social types. I will note that from the autonomy of social reality the scientist concluded that reasons for social changes should be sought namely in society: “We have shown that a social fact can only be explained by another social fact, and at the same time, we have shown how this type of explanation is possible, having recognized internal social environment as the basic driver of social evolution“ (Дюркгейм, 1995). His following statement completely resonates with the modernity “… every time a social phenomenon is explained by a psychic phenomenon, we can be sure that the explanation is false” (Дюркгейм, 1995).

From all what E. Durkheim stated there was formed the requirement for dephilosophization of sociology, which “… must be content with just being a sociology” (Дюркгейм, 1995). In this regard, he formulates one of his most metaphysical thoughts: “Sociology should not take side of any great metaphysical hypotheses” (Дюркгейм, 1995). At the same time, his appeal to development of a specific sociological culture sounds quite relevant: “Sociology, therefore, is not an addition to any other science; it is a special and autonomous science, and a sociologist needs to feel specificity of social reality, so only a particular sociological culture can lead one to understanding of social facts “(Дюркгейм, 1995).

The works by E. Durkheim make impressions of forethought and completely finished texts. The author’s opinion, expressed there, is completely transparent and finalized. He does not stop even before the final conclusions on the chosen grounds. Thus, having formulated the conclusion on the necessity of eliminating all preconcepts, he writes: “Since the external side of things is given to us by feelings, then, summing up, we can say that a science, in order to be objective, must proceed not from concepts that were formed without it, but from feelings “(Дюркгейм, 1995). It is clear that feelings in this case cannot exist in any case without concepts, therefore the requirement to return to feelings, even reinforced by devices, is ungrounded. This is not the only example of extremes in the methodological position of E. Durkheim. These include the view of social facts only as phenomena of collective consciousness, and definition of the normal type of phenomena only as statistically mean. But it is not the case now. Such assertions remain facts of the history of sociology of the XIX century. Emile Durkheim becomes our contemporary due to different facts. Having substantiated independence of sociology, he created a system of sociological realism, where theory and methodology are two inseparable parts. From the monograph “On the division of social labour” to the study “The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life”, Durkheim sociological realism demonstrates ability to self-development and to production of new knowledge. In particular, it should be emphasized that in this case both the theory and the method are actually sociological.
In many respects alternative to Durkheim’s sociological realism, another approach to sociological theory and methodology was developed by Max Weber. His methodological reflection was too connected with the theory of modernization and modernity. The German scientist was persistently seeking an answer to the question about specifics of the West, the reasons for its advance in the world’s contemporary system, and the nature of Western capitalism.

Max Weber’s articles on methodological issues are grandiose works of powerful mind that was capable of storing extremely large amounts of information striving for thorough analysis. But this desire drove him to a continuous deepening of the issues, leaving a horizon of research always open. M. Weber does not boast of any methodological works, which by completeness and transparency are similar to “The Method of Sociology” by Durkheim. Apparently, “Basic sociological concepts” was meant to become its analogue. But even here the German sociologist does not sum up, in conclusion he words a new turn in the discussion about what he would call “normative” and “empirical” social sciences.

Max Weber’s ability to store in mind enormous volumes of information and to think through zillion of links between facts at a time was not always constructive. His methodological works look fragmented and inconsistent upon the first reading. Seems that the author follows the approach: “Yes! Yes! Yes, but, apparently, no. Although, under certain conditions ...”. For this reason any reconstruction of methodological position of the German sociologist is partial, and therefore incomplete. Each reconstruction becomes a distortion of what he wrote on methodological issues. This is not only a fault of interpreters, but also a fault of the object of interpretation. In the late 1920s, Alexandr Neusykhin stated that “... Rickert had always dominated Weber’s methodology and logic, and Marx had strongly dominated his history and sociology “ (Неусыхин, 1994: p. 590).

Max Weber named his sociology “comprehensive”. He wrote: “Behaviour is above all specifically important for understanding sociology, which, on the first hand, is correlated with the behaviour of other people by subjectively predicted meaning of the active person, and, on the second hand, is also defined by its meaningful correlation and, on the third hand, can be clearly explained in reliance on this (subjectively) predicted meaning” (Вебер, 1990: p. 497). M. Weber’s social activity and meaning of action outline the subject field of sociology: “Sociology (in the sense of this very polysemic word, which is implied here) is a science that seeks, interpreting, to understand social action and thus to causally explain its process and influence “ (Вебер, 1990: p. 602).

Such understanding of the subject of sociology makes a purely external approach to social phenomena meaningless. M. Weber directly stated: “... “Objective” study of cultural phenomena, which ideal goal is to narrow empirical links down to” laws “, is meaningless” (Вебер, 1990: p. 378). He gave an explanation of a rather sharply expressed assessment: “ a variety of logical relations can be the basis of behavior that seems to us to be “identical” or “similar”, and we
“understand” the types of behavior that deviate significantly from one another or sometimes contradict, in situations we consider to be “homogeneous” “(Вебер, 1990: p. 610).

This attitude forces the scientist to address the problem of social action. He wrote: “We call the “social” such an action, which, by the meaning of a supposed actor or active person, correlates with the action of other people and focuses on it” (Вебер, 1990: p. 603). This understanding, as well as typology of social actions, offered by M. Weber, focusing on two criteria (the motive of an action and the way of targeting others), become a methodological prerequisite for his research in the fields of sociology of religion, sociology of politics or research in economic life. These are well-known Weberian concepts I will not dwell upon now.

I consider it appropriate to focus on the causes of instability of the Weberian methodological position. It was pushing Max Weber towards use of different research approaches (from almost positivist one to its almost complete denial) and impacted differentiation of his followers. I think that the reason should be sought in the nominalism of the German sociologist, which he persistently was trying to adhere to. His nominalism is a certain body of theoretical work: “The purpose of our study is to prove what “comprehension” is by its essence, and the reason why comprehensive sociology (in our sense) considers an individual and one’s action as a fundamental unit, as “an atom”(Assuming this dubious comparison permissible itself)” (Вебер, 1990: p. 607). Further he writes as if about a proven fact: “Behavior” being intelligible in its sense of orientation of its own actions for us always is an action of one or several individuals by nature” (Вебер, 1990: p. 613).

Nominalist obstinacy brought M. Weber to a peculiar theory of social contract. He writes on mutual expectations of actors: “This expectation can be subjectively based primarily on the fact that the operating individual “comes to an agreement” with other persons, “comes to an accord” with them, having grounds for expecting “observance” of this accord (according to one’s own understanding of such an accord) by these other persons” (Вебер, 1990: p. 510). It is a barren sprout of his thoughts, but because of it M. Weber himself and his followers are constantly stumbling. Thus, the founder of “comprehensive sociology” contrasts the legal understanding of the state as a certain “individual” and the sociological one, which, in his view, is reduced to the fact that “… from the sociological point of view, the word “state”, if at all is used, means only a kind human behavior of a special nature”(Вебер, 1990: p. 508).

Max Weber was engaged in solving problems which exceeded not only individual lifetime, but also lifetime of entire nations. Actions of individuals, their behavior, and changes within them in such a perspective can be explained only by non-individual and sub-individual factors. The German sociologist analyzed them through the notion of “culture”. In this regard, he formulated a thought-out research program, which is to be combined with the narrow-minded sociological nominalism. I think it makes sense to quote it without contractions:
“... To understand reality constellation is important for us as there we find those (hypothetical!) “factors”, grouped in a historical phenomenon of culture which is meaningful for us, and because if we wanted to “causally explain” such individual group, we inevitably would have to turn to other, also individual groups, by means of which we, using (definitely hypothetical!) concepts of the “law”, would give its “explanation”. Setting these (hypothetical!) “laws” and “factors” would be only the first task for us in a set of other tasks which had to lead to the desired result. The second task would be to analyze and organize the image of the historically given individual grouping of those “factors” and their specific, in a way, meaningful interaction and, first of all, explanation of the basis and nature of this meaningfulness. Handling the second task is only possible by using preliminary data obtained as a result of handling the first one, though it is new and independent by its type. The third task would be to get to know, returning back into the distant past, formation of separate, meaningful for the present, individual properties of these groups, their historical explanation from the point of view of the previous, also individual constellations. And finally, there is the fourth conceivable task - in assessing possible constellations in the future “(ВеБеп, 1990: p. 373). All his life Max Weber adhered to this program which was described in the article “The ‘Objectivity’ of Knowledge in Social Science and Social Policy”.

When working within a certain research program, the German sociologist would face controversial issues. Studying individual historical collective bodies (Western Europe, Germany, Western European capitalism, Florence, etc.), Max Weber did not refuse the attempts to find certain patterns in their development. For this purpose he developed a peculiar form of continuous interaction of empirical and theoretical levels of sociology in the process of studying a particular problem. I mean his doctrine on “ideal types”, which originated from the Kantian philosophy.

Reality comes before a sociologist like an infinite variety of phenomena. It is necessary to highlight Alpha and Omega there, where to direct one’s research efforts. This is where ideal types have to come in handy impersonating theoretical constructs of the investigated reality. They are created on theoretical level intentionally unambiguous for implication in empirical study. They are tools for studying certain historical identities. The concept of an ideal type did not become stable in Max Weber’s theory. On the one hand, he considered these theoretical constructs as utopias. So, in relation to economic research, he wrote: “By its content, this construction is of the utopia nature, obtained through imaginary strengthening of certain elements of reality. It is related to the empirical data of real life facts by the following: in those cases where abstracted connection in the given construction, in other words - the processes, associated with the “market”, to some extent, in reality manifested or assumed as significant, we, comparing them with the ideal type, with a pragmatic purpose can show and explain peculiarity of these relationships “(ВеБеп, 1990: p. 389). Further, he contradicts himself in relation to the understanding of the ideal type as utopia: “The “ideal type” in our understanding (we have to repeat this) is something, in contrast with
the *evaluative* judgment, completely indifferent and has nothing to do with some other, not purely logical “perfection”(Вебер, 1990: p. 399). Elsewhere, he speaks out quite prosaically: “The immediate task for sociology at a sociological study, where certain reality is an object, is necessity to constantly keep in mind deviation of this reality from the theoretical construction; establishing degree and nature of such a deviation - “(Вебер, 1990: p. 623).

All the above allowed Max Weber to combine position of comprehensive sociology with the search for laws of social life. The latter, he interpreted through the probability: “Laws”, as commonly referred to some of the terms of comprehensive sociology, for example, “the law of Gresham”, are confirmed by observing typical probabilities that, under certain conditions, social behavior will acquire a character which will make it *understandable*, proceeding from typical motives and a typical subjective sense, which an acting individual is proceeding from”(Вебер, 1990: p. 620).

According to Max Weber, a scientist must constantly keep under control and not confuse two types of thinking, they are objective-truthful and evaluative. And it’s not because they are easily differentiated. In reality, they are constantly interacting. By means of values we highlight important objects for a research, though in a research itself we must refrain from practical evaluations. The sociologist wrote: “... This is in reference only to a rather trivial requirement for a scientist to be able to clearly determine two groups of heterogeneous problems: establishment of empirical facts (including the defined by a researcher “evaluating” position of the people one is empirically exploring), on the one hand, and on the other hand - one’s own practical evaluation, that is, one’s own judgment of these facts (including “evaluations” of the people transformed into an object of an empirical study), considering them as desirable or undesirable, that is, one’s own, evaluating position” (Вебер, 1990: p. 558). From this understanding Max Weber derived the maxima of the researcher behavior: “Introduction of personal motives into a special objective study contradicts the very essence of scientific thinking” (Вебер, 1990: p. 552).

It is important to divide value and empirically-objective sequences since value systems constantly encounter and struggle with each other in a society. Society appears to be contradictory and moving simultaneously in different directions. Individuals can rely on value requirements in different ways, obeying and violating them. Max Weber described it this way: “A sociologist faces no difficulty in recognizing coexistence of significance of different, contradictory systems, within the same circle of people. Indeed, even a single individual can orient one’s actions on systems that contradict each other “(Вебер, 1990: p. 638).

Max Weber, like his distant philosophical inspiration Immanuel Kant, sought to achieve synthesis of extreme positions in the methodology of social knowledge of those times, synthesis as eliminations of their contradictions. So, in the empirical research he proposed to synthesize what would later be named “quantitative” and “qualitative” methods, because “... for a sociologist even the
most obvious adequacy of a sense has a value of a proper causal definition only to
the extent which can prove probability (in any way expressed) that the action being
considered, in fact usually takes place adequately to the sense with repetition which
implies a sufficiently precise or approximate expression (in average or ideal-typical
case). Only such statistical types of regularity, which correspond to subjectively
understandable meaning of social action, are (in the sense used here) the types of

Being a stubborn nominalist he depended on material and said that “... sociology even for its purposes cannot ignore collective thought-based formations, derived from other positions” (Вебер, 1990: p. 614). Considering that sociology deals only with social action (rational and focused on others) he proposed not to ignore factors deprived of meaningfulness and meaningful correlation, but to accept them as conditions of social action (Вебер, 1990: p. 498).

Powerful stream of Weberian thinking has had a hypnotic influence on sociologists. They very often do not pay attention to its internal contradictions. Certain provisions have been picked out from this stream that in a frozen form raise doubts of their fitting with the original source. Reinhard Bendix, for example, interpreted Max Weber’s understanding of the relation between an individual and a group in this way: “Being members of social groups, individuals are the product of social organization. Ideas and deeds of these individuals can, therefore, be studied as distinctive features of this social organization “(Бендикс, 1994: p. 569). Comparing this with Max Weber’s quotations given above, one can hardly be sure that such an interpretation corresponds to theoretical cosmos of Weberian thought.

Max Weber did not have a special analysis of the correlation of empirical and theoretical knowledge in sociology. We have already tried to look at this correlation through the prism of ideal types. I think it makes sense to look at this problem from another side. “Social action” is the central notion of the Weber’s comprehensive sociology. It has constantly been updated. Initially, Max Weber defined it as the action of an individual, subjectively thought through and correlated with behavior of other people (Вебер, 1990: p. 509). This is a so-called community-oriented action (Gemeinschaftshandeln). But thought through action may not be directly communicative. If it is so narrowly understood, then even reading outstanding works of literature or philosophy does not fit with understanding of social action by Weber. He even considered a prayer read by oneself to be a non-social action (Вебер, 1990: p. 625). When we read, say, poems by Homer we interact with product of a person who passed away almost three millennia ago, we interact by means of translators and publishers. The German sociologist tries to make corrections: “Social action (including non-interference or patient acceptance) can be oriented towards the past, present or expected future behavior of others” (Вебер, 1990: p. 625). These namely other “... can be individuals, acquaintances or uncertain great many of completely unfamiliar people” (Вебер, 1990: p. 625). What does this mean? Reading works by Homer, apparently, is still a social act, because it focuses upon the past act of an ancient Greek. The German researcher liked to repeat so much
that opening an umbrella in the rain is not a social action. Why is that so? Even if it does not focus on the other, but the very form provides for orientation on the modus operandi, stipulated in an umbrella by its inventors and manufacturers.

All this suggests that the development of the basic notion of the Weberian sociology stuck between the empirical and theoretical level. It has not turned into an ideal object which theory operates with, it is a fact. At the same time, this fact is the result of incomplete induction. The author, feeling insufficiency, regularly returns to his inferences, trying to improve them. I’ll say more. Actually, generalization of everyday consciousness gets on the level of empirical fact of sociology. Every adult is in the known, that human actions differ from natural phenomena by awareness and orientation on other people?

Typologies of social actions are the same empirical generalizations. Sergey Lebedev quite rightly writes: “Boundaries of empirical knowledge are fully determined by operational capabilities of such a form of rational cognition as mind. Activity of the latter involves application to the material sensory data of various logical operations: abstraction, analysis, comparison, generalization, induction, making a hypothesis of empirical laws, deductive withdrawal of verifiable consequences out of them, their justification, refutation, etc.” (Лебедев, 2010).

These limits entirely include division of social action into affective, traditional, value-rationale and purpose-rationale. Moreover, we again can say that we are dealing with incomplete division of the concept of “social action” on the criterion of motives. Here the motives are regarded as completely sovereign. But there are social actions, the motivation of which is imposed on an individual who is in a dependent position on others. After all, there is such a social action as a game. It is the goal of itself, but not in the sense of value-rationale action.

All written above is not for humiliation of Max Weber. One can only admire his ability to work with the material that everyone can get at everyday level, his ability to find unexpected depths at the empirical level. But empirical will not become theoretical because of this. I again will cite S. Lebedev: “Scientific theory is a logically organized set of statements about a particular class of ideal objects, their properties, relations, and changes” (Лебедев, 2010).

Max Weber, apparently, would agree with what he said. He would always define sociology as an empirical science. Due to this, level of abstraction in natural and social sciences, in his opinion, is different: “For the natural sciences, importance and value of “laws” is directly proportional to the degrees of their universal significance; for cognition of historical phenomena in their specific conditions, the most general laws, most of which are devoid of content, have, as a rule, the least value “ (Вебер, 1990: p. 378).

Example of Max Weber is important for us as methodology and theory of this great scientist undoubtedly are oriented toward each other. Relations here are more complicated comparing to the case of Emile Durkheim. In Weber’s methodological works, only one component of a real research methodology is
considered. Historical materialism, as a rule, remains in the shadow. The subject field of sociology too seemed insufficiently defined for the German scientist. Yes, he included political economy there (Вебер, 1990: p. 621). It can be interpreted as a requirement of sociologization of economic science, which is still on. But, apparently, it’s not about direct inclusion. Uncertainty of the subject field, its pulsation, led to pulsation of the methodology. But it was a live search, where theory and methodology were evolving in unity.

The Max Weber methodology did not become just a property of history of sociology. Yuriy Davydov stated that the “Weberian Renaissance” in the western sociology “... brings forward Max Weber as the key figure not only of Western sociology of the 20th century in general but also of sociology of the last quarter of this century, in particular” (Давыдов, 1990: p. 736). It also fully concerns his methodology.

The wordage and objectives of this article do not allow us to follow the development of methodological thought in sociology upon creation of Weberian texts. We have to state that in contemporary sociology there are directions of methodological thought related to corresponding theoretical search, though it is not peculiar for the main body of sociology as a profession.

To make the next move, I will make one remark. Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, as well as Charles Horton Cooley, Mykyta Shapoval or Pitirim Sorokin, were all inspired primarily by the search for truth. Institutional buildup of universities exerts considerable pressure upon today’s sociology (Анищенко, 2013). Professors have to regularly publish original works and raise citation index. This can be achieved at the expense of originality. The pursuit of originality spurs on to search for new topics which may evoke interest, to search of new turns in the analysis of the already elaborated problem, and finally, to the pursuit of terminological originality. Successful finds are capitalized and exploited to maximize profits.

An Actor-network theory (ANT) can be quite an interesting example for us. Frenchmen Bruno Latour and Michel Callon, and Englishman John Law are its founders. Let’s just take the latter, for an example, without dwelling upon the differences between Parisian and Lancaster schools. He believes that social sciences require a fundamentally new methodological orientation, and the method for them needs to be constructed. The “assemblages method” became a result of such an activity. John Law writes about it: “The assemblages method is a process of establishing and manufacturing of branching out relations’ flocks, which thicken the presence and therefore produce absence, forming, mediating and dividing them. Often, the assemblages method is connected with presentation of the realities there – outside, and picturing these realities here - inside, as well as with establishment of the Other “(cited by work: Давыдов, 2015). Well, who would not agree with the fact that a method is called to establish the existing and separate it from the illusory, that it should correlate the objective and the subjective? But what does this understanding add to the already existing, except for original verbal packaging?

The Actor-network theory, of course, is not limited to this banal definition of the method. A linguistic metaphor is at the heart of its methodological approach.
The ideas of Ferdinand de Saussure are translated in a poststructuralism way. Victor Wachstein conveys the position of ANT representatives this way: “Society is not immanently present in the network of relations, where “objects” are the nodal points, it does not determine them, and does not hide the true source of causality. Relations precede any reality - both “social” and “material” “(Вахштайн, 2006: p. 27). This provision is by no means substantiated. It is based on the fact that lexical items depend on the structure of the language, which, in its turn, being a sign system independent on individuals, exists because of speech acts of certain speakers. But if in linguistics such an approach demonstrates its fruitfulness, it does not mean that it can be applied to society as a whole. All language systems are non-viable outside of society, as well as a society without a language is non-viable.

Such basic notions of ANT as “network” and “actant” have been borrowed from the linguistics. The last term (French actant - “acting”) in linguistics denotes a linguistic structure, which is a mandatory companion of a predicate. Bruno Latour lent it different meaning: in a broad sense, “actant” can not only be a man, but also another creature alive or a thing. An actant is capable of existing only within a network.

One must pay tribute to ANT: theory and methodology are two sides of a single complex within it. But, like methodology like theory. To illustrate this, I will quote “Objects and Spaces” by John Law: “... A ship can be represented as a network - a network of hulks, rafts, sails, ropes, cannons, victualling-yards, cabins and the team itself. On the other hand, with a more generalized consideration, the navigational system, with all its ephemeris, astrolabes and quadrants, calculations tables, maps, navigators and stars, can also be considered as a network. Further, with even more distracted analysis, the entire Portuguese imperial system as a whole, with its ports and bonds, ships, military dispositions, markets and merchants can be described in the same categories (“(Ло, 2006: p. 33). I will not deny that such descriptions, which combine navigators and stars, ropes and crews, are possible. Another thing is, whether they give real knowledge. What is the difference between a network and a structure in this given case? One can find a million explanations which will be smart enough, but all of this will be a kind of a glass bead game.

Purely verbal innovations can shift consideration focus of this as well as any other problem. But they merge with the identities of their authors and do not acquire general use in science. Peak and decay of such local terminologies coincides with the career trajectories of their creators, since they are more similar to poetic creations than to scientific instruments. I do not want to argue that the authors, those working within the ANT did not give anything useful to science. Development of sociological imagination is the benefit of their scientific efforts. I will return to some specific ideas later. Now I point out destructive influence of these authors on the methodological culture of sociology.

This very influence consists in transforming a method into a game, on imagination competition, on creation of worlds, which do not exist in reality. The
method loses status of a serious means, which is called to adequately study the objective world. John Law writes: “... The idea that methods are practices that not only describe realities, but also prove them - considers practices of knowledge as more or less performative” (Law, 2012). The English sociologist then asks himself: what are the reasons to believe that “something really is taking place”? He answers his question very inventively: “The first answer to this question - although it is something more than its reformulation, is: knowledge practices and forms of knowledge supported by them become stable only if they can successfully solve two problems at the same time. Firstly, they must be able to create knowledge (no matter if it is a theory or data) that works, which are somehow organized and which (the key aspect) do what they are required to. But, secondly, they (which is counter-intuitive) must be capable of generating realities that correspond to this knowledge “ (Law, 2012).

As a matter of fact, the equality of all ways of generating knowledge is asserted here. Let’s say, in this sense, science is no different from religion, demonology, etc. I’m afraid to seem too journalistic, but when I read such works, I wish there were Soviet critique of bourgeois sociology. For those who specialized in this genre John Law would become a source of inspiration. Vladimir Lenin liked to use the German word die Schrulle (whim, trick) in relation to such theorists (Ленин, 1968: p. 100). And in such a case, a person is dodging not to recognize reflection of reality in the knowledge, as well as objective truth. One can probably say that the John Law texts did not come out of nowhere; they falsely reflected the fourth scientific revolution with the new unity of the subject and object. But this does not deny the nature of knowledge as an active reflection of reality.

Similar texts generate armies of followers all over the world. Davydov writes: “There’s no Hegel’s objectivity in social science - there is a complementarity there, i.e. the resulting sum of subjective positions of specific researchers who look at problems from their perspective and together with the subject form an actor’s network with feedback” (Давыдов, 2015). Here science is explicitly replaced by doxa. “Anythinggoes”!

Actor-network theory is distinguished by extreme criticism of the “official” science. On the example of Louis Pasteur, Bruno Latour proved inseparability of politics and work of a scientific laboratory. He even associated progress in the fight against illnesses with success of colonial policy: “This work on parasites had a direct impact on colonization, since parasites directly restricted size of empires of the main macroparasites” (Latour, 1988: p. 141). Sarcasm of the study on “war and peace of microbes”, “strong microbes and weak hygienists” results in discovery of science as a production of division of natural and social. “The Prince of Networks” himself then fell under the intellectual investigation with regards to metaphysical prerequisites for his critical exercises, but that is a completely different story (Harman, 2009). The bottom line is - science is being supported only by mutual criticism and ANT maintains critical tension within science.
John Law applied critical capabilities of the theory to mass surveys, showing that they claimed a rather specific version of the collective as a set of aggregates where individuals are considered isomorphic. Having specially analyzed the studies of the Eurobarometer on the rights of farm animals, he rightly stated that “...the latter does not simply describe and approve the views of European consumers on the rights of farm animals. On top of all of this, it also makes a consumer an individual rational and ethical subject; reproduces an individual act of consumption as the true place of political action; creates the EU as a neoliberal political place; performatively creates Europe as an isomorphic set of individuals in a homogeneous, closed, conceptual space; reproduces statistics and questionnaires and, thus, creation of social reality, and embodies philosophical and romantic version of the community, where “small” individuals are placed in emergent large whole and regarded as a part of it contributing to it “(Law, 2012).

If one distracts from certain exotic moments of ANT, then critical orientation of the John Law’s analysis is consistent with the intentions of a modern understanding of the correlation of methods and theoretical representations. Yuliana Tolstova expressed them as follows, matching positions prevailing to this day: “...There is a model of a phenomenon behind each method which is studied with the help of this method. However, sociological literature rarely speaks on the connection of this model with such representations which can be considered substantive and, therefore, based on theoretical concepts. There has been established a tradition according to which any properties of a method are perceived as purely technical characteristics, and their consideration is not a sociologist’s concern. With this approach a researcher does not associate these characteristics with a sociological theory “(Толстова, 2013: p. 14).

Yu. Tolstova touched upon a certain mystery of the modern sociology. It consists in the fact that the main array of sociological methods (both in quantitative and qualitative strategies) has nothing to do with any of the sociological theories. Quantitative methods for obtaining of initial sociological information are based on the theory of statistics, but qualitative methods are based on ethnography, social and cultural anthropology.

This namely fact, which remains under-reflected, explains apathy of the modern sociological methodology. In addition, sociologists almost do not turn to the metatheoretical level of knowledge. Sergey Lebedev believes that it consists of general scientific knowledge and philosophical grounds of science. The scientist writes the following on the first component: “The general scientific level of knowledge consists of the following basic elements: 1) general scientific picture of the world; 2) general scientific methodological, logical and axiological principles”(Лебедев, 2010). Unfortunately, I can only repeat my conclusion about the insular position of the modern sociology. It is locked in statistical functionalism, which is associated with its service functions. Such a metatheoretical precept is very far from realities of the fourth scientific revolution, which now is determining general development of science.
The sociological community has not developed a rational attitude to philosophy. The relations of sociology and philosophy remain, in most cases, similar to those outlined by E. Durkheim. Dephilosophysation was an acceptable position only at the stage of the formation of our science though. I think it is quite possible to agree with the opinion of Sergey Lebedev, according to which “...without philosophical grounds of science not only its integrity is violated, but also integrity of the entire culture, in relation to which both philosophy and science act as only partial aspects” (Лебедев, 2010).

To be honest, the majority of contemporary sociologists who work in the “quantitative paradigm” can quite easily apply functions that statisticians reckon their own science: “... Statistics is a science that studies quantitative aspect of qualitatively defined mass phenomena and processes, revealing existing quantitative dependencies, tendencies and patterns in the specific conditions of place and time “ (Социально-экономическая статистика, 2002: p. 7). In statistics, there are basic methods of obtaining initial information, which are divided into direct observation, documentary method and survey (Социально-экономическая статистика, 2002: p. 19-20). Specialists in the field of statistics have developed basic rules and methods of data grouping, concept of statistical indicators and rules of their measurement, indicators of variations, rows of dynamics and correlations.

The general theory of statistics enjoys a mathematical character. It is based upon the theory of sets, the calculus of probabilities, and the law of large numbers (Орлов, 2004). Methods of statistics can be applied to any phenomena of natural and social life which are characterized by variability and stochasticity. No doubt, statistical methods are useful for studying social phenomena. But the sociologist must remember that sociology is not statistics. When they are being equated, there is a subconscious transition of statistical methodology to sociology. This transition contributes to formation of the nominalist position in sociology, since “in statistics a constituent element of the object is called an observation unit, which is the bearer of the sign, which is subject to registration” (Социально-экономическая статистика, 2003: p. 16).

When a sociologist goes through matching his own science with totality of methods that the science is currently using, one turns to the path of transformation into a bad statistics. He or she will engage in not his/her own business and will always be inferior to a well-trained statistician.

In statistics, it is important to clearly outline boundaries of the subject being studied, to find a distinctive feature that clearly marks the units which belong to a certain set. It cannot always be done when collecting initial information in sociology. Statistics that come into sociology are aware of this. Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot write that sociologists are dealing with categories without clear boundaries; they constantly face difficulties of comparing generic concepts and individual cases. In relation to the latter, they express themselves as follows: “The problem of the ratio of the generic concept and the individual case in the descriptions of societies, which are envisaged by social sciences, arose before us
with all the obvious and it was difficult to be satisfactorily solved from the point of view of an epistemological solution every time when in need of a statement related to one or another macro-sociological category, such as social class , the researchers, readily quoted the interview, considering it as an exemplary or a typical case” (Болтански, Тевено, 2013: p. 21).

All the above, as well as more and more complicated access to respondents in quantitative studies, allow us to diagnose their crisis (Паниотто, Харченко, 2012). This crisis becomes simply threatening in the face of war and social disorganization, contributing to the creation of artefacts.

Discrepancy between theory and methodology in contemporary sociologists’ practices is the reason that a huge number of facts that are constantly collected during surveys, in no way affect the sociological theory. These facts cannot develop the theory of statistics as well.

Russian sociologist Vladimir Ilin writes that in order to understand his contemporary society, he received more information from included observation during his participation in the political process than from the polls’ results. According to him, a sociologist should clearly distinguish research problems: “... It seems to me that it is necessary to differentiate those topics which involve a social statistical approach (for example, a number of people related to any given type), and those which provide for an analysis of the mechanisms, causative links in them, etc. In the latter case, often, although not always, statistical methods are useless. Here one can draw an analogy with the human anatomy: to understand how the body works, it’s not necessary to make a post-mortem examination, following the principles of a national sample “(Паниотто, Харченко, 2012). Actually, this is the position that most sociologists now share.

Is it possible to study the irrational with rational methods?

When people face some new challenges, they seek to find analogues in the past experience of humanity for the initial mastery of the situation. It is clear that modern crises and wars force to first of all turn to the twentieth century which is rich in this kind of experience. It is still in actual collective memory, besides, it is a scene for constant ideological struggle. All this makes it expedient to at least have a quick look at this experience.

For ordinary participants of the historical process crises and wars seemed to be breakthroughs of the irrational. If during the pre-crisis or in the peaceful period it was possible to foresee their actions for a year, two or even longer time period, then with the onset of a crisis or war, people began foresee actions for a very short time intervals. This is especially true to a war.

Memoirs of veterans, who were soldiers in different armies and on different sides from the front-line, are surprisingly similar. In the novel “Die Geschlagenen” by the German writer Hans Werner Richter, who had to fight as part of the Wehrmacht
in Italy, we read: “Day after day from five in the morning, a hurricane fire began and sprayed their mountains until late in the evening. And at night, heavy shells flew over them directly into the “Death Valley”. Again did the rain start and water ran down the slope into their trench. At dusk, they crawled along the rocks to get food. But rarely did they get at least something. Day and night they were sitting, pulling their knees, covering their faces with helmets, waiting for attacks “(Рихтер, 1987: p. 120). On the front-line, a human is scared for one’s life, but gradually gets used to and even becomes indifferent to the deaths of others. “Güller was sitting on the rock, looking toward the battle. Cries were heard more and more often. The wounded were calling for help and the dying were moaning. Güller was distinguishing screams systematizing them. “This one” he thought, “is finished” (Рихтер, 1987: p. 109).

“Reminiscences of the War” by professor and the Hermitage Museum worker Nikolaj N. Nikulin are unique by honesty and sincerity. The whole war he spent on the front-line. Glorification of war he considered to be the most ignominious. “War is the worst beastliness human race ever invented. Not only does awareness of inevitability of death suppress one at war, but also petty injustice, meanness of a fellowman, rage of perversions and dominance of brute force ... Swollen of hunger, you sip balanda (USSR GULAG thin broth ) - water with water, when an officer chews meat nearby”. And further: “Many people at the war got convinced that human life was worth nothing and began to behave guided by the principle of “catching the moment”- grab a fat sum at any cost, jackboot your neighbour, by any means, get the biggest piece of cake” (Никулин, 2008).

Nikolai N. Nikulin got to see first-hand horror comparing to which the Dürerian “dance of death” was a chicken play: “Stockpiles of corpses at the railroad looked like snow-capped hills, only the bodies lying on top could be seen. Later, in spring, when the snow melted, everything below was revealed. On the very bottom there were laying those wearing summer uniform - soldier’s blouses and boots. These were victims of fights of the fall of 1941.Upon them there were layers of marines dressed in pea-jacket and wide black trousers (“bellbottoms”). Above there were the Siberians in sheepskin coats and valenki (felt boots), who went to attack in January-February of 1942. Higher – Political fighters (the collective name of the Komsomol members and members of the All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks), sent to the active front-line units in the first months of the Great Patriotic War) in vatniks (cotton wadded jacket) and ragged hats (such hats were given in Leningrad during the blockade). Above them - bodies in greatcoats, and camouflage jackets with helmets on their heads or without them. There were mixed corpses of soldiers from many divisions that were attacking the railroad in the first months of 1942. A terrible diagram of our “successes”» (Никулин, 2008).

What shall sociology do here? Such a question was also posed after the First World War. Russian general Nikolai Golovin was one of those who clearly formulated it and was trying to answer it. He was a very controversial personality. He was one of the most educated Russian military commanders, as a professor he taught at the Mykolayiv Academy of General Staff, during the First World War he
was in command of the Hussar Regiment, the Chief of Staff of the Army, after the October Revolution he took part in the White Movement, then emigrated to France, he taught History of Warfare in various educational institutions in France and the United States. The end of Nikolai Golovin’s life became shameful. He collaborated with the Nazi occupiers, sent Russian volunteers to work in Germany, wrote propaganda articles in favour of the Third Reich. But despite this, his books and articles retain some value for contemporary research. He was one of the first to try to translate the immediate impressions of the war into a sociological reflection.

Nikolai Golovin believed that understanding a war requires a general science about it, which can only be the sociology of war. By this time, only a warfare science had been developed, where elements of true science of war were embedded. Creation of this science is also hindered by the fact that “...the network of lies, which unfolds around the war, is becoming more and more dense” (Головин, 1938: p. 65). The lie is being produced both by the friendlies and the enemy. The friendlies are lying for reasons of patriotism, to raise the military spirit, to conceal failures and even crimes. Opponents are lying for the purpose of humiliating those whom they compete with and for self-glory. It is almost impossible to develop a science about war grounding on written sources.

Nikolai Golovin believed that creation the sociology of war requires a great preparatory work, where not only sociologists, but also psychologists and statisticians should be involved. The point is that the human behaviour during the battle is quite different from the one under normal conditions.

The motives of a soldier under the influence of fear transfer to the subconscious: “The person who participates in the battle finds oneself distressed so the behaviour of the fighter is not the behaviour of a normal person, therefore it is impossible to understand the true nature of the war without use of a psychological apparatus” (Головин, 1938: p. 65). In the same way, a war also changes perception of space: “The line separating you from the enemy is the line of death. Nobody likes to approach it, and zealous minds suggest thousands of convenient reasons to avoid further nearing”(Головин, 1938: p. 86).

Nikolai Golovin paid a particular attention to statistics in shaping the sociology of war. He believed that the statistics itself discovered social patterns, but military statistics showed patterns in seemingly random events of wars. Therefore, the future sociology of the war must use all productive methods of studying its object. “Among these methods it is necessary to put a statistical method in the first place which allows us to apply quantitative measurements from many qualitative dimensions that take place in a society. When, with the help of this method, looking for manifestation of the law of a large number, a researcher gets an opportunity to find out objective course of social phenomena” (Головин, 1938: p. 159). Respecting the statistical method, Nikolai Golovin considered statistics only as a necessary condition for creation of the sociology of war. The statistical method in the long run should be only an official condition for development of the sociology of war: “If statistics of war “is needed for“ sociology of war, “then, in turn, the latter is needed for the first” (Головин, 1938: p. 218).
Pathos of the works by Nikolai Golovin is that, in his opinion, there are internal and external sides of a war. Scientists are mainly engaged in the latter one, that is, relations “war-society”. He wanted in the first place to investigate the inner side of a war, that is, actions of armies (Головин, 1938: p. 89).

Nikolai Golovin’s achievements seem ambiguous in the light of modern challenges. On the one hand, he drew attention to the fact that a war changes characteristics of social relations, social spatiality and human behaviour. This approach is still quite promising.

The war frankly transforms large masses of people into means of solving political problems. In the context of military action new channels of social mobility appear. Differences in the views of people which used to be private matters, or just a reason for discussion, become a fundamental principle for division inside a previously united community. Failure in the “friend or foe identification” system in this new situation can come with a high price tag. People, who nobody expected evil from, become butchers and rapists. On the other hand, during a war men and women who used to dwell on a purely private life become philanthropies and s

The landscape features of the terrain, which nobody paid attention to in peacetime, become of vital importance. Hills turn into dominant heights, a railroad embankment becomes a line of defence, an open place, being shot through from all sides, becomes a valley of death. The region, which used to be perceived as consolidated, suddenly is divided into friendly and enemy zones. In the new space configuration so called “necks” of checkpoints created, where civilian population moves across.

Undoubtedly, actions of human groups in direct battleships have not been studied very well yet. But for modern military conflicts, as it can be seen on the example of the war in Donbas, vision of the sociology tasks in a military conflict, which Nikolai Golovin was trying to establish, is not very promising. At the first stage a significant role was played by subversive technologies in which civilian population was used as a tool. The information component played and is still playing a crucial role in the conflict. For many other parameters this war is non-classical and therefore it is tagged with a meaningless label “hybrid” (Рущенко, 2015). In this war, from a purely military point of view, much looks irrational.

To develop a methodology for analysing crises and wars in the modern world, including the Ukrainian crisis and the war in Donbas, a new theoretical perspective is needed that should be broad enough.

**Contours of possible theoretical synthesis**

In my opinion, the new perspective of the vision of modern social reality can be based on three available sociological approaches - world-systems analysis, environmental sociology and the theory of the Second Modernity. All of them arose as a result of a protest against the orthodoxy of social sciences, which had prevailed
undivided until the 1960’s and largely reigns all over the world to these days. It is this orthodoxy that the uncertain methodological state of sociology is associated with.

One of the representatives of the second generation of the world-systems analysis Georgi M. Derluguian describes the situation with emergence of a scientific direction he associates himself with in such a way: “In the 1950s - 1960s, for the first time the question of creating a unified theory that would synthesize achievements of modern social science arose. As a result, there appeared paradigms of modernization of western, liberal, as well as of the Soviet, Marxist variants which were striking by their optimism and scope. Then the modernization paradigm collapsed under the pressure of the 1968 youth protest explosion, which led to the loss of ideological belief in the progress directed from above. Liberation of the younger generation of theoreticians belonging to the modernization school from their teachers’ ideological prejudices led to a series of theoretical breakthroughs in the 1970s, which in total set parameters of a new paradigm” (Дерлугьян, 2013: p. 373-374).

Immanuel Wallerstein, who is the main founder of the world-systems analysis, in 2011 mentioned the dispute with Max Weber followers in the introduction to the reedition of his fundamental work “The Modern World-System I”: “Back then a book by Weber on Protestant ethic received conventional interpretation, according to which presence of certain types of values was a prerequisite for what in the post-war period they sought to call modernization, or (economic) development. For scholars of those times, it was a common practice to examine a country by country for presence (or appearance) of such values. As a result, something like an informal chronological hierarchy of the course of progress was created. Which country was the first in it? Which one was following it? Which one could be the next? And hence the following question arose: to become the next one what must the given country do now? “(Валлерстайн, 2015: p. XVIII). This versatile interpretation has not become a property of history until now. It is still a practical form of actions being taken by the United States and, in general, the West in relation to the rest of the world. In Ukraine, they managed to apply this approach even to the regions.

From the very beginning, Immanuel Wallerstein would rely upon a clear methodological position: “Formation of a conceptual view must determine - at least the greater part of the research period - the range of tools for the research, but not vice versa” (Валлерстайн, 2015: p. 9). In the light of our preliminary consideration, we can only express admiration for such a clear statement. This namely statement made it possible to create a sociological theoretical direction of analysis based on Tibet of historical material, but does not lose its sociological character.

The world-systems analysis begins with the definition of a descriptive unit of the transition from feudal society to the Modernity, acknowledged by different worlds: “Which are adequate to descriptive units of this “difference” and what are its causes? In a way, most of the main theoretical discussions of our time can be reduced to disputes around this great issue of modern social science. Therefore, an analysis of social changes process in the modern world should begin with the
definition of an intellectual route to find the concepts necessary for this analysis” (Валлерстайн, 2015: p. 3). Immanuel Wallerstein made a social system a basic notion. There arose a question of its external borders definition and distinction between internal and external in the development of any given system. The answer to it looks quite economocentric: “We take division of labour as a decisive characteristic of a social system, so that various sectors or geographic areas in it depend on economic exchange with others for unhindered and continuous provision of the areas needs. It is clear that such an economic exchange can exist without a common political structure, and even, what is more obvious, without a common culture shared by all” (Валлерстайн, 2001: p. 23).

Methodological nationalism is the main opponent of the world-systems analysis. Immanuel Wallerstein believes that methodological nationalism creates illusions, and then reificates them. This is particularly evident in the analysis of the so-called “backwardness”. Researchers can quite seriously compare France of the XVII century and India of the XX century, Wahhabism and the European Reformation. The founder of the world-systems analysis wrote: “At this very stage of thinking I rejected the idea of making a sovereign state, or even more uncertain concept of a national community, a desired unit of analysis. I decided that they are not examples of social systems, since talking about social changes is possible only with respect to social systems. The world-system was the only social system in this scheme” (Валлерстайн, 2015: p. 7). The scientist writes that “if we are going to talk about the stages of development - and we need to talk about the stages - these should be the stages of development of social systems, that is, integrities. And the only integrities that exist or existed historically are minisystems and world systems, and in the XIX - XX centuries there was only one world system - the capitalist world economy” (Валлерстайн, 2001: p. 23).

Minisystems existed only at the initial stage of the history, and then there appeared a variety of world-systems that could be either world-economies or world-empires, depending on the dominant way of ensuring integrity. “Leaving aside currently non-functioning minisystems, the only type of social system is the world system, which we define very simply - as a community with a single system of division of labour and a plurality of cultural systems. Hence it turns out that there can exist two varieties of such world-systems - with a common political system and without it. We can describe them as a world-empire and a world-economy” (Валлерстайн, 2001: p. 24).

Before the era of Modernity on our planet there had existed several world-systems. In Europe, due to the coincidence of circumstances (first and foremost, the institutional crisis and the crisis of seniors’ incomes), capitalism got a chance to escape exhausting embrace of feudal structures. During the period that historians would call “the long XVI century” there took place formation and strengthening of the European world-economy. In the very beginning there formed three zones - the centre, the semi-periphery and the periphery. Countries of the centre dominate over the whole capitalist system, the semi-periphery countries
occupy an intermediate position, depending on the centre, but dominant over the periphery. Both, the centre and the semi-periphery take advantage of the periphery. Immanuel Wallerstein believes: “The three structural positions of the world economy - the core (centre), the periphery and the semi-periphery –had stabilized until about 1640. It is a long story why specific areas entered certain zones but not others. The key fact is that in the north-western Europe from the very beginning the given light differences coincided with interests of various local groups and led to the development of a strong state mechanism, but in the peripheral regions they sharply diverged, which led to the weakening of a state mechanism. As soon as we got the difference in the power of state machines, there came into effect the “unequal exchange” imposed by the strong states upon the weak ones, by the core states upon the peripheral regions. Thus, in capitalism not only use an owner appropriation of added value produced by a worker, but also a core zone appropriation of added value produced in the world economy as a whole” (Валлерстайн, 2001: p. 38).

The capitalist world-economy became global in the nineteenth century. Since then it has not lost this property, although it has undergone certain transformations in connection with the Russian Revolution of 1917, the Second World War, formation and collapse of the world socialist system. States all the time have only been the means of managing relations of labor and capital at the local level.

The structure of the system has been changing. There were periods of global hegemony of certain states of the center. Immanuel Wallerstein counted three such cases, when dominated respectively the Netherlands, Great Britain and the USA. Establishment of hegemony had been preceded by long periods of war: “In each case, hegemony was provisioned by thirty years of world war. By a world war I mean (again, to impose limits) aground one, which involves into clashes (not necessarily for a long time) almost all major military states of the era, which leads to devastating consequences for the land and population. One of such wars is associated with each case of hegemony. The “Alpha” World War was thirty years long and continued from 1618 to 1648, when interests of Holland in the world economy won over interests of the Habsburgs. The “Beta” World War is the Napoleonic wars between 1792 and 1815. Then British interests won over the French. The “Gamma” World War is a long Euro-Asian war between 1914 and 1945, when interests of the United States won over interests of Germany” (Валлерстайн, 2001: p. 101).

Functioning of the capitalist world-economy involves internal rhythms, the main one is called “The Long Waves” by N. D. Kondratieff. Modern authors count 5 Kondratieff’s cycles of the world economy from the end of the 1780s and for each of them they calculated crises on both phases (Гринин, Коротаев, 2012). Each of the waves ended with transition from one technological pattern to another along with change of the overall design of the Modernity society. The crisis of 2008 seemed to indicate beginning of a new wave in its ascending phase, though it was not observed. It seems that capitalism as a global system has exhausted its reproductive functions.
Immanuel Wallerstein studied differences between Kondratieff’s waves. I will not dwell on this in detail. I will only notice that all phases of development of capitalism were associated with externalization of expenses. Now, too, countries of the center of the world capitalist system are struggling to shift costs upon someone else. But their opportunities in the modern world have significantly decreased. This also applies to environmental constraints, to deruralization and democratization in the modern world. The theorist of the world-systems analysis believed that “the result will be the beginning of “chaos” which is simply an extension of normal fluctuations of the system with a cumulative effect” (Валлерстайн, 2001: p. 364). The world system will be becoming increasingly unstable, states will be losing power and “small wars” will be spreading. Distraction of resources for a new arms race will lead to spread of diseases (Immanuel Wallerstein speaks of AIDS) (Валлерстайн, 2001: p. 364-369).

Collapse of the capitalism now does not promise a new just world, since humanity has no acceptable alternative. The prospects seem uncertain: “After bifurcation, after, say, 2050 or 2075, we can be sure of a very few things. We will no longer live in the capitalist world-economy. Instead, we will live in a new order or orders, in some new historical system or systems. And then we are likely to experience relative peace, stability and legitimacy that we experienced before, or even worse. This is unknown to us, and it depends on us” (Валлерстайн, 2001: p. 370).

The US hegemony is now weakening. If in 1980-1990 this country would absorb up to two-thirds of the world’s investment capital (Дерлугьян, 2013: p. 21), then its significant flows shifted to China. The EU and, at a certain stage, Russia became attractive places for investments. All this pushes the weakening hegemony to find answers to challenges. Georgi M. Derluguian rightly draws attention to the specific features of the American hegemony, comparing it to the Britain’s one: “The British Empire, of course, was colonial. The American global empire is based on an hierarchy of formally independent states held in an acceptable for the hegemony state by various mechanisms of “common values”, trade agreements, financial institutions, and, not least of all, military bases” (Дерлугьян, 2013: p. 21).

Peculiarities of American hegemony affect the whole world system. This is namely what such a phenomenon as “proxy war” is associated with, when a hegemon avoids participation in direct wars, but it stimulates or regulates war between the countries of the periphery and the semi-periphery in needed way.

Here one must take into account yet another feature of the modern development of the world capitalist system. Georgi M. Derluguian wrote about it the following: “The paradox is that the state power is replaced by the power of elite families both in the center of the system and on its far periphery. Capitalist oligarchy co-operate and pull the same end of a rope only in the core, but on the
periphery, the oligarchs constantly split up and brutally intrigue against each other, not allowing a strong power to crystallize in order not to come under its influence” (Дерлугян, 2013: p. 211).

During the years of independence Ukraine has dropped precisely to the periphery of the world capitalist system, although initial conditions allowed the country to stay in a semi-periphery with a prospect of recovery (Кононов, 2012). Elite groups which at that time were being formed became the main subjects of peripheralization of the country. They turned into the main exploiters of geo-economic rent, which overflowed into the core of the world capitalist system. It is possible to agree with Georgi M. Derluguian, who wrote about the Eastern Europe elites: “Change of the dependence vector has become their strategy of recovering from the revolutions” (Дерлугян, 2013: p. 199).

World-systems analysis, represented by the works by Andre Gunder Frank, Immanuel Wallerstein, Giovanni Arrighi, Samir Amin, A. Korotayev, Georgi M. Derluguian, etc., is one of the most powerful areas of sociological analysis in contemporary social science. One can fully agree with Georgi M. Derluguian that: “it is very difficult to present a world-systems view in a concise statement. This is not a theory, but an epistemological movement of a metatheoretic level, a call for paradigm change of the entire science of the XIX–XX centuries” (Дерлугян, 2013: p. 367).

This does not mean that we must accept the works of Immanuel Wallerstein as a new Holy Scripture. I have already mentioned that in his writings sometimes non-economic factors of social development are ignored, and the real unity of human history is associated only with capitalism (Кононов, 2013: p. 97). At the same time, the world-systems analysis provides a general framework for theoretical synthesis in contemporary sociology.

At the same time it should be noted that representatives of the world-systems analysis demonstrate openness to synthesis, but so far only with close directions in sociology and economics. Georgi M. Derluguian shares the opinion of Randall Collins that the most breakthrough achievements in the understanding of macro-historical processes were the following ones: 1) a new theory of emergence and development of a state; 2) the study of revolutions in interaction with civil society; 3) niche market theory; 4) the world-systems perspective (Дерлугян, 2013: p. 333). On the work done mainly in the 1970’s he wrote: “Breakthroughs were carried out by separate schools, sometimes even not connected with other schools. We, the next one or two generations of researchers, have an exciting job at the same time mastering and, then, using these theoretical breakthroughs “(Дерлугян, 2013: p. 374). On the one hand, one should only welcome such sentiments, but, on the other hand, we should speak about theoretical blindness. Researchers take into account theoretical approaches which are close to their ones.

The problem of interaction of a society with what is called “the natural environment” constantly appears on the pages of works by Immanuel
Wallerstein. In the preface to the 2011 “The Modern World-System I” he even wrote a rather amusing paragraph: “Finally, I was criticized for neglecting a factor of environment. First of all, I was inclined to recognize that I, of course, did it unintentionally. However, I was deprived from this ambiguous justification by Jason W. Moore who, following a careful reading of the first volume, showed that the environmental factors and their influence on the process of building the capitalist world-economy are an integral part of my research and, moreover, are in its center. I was really impressed that in my book I embodied the factor for ignoring of which I had been being blamed” (Валлерстайн, 2015: p. Xxx). Despite the sincere surprise of the author, one still must say that the environmental factors in his works are factors of the external environment. Though we must speak about a deeper reality.

A group of authors with different scientific backgrounds (anthropologist Gregory Bateson, physicist Fritjof Capra, cultural scientist Theodore Roszak, sociologist William Robert Catton Jr.) began to work on this reality together with the founders of the world-systems analysis. Within this broad movement there emerged Environmental sociology. Its further fate is paradoxical enough. Despite the fact that environmental problems are becoming more acute, survival of the mankind literally depends on their solution, perception of the ideas of environmental sociology by the global sociological community remains extremely insignificant. Often, environmental sociology is being reduced to “sociology of ecological environment.” Meanwhile, we are talking about a fundamentally new approach to social life.

In environmental sociology, a society is analyzed as an open system. Social environmental metabolism becomes a central concept of analysis. Metabolic processes between humanity and the natural environment on the Earth’s surface, metabolic processes in the natural environment itself and in social systems constitute the very condition of social life (Яницкий, 2013).

The precedent text of environmental sociology is the work by William Catton Jr. “Overshoot. The Ecological Basis of Revolutionary Change” (Каттон м.л., 2006). William Catton Jr. constantly turns to Thomas Malthus as to a classic author and contrasts own position with sociologism of Emile Durkheim. Apparently, this is one of the reasons for the insensitivity of the main body of the sociological community to the ideas of environmental sociology. Sociologists, as an axiom, keep repeating that social facts should be explained by other social facts. In this case, even human communities are considered as reduced biotic communities where people dominate (Каттон м.л., 2006: p. 100).

The “carrying capacity” is the main category of analysis in the work by William Catton Jr. He gives the following definition to it: “An environment’s carrying capacity for a given kind of creature (a given way of life) is the maximum persistently feasible load - just short of the load that would damage
that environment’s ability to support life of that kind. <...> Carrying capacity can be expressed quantitatively as the number of us, living in a given manner, which a given environment can support indefinitely.” (Каттон мл., 2006: p. 22).

Human communities are trying to increase the carrying capacity of their lives. The oldest way to do it is to conquer territory of other communities and destroy competitors. For these reasons, European settlers organized genocide of the Indians. It is possible to invent unique technologies and to achieve trade advantages, which form “ghost acreage”, which supposedly increase carrying capacity. Yet, since the beginning of industrial production, the main way to increase carrying capacity was use of Earth’s nonrenewable mineral resources. William Catton Jr. writes: “Ghost acreage of the Carboniferous period was the resource base for “modern” living.” (Каттон мл., 2006: p. 57). One of the key figures in human history from this point of view is an English inventor, improver of a steam engine - James Watt.

Capitalism, as a social form of development of industrial production, carried fundamentally important environmental consequences. Firstly, humanity began to turn into a collective saprophyte, powered by the energy of dead organisms. This gave a sense of illusory independence from the carrying capacity of the planet and expectation that the population, which number is constantly increasing, can constantly raise the standard of living. The “Age of Exuberance” has begun. In our time, the carrying capacity of the planet is exceeded by 10 times (Каттон мл., 2006: p. 59).

Secondly, during the period of capitalism, humanity has become an anti-evolutional mechanism. If biological evolution has been binding carbon and has been hiding it under the surface of the planet, humanity, on the contrary, has rapidly begun to release it and emit it into the atmosphere. It threatens balance in the atmosphere, which opened the door to the higher forms of life, including a mankind. For now 1/5 of the air is oxygen, 99% of which has been released by biosphere over the past 600 million years. Carbon used to be fixed at a rate of 625,000 tons per year. Since the 1970’s people have been annually emitting about 4 billion tons of it back to the atmosphere, destroying gas balance at a catastrophic speed (Каттон мл., 2006: p. 59). Modern people are stealing resources from their descendants: “Posterity doesn’t vote, and doesn’t exert much influence in the marketplace. Therefore, the present began to steal from the posterity”(Каттон мл., 2006: p. 57).

Thirdly, struggle for resources has long been one of the main factors of tension between human communities and within communities themselves. The dream of general well-being is completely illusory. The countries of the center of the world capitalist system seek to maintain their level of prosperity at the expense of peripheral countries, while those, in turn, demand fair redistribution of resources. The success of such a struggle is, as a rule, achieved through degradation of the environment (modern China can serve as an example). William Catton Jr. explicitly writes: “The rest of the world can no longer be expected to attain the high
standard of living to which so many in America became accustomed.” (Каттон м.л., 2006: p. 79). Though demonstration effect pushes precisely to such aspirations.

The resource component now present in all modern wars and its significance will only intensify. The strategy of struggle for resource advantages of individual countries worsens the chances for survival, but the whole system of relations drags one to selfish behavior. At the same time, “Opinion leaders would generally continue seeking political explanations for erosion of freedom, and would continue neglecting ecological pressure causing it.” (Каттон м.л., 2006: p. 55). In societies in different forms, the search for “unnecessary members” will escalate, and everyone will be afraid of becoming one. This also applies to individual peoples. “… Nazism is partly a reaction of the nation to the fact that it was considered superfluous” (Каттон м.л., 2006: p. 191).

Succession is waiting for any biological species, which exceeded the carrying capacity of its territory. Succession means transition of the biological community from one type to another. For dominant species there are three variants of succession: 1) loss of dominant position; 2) extinction; 3) migration to another habitat (Каттон м.л., 2006: p. 105). If the mankind do not think for a moment, then the second option is the most probable one: “There’s only one law for all biological species: exploding population, exceeding of the carrying capacity, extinction” (Каттон м.л., 2006: p. 185).

Although William Catton Jr. frankly tells his reader that “we came to the end yesterday” that humanity entered the “Post-Exuberant Age” (era after prosperity), when by inertia population continues growing, but less resources left for it, which leads to an increasingly inhospitable world order with fierce hierarchy, he, nevertheless, wants to leave some sort of hope. Here it is worth saying that the founder of Environmental sociology believed that a human, having turned into a collective saprophyte, became a Homocolossus. This colossus, as it is, is standing on clay feet. Moreover, it is destroying biosphere, which is a condition for its existence. Therefore, we need to go back to Homosapiens: “We shall learn to live within the limits of the carrying capacity, giving up attempts to destroy it. We shall learn to live based on renewable resources and consume them no faster than they are renewed. Ecological modesty is the last hope for the humankind” (Каттон м.л., 2006: p. 231). Elsewhere, William Catton Jr. even wrote: “We shall keep the planet as it used to be when Homosapiens appeared on it” (Каттон м.л., 2006: p. 209).

I have already said that the project of environmental sociology by William Catton Jr. possesses intentions that make it inappropriate for sociological community. Now I will point out some more. It involves switching to renewable energy sources. This, in turn, objectively implies a sharp decline in the population across the world. Should such a setting turn into a political guideline, it will make our planet a hell. Countries of the center of the world capitalist system will forcefully channel the
expectations of depopulation to the periphery. Ukraine is already facing this. The western partners of the current ruling coalition in our country advise us to move on towards agrarianism, which inevitably means reducing the population. This perspective is being openly discussed (Кто толкает Украину, 2016).

William Catton Jr. regards a human as a purely terrestrial phenomenon, not taking into account possible space direction of a human development. Even the call for ecological modesty, which in general can only be welcomed, is based on a utopian basis. Mankind cannot bring the Earth back to a state that existed 40 thousand years ago. One can agree that human activity during the period of industrial development has become a creeping catastrophe for the planet’s biosphere, which is now breaking through with planetary catastrophes, and Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant is one of the examples. Scientists have sufficiently proved that it is impossible to return to the pre-crash state after the disaster, but we must seek a new balance of the system (Яницкий, 2013).

Environmental sociology allows us to understand the current crisis of the world capitalist system as destruction of the detritus ecosystem. Such a view can be fully integrated into the world-systems perspective. But the synthesis of these areas of sociological analysis cannot be carried out on the basis of subordination of environmental sociology to the world-systems analysis. Environmental sociology - this is an extremely broad view upon society as a type of open systems capable of self-organization and self-development. Capitalism is just a menacing episode in the history of mankind. Though collapse of capitalism may lead to collapse of Homosapiens. Due to these circumstances, environmental sociology may pretend to become a general theoretical framework for the development of contemporary sociology.

The doctrine of the Second Modernity by Ulrich Beck and Zygmunt Bauman should become the third element of theoretical synthesis. These authors pay attention to the Modernity stages. In their view, today’s problems of mankind are connected with transition from the First Modernity to the Second one. According to Ulrich Beck, the Second Modernity is a global society of risk. Modern risks differ from the risks of previous ages by the fact that they are made by society, being a part of social reproduction. In these conditions society lost the other in nature. To draw a border between them on our planet is to sow illusions. Science, which in the previous period of Modernity used to be considered the main hope of mankind, is now also included in production of risks: “Now, when transiting to the practice, sciences encounter their own objectified past and modern; being a product and a producer of reality and problems that they have to analyze and overcome. They are not only a source of problem solving, but at the same time - a source of problems “(Бек, 2000: p. 237).

The Second Modernity on the system-level is different from the First one: at the level of technology (industrial and information societies), at the level of social
structures (globalization of the ruling class, uprising of transnational bourgeoisie and dispersal, atomization of people of hired labor), at the level of fears and expectations (Коннов, 2013: p. 311-312).

A detailed picture of people’s lives in societies of the Second Modernity has been depicted by Zygmunt Bauman for many years. He names the First Modernity - “heavy modernity”, and the Second one- “light modernity” (Бауман, 2005: p. 27). At the level of economic relations, the “heavy modernity’ was, indeed, the time of engagement between capital and labor fortified by the mutuality of their dependency” (Бауман, 2005: p. 27). Now “... capital abolished its dependence on labor through the new freedom of movement, which no one had ever dreamed of. Its reproduction and growth were largely independent on duration of a particular local labor agreement “(Бауман, 2005: p. 27).

Zygmunt Bauman speaks of an individualized society, since responsibility for one’s fate solely lies upon an individual. An individual is granted such freedom, which history has never experienced before. Risks and contradictions meanwhile are still being reproduced by society, though it is an individual who is now obliged to overcome them alone (Бауман, 2005: p. 59). Individuals are forced to take responsibility in a world where “order is losing value as such” and where “rematch of nomads” is taking place (Бауман, 2005: p. 44). Uncertainty and anxiety become psychological background of the present, because “... not only position of an individual in a society, but also roles they can have access to and obtain, quickly transform and can hardly serve as a goal of someone’s life” (Бауман, 2005: p. 183).

For the many of atomized people of hired labor and for the self-employed, whose number grows, Zygmunt Bauman uses a notion of “precarious” (from the English Precarious - questionable, uncertain, unstable, dangerous). He writes the following on the fate of these people: “The proletariat is rapidly transforming into the precariat, being completed by ever widening stratum of the middle class. Reversal transformation is no longer possible. Transformation of the proletariat of the past into a military class was greatly given a boost by the regimes - just as the current atomization of the precarious, the heir and the undertaker of proletarian traditions and heritage” (Бауман, Донскіс, 2014: p. 83).

In the context of the Second Modernity, regimes change become self-centered. They turn into irresponsible ones. It is essential that regimes and politics are increasingly diverging among themselves. “Elision and avoidance come instead of engagement as the main method of domination” (Бауман, 2005: p. 44).

The ease of power in the modern world is combined with a rigid hierarchy: “Today, about twenty rich but troubled and unconfident countries are confronting the rest of the world, which is no longer inclined to focus on their understanding of progress and happiness, though day by day getting more dependent on them, even in preserving fragments of happiness or simply surviving at the expense of scant own funds “(Бауман, 2005: p. 105).
Powers dominating the modern world undermine political institutions. It is manifested by weakening of states and is particularly noticeable on the periphery of the world capitalist system. “To ensure freedom of maneuver and limitless expansion of opportunities to pursue their goals, global financial, trade and information systems are interested in political fragmentation on a planetary scale. One can say that they need “weak states”, that is, those states which, despite their weakness, still remain states” (Bauman, 2005: p. 242). Zygmunt Bauman writes that such weak states needed as “local police departments” (Bauman, 2005: p. 243). Without these “departments” it would be difficult for dominating non-political powers to ensure at least a minimum level of public security needed for the capital to achieve its purpose and profit.

In the context of the Second Modernity capital needs people primarily as consumers. One of the consequences of this factor is general moral degradation. Zygmunt Bauman says: “A consumerist attitude may lubricate the wheels of the economy, but it sprinkles sand into the bearings of morality” (Bauman, Донскіс, 2014: p. 23). This is another reason for degradation of democracy. By common consent, more and more areas of public life are deprived of moral assessment. Zygmunt Bauman called this process “adiaphorization” (Bauman, Донскіс, 2014: p. 52). Moral evaluations are replaced by pragmatic judgments, which can change by 180 degrees depending on the situation.

The theory of the Second Modernity essentially complements the world-systems analysis with details of the mesa and micro levels. However, between provisions of these areas of sociological analysis there are significant moments of tension. One of which is the globalization concept. Immanuel Wallerstein decisively rejects it, considering it another edition of modernization (Валлерстайн, 2008). Zygmunt Bauman considers it valuable: “... The concept of “globalization” was created in order to replace previous concept of “universalization” when it became apparent that establishment of global ties and networks had nothing to do with intentions and controllability implied by it. The notion of globalization describes processes that are arbitrary, spontaneous and disordered, processes that occur without participation of people sitting at control panels, engaged in planning taking responsibility for the final result” (Bauman, 2005: p. 43).

The call for synthesis, which is offered here, should be accompanied by some considerations. Due to the specialization of research, there has developed a situation of weakness of the side vision in contemporary sociology. Representatives of any given school see either their advocates or opponents. Schools, which may be close by theoretical intentions, left out of sight if they use a different language. Therefore, representatives of the world-systems analysis do not notice supporters of the theory of the Second Modernity, and vice versa. Environmental sociology in general is left on the periphery of modern sociological theorizing. Each of the considered theoretical positions has its own relation to empiricism. For the world-systems analysis the empirical level consists of historical research, for environmental sociology - social ecology, for the theory of the Second Modernity -
current newsmaking and state statistics. It also causes their disregard for each other. Meanwhile, their synthesis could fundamentally change situation in contemporary sociology and the very position of sociology among social sciences.

By the way, the synthesis does not involve elimination of the schools mentioned above. It is enough in researches to simply take into consideration ideas of each other. Only the future will show chances of creating a synthetic theory. Now it is necessary to bring several ideas into a single focus of theoretical attention.

1. The Modernity has always had the world capitalist system as its social form. It, having split into the centre, the semi-periphery and the periphery, spatially distributes flows of resources and risks. Resources accumulate in the center, though risks (including environmental) - in the periphery. This makes the entire structure conflict-ridden and unstable.

2. In its development, the world capitalist system, after it became truly global in the nineteenth century, have experienced two periods - the First and Second Modernity. The Second Modernity at the same time is also a crisis stage of the world capitalist system. Consequently, the Modernity itself can exist beyond limits of capitalism.

3. Merging of capitalism and Modernity has its ecological basis, which has turned humanity into an analogue of detrital biological system, which stipulated dependence of humanity on non-renewable natural resources and made the human society extremely vulnerable, causing endless struggle for resources between human groups. Hence comes the paradox - despite the spread of humanism ideas, during the Modern era, one genocide followed another.

4. Mutual movement of social and environmental factors has led the world capitalist system to a general crisis, which threatens not only capitalism, but the sociality itself.

5. Until now, general crisis of capitalism has not been followed by elaboration of a higher and environmentally friendly production method. The former alternatives to capitalism were developed based on belief in unlimited progress. The new alternative must take into account the fact that on the planet Earth, mankind has gone beyond the “era of abundance.” Period of instability will continue until a new social form for Modernity is found. There will be resource wars ideologically interpreted as battles for cultural values or for “irrepressible freedom”. It is difficult to predict in advance how long the instability will last. A few abstract ideas is not enough for overcoming it. We need a new social group that combines ecological imperative with imperative of social justice. According to the content, such changes will be identical to the world anti-capitalist revolution, which, in addition to the above, will also ensure political unity of mankind.

In the framework of this synthesis one can understand the irrational in modern life associated with crises and wars. It is a result of piling up of many contradictions
on one another, which sometimes leads to formation of incompatible values in one society, different coordinates of action in one social system. To understand this we need a general theory of contemporary social development. As P. Kopnin wrote, “... rational and irrational are moments of a single process of development of human knowledge. It is impossible to deal away with the irrational in one fell swoop, it is conquered in the course of development of humanity and its thinking. This historical process of transformation of irrational into rational never ends in the movement of knowledge itself and human practice “(Копнин, 1974: p. 340).

Conclusions

Attempts of sociological study of modern crises and wars have revealed a crisis state of the modern sociological methodology. It sets one-dimensional statistical functionalism as the main methodological benchmark and isolates sociology from methodological changes triggered by the Fourth scientific revolution.

The analysis shows that reducing sociological methodology to combination of methods of obtaining initial sociological information and mathematical methods of its processing occurred upon transformation of sociology into institution of democratic society. When accompanying election campaigns and other democratic procedures, sociology has been becoming more consumptive. Practical mind needed no sophisticated theory, but demanded accuracy of calculations.

Sociology objectively holds a position of a representative of civil society. Development of modern capitalism has resulted in a significant deterioration of the latter. Extensive development of institutions of civil society in the modern world facilitated with the fact that they are financed by various funds which control various factions of the ruling classes in one or another country as well as globally. This also aggravated a problem of investing in sociological research. Sociology falls into dependence on political class and on economically dominant strata. This has made a service function leading in sociology. Statistics has become a general theory that guides empirical sociological research.

Discrepancy between theoretical and methodological levels of the modern sociology has come around. Examples of unity of theoretical and methodological searches from writings of the classics of our science can help to improve the situation.

To understand the modern world it is practicable to promote convergence of positions of the world-systems analysis, environmental sociology and the theory of the Second Modernity. This theoretical position will allow the contemporary world to be reflected on the mega-, macro-, mesa- and micro-levels. As a result, there will be a theoretical platform for explaining specific crises and wars.
In this light, the Ukrainian crisis and the Donbas war will be plunged into the global context and explained through contradictions of the modern world capitalist system, but not simply through psychological inadequacy of a particular leader or, which is worse, through ethnic factors. In this event, all attempts to place responsibility for social disturbances on inhabitants of a region will lose even a shape of scientific knowledge and can be classified as they deserve it, namely, as manipulative technology in favor of one of the factions of the ruling class.

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(Translated from the Ukrainian language by Igor Roznatovsky)
The paper presents a complete report about the research which had a specific task: to use small samples for testing the Cultural Quotient Scale (or the Cultural Intelligence Scale), which is wide-spread in social sciences for measuring the capability of an individual to function effectively in situations characterised by cultural diversity. This instrument has been developed by American researchers and mainly tested with groups of business-leaders and managers in Western countries. Active investigations of transferability, or possibility to transfer and use this technique in other regions, including Ukraine, have been carried out in recent years.

Validation of the Cultural Quotient Scale (CQS) in Ukraine should consist of several stages. Taking into account the polysemantic nature of the concept of cultural intelligence, ambiguity of its translation into Ukrainian and Russian, as well as specifics of Ukrainian citizens’ perception of other cultures and their attitudes towards cross-cultural interaction, adaptation of CQS was a justified and necessary step allowing for its further use in representative surveys. A qualitative sociological research has been conducted for this purpose. The results of this research are presented in this paper.

Keywords: cross-cultural competence, Cultural Quotient Scale (CQS) testing, adaptation of the CQS, validation, focus group research, small sample

Research Methodology

Academic research of cross-cultural processes and states in terms of “cultural intelligence”, which in turn articulates rational substantiation of cultural knowledge and cultural interactions, has not been practised in Ukraine. However, the “cultural competence” concept, which is understood as a derivative of “cultural education / awareness” and “cultural sensitivity”, is widely used by Ukrainian sociologists in the explanation of cross-cultural communication and cultural participation of the population (Соціокультурні ідентичності та практики, 2002; Медіа. Демократія. Культура, 2008; Субкультурна варіативність, 2010). This terminology is used in management and business-research, the reference is mostly given to G. Hofstede (Hofstede G., Hofstede Gert, Minkov, 2010; Хофтеде, 2002; Буко, 2006).

The concept of cultural intelligence has been widely used in social sciences since 2003, determined as “the capability of an individual to function effectively in situations characterised by cultural diversity” (Ang, 2008: p. 3). The coefficient of cultural intelligence termed CQ (cultural quotient) similar to the overall intelligence quotient (IQ) and emotional quotient (EQ) is an expression of a specific form of intelligence which helps an individual to function in culturally diverse settings and manage them effectively (for more details see: http://www.culturalq.com/research.html). The Cultural Quotient Scale, or CQS has been developed by American researchers as a measuring instrument and mainly tested with groups of leaders and managers in Western countries. Later, the testing and approval of the CQS along with trainings of personnel for raising the level of their cultural intelligence were carried out in other territories and regions (Van Dyne, Ang, Koh, 2008; Ang, Van Dyne, Tan, 2011; Livermore, 2010; House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, Gupta, 2004). Recently, investigations of transferability, or possibility to transfer and use these methods in a wider range of countries with different cultures (Goh, 2009) have been performed. Owing to the efforts of Boyd Johnson, participant of the Organisational Leadership Ph.D Programme in Indiana Wesleyan University (Barnes, Johnson, Buko, Kostenko, 2012), the Cultural Quotient Scale was tested and approved in the Institute of Sociology of the NAS of Ukraine for the first time.

Within the framework of our study, we do not mention discussions concerning relevance of the concept of cultural intelligence (Хухлаєв, 2010). Taking into account the importance of exploring the challenges of intercultural
communication in the present-day world and the need to improve technologies of cross-cultural projects, it would be advisable to confine our study to concrete, specific tasks.

Validation of the Cultural Quotient Scale (CQS) in Ukraine implies the completion of several stages. Considering the polysemantc nature of the concept of cultural intelligence, ambiguity of its translation into Ukrainian and Russian, as well as specifics of Ukrainian citizens’ perception of other cultures and their attitudes towards cross-cultural interaction, adaptation of CQS was a justified and necessary step allowing for its further use in representative surveys. A qualitative sociological study (Якісні дослідження, 2009) has been conducted for this purpose. The results obtained in this research are presented in this paper.

The purpose of the qualitative phase of the research is to identify content validity of the cultural intelligence scale (CQS) and adapt it for further use in a representative survey.

Tasks and objectives of the research are as follows:

— to determine the overall differentiation capacity of the scale (CQS), its selected questions and units, as well as possibility of their application to Ukrainian audience;
— to provide a general description of scale perception on the basis of the participants’ reactions to the questionnaire and on further discussions;
— to identify barriers to understanding and perception of the CQS questions among Ukrainian participants; to detect characteristics of their attitudes towards cross-cultural interaction;
— to establish the interpretation limits for separate questions; to specify the appropriate approaches to translation of separate questions and wordings.

Focus group discussions were chosen as a method. The relevance of this method is determined by the following reasons: 1) discussion helps to determine the participants’ understanding of cross-cultural interaction issues, as well as their interpretations of CQS questions, 2) within the group, participants based their answers both on their personal estimates and on standards and patterns acceptable in the dominant culture; 3) the discussion itself partially “shapes” the flow of cross-cultural interaction since participants are of different sex, age, educational background, income and ethnicity (Ukrainians, Russians).

After the preparatory stage implying development and adaptation of the research instrument, two different focus groups (FG) were engaged. FG participants were representatives of the “general public” (GP) and “leaders” (L) who worked in different non-governmental organisations (see Table 1a and 1b). The group of “leaders” could be considered as a “control group” since CQS initially implies leadership evaluation. Focus groups worked on July 5, 2012 in Kyiv.
Structure of the focus groups:

**Table 1a**

**“General public” FG demographic composition**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant code</th>
<th>Person, age</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>Educational attainment</th>
<th>Income level</th>
<th>Has been abroad or not</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GP1</td>
<td>Zhanna, 28</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>18–40</td>
<td>University degree</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GP2</td>
<td>Dmytro, 18</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>18–40</td>
<td>Complete secondary education</td>
<td>Lower than average</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GP3</td>
<td>Natalia, 55</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>55+</td>
<td>Complete secondary education</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GP4</td>
<td>Malika, 19</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>18–40</td>
<td>Complete secondary education</td>
<td>Lower than average</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GP5</td>
<td>Anatolii, 44</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>41–54</td>
<td>University degree</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GP6</td>
<td>Ihor, 37</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>18–40</td>
<td>Complete secondary education</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GP7</td>
<td>Oleksandr, 46</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>41–54</td>
<td>University degree</td>
<td>Lower than average</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GP8</td>
<td>Svitlana, 43</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>41–54</td>
<td>Vocational education</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 1b**

**Demographic composition of the “Leaders” FG**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant code</th>
<th>Person, age</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>Educational attainment</th>
<th>Income level</th>
<th>Has been abroad or not</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>L1</td>
<td>Tetiana, 54</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>41–54</td>
<td>University degree</td>
<td>Lower than average</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L2</td>
<td>Larysa, 53</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>41–54</td>
<td>University degree</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L3</td>
<td>Oleksandr, 19</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>18–40</td>
<td>University degree</td>
<td>Lower than average</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L4</td>
<td>Olena, 27</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>18–40</td>
<td>University degree</td>
<td>Lower than average</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L5</td>
<td>Dmytro, 56</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>55+</td>
<td>University degree</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L6</td>
<td>Tania, 62</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>55+</td>
<td>University degree</td>
<td>Lower than average</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L7</td>
<td>Olesia, 33</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>18–40</td>
<td>University degree</td>
<td>Higher than average</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L8</td>
<td>Yurii, 31</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>18–40</td>
<td>University degree</td>
<td>Higher than average</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L9</td>
<td>Oleksii, 38</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>18–40</td>
<td>University degree</td>
<td>Higher than average</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The situation in which focus groups operated was specific in two respects, both of them were immediately related to cross-cultural interaction. Firstly, the 2012 UEFA European Championship (Euro 2012) that took place in Kyiv had just finished. That is the reason why the cross-cultural interaction concept became even more relevant to the participants. Secondly, the so-called “language law” (“On the principles of the state language policy”) had become a hot topic in the Ukrainian Parliament at that period. Discussion of the language law caused a noticeable reaction both from its supporters and its opponents, which in turn significantly affected the mood of the “leaders”. They were quite emotional in their contradictory statements on the FG topic before the discussion started.

Segmentation of cultural intelligence space in the Ukrainian audience (CQS differentiation capacity)

Participants were asked to fill out the cultural intelligence questionnaire before the main goals of the research were explained to them and focus groups were started. This was done in order to capture their spontaneous reactions to the CQS. Since two languages are spoken in Ukraine, two versions of the questionnaire translated as close as possible were offered to the participants — both in Ukrainian and in Russian (see Appendix A). A list of test questions was presented along with a 7-point scale where “1” means “absolutely disagree” and “7” means “completely agree”.

The data array (17 questionnaires) was processed by the SPSS software package. Correspondence analysis was used as a tool for data grouping. The results are rather illustrative due to a considerable number of respondents in both groups. On the other hand, these results demonstrate differential capacity of the CQS when applied to the Ukrainian audience; they also can be used to formulate a hypothesis within representative survey.

According to the respondents’ answers to the CQS questions, there are three segments linked to different intercultural communication styles (see Figure 1 in Appendix A). Orientation towards the pragmatic, or behavioural style prevails in one of the segments. The behavioural unit differentiates Ukrainian audience most clearly (see Figure 2 in Appendix A); it can be noticed through altered facial expressions during interaction, verbal and non-verbal behaviour, as well as through the speech rate. Such a style is typical of half of all participants, both “leaders” and “general public” representatives. There were no significant differences in age, sex, educational background and income level. The following discussion analysis confirms that most of these participants were result-oriented in the course of intercultural communication. The participants tended to consider characteristics of a particular cross-cultural situation; some of them gave examples of successful, effective communication with representatives of other cultures where they were able to adjust their knowledge during cross-cultural interaction.

The second segment is based on the cognitive type of attitudes (knowledge of foreign language rules, values and norms of another culture), metacognitive
(awareness of one’s own cultural knowledge in the process of interaction, check of the person’s own accuracy of knowledge about other cultures) and motivational one (pleasure gained from communication with representatives of other cultures, which is typical of all segments of the audience). The issue is concerned with the so-called *cultural value style*. This kind of cultural-value attitudes (pleasant intercultural communication based on the knowledge of cultural traditions, customs and language) is typical of young and well-educated women participants.

Elements of motivational, cognitive and metacognitive units can be found among the attitudes of the third segment where the *projective style* dominates. The following aspects were listed within motivational reactions: confidence in one’s own ability to cope with stress, adjustment to local shopping and trading conditions, pleasure from living in an unfamiliar culture, ability to find a common ground with its representatives. The following aspects were listed within the cognitive unit: confidence in knowledge of the legal and economic systems of different countries, as well as (to a lesser extent) ability to use non-verbal behaviour during cross-cultural interaction. Metacognitive elements include confidence in conscious use of cultural knowledge in cross-cultural interactions (less differentiated) and adaptation or adjustment of one’s own cultural knowledge in interactions with people of different cultures (more differentiated). “Leaders” are more prone to this style. Further analysis of the focus group discussion has shown that many of these leaders tend to be very expressive in justification of personal perceptions, they have a vivid imagination, a broad outlook, the ability to appeal both to the personal experience and to experience of other people, as well as to draw conclusions from the latter. The style of reactions to the CQS test within this group should be termed *projective*, since communication with other cultures is rather perceived as communication with the “imagined other”. The result of this kind of interaction cannot be considered negative, since these leaders attribute to themselves such characteristics as high level of cultural knowledge, confidence in their own abilities, friendliness and open-mindedness.

Range of the “cultural intelligence” styles can be measured using the following axes: *Reflection vs. interaction* and *Pragmatism, situation vs. values, traditions* (see Figure 1 in Appendix A).

**Focus-Group Discussions and Interpretation of Results**

**General Estimation of the Questionnaire**

The participants’ general impression of the CQS test after its completion was mostly negative. They obviously recognised importance and relevance of cross-cultural interaction problems, but they faced difficulties connected with understanding questions (in particular, because of the language barrier, since questions are given in English), as well as with the format of questionnaire.

*Question content:* most participants were surprised by a great number of questions. In their opinion, in many cases questions and their context duplicated
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each other, which resulted in tautology, complexity and incomprehensibility. This kind of resentment can be explained by several factors of psychological, cognitive, and axiological nature.

Compulsion to take rational actions. Respondents felt as if the questionnaire’s content suggests that they should carefully monitor themselves, pay attention to the slightest nuances of their behaviour and knowledge reserve, check and critically re-evaluate it. In the process of further discussion such kind of activity was labelled by participants as meaningless and unnecessary. Although participants use cross-cultural interaction strategies and tactics mentioned in the questionnaire in a real life (as can be seen from the examples given by them in the course of discussion), they did not think of the possibility of this kind of articulation and reflections of their actions and experiences before. Hence, new knowledge about conscious monitoring of their own practices in intercultural interaction, they have received, could have caused cognitive dissonance and overall rejection of the questionnaire.

The need for critical self-evaluation. CQS implies total agreement with listed statements. Respondents perceived such implication as some kind of the “most correct”, “approved” or “perfect” answers, which they could not give for different reasons. They were irritated by the statements “I know”, “I am sure”, and “I am confident”. Such radical statements were considered inappropriate in their nature, since “it is impossible for one person to know everything about all cultures in the world”. During the focus group discussion, participants used comments like “‘I know’ is the statement that has frightened me the most”; “‘I know, know, know’ is completely unsuitable”. On the one hand, participants were afraid to take on the responsibility by saying “I agree that I know”, but on the other hand, they were unwilling to admit their intellectual inability by choosing the answers like “I disagree that I know”. This aspect could also cause rejection of questionnaire by respondents.

Suppression of natural / normal reactions. Statements in the behavioural unit also caused rejection. Respondents often mentioned that a lot of actions in communicative situations are done automatically (“We do not monitor how we breathe or walk, do we?”). Hence, the idea of non-verbal and verbal behaviour monitoring (or adjustment) is firstly perceived as absurd, and secondly, reminds them of manipulative techniques, which are against traditional humanistic values (friendliness, open-mindedness, sincerity) declared in making contacts with representatives of other cultures.

Questionnaire format. The CQS test statements were presented in the form of 20 table rows printed out on an A4 format sheet with the scale explanation (“1” — “absolutely disagree”, “7” — “completely agree”) on the top of the table. Such a presentation caused visual difficulties. Besides, in two cases the answer was missing (because rows merged and scale statements were forgotten).

Most of the participants said that it would be better to verbalise each point of the scale and shorten their number to five or even three items. In their opinion, such an arrangement would have made filling out the questionnaire much easier. Many
participants complained that it was difficult to define the difference between some of the scale points, for example between “4” and “5” or “5” and “6”. They admitted that when they had to choose one of them, their choices were not always justified.

There were more complaints about complicated question wordings in the “general public” focus group: “I had to re-read the same question several times to understand what it is about. The wording is too complicated. I mean, it can be re-phrased using simpler words so that everyone could understand it, and that is all” (GP8, f., 43).

**METACOGNITIVE UNIT**

*Perception of the question wordings*

MC1 I am conscious of the cultural knowledge I use when interacting with people with different cultural backgrounds.

MC2 I adjust my cultural knowledge as I interact with people from a culture that is unfamiliar to me.

MC3 I am conscious of the cultural knowledge I apply to cross-cultural interactions.

MC4 I check the accuracy of my cultural knowledge as I interact with people from different cultures.

Metacognitive CQ unit (MC) turned out to be the most difficult to understand since self-reflections on individual cross-cultural interaction knowledge and practices were not inherent in most respondents (according to what they stated). However, when they describe their real life experience, they often refer to such reflections.

*The discussion was prompted by the following words and phrases:*

a. Respondents were confused by such statements of reflective actions as “I am conscious”, “I adjust”, “I check”, since, as they suppose, if such actions take place, this is rather automatic or subconscious. Rationalisation of this kind of actions as some separate procedures is considered vague, strange and unnecessary. The instrumental context of such intercultural communication is also considered by participants as unacceptable. Many participants think that cross-cultural communication should be “based on free will” and “mutual openness” (“It feels like we are talking about computers [not humans]” (LA, f., 27).

b. Many participants did not like the “cultural knowledge” expression as it sounds unfamiliar for them. Respondents noted that it would be better to say “knowledge of culture”, “knowledge about the culture” or “knowledge of the culture peculiarities”. The expression “your cultural knowledge” was usually seen as related to other cultures and countries. At the same time, it can be understood as “general cultural reserve” which is based on internalised images of “personal”, or “native” culture (One of the respondents told a story about how typical Ukrainian traits, such as good cooking skills, thriftiness, diligence and friendliness, helped her mother to win her employer’s respect while she was working as a migrant worker in Poland).

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1 See the proposed versions for translation into Russian and Ukrainian in Appendix B.
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c. The phrase “different cultures” was perceived as too broad and vague. In most cases it was interpreted by participants as a reference to the culture of another country or nation (foreigners, foreign guests or citizens of other countries which we visit as tourists or guests). Participants lacked some general specifications to help them understand which culture the questionnaire was referring to (European, Asian, etc.). They supposed that with this kind of clarification they would be more confident in their answers. At the same time, some respondents associated the expression “different cultures” with cultural differences inside the country or society. They mentioned ethnic minorities, regional cultures, subcultures, cultures of different generations and professional cultures, although they did not think that questionnaire was suitable for studying those cultures.

d. The phrase “cross-cultural interaction” was perceived as too formal, official, not grasping the specifics of human communication.

Perceptions of the question content

The discussion started with the moderator’s request to substantiate the importance of cross-cultural communication and describe its benefits. Participants returned to exchanging views on this topic later. Their observations and answers helped us highlight arguments, justifications and attitudes which served as a basis for further adaptations of the questionnaire’s wordings. In order to make these items easier to comprehend, we will present them in the form of dichotomies or special measuring axes that indicate the ambivalence of respondents’ attitudes towards “other cultures”. This ambivalence changed depending on the situation and the intercultural interaction context. The main dichotomies are interpreted on the basis of qualitative data processing, like “Reflection vs. interaction” and “Pragmatism, situation vs. values, tradition” (see Figure 1 in Appendix A). Focus group discussions explain and specify them.

Self-reflection vs. automatic reactions served as a “methodological” dilemma for the respondents, as it was mentioned before. Most respondents, as they said, did not accept the rational control of situation during cross-cultural interactions. They did not accept an instrumental use of their knowledge about other cultures either, thinking that human communication should be based on “good intentions”, willingness to understand others, and openness.

Political correctness vs. authenticity. Just like in any other society, a lot of ethnical stereotypes and prejudices are functioning in the Ukrainian society. During the focus group discussion, participants mentioned American laziness, Swedish and Finnish slowness, Russian rudeness, Ukrainian kindness as something really obvious. At the same time, one of the strongest arguments supporting importance of intercultural communication is based on the statement that there is always something new and interesting to learn from any culture. Such kind of communication enriches, leads to spiritual and intellectual growth and opens new perspectives.

An ideal model for interaction of different cultures is a peaceful, friendly way of coexistence and communication, as it was mentioned in the example with the Armenian quarter in Odessa (GP5, m., 44). There is no doubt that participants
know about countless national, ethnic, racial and language conflicts in Ukraine and abroad, nevertheless that topic was not specifically addressed. It should be noted that such events are neither accepted nor interpreted in a humorous way (for example, a story when Russian soccer team fans threw a banana at a player of African origin after the match ended).

The initial debates (which took place in the “leaders” group) were related to the Ukrainian / Russian language status as a reminder of possible conflicts in the situations when one of the sides refuses to change their point of view. The opponents naturally attempted to prove their point very emotionally but their politeness stopped them. They did not want to offend each other or to appear a quarreler in front of the other participants. The same pattern is observed when it comes to communication with representatives of other cultures: political correctness and authenticity (naturalness) of the communication can come in dissonance.

Political nation vs. multiculturalism. The CQS metacognitive unit draws the respondents’ attention towards understanding of “another culture” in terms of “another nation”, “another country”. In this case, they stress the importance of a political nation, citizenship, which determines the national identity of a person in the eyes of representatives of another country. In other words, “it is not important that Zinedine Zidane is of African origin, the most important thing is that he is a great Frenchman!” (L5, m., 54). At the same time, some respondents paid a lot of attention to the multicultural environment typical of many countries (“Tatars, Hutsuls, Hungarians, Jews, Poles living in Ukraine and Abkhazians, Megrelians and Ossetians living in Georgia” have their own culture). However, the most familiar unit of cultural specification / identification was the country and the political nation.

Close cultures vs. distant cultures. Despite the fact that participants declare the value and importance of every culture, they feel the need for understanding which culture is specifically mentioned — American, Muslim, Chinese, African, etc. It was implied in the discussion that there are close (Slavic, European) cultures which do not significantly differ from the Ukrainian culture, and distant cultures, which are different and less known. The general approach does not give any information on the level of knowledge. So, the participants demonstrated that in their perceptions, a certain hierarchy exists in their minds. Such a hierarchy is based on the “close — distant” axis (a distance produces both some interest and some fear).

Universalism vs. ethnocentrism. Justifying importance of intercultural contacts, respondents appeal to universal values, such as the need to establish mutual understanding between people (despite their ethnic and national origin), the importance of openness, friendliness, humanity and respect towards another person representing any culture.

However, while insisting on the need to see normal human beings (“just like us, Ukrainians”) in people from other countries, participants unconsciously demonstrated their ethnocentrism (they compared the Others to Us, not Us to the Others), as well as elements of group favouritism.

“They are people similar to us, only from another nation. They are the same as us” (GP1, f., 27). “You always have to remember that he is not worse than you — this is the most important thing” (L6, f., 62).
Testing the Cultural Quotient Scale (CQS): Ukrainian Audience

Openness vs. closeness. Participants gladly talk about cross-cultural interaction benefits: gaining new interesting knowledge, broadening the world view, acquiring opportunity to talk to kind and open people. All this enriches people spiritually and intellectually, leads to new contacts, helps acquire new friends (e.g. Euro 2012 being held in Ukraine).

“That is why I am interested in getting to know other cultures. Maybe, I am just lucky, but I see only people which are open and ready to help. I also get to know good sides of another culture, hence I can broaden my mind” (L4, f., 27).

“[Intercultural communication] contributes to spiritual and intellectual enrichment of a person. We learn something new from another culture and try to get closer” (L5, m., 56).

Basically, there were no evident examples of cultural closeness or cultural distance during the focus group discussion. The discussion topic and atmosphere did not urge to hold a conversation in such a way. There were only some phrases like “sundry refugees”, “those Jews”, humorous descriptions of intercultural marriage (the story about a Chinese son-in-law) or far-fetched fears of flourishing theft in the neighbouring country. But all that suggests the existence of ethnocultural distance in the society.

Adjustment or adaptation as a gift vs. adjustment or adaptation as a benefit. In the statements concerning the importance of adjustment or adaptation to the Other in cross-cultural situations, we can also identify another axis: humanism and pragmatism. In case of humanism, the proper attitude towards the Other can be explained in the context of universal values “...because they are people too. They came to a different country, so, we should respect them” (GP1, f., 28). Their customs and traditions should be respected, it is important to be hospitable and not to expect anything in return, not even a praise. The fact of doing something good for others should serve as a reward for a person:

“We really have to please people... We had a reception, there were Muslim people there. It was very good that food prepared for that reception was suitable for them. Because they do not eat pork, beef, etc. There was chicken meat and there was happiness. We had something to treat them, they were delighted, because they had something to eat and were not hungry. And we respected their culture; we did not make them eat what they do not eat... So, we treated them nicely. They were grateful for that” (GP8, f., 43).

“When we come to another country, we will try to please people there. For example, French people and I... I tried to learn something in French, stayed up late to do that” (L5, m., 56).

Another opportunity is related to getting benefit (not necessary financial, it can be practical) through cross-cultural communication. That means new impressions, new experience, the ability to compare one’s own culture to another one — all of that perceived solely in an instrumental context. Respectful relationships in this case can be understood as those that lead to a practical result and problem solution. In this case pragmatism does not contradict humanism:

“...You just see how people live there — their ideals, values; and you see how everything is going here. We can ‘borrow’ and implement some of their values here” (GP2, m., 18).
"You always have to remember that he is not worse than you — this is the most important thing. If you think this way: aha, he is like that, we have nothing in common, we will not be able to solve what needs to be solved" (L6, f., 62).

Discussion of the first CQS unit has shown the existence of metacognitive practices in the respondents’ experience, which are, however, not publicly articulated.

**COGNITIVE UNIT**

*Perception of the question wordings*

COG1 I know the legal and economic systems of other cultures.
COG2 I know the rules (e.g., vocabulary, grammar) of other languages.
COG3 I know the cultural values and religious beliefs of other cultures.
COG4 I know the marriage systems of other cultures.
COG5 I know the arts and crafts of other cultures.
COG6 I know the rules for expressing non-verbal behaviours in other cultures.

The following words and phrases prompted a discussion in this unit:

a. The majority of respondents are not ready to state “I know” in their answers openly and firmly, when different aspects of other cultures are discussed. Respondents do not think that it is possible at all. They stated that more “passive” phrasing like “I am aware”, “I am familiar with”, “I have heard...”, “I have an idea” is more applicable to these questions.

b. In the context of law, language, economy, etc. “other cultures” are perceived by respondents as “other countries”.

c. Identification of the subject matter of knowledge through “rules” or “systems” of different cultural institutions is perceived by most respondents as too general, formal and official, which required explanations and more details. Taking into account their opinions, it would be more relevant to ask people about “peculiarities of legal and economic systems”, “peculiarities of marriage and family systems” (“marriage traditions”).

d. A similar situation is identified within perceptions of respondents regarding language proficiency. Respondents believe that it is important to specify the language type (Romano-Germanic, oriental, etc.) and discuss not the knowledge of rules of other languages including grammar and vocabulary (where respondents also commented that vocabulary is not actually related to the language rules), but rather to focus on the “ability to speak foreign languages” in the questionnaire. Questions about “rules of non-verbal communication” should be expanded with more details in parentheses (i.e. gestures, mimics, facial expressions) or the wording should be replaced with “knowledge of gestures accepted in different cultures”.

2 See the proposed versions for translation into Russian and Ukrainian in Appendix B.
Objectivity vs. subjectivity. The respondents were concerned about their inability to identify the objective criteria for the measurement of the depth of knowledge. They were also concerned that points given by different respondents to the same questions would be incompatible: “My level of knowledge is ten times lower than that of Dmytro, but if we give the same number of points on the scale, the final result will be identical. What is the point of the questionnaire then?” (L3, m., 19). Some respondents consider that researchers are probably more interested not in the level of knowledge but rather in the subjective evaluation of the level of knowledge, but this fact did not calm them down. In those cases, where the problem of “objective evaluation” does not arise, the statements are perceived significantly more adequately (the respondents named the COG1 position “the only normal one”).

Specific formulation of a question vs. general formulation. A wide range of general meanings of “rules” and “systems” caused an obvious discomfort in the participants, who would like to “clarify”, “specifically indicate” the subject matter of knowledge that they are being asked about. Moreover, incapacity to grasp what problems the questionnaire is aimed at solving or learning more about (level of tolerance, level of racism, or level of knowledge concerning language, traditions, gestures, etc.) caused a certain mistrust regarding the true goal of the research: “They are provoking you on purpose, they know everything” (L5, m., 56).

Micro-level of cross-cultural interaction vs. macro-level of cross-cultural interaction. Respondents do not understand which level of cross-cultural interaction is being discussed. The image of a huge variety of cultures with their values, religions, traditions and languages and at the same time realisation of difficulty in dealing with convictions, beliefs and value orientations even at a personal level cause a feeling of perplexity, when they try to understand the meaning of judgements in this unit and use them in their own life experience.

“Cultural values in my opinion are very personal. Just as it was stated earlier, there can be different cultures even in one family. And when we discuss such a great scope of cultures, the difference becomes much more apparent. In my opinion, it is very personal and cannot be related only to cross-cultural communication” (GP2, m., 18).

Process of learning vs. result of learning. Acquisition of knowledge is an endless process, especially if it covers an indefinite number of cultures, languages, countries and people. But the proposed statements are perceived as if the individual has finalised the learning process and confidently informs about the result (“I know!”). Such self-confidence leads to an ironic attitude towards the person. This is the cause why participants try to indicate that the process of understanding the questionnaire’s statements has not been finalised yet. Besides, some notions should be narrowed.

Prior experience of having contacts with other cultures vs. lack of such experience. Respondents emphasise that people who have some cross-cultural communication experience and those who lack such experience will perceive
many questions differently. Such experience can be acquired when travelling to other countries. But these trips are not easily accessible to most Ukrainians because of limited economic resources of their families. “Well, you need money for this. But our people with the pensions they are getting cannot travel anywhere. They can only pay for milk, bread and utilities in an apartment” (L6, f., 62).

The data collected from the CQS submitted by the respondents show that statements from the cognitive unit receive the lowest grades on the scale (see Appendix A).

MOTIVATIONAL UNIT

Perception of the question wordings

MOT1 I enjoy interacting with people from different cultures.
MOT2 I am confident that I can socialise with locals in a culture that is unfamiliar to me.
MOT3 I am sure I can deal with the stresses of adjusting to a culture that is new to me.
MOT4 I enjoy living in cultures that are unfamiliar to me.
MOT5 I am confident that I can get accustomed to the shopping conditions in a different culture.

The following words and phrases prompted a discussion in this unit:

a. The affirmation “I am confident / I am sure” (MOT2, MOT3, MOT5) repelled the respondents due to its categorical tone (it is not clear, what the basis of such confidence is, especially if the person does not have such an experience). According to their opinion, it would be more adequate to use the subjunctive (“I could” socialise, get accustomed, deal with”) or subjective estimations (“I think that I can socialise”, “I consider that I can socialise”).

b. The expression “socialise with locals” (MOT2) is seen by some participants in a pejorative light, similar to such concepts as “aborigines” or “indigenous people” that are associated with colonialism, with stories about primitive populations and cultures. It was proposed to change the wording and talk about socialising with “people from the local culture” or use the statement “I am ready to socialise with the inhabitants of an unfamiliar country”.

c. The statement MOT3, in the opinion of the “general public” group, should be presented as “I think that I can deal with stress in a foreign cultural environment”.

d. The expression “I enjoy living” (MOT4) is more adequate in the subjunctive mood (“I would enjoy living...”) or it requires replacing the verb “live” with the verb “reside” since the verb “live” is associated with emigration, moving to another country for permanent residency: “Five days or a week or the entire life — these are different things” (GP8, f., 43).

e. If the question is posed about the peculiarities of shopping, it is more appropriate to talk about “another country”, but not about “a different culture” (MOT5).

3 See the proposed versions for translation into Russian and Ukrainian in Appendix B.
Perception of the question content

Natural interaction — artificial, theatrical game. The questions of the fourth unit caused rejection first of all in the group of “leaders”. Many of them noticed intuitive, “natural” bases of the interaction process and the unnecessary character of controlling speech rate, tone and other similar things during interaction, since the latter takes place at the subconscious level. (As one of the participants mentioned, the expression “this is natural”, “this is a natural process” was used 11 times during the focus group discussion — L5, m., 56).

Controlling speech rate, mimic and gestures is associated by most respondents with the actor’s performance where actors may pause, speak faster or slower. But all this is rejected by the majority as an “unauthentic” or “insincere” interaction. “I think it is something like acting (all respondents together)”. “I have never even tried this, all this is done by actors, not by ordinary people” (L8, m., 31). “I alter my facial expression, but I do not understand what for” (L7, f., 33).

Behavioural dilemma of “natural — artificial” interaction at the reflective and strategic levels is similar to the dichotomy “political correctness — authenticity”, where reaching a cognitive and emotional balance was really possible for the participants. In the “leaders” group, after the initial conflict provoked by discussion of the language law, participants tried to behave correctly, to avoid confrontational words and phrases, to smooth the authentic reaction of impatience. All this has stimulated positive group dynamics. The image of well-educated, intellectual person, having an active civil position, as the participants in the “leaders” group have anticipated before the meeting, is not compatible with aggression and intolerance. The respondents understood this very well, considering the conflict situation with a touch of irony as an example of lack of self-control in a cross-cultural situation.

Intellectual confidence vs. intellectual vulnerability. Need for monitoring and control of verbal and non-verbal behaviour, which implied in the statement of this unit, created a situation of cognitive dissonance, especially in the “leaders” group. “This question really ‘blocks’ you. You start analysing and thinking, oh, maybe I am somewhat”… (tapping fingers on the table) (L7, f., 33). It is required to clarify and specify the meaning of the questions for the broader audience, to specify whether we deal with macro- or micro-levels of cross-cultural interaction.

“Our people usually are not aware of what they are doing while they are communicating non-verbally. That is why in order to understand these questions, it would be advisable to add more specific details; for example, give some examples in parentheses” (L8, m., 31).

“How can we avoid doing it in a dry manner? It should be clear for individuals of different levels, let us say, having different levels of erudition” (GP5, m., 44).

“It is important to specify the level of cross-cultural interaction: state level (between different states), private level, social level, etc.” (L2, f., 53).

Lack of an obvious, articulated experience of such practices, which causes feeling of intellectual inferiority, provokes in some respondents a wish to defend themselves, to accuse the authors of the questionnaire of a simplified approach
or concealment of “true” purposes of the questionnaire, or even of using the elements of manipulative technologies. However, as participants of the “leaders” group have mentioned, they would like to feel a necessity of experience obtained in the course of the discussion and to find a practical use of results of this research in future.

The cognitive dilemma “process of learning vs. result of learning” is also identified here. Some participants wanted to replace phrases indicating the available reserve of knowledge, i.e. result of learning (“I change my speech”, “I change my non-verbal behaviour”) with phrases referring to the incompleteness of the learning process (“I comprehend speech”).

**Using stereotypes vs. avoiding stereotypes.** Images of other cultures are often stereotypical; for example, perception of the speech rate of the representatives of different ethnicities. In the opinion of respondents, it is considered that the Swiss and the Finns speak slowly, while the Spanish and the Italians speak fast. However, respondents recognise the presence of such stereotypes and their confusion potential. For example, watching of the original version “The Godfather” helped one of the participants to understand that “actually Italians speak rather slowly” (GP2, m., 18). This fact demonstrates meta-cognitive abilities of the respondents who verify, check and adapt their knowledge.

In the participants’ opinion, it is necessary to take into account the situation of multiculturalism within one country, where live people with different cultures, languages, speech rates and pronunciations. All this can become a barrier in the intercultural communication. For example, it is difficult to understand Hutsuls from Western Ukraine or different dialects of Chinese (even native Chinese may not understand them). “I have a niece. She lives in the south of the U.S.A., close to Mexico. She knows the language [English], she can speak very well [English]. But at the beginning it was difficult for her to understand English-speaking Mexicans because everyone has his / her own accent” (L1, f., 54).

**Dominance in a cross-cultural situation vs. dependence in a cross-cultural situation.** Controlling speech and non-verbal behaviour was analysed by participants from two points of view / roles: Guest and Host. Strong position of the Host in a cross-cultural situation implies speaking the language of the Other, willingness to adapt to the specifics of the situation, as well as expectations that the others will offer him to help. Otherwise such feelings as dependency, vulnerability, obedience or even danger may arise. “When I meet my friends in a group, usually Americans, English people and Canadians also join us. Sometimes they forget that Ukrainians are also present among them, but some people remind that Ukrainians are also present here and says that they should not speak so fast” (L4, f., 27). “When you realise that some of your gestures you use in a foreign country mean something different there, you change them right away, because you do not want to cause any problems” (GP2, m., 18).

Feeling of dominance or dependency in a cross-cultural situation depends mainly on personality traits (shyness, fear of being mocked). One of the participants gave an example of not wanting to speak Ukrainian among her colleagues because she is often mocked. However, she underlines that people
behave differently in a different cultural environment when someone does not speak the official language of that country. “When we travelled to Georgia and tried to spoke Georgian, some Georgians stopped and asked: ‘Can you say something else?’ But when I am here and try to say something in Ukrainian being at my working place (I have been working for 30 years at the same place), sometimes people laugh at me. And I reply to them so: ‘Well, I have an accent. But you provoke me [through your behaviour] into continuing to speak only Russian!’”

When the participants immerse themselves in the role of Host, they analyse differently the cross-cultural situation because they are in their own country, on their own territory. One can feel a strong confidence, the need to adapt himself / herself to the Other, which is considered as a goodwill and not as a coercion. “When I am in my own country, I act the way I think I should act, I speak the language I want to speak. However, I adjust myself to the foreigners, who do not understand me, so that they can understand me (...) This is a matter of a principle. (...) Can I change it [verbal behaviour] or not? When I know his / her language but he / she does not know mine, I definitely change it” (L3, m., 19).

Regardless of sharp criticism of the CQS behavioural unit, statements about confusing meaning of the questions and their manipulative character (which is not characteristic of the “genuine interaction”), the “leaders” group demonstrated high level of agreement with the statements proposed in this unit (see Appendix C).

Variations of the axes which differentiate the range measured by CQS, their correlation with the external factors creating obstacles to the perception of the CQS questions and units, are presented in Table 2.

Search for an equivalent of the “CULTURAL INTELLIGENCE” concept

At the end of the discussion, the participants were offered to choose a name for knowledge and skills that were discussed, in the form of a word or phrase. All variants are presented in Table 3.

The respondents in both groups define the attitudes towards cross-cultural interaction with regard to understanding, tolerance, and personal development. “Leaders” often emphasise the role of knowledge in communication, while “general public” underlines the importance of respect to “other cultures”. Both the “leaders” and the “general public” bring to the foreground spiritual and intellectual enrichment and human contacts in cross-cultural interaction; this is confirmed by the vocabulary of personal qualities required for efficient communication between representatives of different cultures (see Appendix E). Most respondents agree with acceptability of such generalisation of knowledge and skills in cross-cultural interaction as “cultural consciousness”, keeping in mind its cognitive and emotional manifestations, as well as regulation of cross-cultural practices.
### Measuring vectors of the “cultural intelligence”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CQS perception axes</th>
<th>Measuring axes</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>CQS units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Knowledge of norms and rules of the proper behaviour towards the representatives of other cultures vs. authenticity, genuine reactions concerning other cultures, related to the convictions, orientations and situational emotions</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLITICAL / IDEOLOGICAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>Advantage of the political nation or state as a cultural unit vs. image of the society as a whole, which consists of different ethnic, language and regional cultures. Age differences</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Priority of basic human values in the relationships between cultures vs. group-centered favouritism</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCIAL</td>
<td>Material freedom vs. poor resources</td>
<td>Material freedom as a realisation of the dream of travelling to other countries vs. poor resources which create an obstacle to travelling and learning new cultures. Personal income level Self-assessment of material status of the family</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prior experience of interaction with other cultures vs. the lack of such experience</td>
<td>Correlation between available knowledge and feeling of confidence in a favourable cross-cultural interaction (if a person has an experience of such interactions) vs. lack of such experience as a reason for not foreseeing the probable development of cross-cultural communicative situation and for having a lower level of knowledge about other cultures</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Micro-level vs. macro-level of the cross-cultural interaction</td>
<td>Difficulty of identifying the level of cross-cultural interaction on the macro- and micro-scale</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dominance vs. dependence in a cross-cultural situation</td>
<td>Feeling of dominance over the situation during cross-cultural interaction in a favourable environment vs. feeling of obedience or dependence in an unfavourable environment. Confident / not confident status</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CULTURAL</td>
<td>Perception of different cultures as close (more comprehensible, not dangerous) or as distant cultures (less knowledge, a higher probability of danger)</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Openness vs. closeness</td>
<td>Manifestation of attitudes towards openness (interest in other cultures, kindness, friendliness) or closeness (distancing, stereotypisation)</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanism vs. pragmatism</td>
<td>Reference to the universal humanistic values in cross-cultural communication vs. reference to the instrumental values (getting benefits from communication)</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural interaction vs. artificial, theatrical game</td>
<td>Priority of genuine and natural interaction vs. rejection of artificial and manipulative interaction</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Using stereotypes vs. avoiding stereotypes</td>
<td>Reference to stereotypical knowledge about other cultures vs. acknowledgement of the confusion potential and simplified nature of stereotypical knowledge</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introvertedness vs. extrovertedness</td>
<td>Allowing for personality traits: introverts experience difficulties in communication as such, while extroverts can easily socialise with others</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear of interaction vs. courage to interact</td>
<td>Fear of interaction vs. courage to establish contacts with unknown persons</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard stylistics vs. soft stylistics</td>
<td>Refusal of categorical judgements related to confidence in positive outcome of cross-cultural communication, tendency to soften formulations</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intellectual confidence vs. intellectual vulnerability</td>
<td>Contradiction between confidence in his / her own intellectual capabilities and lack of experience concerning reflection of verbal and non-verbal communication in detail</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectivity vs. subjectivity</td>
<td>Emphasising the fact that the questionnaire is incapable to measure the depth of knowledge objectively vs. drawing attention to its orientation towards measurement of attitudes</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special vs. general</td>
<td>Tendency to specify general formulations vs. rejection of vagueness, sweeping generalisation, complexity of the CQS concepts</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process of learning vs. result of learning</td>
<td>Perception of learning as an incomplete process vs. rejection of indications of the available reserve of knowledge as a result of learning</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-reflection vs. automatic reactions</td>
<td>Denying the importance of rational control in a cross-cultural situation vs. emphasising the advantage of naturalness and intuitive character of cross-cultural interactions</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3

Knowledge and skills associated with the “cultural intelligence” concept

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“GENERAL PUBLIC” GROUP</th>
<th>“LEADERS” GROUP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNDERSTANDING</td>
<td>UNDERSTANDING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness to understand another culture</td>
<td>Mutual understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal understanding</td>
<td>Understanding between nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercultural understanding</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Intercultural mutual understanding</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMUNICATION</td>
<td>TOLERANCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-cultural communication</td>
<td>Tolerance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural communication</td>
<td>Cultural tolerance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication between nations</td>
<td>Indulgence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication with foreigners</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mastery of communication</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talent for communication</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOLERANCE</td>
<td>PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance</td>
<td>Good manners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability to take into consideration the specificities of other cultures</td>
<td>Cultural tolerance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness to take into account the specificities of other cultures</td>
<td>Indulgence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect for another culture</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercultural respect</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Self-development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>Good manners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural openness</td>
<td>High level of personal culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercultural openness</td>
<td>Good communication skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexibility</td>
<td>Sociability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural flexibility</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural exchange</td>
<td>Cultural exchange</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intercultural knowledge</td>
<td>Cultural experience</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Multiculturalism</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Cultural diversity</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Multi-vector approach</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Integral approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cultural relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CULTURAL AWARENESS</td>
<td>CULTURAL AWARENESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Cultural awareness is more appropriate than cultural intelligence”</td>
<td>“Cultural awareness sounds very good”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“...Better reflects the essence of the concept”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Awareness is clearer at the everyday level than intelligence”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The term “cultural intelligence” has not been mentioned in this regard. The participants, having been asked by the moderator to express their opinions concerning this concept, emphasised its low relevance, since the “intelligence”
requires a high level of knowledge, rational comprehension of actions that
represents only a very small part of cross-cultural communications. In respondents’
opinion, a culturally sensitive (or culturally aware) person is not supposed to be
an “intellectual”.

**Adaptation of the CQS for application to Ukrainian audience**

Taking into account comments of respondents related to the perception
of the CQS questions, as well as peculiarities of translation from English into
Ukrainian (without any distortion in the measuring instrument), we offer the
CQS version adapted to Ukrainian audience (see Table 4).

**Table 4**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Original statements</th>
<th>Translation into Ukrainian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MC1 I am conscious of the cultural knowledge I use when interacting with people with different cultural backgrounds.</td>
<td>MC1 Я свідомо використовую свої культурні знання, коли спілкуюся з людьми інших культур.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MC2 I adjust my cultural knowledge as I interact with people from a culture that is unfamiliar to me.</td>
<td>MC2 Я адаптую свої культурні знання, коли спілкуюся з людьми культури, яка мені незвідана.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MC3 I am conscious of the cultural knowledge I apply to cross-cultural interactions.</td>
<td>MC3 Я свідомо використовую знання про інші культури в міжкультурному спілкуванні.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MC4 I check the accuracy of my cultural knowledge as I interact with people from different cultures.</td>
<td>MC4 Я перевіряю точність своїх культурних знань у процесі взаємодії з людьми інших культур.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COG1 I know the legal and economic systems of other cultures.</td>
<td>COG1 Я знаю правові та економічні системи інших культур.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COG2 I know the rules (e.g., vocabulary, grammar) of other languages.</td>
<td>COG2 Я знаю правила (наприклад, лексику, граматику) інших мов.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COG3 I know the cultural values and religious beliefs of other cultures.</td>
<td>COG3 Я знаю культурні цінності та релігійні переконання інших культур.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COG4 I know the marriage systems of other cultures.</td>
<td>COG4 Я знаю правила шлюбних систем інших культур.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COG5 I know the arts and crafts of other cultures.</td>
<td>COG5 Я знаю мистецтва і ремесла інших культур.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COG6 I know the rules for expressing non-verbal behaviours in other cultures.</td>
<td>COG6 Я знаю правила невербального спілкування в інших культурах.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOT1 I enjoy interacting with people from different cultures.</td>
<td>MOT1 Мені подобається спілкуватися з людьми різних культур.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOT2 I am confident that I can socialise with locals in a culture that is unfamiliar to me.</td>
<td>MOT2 Я впевнений, що можу спілкуватися з місцевими жителями культури, яка мені незвідана.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conclusions

Analysis of the focus group discussions enables the researchers to draw certain conclusions regarding specificities of the CQS perceptions by Ukrainian audience, identify barriers of such perceptions, as well as peculiarities of attitudes of Ukrainian citizens towards cross-cultural interaction. Importance and relevance of the research topic have been acknowledged by all participants.

1. Respondents’ perception of the initial version of Cultural Quotient Scale is influenced by a set of political and ideological, social, cultural, psychological and gnoseological factors; these factors generated drivers and barriers to active participation in this research and to further demonstration of cultural predispositions and practices. The above-mentioned factors have impact on multiple levels: they define specific value dichotomies whose poles serve as reference points in the course of cross-cultural communication, as well as unconventionally affect configurations of intellectual ranges articulated by separate units of CQS.

2. Barriers to the loyal perception of the questionnaire are of mixed nature based on the psychological, cognitive and cultural reactions. Key rejection (or resistance) aspects are the following:

- Coercion to the rational activity, which forms internal resistance of respondents due to lack of clear and meaningful self-reflection experience related to their own behaviour in cross-cultural situations, as well as cognitive dissonance formed due to implied requirement of the CQS (in meta-cognitive and cognitive units) to track personal reactions and actions when communicating with others.
However, descriptions shared by respondents related to their cross-cultural experience indicate that they actively use various meta-cognitive practices, which are not publicly discussed (if one follows the norms of “culture comprehension”).

- **Suppression of natural reactions** perceived by respondents as a part of CQS image of intercultural interaction (especially in behavioural unit). This image collides with general perception of respondents about prevalence of automatic reactions when directly communicating with others. The overall idea of controlling verbal and non-verbal behaviour is perceived by Ukrainian audience as something of manipulative nature. This leads to dissociation with traditionally declared beliefs about the leading role of human characteristics (such as friendliness, openness, sincerity) in establishing contacts with representatives of different cultures.

Besides psychological rejection of “technologism” during cross-cultural communication, such a type of barriers is supported by widely declared values of humanism, mutual understanding and genuine communication leading to mutual spiritual and intellectual enrichment (as an antipode to various pragmatic orientations, which are based on the usefulness of intercultural communication, rational planning of the strategy and tactics of communication geared to the achievement of wanted effects, using the other to reach wanted goals).

- **Need for critical self-evaluation** of personal knowledge about other cultures, fear of feeling intellectual vulnerability due to inability to reach the level of knowledge assumed as a maximum on the scale of the cognitive unit (“absolute knowledge of all rules in all cultures”). The same concerns also metacognitive and motivational units, where complete agreement with the questionnaire’s statements would mean absolute confidence in knowledge of all cultures in their diversity. Fear of showing self-confidence or ignorance, unwillingness to be responsible for defining any type of “objective” criteria for knowledge and skills stimulate respondents to use formulations different from those used in the questionnaire (“I am aware” instead of “I know”) or prefer subjunctive mood (“I would like” instead of “I like) and hypothetical conditional sentences (“I could change it” instead of “I am changing”).

- **Terminological pressure**, strong saturation of the CQS with generalising concepts (“cross-cultural interaction”, “cross-cultural situation”, “other cultures”, “different cultures”, etc.), which do not always make sense for respondents. In participants’ opinion, such concepts need to be restructured or specified. Otherwise it may result in wrong understanding of the questions, especially among the elderly and lower educated respondents.

Due to complex terminology of the questionnaire, respondents often do not understand which level of cross-cultural communication is being discussed — is it interaction among countries, nations or direct human communication.

- **Impairment of social status** of some respondents because of CQS statements (especially from motivational unit) that appeal to the personal experience of travelling and shopping abroad. Owing to low level of well-being of the large groups of Ukraine’s population such things still remains in the sphere of impossible or desirable.
3. In general, participants demonstrate rather positive attitudes towards other cultures and their representatives. They also would like to gain some more experience of cross-cultural communication. The attitudes of Ukrainian audience towards cross-cultural interaction are being formed under conditions of popularisation of the present-day requirements related to political correctness and tolerance of any nation or culture. However, stable stereotypes of ethnocentrism, ethno-favouritism and discrimination of cultures as “close” and “distant”, hierarchical picture of intercultural world and group conformity are also present. Such stereotypes sometimes hinder the participants to use the same criteria for adequate evaluation of their knowledge and behaviour in the situations offered by CQS.

Since the participants usually associate the “other cultures” concept with cultures of other countries, the problem of multiculturalism in Ukraine, ethnic, regional and language minorities, as well as importance of contacts with their representatives are drifting to the periphery of Ukrainian audience’s attention.

4. Certain barriers to the loyal perception of the CQS are also formed under the influence of ideological context and political situation characteristic of the transforming Ukrainian society where discussions concerning national identity are rather heated and confrontation between “Ukrainian” and “Russian” is encouraged by different political forces on the eve of the 2012 Ukrainian parliamentary election. These external influences are especially noticeable in the group of “leaders” who work in non-governmental organisations and actively articulate their civic position.

Representatives from the “leaders” group criticised the CQS questionnaire more sharply. They wanted to understand supposed practical results of the research, its practical applicability, especially in the development of “civil society”. Such a reaction is partially related to the readiness of the “leaders” to understand better the concept of “cultural intelligence” (although they rejected the concept itself, considering it merely as a part of “cultural awareness”). Their aspirations may be realised within the framework of special trainings.

5. Despite various barriers in the perception of the CQS questionnaire, its testing with Ukrainian audience has obviously demonstrated capacity of the scale to discriminate a small sample by segmenting the range of “cultural intelligence” into different styles (pragmatic & behavioural style, projective style, value & cultural style) and by differentiating indicators from the groups of “leaders” and “general public”.

Focus group discussions have demonstrated the expediency of CSQ adaptation to the Ukrainian audience. The adaptation should include specification of several concepts, softening of categorical judgements and use of verbal constructions acceptable for Russian and Ukrainian languages (without affecting the integrity of measuring instrument).
Figure 1. “Cultural intelligence” range segmentation (correspondence analysis)
Figure 2. "Cultural intelligence" profile segments (mean values)*
### Formulations of the Cultural Quotient Scale, used in the focus group discussion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Original statements</th>
<th>Translation into Ukrainian</th>
<th>Translation into Russian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MC1 I am conscious of the cultural knowledge I use when interacting with people with different cultural backgrounds.</td>
<td>МС1 Я свідомо використовую свої культурні знання, коли спілкуюсь з людьми інших культур.</td>
<td>МС1 Я осознанно использую свои культурные знания, когда общаясь с людьми других культур.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MC2 I adjust my cultural knowledge as I interact with people from a culture that is unfamiliar to me.</td>
<td>МС2 Я адаптую свої культурні знання, коли спілкуюся з людьми культури, яка мені незнайома.</td>
<td>МС2 Я адаптирую свои культурные знания, когда общаясь с людьми незнакомой мне культуры.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MC3 I am conscious of the cultural knowledge I apply to cross-cultural interactions.</td>
<td>МС3 Я свідомо використовую знання про інші культури в міжкультурному спілкуванні.</td>
<td>МС3 Я осознанно использую знания о других культурах в межкультурном общении.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MC4 I check the accuracy of my cultural knowledge as I interact with people from different cultures.</td>
<td>МС4 Я перевіряю точність своїх культурних знань у процесі взаємодії з людьми інших культур.</td>
<td>МС4 Я проверяю точность своих культурных знаний в процессе взаимодействия с людьми других культур.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COG1 I know the legal and economic systems of other cultures.</td>
<td>COG1 Я знаю правові та економічні системи інших культур.</td>
<td>COG1 Я знаю правовые и экономические системы других культур.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COG2 I know the rules (e.g., vocabulary, grammar) of other languages.</td>
<td>COG2 Я знаю правила (наприклад, лексику, граматику) інших мов.</td>
<td>COG2 Я знаю правила (например, лексику, грамматику) других языков.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COG3 I know the cultural values and religious beliefs of other cultures.</td>
<td>COG3 Я знаю культурні цінності та релігійні переконання інших культур.</td>
<td>COG3 Я знаю культурные ценности и религиозные убеждения других культур.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COG4 I know the marriage systems of other cultures.</td>
<td>COG4 Я знаю правила шлюбних систем інших культур.</td>
<td>COG4 Я знаю правила брачных систем других культур.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COG5 I know the arts and crafts of other cultures.</td>
<td>COG5 Я знаю мистецтва і ремесла інших культур.</td>
<td>COG5 Я знаю искусства и ремесла других культур.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COG6 I know the rules for expressing non-verbal behaviours in other cultures.</td>
<td>COG6 Я знаю правила невербального спілкування в інших культурах.</td>
<td>COG6 Я знаю правила невербального общения в других культурах.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOT1 I enjoy interacting with people from different cultures.</td>
<td>MOT1 Мені подобається спілкуватися з людьми різних культур.</td>
<td>MOT1 Мне нравится общаться с людьми разных культур.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOT2</td>
<td>МОТ2</td>
<td>МОТ2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am confident that I can socialise with locals in a culture that is unfamiliar to me.</td>
<td>Я впевнений, що можу спілкуватися з місцевими жителями культури, яка мені незнайома.</td>
<td>Я уверен, что могу общаться с местными жителями незнакомой мне культуры.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOT3</th>
<th>МОТ3</th>
<th>МОТ3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I am sure I can deal with the stresses of adjusting to a culture that is new to me.</td>
<td>Я впевнений, що можу впоратися зі стресами, коли потрібно пристосуватися до нової для мене культури.</td>
<td>Я уверен, что могу справиться со стрессами, когда нужно приспособиться к новой для меня культуре.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOT4</th>
<th>МОТ4</th>
<th>МОТ4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I enjoy living in cultures that are unfamiliar to me.</td>
<td>Мені подобається жити у культурному середовищі, яке мені незнайоме.</td>
<td>Мне нравится жить в незнакомой для меня культурной среде.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOT5</th>
<th>МОТ5</th>
<th>МОТ5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I am confident that I can get accustomed to the shopping conditions in a different culture.</td>
<td>Я впевнений, що можу звикнути до правил торгових відносин в іншій культурі.</td>
<td>Я уверен, что могу привыкнуть к правилам торговых отношений в другой культуре.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BEH1</th>
<th>ВЕН1</th>
<th>ВЕН1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I change my verbal behaviour (e.g., accent, tone) when a cross-cultural interaction requires it.</td>
<td>Я можу змінювати свою мовну поведінку (наприклад, акцент, інтонацію), коли цього вимагає міжкультурне спілкування.</td>
<td>Я могу изменять свое речевое поведение (например, акцент, интонацию), когда этого требует межкультурное общение.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BEH2</th>
<th>ВЕН2</th>
<th>ВЕН2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I use pause and silence differently to suit different cross-cultural situations.</td>
<td>Я по-різному використовую паузи і мовчання в залежності від різних міжкультурних ситуацій.</td>
<td>Я по-разному использую паузы и молчание в зависимости от разных межкультурных ситуаций.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BEH3</th>
<th>ВЕН3</th>
<th>ВЕН3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I vary the rate of my speaking when a cross-cultural situation requires it.</td>
<td>Я говорю швидше або повільніше, коли цього вимагає міжкультурна ситуація.</td>
<td>Я говорю быстрее или медленнее, когда этого требует межкультурная ситуация.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BEH4</th>
<th>ВЕН4</th>
<th>ВЕН4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I change my non-verbal behaviour when a cross-cultural situation requires it.</td>
<td>Я змінюю свою невербальну поведінку, коли цього вимагає міжкультурна ситуація.</td>
<td>Я изменяю свое невербальное поведение, когда этого требует межкультурная ситуация.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BEH5</th>
<th>ВЕН5</th>
<th>ВЕН5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I alter my facial expression when a cross-cultural interaction requires it.</td>
<td>Я міняю вираз обличчя, коли цього вимагає міжкультурна взаємодія.</td>
<td>Я меняю выражение лица, когда этого требует межкультурное взаимодействие.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The matrix of CQS filled by focus group participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statements</th>
<th>GP1</th>
<th>GP2</th>
<th>GP3</th>
<th>GP4</th>
<th>GP5</th>
<th>GP6</th>
<th>GP7</th>
<th>GP8</th>
<th>L1</th>
<th>L2</th>
<th>L3</th>
<th>L4</th>
<th>L5</th>
<th>L6</th>
<th>L7</th>
<th>L8</th>
<th>L9</th>
<th>Mean values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MC1 I am conscious of the cultural knowledge I use when interacting with people with different cultural backgrounds.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MC2 I adjust my cultural knowledge as I interact with people from a culture that is unfamiliar to me.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MC3 I am conscious of the cultural knowledge I apply to cross-cultural interactions.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MC4 I check the accuracy of my cultural knowledge as I interact with people from different cultures.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COG1 I know the legal and economic systems of other cultures.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COG2 I know the rules (e.g., vocabulary, grammar) of other languages.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>3.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COG3 I know the cultural values and religious beliefs of other cultures.</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COG4 I know the marriage systems of other cultures.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COG5 I know the arts and crafts of other cultures.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COG6 I know the rules for expressing non-verbal behaviour in other cultures.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOT1 I enjoy interacting with people from different cultures.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOT2 I am confident that I can socialise with locals in a culture that is unfamiliar to me.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOT3 I am sure I can deal with the stresses of adjusting to a culture that is new to me.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOT4 I enjoy living in cultures that are unfamiliar to me.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix C (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Scores</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MOT5</td>
<td>I am confident that I can get accustomed to the shopping conditions in a different culture.</td>
<td>1 3 2 2 3 6 7 6 7 7 5 5 4 4 7 5 4.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEH1</td>
<td>I change my verbal behaviour (e.g., accent, tone) when a cross-cultural interaction requires it.</td>
<td>1 6 6 7 5 6 5 6 5 1 2 5 6 5 3 6 4 4.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEH2</td>
<td>I use pause and silence differently to suit different cross-cultural situations.</td>
<td>1 2 6 1 7 6 4 6 5 7 7 6 7 6 4 4 4 4.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEH3</td>
<td>I vary the rate of my speaking when a cross-cultural situation requires it.</td>
<td>1 4 7 1 7 6 4 7 5 7 7 7 6 4 7 5 5.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEH4</td>
<td>I change my non-verbal behaviour when a cross-cultural situation requires it.</td>
<td>4 5 6 3 4 6 4 7 5 5 5 7 6 6 4 7 5 5.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEH5</td>
<td>I alter my facial expressions when a cross-cultural interaction requires it.</td>
<td>1 4 6 1 4 6 0 5 6 1 4 2 1 6 4 1 5 3.35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 3. “Cultural intelligence” profiles of the groups of “leaders” and “general public” (mean values)
**Appendix E**

**Vocabulary of personal qualities and practices required in the course of cross-cultural interaction**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personal qualities required for efficient cross-cultural communication</th>
<th>Actions and tactics used in cross-cultural communication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mutual understanding</td>
<td>Be attentive (be on top of things)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delicacy</td>
<td>Act according to the situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Be ready to help</td>
<td>Listen to the other person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competence</td>
<td>Guess by mimic, gesture or some other signs what you are being asked in a foreign language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benevolence</td>
<td>Draw something on a sheet of paper or on a napkin in case you cannot explain this verbally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kindness</td>
<td>Use your cultural knowledge (about music, sports, or architecture of the country whose representatives you are communicating with)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cordiality</td>
<td>Change your image or facial expression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness to communicate properly</td>
<td>Find a soft approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness to learn something new from others</td>
<td>Do not impose your point of view (“When in Rome, do as the Romans do”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>Do not treat another person as your opponent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sincerity</td>
<td>Do smile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intellectual curiosity</td>
<td>Hug each other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisdom</td>
<td>Answer a call for help</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persevere in reaching mutual understanding</td>
<td>Treat others as help</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realise that you are not alone and your own culture is not unique</td>
<td>Treat others as you wish to be treated yourself</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenderness</td>
<td>Adjust yourself to others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Openness</td>
<td>Learn the language your guest speaks in order to please him / her</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding each other</td>
<td>Remember that others are not worse than you</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decency</td>
<td>Be careful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treating other people with interest</td>
<td>Do not be ashamed of not knowing other language good enough</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Striving for understanding another person</td>
<td>Try to establish a dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance</td>
<td>Try to understand the person to whom you are talking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect for another person</td>
<td>Try to say some phrases in your interlocutor’s language in order to please him</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect for locals and local culture</td>
<td>Try to act like locals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humaneness</td>
<td>Try to help the others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generosity</td>
<td>Try to please others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Treat your guests to the meals that conform to their cultural traditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Catch the intonation without knowing the language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Catch the nuances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cook a dinner for your guests, show hospitality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Feel another person</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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3 UKRAINIAN SOCIETY

THE PROBLEMS
OF TRANSFORMATION
ETHNIC GROUPS AND MINORITIES IN UKRAINE: IDENTITY FORMATION, PATTERNS AND MODELS OF INTEGRATION INTO UKRAINIAN SOCIETY*

Vil Bakirov (Kharkiv)
Oleksandr Kizilov (Kharkiv)

This chapter is based on the findings of the international research project “ENRI-East: Interplay of European, National and Regional Identities. Nations between the States along the New Eastern Border of the European Union”. Project has been implemented in 2009-2011 by an international consortium of 15 universities with Ukraine being represented by the V.N.Karazin Kharkiv National University under the leadership of the authors. Two ethnic minorities, Hungarians and Poles, have been studied in Ukraine within this project. The chapter presents an overview of the basic theoretical approaches to the understanding of the phenomenon of identity as the fundamental category of the project. The process of identity formation and main factors contributing to the actualization of ethnic identity are considered. Modes of interplay between the ethnic majority and minority are described. Concepts of “solidarity”, “assimilation”, “adaptation”, “segregation” and “marginalization” are discussed within the discourse of the Poles’ and Hungarians’ integration into the Ukrainian society. Conclusions on the discrepancies in the identity-forming components are based on the findings of mass survey conducted among Poles and Hungarians residing in Ukraine. Such issues as the feeling of ethnic belonging, territorial identity, national identity, European identity, articulation and satisfaction of cultural needs, ethnic composition of social networks etc. are discussed to describe and explain the different position of the two ethnic minority groups in the Ukrainian society. Differentiating factors of Polish and Hungarian ethnic identity are distinguished; the hierarchy and the peculiarities of satisfaction of cultural needs of ethnic Poles and Hungarians in Ukraine are described; the involvement of Ukrainian Poles and Hungarians into the political life in Ukraine and the cohesion of these ethnic group are examined. The chapter features also considerations on the necessary differentiation of national ethnic minorities policies and regulations to improve their efficiency.

Keywords: identity, ethnic minority, Polish and Hungarian ethnic minorities in Ukraine, solidarity, group cohesion, language, religion, societal integration, social networks, national pride, confidence, cultural needs

* Chapter includes some materials and findings from the earlier publications of the authors, including: Bakirov V., Kizilov A., Kizilova, K. Theoretical background, methodology and results of study of ethnic minorities in Ukraine (according to the results of the international
Reinforcement of the globalization process made state boundaries relative. The relationships between groups and individuals are intensifying, and the distribution of patterns of social relations becomes continuous – as continuous is the economic, political and cultural exchange between the societies. Through mediatization of the social space these patterns obtain mass character. At the same time, the reverse side and the consequence of the globalization is localization. Localization aims at preservation and re-production of the existing differences between the individuals and communities, wherein ethnicity becomes one of the important facets expressing these differences. While such examples could be found all over the world, the great national, ethnic, religious, social and economic diversity within the European community conduced great number of movements and clashes inspired by the williness of the communities to preserve own ethnic authenticity among the many peoples inhabiting the European continent. Since recently actualization of ethnic communities against the background of dominant globalization wave becomes an important focus of modern sociological analysis (Beck, 1999).

The changing role of the national state and the emergence of supranational and subnational formal institutions, transformation of relations between the society and the state, as well as the change of state borders in Europe in the first half and middle of the XXth century contributed to the emergence and establishment of a complex system of identities. The portfolio of identities of
a modern European citizen features a complicated plexus of local territorial, regional, ethnic, national and supra-national identities. Numerous empirical studies conducted by the European Social Survey, European Values Study and the World Values Survey reveal that nations and communities residing in Europe have different strength of the feeling of national belonging and ethnicity as well as varied levels of attachment to the European Union. This fact deserves a special attention of Social Scientists as such self-identification and self-placement of the individual in the social, political and national space constitutes an important part of the system of values, norms and beliefs that guides individual’s behaviour in everyday life within the local community, nation as the political community and beyond (Pichler, Vassiliev, Agarin, Chvorostov, Heinrich, Wallace, Patsiurko, 2012).

In relation to this, at the end of the XXth century the concept of ethnic groups and cultural boundaries of the Norwegian scholar Fredrik Barth became very popular in ethnology and sociology. Barth did not consider ethnic groups as discontinuous cultural isolates and focused on the interactions between the groups that caused and enhanced the identities. He wrote that: “[…] categorical ethnic distinctions do not depend on an absence of mobility, contact and information, but do entail social processes of exclusion and incorporation whereby discrete categories are maintained despite changing participation and membership in the course of individual life histories” (Barth, 1969: p. 9). According to Barth, ethnic identity of the group is therefore not a stable phenomenon, but an ongoing process that is amendable by other ethnic groups or other types of identities. An important conclusion made by Barth was that ethnic identity is relational, inter-connected and inter-dependable on other identities (Barth, 1969). American political scientist Samuel Huntington in his famous work “The Clash of Civilizations?” asserted that in the XXI century “[…] the most important conflicts of the future will occur along the cultural fault lines separating civilizations from one another” suggesting that the predominant sources of conflicts will be determined by culture (Huntington, 1993: p. 24). According to division of the world into the cultural zones proposed by Huntington, the Western border of Ukraine constitutes exactly the border between the Western and the Orthodox civilizations and is therefore a potential area of cultural “clashes” and zone of conflicts between the ethnic groups (Huntington, 1996).

Disposition on the “frontier territory” on the confluence of the two cultural zones affects the social and political historical and contemporary development of the Ukrainian state. Similar to other Eastern European countries whose territory and borders were repeatedly changed in the course of the XX century, Ukraine emerged as a multicultural and multi-ethnic society. Representatives of many ethnic groups live on the territory of Ukraine forming numerous national minorities. The Law of Ukraine “On National Minorities” (1992) defines the national minority as “a group of Ukrainian citizens who are not Ukrainians by nationality but show feelings of ethnic self-identification and unity among themselves” (Закон України "Про національні меншини в Україні", 1992: ст. 3). According to the last Ukrainian Population Census conducted in 2001, representatives of 130 nationalities and ethnicities live
in Ukraine. Ethnic minorities constitute around 22% of the country’s population. The most numerous ethnic minorities are Russians, followed by Belarusians, Moldovans, Crimean Tatars, Bulgarians, Hungarians, Romanians, Polish, and the Jews. In the newest period of the Ukrainian history, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the modern foreign policy of the independent Ukrainian state introduced new ethnicities into the Ukrainian society, such as the Koreans, Vietnamese, Meskhetian Turks, South Caucasians, Syrians, Lebanese, Nigerians, Chinese (Дані Всеукраїнського перепису населення, 2001). While verbalization of the problems of ethnic communities in the conditions of the Soviet political system was impossible, collapse of the Soviet Union, subsequent establishment of the democratic regime in Ukraine, expansion of the rights and freedoms of citizens, and later Association of Ukraine with the European Union lead to the mobilization of ethnic groups and actualization of their needs in self-expression, self-identification and the protection of their cultural rights.

Historical dynamics of statehood and issues related to the multi-ethnic composition of the society are particularly relevant for the Western part of modern Ukraine. This territory has a complex political and cultural history, characterized by regular population migration and frequent changes of state formations. During the last hundred and fifty years the subordinations of Russia, Austria-Hungary, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, and Germany were established on these lands. In certain historical periods Ukrainian own state entities (West Ukrainian People’s Republic, Ukrainian People’s Republic) were proclaimed. While the modern Ukrainian statehood has been established on this territory since several decades, the historical memory, strong feeling of ethnic belonging and close connections with the “mother nations” make some ethnic groups residing in Ukraine being “detached” from the Ukrainian society as a political entity. While interethnic relations in Western Ukraine are devoid of elements of violent confrontation, numerous studies conducted in the last three decades suggest that social and political orientations of national minorities in this region are of particular significance as an important indicator of solidarity and consolidation of the Ukrainian society as a whole. Famous studies exploring the inter-ethnic relations in Western Ukraine have been conducted by the Kiev International Institute of Sociology since 1994. These projects used the Bogardus social distance scale to measure the level of xenophobia within ethnic groups towards Ukrainians, Russians, Belarusians, Jews, Americans, Canadians, Polish, Germans, Romanians, Africans, Roma and French (Паниотто, 2008). A study on the “Dynamics of relations between the ethnicities of Transcarpathia” conducted in 1995-1998 by the Department of Social Problems in the Carpathian Region of the Institute of Sociology of the Ukrainian National Academy of Sciences. The study focused on ethnic Hungarians, Polish, Romanians, Slovaks, Germans, Ukrainians, Russians, Jews, Roma, Caucasians and Rusyns residing in the Transcarpathian region of Ukraine (Пєлін, 2009). Ukrainian researchers I. Migovic, I. Ganchak and L. Poti in their research focused on the peculiarities of existence of the Hungarian ethnic minority in the social and political life of Transcarpathia. In particular,
they described the participation of Hungarians in political parties, national and cultural associations representing the interests of ethnic Hungarians in the parliamentary elections in Ukraine (Мигович, Гранчак, 1998; Поти, 2002; Берені, 2003).

The new economic and social crisis started in Ukraine as a consequence of the world financial crisis of 2008; being further affected by the military conflict in Eastern Ukraine and the association agreement signed between Ukraine and the European Union, it induced the next round of self-actualization of ethnic groups residing in the Western part of Ukraine bordering with the European Union. Sometimes this phenomenon is described also as the “politicization of ethnicity” – the process of development of ethnic group’s political consciousness, including acknowledgement of belonging to the ethnic group, actualization of the need to reproduce and practice own culture, traditions, history, and language. Politicization of ethnicity enhances political mobilization, establishment of political parties and groups, intensifies participation in the political life of the region and country, and in political decision-making. Politicization of ethnicity is beneficial for the ethnic group as it enhances local self-governance and efficiency of resources distribution, facilitative satisfaction of needs of the ethnic group members. Politicization of ethnicity can have also positive effects for the development of the society as a whole by facilitating national consolidation via intensification of the cultural exchange. However, under the unfavourable conditions, such as economic or political crisis, civil war or confrontation on the international political scene, politicization of one or several ethnic groups contributes to the fragmentation of the society and further destabilization of the internal situation in the country (Weber, Hiers, Flesken, 2016).

The concept of identity is fundamental for the understanding and explanation of inter-ethnic relations as well as models of integration of ethnic minorities into the Ukrainian society. The concept of identity received its theoretical background in Psychology, Social Psychology and Sociology. While Psychology emphasizes the role of the individual in the development of the identity, researchers in socio-psychological tradition are engaged into the interpretation of intragroup and outgroup mechanisms of social relations between the members of different groups. Sociologists deal with the collective identity - the collective aspects of the identity of the individual. These aspects are considered as social - as they consist, among other things, of socially transmitted ideas about how a person with a certain identity should behave (Pichler, 2008). Among the first ones to analyze the phenomenon of identity were representatives of the psychoanalytic school (Erik Erikson, Erich Fromm). The concept itself has been introduced into the Psychology by Sigmund Freud who used the term “identification” in his works. Detailed development of the concept identity was carried out in the works of Erikson. Considering identity as a process of organizing life experience into an individual “I”, Erikson focused on change of identity throughout human’s life. Erikson considered adaptation as the main function of identity. According to him, formation and development of identity is a process that protects the
integrity and individuality of the person’s experience, enables human to foresee internal and external dangers, to bring into balance his own abilities with the social opportunities provided by society. Thus, for Erikson, identity is correlated with the constant, incessant development of personality in the society (Erikson, 1968). James Marcia implemented the operationalization of the category of identity, putting forward the assumption that its structure manifests itself phenomenologically through the observed patterns of “problem solving”, that is, it is actualized in the situation of social choice (Marcia, 1980). Alan Waterman focused on the value-willed aspect of identity development. He suggested that a formed identity includes the choice of goals, values and beliefs. This choice is actualized during the crisis of identity and becomes the basis for determining the meaning of life in the future (Schwartz, Luyckx, Vignoles, 2011). These features of identity, its ability to change over the course of one’s life, decline or actualization in particular social contexts, and contribution of identity to adaptation as well as setting of values system, goals and beliefs are particularly relevant for our further analysis of the ethnic identities of the Polish and Hungarian ethnic minorities in Ukraine – the two groups studied within the ENRI-East project in Ukraine.

Identity studies carried out within the framework of symbolic interactionism proceed from the concept of George Mead’s “I”. Analyzing the ratio of personal and social aspects in a personality, Mead highlights conscious and unconscious identity. Unconscious identity is based on unconsciously accepted norms - this is a set of expectations accepted by a person, coming from the social group to which he belongs. Conscious identity appears when a person begins to reflect on himself and his behavior. The development of identity goes from an unconscious identity to a conscious one. A perceived identity does not mean autonomy of the individual from society, since it is formed with the help of the categories developed in the language acquired in social interaction. But at the same time, the presence of a conscious identity indicates a moment of relative personal freedom, as a person ceases to follow ritualized deployment of actions and begins to think about the purpose and characteristics of his behavior. Mead believed that at birth a person does not have an identity: identity arises as a result of social experience, interaction with other people. Thus, Mead emphasized the social conditionality of identity, arguing that it arises only if the individual is included into a social group, in communication with members of this group (Mead, Morris, 1967). Correspondingly, inclusion into different groups might contribute to actualization of different types of identities. Later in this chapter we will use findings from the ENRI-East project to discuss how inclusion into different national-ethnic environment, being in frequent communication with the mother-nations and/or the Ukrainian ethnic group influences the structure and actualization of ethnic identities of the Polish and Hungarian ethnic minorities in Ukraine.

Jurgen Habermas regards personal and social identities as two dimensions in which a balancing I-identity is realized. Personal identity is a vertical dimension, it provides a coherent history of human life. Social identity is a horizontal dimension, it is associated with the fulfillment of various requirements of all role-
Bakirov Vil, Kizilov Oleksandr Ethnic groups and minorities in ukraine: identity formation and models of integration into the ukrainian society

playing systems to which a person belongs. Self-identity arises in the balance between personal and social identity. The establishment and maintenance of this balance takes place with the help of interaction techniques, among which language is of exceptional importance. In interaction, a person clarifies his identity, striving both to meet the regulatory expectations of a partner / group and express his originality (Habermas, 1998). Another theory of social identity has been offered by Henri Tajfel and John Turner who focused on the relationship between personal and social identities in the structure of the I-concept of the personality. In the theory of Tajfel and Turner personal and social identities are considered as categories that are mutually exclusive. Tajfel spoke about the existence of a certain socio-behavioral continuum, on one side of which forms of interpersonal interaction are localized, and on the other - interaction of people as representatives of certain communities. The first option involves the actualization of personal identity, the second option – of social identity. Depending on the situation, either personal or social identity can be actualized (Tajfel, 1982). The main mechanism that triggers the process of actualization of personal and social identity is the motivational structure oriented towards the achievement of positive self-esteem by the individual. The individual will actualize social identity and resort to intergroup behaviors if this is the shortest way to achieve positive self-esteem. If a person can achieve it at the level of interpersonal communication, actualizing personal identity, there is no need for him to switch to opposite forms of behavior (Turner, 1985).

Theory of social representations of Serge Moscovici criticizes the idea of opposing personal and social identity (Moscovici, 1988). In particular, Willem Dois suggests that personal identity cannot be considered only as a set of unique personality characteristics and reduces the individual level exclusively to differences. Differences and similarities can be found both at the level of personal identity and at the social level; personal identity can be viewed as a social representation, and therefore as the organizing principle of an individual position in the system of symbolic relationships between individuals and groups (Doise, 1998). The idea of contradistinction the two types of identity is also criticized by the followers of symbolic interactionism. One of the recent works written in the framework of procedural interactionism and devoted to the study of the identity concept is the monograph by Richard Jenkins “Social Identity” (1996). According to Jenkins, social identity is an understanding of who the individual is and who the others are, and vice versa, the understanding by other people of themselves and other people. In contrast to the traditional view of the existence of qualitative differences between the individual and collective identities Jenkins claims that unique individual and collective similarity may be regarded as two sides of the same process. The main difference between them is that in the case of individual identity, the emphasis is on the distinctive characteristics of the individual and...
also similar. Proceeding from this, Jenkins notes that both of these identities are social in their origin and arise only when an individual is included into a social group (Jenkins, 1996).

Interplay of the social identities of several groups – the modes of interrelations between ethnic minority and ethnic majority and the patterns of integration of ethnic minorities into the society as the political nation – can be explained via the concept of societal solidarity. Sociological studies exploring the concepts of society’s “solidarity” suggest that two aspects – normative and structural – can be distinguished here. The notion of normative solidarity characterizes the existence of a homogeneous system of norms and values, common views and beliefs, as well as feelings of unity in a society or in a group. The concept of structural solidarity characterizes involvement into social networks, integration into the labor division system as well as the intensity and quality of existing social relations. These two aspects of the same phenomenon should be considered in their integrity and interconnection. While commonality of ideas, beliefs and values serves as a normative basis for the social solidarity in a society, it is necessary to take into account the complexity of this phenomenon related to the structural dimension – as exclusion of one social group from the societal structure in any of the domains of public life (education, labour market or political representation) leads to the change in norms and values. Hence, the low level of structural solidarity causes decline in normative solidarity (Hechter, 1987).

Considering the issue of minority-majority relations through the prism of the solidarity concept, three main models of coexistence of the national majority and ethnic minorities can be identified. The first model does not feature substantial efforts of the majority and the state to create the necessary conditions for the ethnic minorities to preserve and reproduce their ethnic identity and authentic culture. The main outcome of the first model is assimilation of ethnic minorities, loss of the society’s ethnic diversity and further homogenization of the country’s national composition. The second model which is located on the other side of the spectrum of modes of coexistence of ethnic groups can be described as ethnic segregation. In this situation members of the ethnic minority group create their own, ethnic structures and institutions in many spheres of public life, including education, religion, economy, politics etc. Significant reinforcement of such institutions creates a situation of a “state inside a state” and leads to a conflict between the ethnic minority structures and the formal national institutions operating inside the country. Deliberate ethnic segregation makes cooperation and peaceful coexistence difficult within the one state. It should be noted that both ethnic assimilation and ethnic segregation can be initiated under the different circumstances, and sometimes even with the good intentions, but however, do not bring the desired positive results (Machacek, Heinrich, Alekseeva, 2012).

The optimal model of coexistence is the organic integration of the ethnic minority group(s) into the society and nation as the political community but with the preservation of their cultural authenticity. Successful integration of ethnic minorities depends much on the state policy and state’s ability to create
the necessary conditions to protect the ethnic authenticity of the minority group and its culture and at the same time to ensure its full-fledged inclusion into the social and political life of the country. The ethnic minority from its side is also expected to undertake a number of steps proclaiming its loyal and supportive attitudes to the state which territory they inhabit and whose citizens they are. Successful integration of the ethnic minority into the society is therefore a result of a joint long and hard work from the side of both the minority and the majority; implementation of such work frequently requires shared social and political values, common understanding of past history and visions of the future.

A similar classification has been proposed by the Canadian Psychologist John F. Berry in his famous acculturation model theory. According to Berry, acculturation process, that is the ways how the individuals of different ethnicities relate and assimilate to the dominant (majority) culture, can occur following one of the four strategies: separation, marginalization, assimilation or integration. The four strategies represent basically different variations of correlation of the own ethnic identity and the strength of feeling of ethnic belonging with the level of adaptation to the majority culture. Minorities with the strong feeling of own ethnicity and low level of adaptation to the majority culture end up in “separation” being detached from the rest of the society. Minorities with the low profile of own ethnic identity and high adaptation to the culture of the state of residence are considered as “assimilated” minorities. Marginalization takes place when the minority group rejects both own ethnic identity and the culture of the majority of the population in the country. Finally, integration strategy takes places when individuals are able to adopt to the cultural norms of the dominant majority culture while still maintaining own ethnic belonging and own culture (Berry, 1997). It is remarkable that while first approach focuses on efforts both the state and the minority should undertake to ensure successful integration, the second approach considers possibility of integration dependent on the strength of the own ethnicity and related culture and set of norms as well as minority’s ability to adapt to the majority culture.

**Table 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cultural adaptation (relation to the majority group)</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance of own ethnic culture</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Separation</td>
<td>Integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Marginalization</td>
<td>Assimilation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Integration as the model of coexistence of ethnic minorities and the national majority is strongly endorsed by the international regulating documents such as the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities accepted by the Council of Europe which came into effect in 1998 and was ratified by Ukraine. In particular, paragraph 5 of the Convention suggests that all members shall “undertake to promote the conditions necessary for persons belonging to national minorities to maintain and develop their culture, and to preserve the essential elements of their identity, namely
their religion, language, traditions and cultural heritage” and “shall refrain from policies or practices aimed at assimilation of persons belonging to national minorities” (Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, 1998). At the same time, while the state should provide conditions for the preservation of ethnic culture and language, members of ethnic minority groups are expected to be bilingual in order to participate fully in the life of the society. In other words, preservation and ability to use mother tongue for the ethnic minority group does not presume ignorance towards the official national language of the country. Requirement to know the state language should not be considered as oppression as only via ability to communicate with the rest of the society in the commonly used in the country language members of the ethnic minority groups can become full members of the society and participate at the equal level in the country’s social and political life, including education, labour market and political decision-making.

The described above models constitute -in the terminology of Max Weber- the “ideal types” while in reality the exact mode of co-existence of the majority and the minorities can combine features of several models. As described above, the process of minority integration to a certain extent depends on the policy measures undertaken by the state, but at the same time is caused by the strength of own ethnic belonging and attachment to the minority’s own culture. Having that said, one can assume that there are differences in the way how members of ethnic groups see their own ethnicity, importance of preservation of its cultural attributes and how this affects the particular model the minority is following in its relations with the majority in the country of residence. We will use empirical evidence from the international research project “ENRI-East” to compare the structure of ethnic belonging of two ethnic minorities residing in Ukraine, the Polish and the Hungarian ethnic minorities. We will discuss how discrepancies in historical resettlement, language, religious, social and political practices cause the different strategies these two ethnic groups follow in their co-existence with the ethnic majority in the Ukrainian society.

ENRI-East “Interplay of European, national and regional identities: nations between the states along the new borders of the European Union” is a large-scale international research project implemented in 2009-2011 by a multinational team of scholars from 10 countries, with the financial support of the European Commission. Project’s aim was to study and to deepen the understanding of how the modern national and cultural self-identities of the peoples in Europe and the regional cultures of the Eastern part of the European continent are formed and interact. More specifically, the project was focused on the methods of formation, realization and reproduction of European, national and regional identities in individual and group narratives and practices within the frame of an increasingly complex set of institutional structures. The project was a comparative interdisciplinary study that combined the efforts of sociologists, ethnographers and political scientists in explaining ethno-social trends in Eastern Europe. The geography of the project covered the Carpathian region, Eastern Europe, the Baltic region and Germany. The object of research in the project were specific
nations and their “bits” - ethnic groups residing on the different side of the EU border and outside the mother nation state. Ethnic minorities, cut off by their political borders from their mother country, face the problems of preserving ethnic traditions and assimilation, forming ethnic and ethno-linguistic identities and establishing intercultural contacts in the conditions of overlapping and merging economic and information spaces. ENRI-East addressed these problems and examined how European, national and regional identities of the members of ethnic minorities are formed and reproduced (Beck, 1999).

More than 50 sociologists and experts from seven EU countries and three CIS countries took part in the international project. The national team of Ukraine was represented by sociologists of the V.N.Karazin Kharkiv National University in cooperation with the survey researchers from the East-Ukrainian Foundation for Social Research. The project represented a comprehensive research effort, both theoretically and methodologically. The project research agenda included four interdisciplinary themes focusing on such issues as the interaction of identities and cultures and comparison of “mother nations” and their “groups residing abroad”; nations between the states and the policy of “mother nations” and “host nations” to the ethnic groups; the self-organization and representation of ethnic minorities along the Eastern border of the European Union; historical paths, historical memory, the current state and the expected dynamics of the development of the “divided nations” in Eastern Europe (Gibson, Cebotari, Nurse, Oerkeny, Samoilova, Sik, Suranyi, Szekelyi, Tchistiakova, Waechter, 2012).

The project employed a broad variety of theoretical and empirical research methods which allowed executing comprehensive analysis of the “divided nations” and the ways the identity of ethnic minorities is formed and reproduced in a culturally different environment. The methodological toolbox of the project included critical review of the literature for each of the ethnic groups; secondary analysis of existing statistical and secondary survey data; cross-national formalized mass survey of the members of ethnic minority groups; complex qualitative study including biographical interviews, expert interviews, content-analysis of Internet resources, teenagers’ essays, focus group discussion, and musical focus groups. Twelve ethnic minority groups became the object of analysis in ENRI-East including the Slovaks in Hungary, Hungarians in Slovakia, Russians in Latvia, Polish in Belarus, Russians in Lithuania, Polish in Lithuania, Belarusians in Lithuania, Ukrainians in Poland, Belarusians in Poland, Lithuanians in Russia (Kaliningrad region), Hungarians in Ukraine and Poles in Ukraine. Sample size for each of the studied ethnic minorities constituted 400 respondents; respondents were selected by different methods depending on the population density of the ethnic group in the region (random route walking for high-density areas and snowballing low-density territories). Belonging to ethnic minority was based on self-identification only; members of ethnic minorities in the age of 18 years and older were interview only.

Ethnic minorities of Poles and Hungarians were selected as the research object for a number of reasons. First, ethnic Polish and Hungarians have a weighty number in Western Ukraine and are among the ethnic groups that are most active
in public and political life both at local, regional, and national level in Ukraine. At the same time, in terms of their size ethnic Polish and Hungarians are “typical” minorities in Ukraine constituting around 0.3% of the country’s population (for example, the Russian ethnic minority due to its large size is a special case which needs to be treated separately). Poles and Hungarians in Ukraine live in the special areas with the cross-border provision and maintain close relations with their mother-nations. These minorities, whose mother-nations became members of the European Union, since many years supported the Western vector of development of Ukraine, increased migration flows and infringed on territorial integrity and unitary structure of Ukraine in the areas of their compact settlement. While there are quite a number of similarities between the Polish and Hungarian ethnic minorities in Ukraine, ENRI-East project revealed a great number of discrepancies in the structure of their ethnic identities and channels of its reproduction which affects the behavior and self-representation of these groups at both local and national levels and explains those inter-cultural and political conflicts which emerged recently in 2017-2018 between the members of these ethnic minorities and the Ukrainian state (Бакіров, Кізілов, Кізілова, 2010).

The Polish and Hungarian ethnic communities have a number of objective differences related to the peculiarities of their settlement in Ukraine which have a significant impact on both the way of life the representatives of these minorities have and the degree of cohesion of these groups and their integration into the Ukrainian society. The first such aspect is associated with the different history and duration of inhabitation of these ethnic groups on the territory of Ukraine, and, consequently, interaction with the Ukrainians and their culture. The history of co-existence of Poles and Ukrainians counts many centuries and is characterized by extreme inconsistency and complexity of relationships. The Poles came to the Ukrainian lands in the era of Kievan Rus. Mass colonization of the territory of Western and Central Ukraine by the Poles occurred during the expansion of the Polish state to the East in the XIV century. The Poles who resettled on the territory of Western Ukraine acquired higher social status than the indigenous population, constituted the majority of the ruling landowner elite and a significant part of the Catholic clergy. This dominant position of the Poles on the Ukrainian lands was maintained until the first half of the XX century, when the Soviet authorities forcibly evicted Ukrainian Poles into Poland and in many ways oppressed those who remained in the Soviet Union. Thus, in historical terms one can speak about a close and long-term interaction of Polish and Ukrainian ethnoses on the territory of Ukraine (Bakirov, Kizilov, Kizilova, Heinrich, Alekseeva, 2012). Hungarians came to the territory of the modern Transcarpathian region eight centuries ago as a result of the Tatar-Mongolian raids and the colonization of the territory of modern Hungary by the Ottoman Empire. However, as part of the Ukrainian society, Hungarians appeared only 75 years ago - after the inclusion of the Transcarpathian region into the Ukrainian Soviet Republic in 1945. In this way, within days whole villages consisting of ethnic Hungarians appeared to be part of the Ukrainian state. In this way, the history of co-existence of ethnic Hungarians and Ukrainians within a single state is relatively short and is associated with the
slow process of integration of the Hungarian minority into the cultural and language environment of the majority (Bakirov, Kizilov, Kizilova, Heinrich, Alekseeva, 2012).

Another important factor that to a large extent explains the integration problems of the ethnic Hungarians in Ukraine is their resettlement patterns. Thus, 97% of Ukrainian Hungarians live in the Transcarpathian region, with almost 85% of them living locally in four districts of this region - Beregovo, Vinogradovsky, Mukacheve and Uzhgorod, which form the territory of the so-called “Hungarian compact”. Therefore, territorially and, as a consequence, on the cultural level Hungarians in Ukraine constitute a relatively isolated community; these settlement patterns facilitate preservation of own language and cultural traditions since many decades and at the same time constitute a natural barrier for the intervention of the Ukrainian language and cultural norms into these lands. The situation is very different for the Poles in Ukraine. The Poles are present in the ethnic structure of the Ukrainian society since a much longer period of time and managed to mix with Ukrainians, Russians and other ethnic groups residing in Central and Western Ukraine. Ukrainian Poles are settled in a much more dispersed way and nowadays live mainly in four provinces of Ukraine: Zhytomyr (34% of all Ukrainian Poles), Khmelnytsky (16% of all Ukrainian Poles), Lviv (13%) and Ternopil (3%). According to the 2001 population Census, in these four regions, a total of two thirds (66%) of Ukrainian Poles live. The density of the Poles in these regions is very low and ranges from 0.3% to 3.5%. While, as we will see further, ethnic Poles in Ukraine do have a rich cultural life and preserve own ethnic traditions, the specific resettlement patterns conduct the primary assimilation mode of co-existence of Polish ethnic minority with the Ukrainian majority. And the compact settlement of Hungarians in Ukraine makes the separation strategy a natural consequence. The experts of Polish, Hungarian and Ukrainian decent interviewed within the framework of the ENRI-East research project when describing and analyzing the peculiarities of the resettlement of Poles and Hungarians in Ukraine, note the tendencies of assimilation of the Poles in Ukraine and the strong preservation of their ethnic identity by the Hungarians. At the same time experts recognize the greater “ethno-cultural distance” between Hungarians and Ukrainians as another factor explaining low level of integration of this group into the society.

**Expert 1, Member of the Polish ethnic minority in Ukraine, leader of a Polish NGO**: “That is a consequence of the dispersed settlement, the fact that they [Poles] are surrounded by the Ukrainian environment, they feel comfortable that they are not alienated from this environment […] For Hungarians that is a little different because they live in Transcarpathia, so the relative amount of 90 percent or 98 living in Transcarpathia that is a group living compactly. For Ukrainian Poles, because they live in such a dispersive way, that doesn’t have such a value here. Simultaneously, they do not differ in their appearance from Ukrainians”.

**Expert 2, Member of the Polish ethnic minority in Ukraine, leader of a Polish NGO**: “Poles are a group that is well-integrated into the Ukrainian society. You can talk about assimilation, yes, they have lived for a long time
here, they do not constitute any alienated item, and they keep the same customs, traditions and culture as Ukrainian people, they do not differ. This is such a group that is for a long time living here”.

Expert 3, Member of the Hungarian ethnic minority in Ukraine, leader of a Hungarian NGO: “If we talk about the Hungarian community, I must say that most of it is not integrated [into the Ukrainian society]. If I was asked about the Poles, then I would say that they are more likely [integrated]. They are rather Ukrainians than Poles. Hungarians - no, they are not integrated. Hungarians are probably one of the most non-integrated minorities [in Ukraine]”.

Expert 4, Ukrainian by ethnicity, specialist on ethnic relations and migration: “Features may be in the proximity of cultures, ethno-cultural, psychological distance, well, let’s say, ethno-cultural distance is much smaller between Ukrainians and Poles rather than between Hungarians and Ukrainians”.

An important survey indicator we can use to characterize the acculturation strategies followed by ethnic Poles and Hungarians in Ukraine is the feeling of closeness and unification with own ethnic group and the society as a whole. In the ENRI-East project, members of Polish and Hungarians ethnic minorities were asked to reflect how close they feel to their own ethnic group, the settlement where they live, their ethnic mother-nation, the Ukrainian state and the European. This case of the ethnic minorities is interesting to compare the strength of connections with different territorial, national and ethnic units the group is in one or another way related to. The main conclusion one can make from the analysis of self-identification patterns of Ukrainian Poles and Hungarians is that these two groups have different modes of inclusion into all types of communities (Table 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answers' distribution to the question:</th>
<th>Hungarian ethnic group in Ukraine</th>
<th>Poles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hungarian ethnic group in Ukraine</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your settlement (city, village) and the people who live here</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine and Ukrainian society</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary and its people</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe, European community</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data-sets: Poles in Ukraine N=400; Hungarians in Ukraine N=400

Project findings suggest that own ethnic group in Ukraine is very close or close to between a half and two thirds (58%) of both Poles and Hungarians with the significant differences in the levels of closeness to the local territorial community (settlement), Ukraine, mother-nation (Hungary/Poland) and Europe as a whole. In case of the Polish minority we can suggest that strong own cultural heritage and active cultural life on one side and certain territorial disconnection from the mother-nation on the other side lead to a higher integration of Poles into the Ukrainian society.
as a cultural community which still has a strong feeling of own ethnicity. Hence, the acculturation strategy practiced by this ethnic minority can be identified as organic integration into the Ukrainian society rather than assimilation. While maintaining their authentic ethnic belonging, the Poles are greatly integrated into the Ukrainian society: they have close ties with the local community (75% feel very close or close to own settlement); more or less the same part of the respondents (67%) have same feelings of closeness towards Ukraine and Ukrainians. We can also note that feeling of inclusion into the Ukrainian society is more widespread among the Ukrainian Poles (67%) rather than strong ties with the own ethnic group (58%). Local territorial community and the Ukrainian nation are therefore primary groups of reference for the Poles in Ukraine.

In case of Hungarians, the revealed levels of closeness towards different types of communities presumes that this ethnic minority -while following the separation acculturation strategy- is greatly affected also by marginalization. Survey findings allow to suggest that Hungarians in Ukraine are in a transition period featuring a “crisis of identity”: there is no strong unity among them as only half of our respondents said they felt close to the ethnic Hungarians living in Ukraine. At the same time approximately, the same part (54%) of Hungarian respondents said they felt close to their local community (settlement) which allows us to conclude that when speaking about the members of their own ethnicity in Ukraine, most Hungarians mean first of all their fellow villagers. Hungarians in Ukraine, despite the great importance of the Hungarian language and own cultural traditions as we will discuss later, are strongly consolidated as a territorial community. The feeling of closeness to Ukraine is shared only by a third (31%) of the respondents; at the same time detachment of Ukrainian Hungarians from their mother-nation – Hungarians in Hungary – already occurred (as only 31% of the respondents said they feel very close to Hungary). Hungarians in Ukraine are at the crossroads; their ties with the Hungarian state do not seem to be that strong as described sometimes while the integration into the Ukrainian society did not take place yet either. Great linguistic differences between the Hungarian and Ukrainian languages (as compared to closeness and high similarity between Polish and Ukrainian languages) become an additional segregation and isolation factor turning Hungarians in Ukraine into a marginalized, closed, self-oriented and self-providing community. This feature was also noted by the experts who were interviewed in the ENRI-East project.

Expert 5, Member of the Hungarian ethnic minority in Ukraine, leader of a Hungarian NGO: «…if we investigate the situation in Hungarian villages, we could say that the Hungarian group is still separated till now. In the rural locations there are almost no mixed cities and villages: the village is either Hungarian, or non-Hungarian».

Expert 6, Member of the Hungarian ethnic minority in Ukraine, member of the Hungarian political party: «…while we preserve our identity, in a certain way it makes our total integration into the system impossible. At the biological level as well as at the level of public subconsciousness those who will produce this reaction will not even realize that they do so. After twenty-two or
twenty-three years in this field I can confirm this empirical fact that this group [Hungarians in Ukraine] is a foreign element».

Expert 7, Member of the Polish ethnic minority in Ukraine, leader of a Polish NGO: «As I am responsible for this at various quorums, we should remark and say definitely that the Poles in Ukraine are an open community».

The “crisis of identity” or the “crisis of belonging” inside the Hungarian community becomes particularly notable if we investigate the responses of the respondents of different age. Survey findings show that older Hungarians feel closer to Hungary than young Ukrainian Hungarians. Same is however valid for the attitudes towards Ukraine: young Hungarians feel less close to Ukraine than those who had lived here for many years. Therefore, while older generation of Ukrainian Hungarians had a chance to develop over the years a clearer ethnic, territorial and political identity, young ethnic Hungarians born in Ukraine after the proclamation of the independence in 1991 found themselves in a new situation with the greater variety of potential choices and opportunities produced by borders openness and population mobility and therefore experience an “identity gap”: from one side, they have no strong ties with Hungary, but on the other side, they did not manage to develop a Ukrainian political identity to become integrated into the Ukrainian society. Therefore, a properly organized and carefully planned strategy of the Ukrainian state to help the Hungarian ethnic minority get included into the Ukrainian society has significant chances for a success (provided that such policy will take into account the language, religious and other peculiarities of the Hungarian ethnic community in Transcarpathia). And the empirical evidence which was collected within the ENRI-East project suggests that such work should be started exactly with young people of Hungarian decent living in Ukraine.

Europe remains the most distant community for both interviewed Poles and Hungarians: around 27% of Poles and around 22% of Hungarians assumed high level of closeness towards Europe. This finding can be partly explained by a more favorable image of the European Union for the Polish people than for the Hungarian. For instance, 73% of interviewed Ukrainian Poles had a positive image of the EU while among the Hungarians only 44% shared positive attitude towards the European Union. Correspondingly, when asked about the potential membership of Ukraine in the European Union, 50% of Hungarians said it would be beneficial for the country while among the Poles a vast majority (78%) was confident that membership in the EU will have a positive influence on the development of Ukrainian state. It is important to stress though that -while ethnic identity and attitudes towards language and culture are individual’s long-term orientations that do not change overnight- attitudes to political institutions and supra-regional political organizations, and the European Union among them, are much more dynamic, and the actual attitudes towards the EU among Poles and Hungarians in Ukraine in 2018 can differ from the findings we obtained in 2010 when the ENRI-East survey fieldwork took place.

Native language and its proficiency are important components of ethnic identity and factor of cohesion of the Polish and Hungarian ethnic minorities in Ukraine. However, the role and importance of native language in the life of
these ethnic groups varies considerably. Linguistically Hungarians are a much more closed and isolated group in the Ukrainian society than the Poles. Among Hungarians surveyed in Ukraine within the ENRI-East project, almost everybody (98%) speaks Hungarian while only two-thirds (63%) of the respondents said they speak Ukrainian (interviewers speaking Hungarian were involved into the project to conduct interviews with the respondents who did not speak Ukrainian). Within the Poles the situation was the opposite: all interviewed Poles speak Ukrainian language and only two-thirds (70%) of them can actually speak Polish (Table 3).

**Table 3**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language proficiency among the Poles and Hungarians in Ukraine, %</th>
<th>Hungarian</th>
<th>Poles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hungarian</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other language(s)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data-sets: Poles in Ukraine N=400; Hungarians in Ukraine N=400

Similar findings were obtained when analyzing the languages used by the respondents for everyday communication at home. Regardless of their high proficiency in Polish, over a half (55%) of Poles do speak Ukrainian at home as the main language, and 17% more use both Polish and Ukrainian in conversation with their family, friends, relatives and neighbors. The opposite is the situation with Hungarians in Ukraine: while 63% of them stated their proficiency in Ukrainian, only 5% of Hungarians in Transcarpathia actually use Ukrainian as the language of communication at home, and 20% more use Ukrainian and Hungarian equally while vast majority (75%) of the Hungarian minority members speak Hungarian on the everyday basis and use it as the main language for their everyday communications and interactions.

**Table 4**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answers’ distribution to the question: “What language or languages do you speak most often at home?”, %</th>
<th>Hungarian</th>
<th>Poles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hungarian</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both Hungarian and Ukrainian equally</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other language(s)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data-sets: Poles in Ukraine N=400; Hungarians in Ukraine N=400

While we can hypothesize if this state of the art is linked with the greater opportunities and conditions created for the Hungarians in Ukraine to learn their language at schools rather than for the Polish ethnic minority, or if this is associated with the different settlement patterns and residence in primary Hungarian for the Hungarians environment or in primary Ukrainian and multi-national
environment for the Poles, or with a simple belonging of Ukrainian and Polish to the same language group and a greater linguistic difference between Ukrainian and Hungarian languages, in either case discrepancies in the language proficiency are indicative in explaining separation of the Hungarian community in Ukraine and their inability to integrate fully into the society, into the education system, labour market, civil society and the political life of the Ukrainian state. Being unable to understand Ukrainian and speak Ukrainian, Hungarians are forced to create their own education institutions, civil society organizations and political parties, and seek support (both financial and ideological) from Hungary – with whom they have no language barrier. While we can hypothesize if the rejection of the Ukrainian culture and Ukrainian statehood by the Hungarian ethnic minority is conscious and consistent, the language barrier constitutes an objective practical obstacle in relations between the Hungarian minority and the Ukrainian majority. If the aspirations for the cultural and social autonomy of the Hungarian ethnic minority in Ukraine have indeed contributed to actual marginalization of the community, the policies of the Ukrainian state appeared to be inefficient either. The right to preserve and reproduce own language and culture as granted by the Law on National Minorities, Ukrainian Constitution and the Law on the ratification of the European Charter on Regional or Minority languages so far has been treated unilaterally, omitting its reverse side that knowledge of the state language is the basic foundation for the co-existence of any ethnic minority in the multicultural, multinational and multilanguage society (The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, 1998). Finding a compromise solution for the language dilemma can be easier in case of some minorities (like Poles in Ukraine) and might require greater time, efforts and deeper knowledge about the problem for the case of Hungarians in Ukraine. However, without the resolution of the language problem, further integration of Hungarians into the Ukrainian society is unlikely to follow a smooth path.

Since ENRI-East project was an international research effort implemented in several countries, we have a chance also to compare Polish and Hungarian minorities in Ukraine with same ethnic groups residing in neighboring countries. We can observe striking similarities in the language usage patterns between Hungarians in Ukraine and Hungarians in Slovakia: around 75% of Hungarians in both countries use Hungarian as the main language in their everyday life while only few (3-5%) of respondents do use the language of the majority (that is Ukrainian or Slovak). For comparison, Slovaks residing in Hungary speak either primarily Hungarian or both Hungarian and Slovak. Situation with the Polish minority is a bit different: Ukrainian Poles have a better knowledge of the own ethnic language while, for example, members of the Polish ethnic minority in Belarus can be considered as an assimilated group and speak primary majority language (Russian) in their everyday life.
Answers’ distribution to the question:
“What language or languages do you speak most often at home?”, %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Own ethnic group language</th>
<th>Country of residence language</th>
<th>Both languages equally</th>
<th>Other language(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russians in Latvia</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarians in Slovakia</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarians in Ukraine</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians in Lithuania</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish in Lithuania</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Byelorussians in Poland</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians in Poland</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish in Ukraine</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Byelorussians in Lithuania</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish in Belarus</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanians in Russia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovaks in Hungary</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data-sets: Poles in Ukraine N=400; Hungarians in Ukraine N=400

Partly the situation with the knowledge of the own ethnic language is explained by the differences in the structure and factors of ethnic identity how it is considered by Poles and Hungarians residing in Ukraine (Table 6). If the basis of ethnic belonging for both the Poles and Hungarians is their subjective self-identification (“to feel Polish/Hungarian”) as stressed by vast majority (71-80%) of the respondents, on the second place in the list of identity-forming characteristics for Hungarians is knowledge of and ability to speak Hungarian (78%). For the members of Polish ethnic minority knowledge of Polish is important (46%), though way less significant than for the Hungarians. Ukrainian Poles have partly assimilated after many years of settlement on the territory of Ukraine, and subjective feeling of belonging to the Polish ethnus by half of them is considered to be enough to be truly “Polish” while the knowledge of Polish language is not mandatory. In case of the Hungarian ethnic minority, language becomes one of the main identity-forming foundations, and therefore any feeble effort to limit the usage of the Hungarian language for the members of this ethnic minority is equal to the infringement of their ethnic identity and authentic Hungarian culture as a whole. The findings of the ENRI-East project in 2010 therefore predict and explain the different attitudes ethnic minority groups in Ukraine revealed publicly in 2018 in response to the potential innovations in the language policy. Similar to this, if for the Hungarians their language constitutes the main pillar for their ethnic identity, religion is such a pillar for the Poles (Table 6). These specific features of ethnic minority groups in Ukraine and differing contribution of various identity-forming components (language, cultural life, religion etc.) need to be considered when developing any policies and regulations affecting the life of the ethnic minorities in Ukraine.
Table 6

Answers’ distribution to the question:
“How important are the following things for you to feel truly Polish/Hungarian?” (% for “very important”)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hungarian</th>
<th>Polish</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To feel Hungarian</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To speak Hungarian</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To have Hungarian ancestors</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To respect the political system and laws of Hungary</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To be Catholic/Protestant</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To have Hungarian citizenship</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To be born in Hungary</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To live in Hungary for the most of your lifetime</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To speak Polish</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To have Polish ancestors</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To respect the political system and laws of Poland</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To be Catholic</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To have Polish citizenship</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To be born in Poland</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To live in Poland for the most of your lifetime</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data-sets: Poles in Ukraine N=400; Hungarians in Ukraine N=400

For the Polish ethnic minority such an important component and integral part of their ethnicity is their religion—Catholicism. Around 60% of Poles in Ukraine believe that being Catholic is very important to be truly Polish, while among the Hungarians it is only around 14% who stress the importance of religion for their ethnic identity. In terms of religion, the Poles constitute a more united group than the Hungarians. The overwhelming majority (91%) of the interviewed Polish respondents in Ukraine belongs to Catholicism while Ukrainian Hungarians are divided into two groups: 70% profess Protestantism and about 27% Catholicism. Ethnic Poles are much more religious than the Hungarians: two thirds (66%) of the interviewed Poles attend religious services once a week or more often. The Catholicism as a factor of the Polish solidarization does not make this group closed and isolated at the same time: there are adherents of the Catholicism among the Ukrainians living in the Western and Central Ukraine. The services in churches in the studied areas are conducted in both Polish and Ukrainian languages. The Hungarians mostly confess the Protestantism. The Reformed Church in Transcarpathia is the national Hungarian church where the service is in Hungarian and most of the congregation is Hungarian.

In the second part of the survey conducted within the ENRI-East research project, we focused on exploring the cultural needs of the ethnic minorities. Numerous international and national regulations and official documents guarantee the rights of ethnic communities for self-determination and realization of the cultural needs associated with own language, traditions, customs. At the same time, in a multinational society knowledge of the specific needs of different ethnic groups allows ensuring the efficiency of state policy measures towards the ethnic minorities. Members of the Hungarian and Polish ethnic minorities were asked to estimate how important would be for them such opportunities as the possibility to speak own language in everyday life, possibility to preserve own ethnic group customs and traditions, possibility to read newspapers and magazines in the own
language, opportunity to have the representatives of own ethnic group in the Ukrainian parliament, possibility for the children to obtain education in the own language and possibility for the children to study the ethnic history and culture.

Table 7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Hungarian (%)</th>
<th>Polish (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To speak Hungarian in everyday life</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To preserve Hungarian ethnic group folk customs, traditions, culture</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To read newspapers and magazines in Hungarian</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To have the Hungarians being represented in the Ukrainian parliament</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For your children to get education in Hungarian</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For your children to study Hungarian ethnic history and culture</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data-sets: Poles in Ukraine N=400; Hungarians in Ukraine N=400p

According to the project findings, possibility of realization of all their cultural needs is much more important for Hungarians than for the members of the Polish ethnic group in Ukraine. Possibility to speak Hungarian is very important for almost all the interviewed respondents (85%) while among the Polish respondents only one third (38%) said it is very important to them. The most important cultural need for the Polish ethnic minority is a possibility to preserve their own traditions and customs, to follow cultural and religious norms. As we will see further, members of the Hungarian minority do also have a much higher level of satisfaction of all their cultural needs. Hence, the high demand for ethnic self-determination is not caused by the inability to satisfy these needs, but apparently by a stronger williness of Hungarians to protect own authentic culture and unwillingness (or inability) to open it for any alternative cultural system. The mode of existence of the Hungarian ethnic community in Ukraine features “protective behavior” where any intervention into the language, education, media or other sphere is considered to be a threat to the cultural self-determination.

It is remarkable that Polish and Hungarian ethnic groups in Ukraine seem to belong to the different stages of ethnos development with regard to the need in political representation of the ethnic group. While members of the Polish ethnic minority at the time of the survey did not have yet any political party representing their interests and did not experience a significance need to establish one, for the Hungarian ethnic minority political representation both at the settlement level, region level and national level was always of a great
importance. An additional study in this field would be required to identify if the political representation of ethnic Hungarians in Ukraine is associated with the experienced need to protect further the cultural and linguistic rights of this minority or other intentions. Experts interviewed within the ENRI-East project stated that willingness and ability to solve emerging issues by political means is an indicator of strength, organization, consolidation, and according to the most ambitious estimates indicates the viability of a national minority to survive in an alien culture. However, linguistic assimilation of Poles in Ukraine and the lack of clearly expressed desire of political representation should not be unequivocally interpreted as a degradation of this ethnic group: the Poles have adapted to life in Ukraine, they are well integrated into the Ukrainian society, at the same time adhering to the Polish folk customs and traditions and preserving their culture. We should add also that while there were no Polish political parties in Ukraine at the time of the ENRI-East project (2009-2011), the first political party of the Polish ethnic minority in Ukraine was registered in 2014. On the territory of the Transcarpathian region there are two political parties of ethnic Hungarians: the Hungarian Party of Ukraine (KMKS) and the Democratic Party of Hungarians of Ukraine (DPUU). Although both parties formally have the status of all-Ukrainian, their activities and membership are concentrated exclusively in places of compact residence of Hungarians in four districts of Transcarpathia. On the territory of “Hungarian compact” Hungarians parties have majority of seats in the city and village councils.

Expert 8, Member of the Polish ethnic minority in Ukraine, leader of a Polish NGO: “Political representation gives more opportunities and more practice in order to realize the vested interests. Surely, there are national groups that do not grow up to this [level]. For example, the Poles”.

Expert 9, Member of the Hungarian ethnic minority in Ukraine, member of the Hungarian political party: “Well, it can be considered an indicator. If there is the one who would answer your question that politics does not matter, that he is not engaged into politics, then it is the end for this [ethnic] group. This is not the national group”.

While having strong and clearly articulated demands for the ethnic and cultural self-determination, the Hungarian ethnic minority also has a great number of its demands being already satisfied – which is confirmed by the Hungarian population survey data. Thus, 93% of Hungarian respondents noted that they had an opportunity to give school education in Hungarian language to their children and that they have a possibility to read newspapers and magazines in Hungarian language issued in Ukraine on a regular basis. Over a half (64%) of Ukrainian Hungarians listen to the radio programs of the Ukrainian radio stations in Hungarian language. Around a half of the respondents can watch TV programs on Ukrainian TV channels in Hungarian language (Table 8).


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hungarian</th>
<th>Poles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To read newspapers/journals published in Ukraine in Hungarian</td>
<td>To read newspapers/journals published in Ukraine in Polish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To give your children education in Hungarian</td>
<td>To give your children education in Polish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To obtain secondary education in Hungarian</td>
<td>To obtain secondary education in Polish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To obtain primary education in Hungarian</td>
<td>To obtain primary education in Polish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To watch TV programs of Ukrainians channels in Hungarian</td>
<td>To watch TV programs of Ukrainians channels in Polish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To listen to the radio programs of Ukrainians senders in Hungarian</td>
<td>To listen to the radio programs of Ukrainians senders in Polish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To obtain tertiary education in Hungarian</td>
<td>To obtain tertiary education in Polish</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data-sets: Poles in Ukraine N=400; Hungarians in Ukraine N=400

While members of the Polish ethnic minority in Ukraine do also have a chance to watch TV programs and listen to the radio programs of the Ukrainian senders in Polish language, it is remarkable that members of the two ethnic groups had very different experience in obtaining primary, secondary and tertiary education in their own language. Around 60-70% of surveyed Hungarians in Ukraine actually did obtain primary and secondary education in Hungarian while among the Polish respondents only one in ten persons (9-16%) did studied in Polish at school. These findings prove that the conditions created for the Hungarian ethnic minority to preserve and use their own language are quite extensive. In particular, in Transcarpathia there are about 100 schools and more than 70 preschool establishments with a Hungarian language of instruction/education. In the universities of the region, groups with Hungarian language of teaching were created at Mukachevo State University, Kyiv Slavic University, Uzhgorod College of Culture and Arts, Berehove Medical College, Mukacheve Agrarian College. In 1996, the Zakarpattia Hungarian Institute was functioning in Berehove. There were 94 libraries with the collection of 408,000 books in Hungarian, over 400 clubs and amateur groups (Лоїко, 2005). At the same time satisfaction of the linguistic and education needs of the Hungarian ethnic minority via the broad network of Hungarian education institutions creates the foundation of the problem for the subsequent integration of the members of the Hungarian ethnic community into the Ukrainian society. According to experts, the problem of the language and education as a derivative part is a very important one unifying the Hungarians in Ukraine. This conclusion may be drawn from biographical and expert interviews. Almost all the experts of the Hungarian diaspora note that
most of its representatives are ignorant of the official language which creates great difficulties in obtaining the education, finding a job and further comfortable coexistence and self-realization in the Ukrainian society.

**Expert 10, Member of the Hungarian ethnic minority in Ukraine, leader of a Hungarian NGO:** “I remember when I entered the institute during my first lectures I did not know the difference between full stop and dash. I did not know it because we finished a Hungarian school. The good thing is that I studied and could distinguish them afterwards, but not everybody has this opportunity”.

The problem of language limits substantially the possibilities of building a career and promotion of the professional status of the representatives of the Hungarian diaspora in Ukraine. It leads to an incomplete representation of the Hungarian national minority in the Ukrainian cultural, business and political elite.

**Expert 11, Member of the Hungarian ethnic minority in Ukraine, leader of a Hungarian NGO:** “Before I came here I had worked in an NGO. I posted an announce in a newspaper that we sought young people to work. Several young people who have already finished the university came to us [for a job interview]. They could type on the computer and knew how to manage ECDL, they also knew all kinds of computer programs and communications very well. The only thing they did not know was Ukrainian language. And I could not hire them”.

**Expert 12, Member of the Hungarian ethnic minority in Ukraine, leader of a Hungarian NGO:** “We are not represented in high education and accordingly in nomenclature. It means that we represent less students, doctors, lawyers and officials in percentage. It is quite logical. The [Hungarian] language is quite different from the official [Ukrainian] one. That’s why those who possessed certain knowledge according to the normative standards cannot pass only because of the ignorance of the official language”.

Scarce knowledge or even total ignorance of the Ukrainian language and all the derivatives from this problem unite the Ukrainian Hungarians and create the fundamental basis for internal consolidation and mutual support of this ethnic group. The same reasons interfere the integration into Ukrainian reality. The Poles in Ukraine do not have such problems.

**Expert 13, Member of the Hungarian ethnic minority in Ukraine, leader of a Hungarian NGO:** “We solve our problems ourselves. If we need to translate the school tests – we do it. If we need any manuals or textbooks, we do the translations ourselves or order them in Hungary. We are doing everything ourselves. We find money, print, distribute, children begin to learn ... I could say that the Hungarians [in Ukraine] save themselves, provide themselves for themselves”.

**Expert 14, Member of the Polish ethnic minority in Ukraine, leader of a Polish NGO:** “The Poles know the language in Ukraine. This is important. They know the language of this [Ukrainian] state very well. There are many intellectuals in Ukraine of the Polish decent. Even it is considered to be a shame if one does not have higher education. It is a shame [for ethnic Poles in Ukraine]. There Poles who are doctors, work in cultural and other fields in Ukraine”.
Apart from the education field, culture preservation needs of Hungarians are organized. In the Transcarpathia region more than 60 Hungarian political and cultural monuments and signs are established. According to the Center for the Cultures of National Minorities of Transcarpathia, the following Hungarian organizations operate in Ukraine: the Hungarian Culture Society of Transcarpathia; Democratic Union of Hungarians of Ukraine; Society of the Hungarian Intelligentsia of Transcarpathia; Transcarpathian Hungarian-speaking Scientific Society; Union of Hungarian librarians of Transcarpathia; Forum of Hungarian organizations of Transcarpathia; Transcarpathian Hungarian-speaking Pedagogical Society; Transcarpathian Hungarian Society of Health Workers; Transcarpathian Hungarian Association of Scouts; Union of Hungarian journalists of Transcarpathia; Transcarpathian Hungarian-speaking Society of Students and Young Researchers; Transcarpathian Democratic Union of Hungarian Youth “Gordius” (Лойко, 2005).

It would be important to add that while ethnic Poles in Ukraine are much more open towards the Ukrainian culture and the Ukrainian language, there are also conditions for the members of this ethnic group to study in their own language and to realize their cultural needs. At the time of the ENRI-East project implementation there was a weekend school for children and adults under the Transcarpathia Polish cultural community. There were two Polish schools in Khmelnytsky province where nearly 500 pupils studied fully in Polish. Two thousand more pupils studied Polish as a native language in 19 schools of Khmelnytsky province. Polish was taught in several Ukrainian universities. Polish Senate partly funded several institutions where the Polish language courses were offered. Among them were the Center of Polish Language and Culture in Berdyansk, Khmelnytsky University, educational Centre of Polish language and culture in Drohobych, the department of Polish language in Shevchenko Kiev National University and others. Many Polish organizations and associations functioning in Ukraine arrange Polish language courses for their members. In Kiev there is Adam Mickiewicz Polish Library. A fund “Semper Polonia” was one of the main organizations which realized programs for the education of youth. Since 2004 this fund cooperated with the Ministry of Health, on the basis of this cooperation was launched the project on annual medical training in Poland for the graduates of Ukrainian medical schools. Educational programs “Opportunities for youth” and “Ex Libris Polonia” by this fund were organized as well. According to these programs, seven thousand young ethnic Poles were permitted to study in their native country, and more than 200 graduates were hired by Polish companies. Such Polish-Ukrainian educational exchange programs like “Osvita pol – 3 steps to the European education” could also be mentioned. Despite the high level of assimilation, the Ukrainian Poles are making active efforts for consolidation, self-expression and preservation of their identity. In the territory of Ukraine several dozens of Polish ethnic non-governmental organizations operate, 17 of them in Lviv, 34 more in the Lviv province, 25 in Khmelnytsky province, 42 in Zhytomyr province. In various cities
of Ukraine there are communities of Polish culture, Polish houses, associations of Polish doctors and teachers, Polish scientific societies, organizations of Polish Veterans of World War II, natural history Polish organizations, cultural and educational Polish societies, Polish music organizations, communities of business initiatives, Polish youth organizations, centres of the Polish-Ukrainian cooperation, Polish charity organizations, associations of veterans of the Polish Army, Polish sports and religious organizations. There are also federations that unite many organizations, including the Federation of Polish Organizations in Ukraine (based in Lviv), the Association of Poles in Ukraine (based in Kiev), and the Zhitomir Association of Polish non-governmental organizations “Confederation of Zhitomir”. Poles living in Ukraine receive financial aid from the Polish Senate for preservation and development of Polish language and culture, public events, participation in international festivals, schools and seminars (Винниченко, Марценюк, 2006).

Existence of an ethnic minority in the territory of any state makes it particularly relevant to consider the issue of inter-ethnic tolerance. In our case of great interest is the “social distance” that exists between Hungarians or Poles and the Ukrainian nation and other ethnic groups residing in the country (in the ENRI-East project two biggest ethnic minorities were selected for this in every studied country; in Ukraine, according to the population Census, the two biggest ethnic minorities are Russians and Belarussians). Inter-ethnic tolerance and “social distance” allows us in some approximation to judge the extent to which ethnic minorities are ready to integrate into the Ukrainian society, or, conversely, consolidated as a closed group. To measure this, we used a scale similar to the Bogardus social distance scale, developed in 1925 by the American social psychologist Emory Bogardus and has since been regularly used in ethnic studies. As obtained findings show, social distance from the Poles to representatives of other nationalities is generally shorter than the one from the Hungarians to other ethnic groups. This means the Poles are more open towards representatives of other nationalities than the Hungarians. In our case, it is indicative that only 2/3 (66%) of the Hungarians are willing to see a Ukrainian as a family member, whereas among the Poles the same figure is 97%. While Poles are also open towards Russians and Byelorussians and did not make any significant different between these ethnic groups (findings are valid as of 2009 before the conflict between Ukraine and Russian Federation emerged), for the Hungarians both Russians and Byelorussians remained quite remote and unfamiliar ethnic communities whose members Hungarians would not be willing to see among their family members or close friends.

Another indirect indicator of the actual integration of Poles and Hungarians living in Ukraine is the ethnicity of friends of representatives of these ethnic minorities (Table 9). As we found out from the survey, members of the Hungarian ethnic minority in Ukraine primary communicate with the members of their own ethnic community: around 60% of the interviewed Hungarians stated that they communicate and interact on the daily basis primary with Hungarians living in Ukraine, and only a third (30%) of the respondents said that they do have
friends of different ethnic background. In contrast, ethnic Poles do communicate and establish friendly relationship with people of different ethnic origin: only 29% said they communicate primary with the Poles while almost a half of the respondents (45%) said they do interact with diverse ethnic groups in the course of their life.

**Table 9**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Hungarian (%)</th>
<th>Polish (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Most of my friends are Hungarians that live in Ukraine</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most of my friends are Ukrainians</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most of my friends are Hungarians that live in Hungary</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most of my friends are of other origin/nationality</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My friends come from various ethnic/nationality groups</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data-sets: Poles in Ukraine N=400; Hungarians in Ukraine N=400

Comparative study of the two ethnic minorities in Ukraine, the Poles and the Hungarians, implemented within the frame of the international research project ENRI-East brought a set of interesting findings describing and explaining on the different ways how ethnic identity is formed, how the feeling of ethnic belonging can be expressed and transmitted and which positive and negative effects it might have on the existence of the minority group in a multicultural society and its relations with other ethnic groups and the national majority. Our findings suggest that, given the revealed discrepancies between the 2 studied ethnic groups, Ukrainian state policy with regard to the ethnic minorities might reach greater results when being differentiated depending on the specific needs of the ethnic groups and if tailored to the particular domains of ethnicity being of special significance for one or another ethnic minority.

Our project findings showed that the Polish ethnic community became a part of the Ukrainian society since a long time; Poles are settled primary in several regions in Ukraine where their density does not exceed 3-4%. Poles constitute an open ethnic group, they frequently interact with other ethnicities residing in Ukraine and have good knowledge of the state language. While aimed at preservation of their cultural norms, customs and traditions, the Polish community is greatly integrated into the Ukrainian society: vast majority of Poles obtain education in Ukrainian, occupy high positions among the members of the political and cultural elite of the Ukrainian state. At the same time, due to a greater diversity inside the Polish community, its members not always can reach consensus and act jointly for the joint common goal. Until 2014, for example, the
Poles while having many NGOs promoting Polish culture and language, had no political party or political group to articulate their political interests. This, however, also indicates greater integration of Poles into the Ukrainian society as apparently till recently the Polish minority felt that their interests are taken care of by the Ukrainian institutions and political parties. Over a long history of relations between the Poles and the Ukrainians, a number of issues related to particular historical events and their interpretation emerged. Given the importance of their traditions and cultural heritage for the Poles, particular attention to such cases would be important as a part of the state policy towards the ethnic minorities in Ukraine. With respect to the integration of the Polish ethnic group into the Ukrainian society, indicative is also the fact that Polish cultural organizations are operating all around the territory of Ukraine; their main aim is to promote Polish culture and to open it to other ethnic groups residing in Ukraine. Hungarians organizations established in Transcarpathia are primarily focused on self-provision of the Hungarian minority and satisfaction of the cultural, education and linguistic needs of its members as well as promotion of their political rights. Members of the Hungarian ethnic community in Ukraine despite several decades of existence within the Ukrainian state do not experience strong ties with the Ukrainian majority and are poorly integrated into the Ukrainian society. The main reasons causing this is the compact settlement of the Hungarian ethnic group within few districts of the Transcarpathia region and the language barrier which is generated by the great linguistic differences between the Hungarian and Ukrainian languages and supported broad usage of Hungarian in education and public life in Transcarpathia. This creates poorer employment opportunities for Hungarians in Ukraine and generates higher difference in income levels reinforcing further alienation and detachment of Hungarians from the Ukrainian majority. Hungarian ethnic community culturally and linguistically remains a closed and marginalized community. At the same time, survey findings reveal that there is a “crisis of belonging” or an “identity gap” among the young generation of Ukrainian Hungarians. At this stage a carefully planned state policy which would consider the importance of the Hungarian language for the members of this ethnic minority in Ukraine, provide support with the improvement of proficiency in the state language and facilitate employment opportunities for the young people might give fruitful results for the future integration of Ukrainian Hungarians into the Ukrainian society.
References


The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages // Text of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages by the Council of Europe, 1998 (accessible at https://www.coe.int/en/web/european-charter-regional-or-minority-languages/text-of-the-charter)


This chapter is about the dynamics of the labor movement in post-Soviet Ukraine. While in the 1990s it was intense and undulating both in terms of the number of strikes and their members, in the 2000s, there was a trend towards its attenuation. This decline can be explained by seven reasons: improving economic conditions (higher wages, the reduction of unemployment, etc.); complication of the procedure of starting the strike caused by legal regulations; institutionalization of the social dialogue model; changes in the workplace that leave less space for collective protest action and class solidarity; reduction of the number and influence of trade unions and strengthening of the employers' associations; diversification of forms of social protection; and the changes in the methodology of strike activity fixation. The labor movements in Ukraine and the developed Western countries had similar tendencies: they were characterized by unevenness (periodic ups and downs; and while the Western countries were experiencing the peak of labor protests in the 1970s, in post-Soviet countries it occurred in the 1990s); motivation primarily with economic slogans; and the transition from the forms of direct mobilization of collective action to the institutionalized ones.

*Keywords*: labor movement, strike, trade unions, political parties.
Labor movement in the USSR was revived and legalized at the end of the 1980s by a powerful wave of strikes and meetings. They were a rather popular and effective instrument of protection of employees’ interests during the next decade of post-Soviet transformation as well. Both experts and employees hoped for the revival of independent and powerful trade unions as subjects of the political process and formation of political parties that would be based on the ideology of working people rights protection. Yet, labor and class conflicts, born by economic and political transformation of the society, were supposed to be resolved by civilized methods, a step to which was seen in the institutionalization of the social dialogue model and the passing of new labor legislation. On the threshold of a new century, however, there was a turn seen by experts as a defeat of the labor movement and the loss of its role of a subject of social change. In the 2000s, strike activity attenuated and trade unions failed to become independent and effective actors in the fight for the interests of the working class; the political parties formed in that period did not have a clear class ideology; labor conflicts were resolved declaratorily within a tripartite social dialogue model by the means of constructive talks, which eliminated outbreaks of strikes. Employees and experts, however, were under the impression of compulsion to the dialogue and strengthening of bureaucratic limitations to the direct mobilization of workers for protection of their rights.

The problems and issues connected with the labor movement have been actively studied by sociologists of post-socialist countries. Owing to their research, we have empirical data about different aspects of development of the labor movement strikes, trade unions and social dialogue model (Alekseeva, 1983; Бизюков, 2011; Борисов, 2001; Дубровский, 2009; Гуляев, 2003; Ильин, 1998; Кабалина, 1998; Кацва, 2008; Кононов, Кононова, Денщик, 2001; Косян, 2009; Крутов пласти, 1999; Максимов, 2008; Нариси історії, 2002; Панькова, Ивщенко, 2006; Протести, 2011; Рабочее движение, 1995; Руснакенко, 2000; Соболев, 2009; Солидаризация, 1998; Сучасний стан, 2003; Забастовки, 1996; Жуков, 2000; Siegelbaum, Walkowitz, 1995). The aim of this article is to analyze the dynamics of the labor movement in Ukraine for the last twenty years.

The conceptual base of the research

Labor movement is a social movement aimed at protecting the rights and interests of employed workers, resolving conflicts between employers and employees
and transforming the existing system of economic power and resources distribution. Labor movement usually starts with unofficial interest groups, then leading to the formation of political parties or other institutionalized groups, which become the main actors of the movement. The ideal typical model of a social movement development (in particular, labor movement) is described by Otthein Rammstedt (Rammstedt, 1979) as a succession of the following phases: 1) the crisis of the existing system of institutional practices and the emergence of uncoordinated, illegitimate, innovative practices; 2) reaching consensus among the people affected by the crisis and interested in the changing of the social order, polarization of “social activists” and administrative authorities, formation of a collective identity of the movement participants; 3) articulation of the problem and drawing up the line of arguments opposing the existing order; 4) formation of the movement, its geographical and social localization; 5) formulation of the ideology, drafting the action plan, ignoring the old institutional norms and following new ones; 6) extension of the movement and localization of the opponent, active propaganda of the movement ideas, increase in the number of supporters; 7) emergence of the organization; 8) institutionalization or revolution as a result of the movement and indicator of the achievement of its aims, transformation of the social order.

Some researchers find it difficult to analyze a labor movement as a social movement because it is predominantly institutionalized in the modern society (Fantasia, 2001; Fantasia, Stepan-Norris, 2008; Nieuwbeerta, 2001). It is common knowledge that the role of the organizations, forming the labor movement (trade unions and political parties), is not limited to the mobilization of workers for participation in collective protest action. The functions of trade unions are chiefly those of concluding collective labor agreements and negotiating with the employer. These are institutionalized participation in regulation of economic activity and stabilization of labor-management relations, which result in bureaucratic regulation of collective action and weakening of class confrontation. So, for the most part, the labor movement is realized in institutionalized forms.

Modern theorists of social movements stress the importance of a methodological approach, which was underestimated before. According to this approach, it is impossible to completely understand the logic of a social movement mobilization without simultaneously considering the anti-mobilization forces (Meyer, Staggenborg, 1996; Fantasia, Stepan-Norris, 2008). In this case, to understand the dynamics of labor/trade union movement, it is necessary to analyze it not as an isolated one but correlated with the activity of the employers’ organizations as “countermovements” (Griffin, Rubin, Wallace, 1986). The employers’ organizations are interested in reducing or even neutralizing the ability of workers for mobilization, ideally trying to create “union-free environment” in counteraction to the activity of local trade unions as well as workers’ movement in general. Countermovements of employers are, on some occasions, visible and direct (when repressions towards labor movements are used – suppression of strikes, murders, intimidation, and bribery of trade union leaders and activists), and on other occasions, these countermovements are concealed and disguised.
(when employers realize their interests through state structures, trying to weaken the influence of trade unions and limit the instruments of their activity with the help of legislation) (Krupat, 1997). Notwithstanding the fact that since the end of the 20th century, the trade unions of the most European countries have had to work within strict bureaucratic limits, the mobilization of direct collective action is still an important instrument of their activity.

Michael Burawoy claims that in the studies of class as an actor of the labor movement too much attention is devoted to “the realm of superstructure—education, political parties, ideology and state”, though “they no longer exist as opposition to political challenges” (Буравой, 2001: p. 22). From his point of view, the realm of industry (the principal “melting pot of class formation”) has its own superstructures, or political and ideological mechanisms of production, which he called “the regime of production”. This notion gives Burawoy a conceptual framework for studying competing confrontations and identities arising around work. Different regimes of production (despotic and hegemonic, as well as their variations — bureaucratic, colonial and hegemonic despotism) have different consequences for class struggle. While despotic regime prodded to class mobilization, hegemonic regime (born by the increasing state involvement into regulation of labor-management relations and ensuring welfare) relied on agreement and coordination of workers’ and management’s interests. However, in the last decades, a so-called hegemonic despotism took shape: workers are still protected from arbitrary dismissals, but they lose their jobs because of frequent suspension of production; they can come out on strike, but membership is constantly changing.

“Hegemony is functioning now in the opposite direction: it is not the capital that makes concessions to labor, it is the labor that does it to keep workplaces. Economic compulsion of workers to collaboration and agreement leads to attenuation of strikes and reducing in trade unions membership” (Буравой, 2001: p. 37). Burawoy’s answer to why strikes are seldom used as a means of resolving labor disputes is: people nowadays are not afraid of exploitation to the same extent as they are afraid of social exclusion and the prospect of losing their jobs.

So, during the last decades, the researchers in post-Soviet, as well as in Western sociology, have been trying to explain the obvious tendency to reduction in strike activity and weakening of labor/trade union movement (Baer, 1975; Brandl, Traxler, 2009; Smelser, 1963; Tilly, 1978; Rammstedt, 1979; Tarrow, 1994; Social Movements, 2002; Olson, 1965; Fantasia, Stepan-Norris, 2008). Structural and institutional reasons for the labor movement weakening are seen in the changes in the workplace, globalizing processes, changes in the forms of protection of employees’ interests (by the means of institutionalized practices, not mobilizing ones), loss of trade unions’ authority and influence, and at the same time, existence of well-consolidated countermovements of employers.
Problem statement and methodology

The following issues connected with labor movement are usually studied: the level and pattern of mobilization (mainly strike) activity and factors, affecting its dynamics; the subjects of this movement (trade unions, political parties, strike committees); the effectiveness of their activity and level of employees’ trust to them. To have an insight into the labor movement of post-Soviet Ukraine and Russia, it is necessary to conduct an empirical analysis of, firstly, the level of strike activity of employees, and secondly, the reasons of its dynamics. We consider it effective to study these aspects both in time (for the last 20 years) and comparative (in comparison with the developed Western countries and post-socialist countries) perspectives.

A wide range of data was used as the empirical base for the fulfillment of objectives set: the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine and the International Labor Organization from 1989 to 2010; the Sociological monitoring surveys of the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (1994–2010); the European Social Survey (ESS) (2005–2011).

Discussion of results

History and modern state of the labor movement

It is generally known that in the second half of the 20th century, the working class of the USSR, in contrast to the working class of Western countries, had practically no experience of collective asserting of its rights. Having good reasons for labor conflicts (low wages, substandard working conditions, lack of material comforts), employees rarely if ever embarked on active collective actions. The uneventful history of the alternative trade unions and the labor movement in 1950-1980 is described in several sources (Забастовки, 1996; Рабочее движение, 1995; Борисов, 2001; Русянченко, 2000; Нариси історії, 2002: pp. 562–567). As a rule, the cases of strikes and self-organization into independent trade unions were either hushed up or interpreted as sabotage and marginal activities in the Soviet mass media. Lyudmila Alekseeva, basing on the archives of dissidents and the samizdat, collected information about 76 strikes of post-Stalinist decades (the most high-profile among them are: the cruelly suppressed labor unrest in Novocherkassk in 1962, and the waves of strikes in 1976-1978) (Alekseeva, 1983). Having given a rather detailed description of their motives, results and initiates, the researcher stated that all these strikes were chiefly “spontaneous outbreaks of desperate people”, a revolt caused by either intolerable living conditions or the unjust actions of the authorities, but not by far-reaching plans of social reorganization. In the Soviet times, the only legitimate mechanism for workers to protect their rights and interests were trade unions, but their independence and effectiveness in realization of this task is often debated. Experts claim that (basing, among other things, on the data of content analysis of records of the trade
union committees meetings) in the Soviet period, the main function of the trade union was not protection, but administration, maintenance and morale building activities (Нариси історії, 2002: р. 530; Кабаліна, 1998).

In the late Soviet period, there was no legislative base for direct mobilization of collective actions. In the 1920s, workers’ strikes were still quite legal practices, but in the late 1930s, it was declared that there were no good reasons in the Soviet society for class and labor conflicts. So, there was no article guaranteeing citizens the right to hold strikes in the Constitution of Ukraine of 1978. Only at the beginning of the 1990s, under the pressure of spontaneous mass protests and on the initiative of their leaders, a number of changes and amendments were written into the Constitution, which “with the aim of strengthening and developing of the constitutional system, guaranteed the citizens of Ukraine the freedom of speech, press, assembly, meetings, street processions and demonstrations” (article 48) and granted “the right to organize political parties, other civil organizations, take part in movements assisting in promoting their legal interests” (article 49).

At the present time in Ukraine, as well as in most economically developed Western countries, the right to strike is guaranteed by the law. Adopted in 1996, the Constitution of Ukraine (article 44) guarantees working citizens the right to strike in order to defend their economic and social interests. The procedure of exercising the right to strike is prescribed by the Act of Ukraine of 1998 “About the procedure of resolving labor disputes (conflicts)”. According to article 17 of the Act, a strike is interpreted as a temporary collective voluntary cessation of work by a factory, institution or organization with the aim of resolving a collective labor dispute. According to this Act, a strike can be started if conciliation procedures did not lead to resolving a collective labor dispute, or if the owner or the representative of the owner evades conciliation procedures or fails to abide by the agreement, reached in the course of resolving a collective labor dispute.

The dynamics of the level of the labor movement. We will consider the panoramic view of strike activity in independent Ukraine basing on the data of official statistics. Fig. 1 presents the data on the dynamics of the number of strikes and their participants from 1989 to 2010. It can be seen that during the two decades, the strike movement was extremely uneven: while in the 1990s it was of an undulating character (there were increases in the number of strikes and their participants in 1991, 1994, 1997), in the 2000s an almost complete attenuation can be observed. The dividing line between the decades (as a change in the tendency) falls on the 2000s.

Of course, the level of strike activity in the 1990s was impressive. Supported by the media, it was estimated as exceptionally high, especially amid the situation in the Soviet times when workers had minimum experience of mobilization (as it was mentioned above, only 76 trustworthy cases of labor protests were recorded). However, as intensive as this period of the labor movement outburst in the post-Soviet Ukraine and Russia in the 1990s was, viewed in a longer historical perspective, it is incommensurable with the period of social revolutions at the beginning of the 20th century (see Table 1). So, the percentage ratio of the number
of striking workers compared to the general number of industrial workers in the Russian Empire in 1912–1913 (when the level of strike activity was not the highest registered) was considerably higher than in Ukraine and Russia in 1996 and 1997, the peak years of strike activity. While at the beginning of the 20th century the number of workers who took part in strikes varied from one third to a half of the total number of industrial workers, at the end of the century it was only 1.2–2.5% (Воейков, 2004). It is a rather indicative difference that fortifies the thesis of the labor/strike movement weakness in post-Soviet Ukraine and Russia.

Table 1

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<th>The Russian Empire</th>
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<th>Ukraine</th>
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Figure 1. The dynamics of the strike movement in 1989–2010, %
Source: the data of Table 2.
### Table 2.

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*Source: data from the ILO website: [http://laborsta.ilo.org/applv8/data/c9e.html].
It is possible to compare the dynamics of the strike movement in Ukraine with other countries using the data from the International Labor Organization (ILO) on the number of strikes starting from 1971 (see Table 2). Among the countries with a traditionally low level of strike activity are Norway, Sweden, Portugal, the USA and Canada. Among the countries with a traditionally high level of strike activity are France, Italy and Japan. It is obvious that all countries have an undulating level of strike movement with both ups and downs, but in a 40-year perspective, a gradual reduction in the number of strikes can be registered. The peak of labor protests fell on the 1970s, but from the 1990s labor protests have been attenuating. The corresponding data on the post-Soviet countries starting from 1989 can be found on the Web Site of ILO. Among the former republics of the USSR, only Russia and Ukraine have a rich post-perestroika history of strikes, among the countries of the former CMEA — Poland. It is obvious that the peak of the strike movement, which Western countries experienced in the 1970s, fell on the 1990s in the post-Soviet countries. (Russia was the leader in the number of strikes: 17 thousand in 1997). In the 2000s, the outbursts of protests occurred only in Poland and Russia.

So, the dynamics of the labor movement in Ukraine has a pronounced descending character up to almost complete attenuation by the end of the 2000s. I will give my own explanation of the reasons for the demobilization of employees, pointing out seven reasons.

**The reasons for the strike movement attenuation**

*The first reason* — and the most obvious one — is *the change of economic situation* in the 2000s, the elimination of acute economic problems, which stimulated strikes in the 1990s (see Table 3). In Ukraine in the middle of the 1990s, *involuntary part-time employment* (working half-day and being on administrative leave) reached 25–40%, but by the end of the 2000s it decreased to 6–15%. *The level of unemployment* in the 1990s was 12%, decreasing then to 8% (which is the average level of unemployment in Western countries). The amount of *debt in wages* during this period diminished by 4–10 times. There was a progressive (though very slow) increase of the level of nominal and real wages. By the way, the analyzed period consisted of the stages from the total food and commodities shortages in the 1990s to the abundance of products and relative prosperity in the 2000s. The data of Table 4 show a considerable growth in the supply of durable consumer goods to the population (cars, refrigerators, washing machines, TV sets, computers, mobile phones) in this period.

The positive dynamics of these goods was made possible both by the increase in real salaries and the mass granting of consumer loans after the year 2000 (the number of consumer loans rose by 10 times). All these created a feeling of increasing well-being in many people, which was evident in the growth in self-estimated material status. There is no doubt that the improvements in economic situation weakened protest moods and actions. Western sociologists acknowledge that the better people live, the less they are inclined to protesting.
### Table 3


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Number of factories, organizations where strikes took place</th>
<th>Unemployed</th>
<th>Involuntary part-time</th>
<th>Wages</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>According to the methodology of ILO, %</td>
<td>Offically registered, %</td>
<td>On administrative leave, %</td>
<td>Working half-day/half-week, %</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
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Now I will move to other — less evident and less easily checkable empirically — explanations of the decreasing in labor protests.

The second reason seems to be legal regulation of strikes. In 1998, the Law of Ukraine “On the procedure of settlement of collective labor disputes (conflicts)” was adopted. This Act legally regulated a strike as a form of resolving labor conflicts, and at the same time, it brought complications to the procedure of starting a strike, which made it less popular among workers. According to experts, at the present time, the prescribed period for the procedure of starting a legal strike in Ukraine is not less than 40 days.
The third reason for the weakening of labor protests is the institutionalization of the social dialogue model. This conception (aimed at ensuring the balance of interests of employees, employers and the state) was created as a substitute for the conception of class struggle and starting from the 1960s, proved its effectiveness in many economically developed countries. The model of social dialogue was implemented by the International Labor Organization. It was implemented in post-Soviet countries as well: the National Service of Mediation and Reconciliation was created in Ukraine in 1998; a tripartite Council of Conciliation of Labor-Management Relations was created in Russia in 1991. It is declared that from this time on, various disputable points between employees and employers at the national, regional and local levels are to be resolved in the framework of constructive negotiations (with the mediation of trade unions, representatives of the employer and government agencies), which allows avoiding strikes. According to the statistics of the State Statistic Committee of Ukraine and the Rosstat (Federal Statistic Service) on the collective labor disputes, it really works: most of the registered conflicts were resolved with the help of the National Service of Mediation and Reconciliation, and none as a result of a strike. However, there is no agreement among the experts on the estimation of the social dialogue model realization in the post-Soviet countries. Further research is necessary to understand what the absence of strikes means and whether it is a reflection of the fact that institutionalized forms of settling of labor disputes in the 2000s are really effective or not. Or whether it is a sign of victory of the policy of employers and the state, which enforces profitable for the employers rules of the game in resolving labor disputes, and strengthens bureaucratic limitations for direct mobilization of workers, forcing them to the dialogue and agreement.

### Table 4

The dynamics of supply of some durable goods to the population of Ukraine (1985–2010), items per 100 households* on average

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Cars</th>
<th>Refrigerators, freezers</th>
<th>Washing machines</th>
<th>Colour TVs</th>
<th>Video recorders</th>
<th>Music centers</th>
<th>Cameras</th>
<th>Computers</th>
<th>Microwave ovens</th>
<th>Mobile phones</th>
<th>Self-estimation of the material standard of living of a family on a 10-point scale**</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>88</td>
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<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>69</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2004</td>
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<td>30</td>
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<td>2006</td>
<td>17</td>
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<td>96</td>
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<td>2008</td>
<td>20</td>
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<td>84</td>
<td>107</td>
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<td>17</td>
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<td>2010</td>
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<td>85</td>
<td>110</td>
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<td>167</td>
<td>3.6</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

** Source: The data of monitoring of the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Science of Ukraine.

The third reason for the weakening of labor protests is the institutionalization of the social dialogue model. This conception (aimed at ensuring the balance of interests of employees, employers and the state) was created as a substitute for the conception of class struggle and starting from the 1960s, proved its effectiveness in many economically developed countries. The model of social dialogue was implemented by the International Labor Organization. It was implemented in post-Soviet countries as well: the National Service of Mediation and Reconciliation was created in Ukraine in 1998; a tripartite Council of Conciliation of Labor-Management Relations was created in Russia in 1991. It is declared that from this time on, various disputable points between employees and employers at the national, regional and local levels are to be resolved in the framework of constructive negotiations (with the mediation of trade unions, representatives of the employer and government agencies), which allows avoiding strikes. According to the statistics of the State Statistic Committee of Ukraine and the Rosstat (Federal Statistic Service) on the collective labor disputes, it really works: most of the registered conflicts were resolved with the help of the National Service of Mediation and Reconciliation, and none as a result of a strike. However, there is no agreement among the experts on the estimation of the social dialogue model realization in the post-Soviet countries. Further research is necessary to understand what the absence of strikes means and whether it is a reflection of the fact that institutionalized forms of settling of labor disputes in the 2000s are really effective or not. Or whether it is a sign of victory of the policy of employers and the state, which enforces profitable for the employers rules of the game in resolving labor disputes, and strengthens bureaucratic limitations for direct mobilization of workers, forcing them to the dialogue and agreement.
The fourth reason for the decline in the number of strikes is the dynamics of the collective organization of the opposing classes — employees and employers.

The trade unions in Ukraine in the 1990s were going through a crisis and were making attempts to come out of it. They were restructuring themselves, dividing into traditional and alternative trade unions, looking for a new ideology, gaining experience of bargaining with the employer about better conditions of selling workforce and learning to settle labor disputes constructively, trying to turn into really independent structures of the Western type. The successes and failures of trade unions in this period are a separate topic. Here we will only discuss the amount of trade union membership. At the present time, it is difficult to adequately estimate these numbers because information from official sources and data of sample surveys differ considerably. According to official data of The Federation of Trade Unions of Ukraine, in 2009, the number of trade union members was 59% of the total number of employed workers. The data of the international project ESS (and a number of other projects) estimate the number of trade union members as about 20% of the total number of workers (see Table 5). It can be seen in Fig. 2 that such level of trade union membership is average in most European countries (18%), with the exception of the Scandinavian countries, where it is more than 60%.

Table 5 shows the dynamics of trade union membership starting from 1960. During the last 50 years, trade union membership decreased by 1.5–2 times in most western countries such as France, Germany, Switzerland, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Austria as well as the USA and Japan. Some researchers ascribe the reasons for this downward process to the change in the structure of working relationship in the “new economy” (an increasing number of people who work half

![Figure. 2. Trade union membership in Ukraine and some OECD countries (2010), %](image)

Sources: the data of Table 5.
day/half week and are employed on temporary contracts, outsourcing etc., and as a rule, are not covered by trade unions). Others argue that despite global changes in the sphere of work, the trade unions in some countries like Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Canada, Italy retained their status-quo or even became stronger, which is probably connected with the effectiveness of their real participation in protection of interests of workers united by trade unions (Соболев, 2009).

Table 5

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<td>17.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>18.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>The USA</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>11.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>7.7</td>
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In the Soviet period, trade union membership in Ukraine and Russia was constantly increasing, and by the beginning of the 1990s reached the unthinkable for
Western countries 99.5% of the total number of employed workers. But later, trade union membership declined by more than a half because of abrupt socio-economic transformations (the same thing happened in Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic). Historians of trade union movement see the reasons for this process in the closure of many big enterprises; extension of different kinds of unofficial employment (22% of Ukrainians were employed in the unofficial sector in 2009); increase in the number of enterprises of the private sector, where trade unions were not encouraged; disenchantment with the activity of traditional trade unions, that turned out to be incapable of providing real protection of the economic and social interests of their members; division of industry-specific trade unions (such as miners, metal-workers, and railway employees) into traditional and independent ones in the process of strike movement. The trend of declining trade union membership is common both for Western and post-Soviet countries, but the reasons are different.

In contrast to trade unions in Ukraine, which have a rich history, employers’ organizations started to appear only in the 1990s and at that time mainly consisted of large state-owned enterprises directors. Starting from the 2000s, a considerable growth of unions of large employers (now mainly private owners) have been taking place; in 2012, the Federation of employers of Ukraine claimed to unite 70% of employers. By the way, the same trend exists in Western countries: the class of employers is united better than the class of employees (Сучасний стан, 2003). While trade unions are uniting, on average, 18% of employed workers, employers’ organizations unite 60% of employers; small and medium-sized businesses estimate the level of trade union membership as 7–10%. Besides having considerably more power and economic resources, in comparison to employees, employers are better organized that makes it easier for them to protect their class rights.

![Figure 3. Level of membership in political parties, %](image)

**Sources:** The proportion of members of the CPSU among the employed population of Ukraine for 1980 is calculated by: (Комуністична партія України, 1980: p. 339). Data on Ukraine, Russia, countries of Eastern and Western Europe from the ESS 2005–2011 project.
Political parties are another instrument of class rights protection. According to monitoring data of the Institute of Sociology of National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, the level of membership in political parties has considerably increased from 0.6% in 1994 to 3.6% in 2011. It can be estimated as rather low as compared to the Soviet past (when 11.7% of employed population of Ukraine were members of CPSU), and at the same time, as average as compared to Europe (according to the data of the international project ESS 2008, membership in political parties in post-Soviet and capitalist countries does not exceed 4%) (see Fig. 3). Thus, the levels of membership in trade unions and political parties in Western and post-Soviet countries are similar. The tendencies of the reducing impact of these organizations on social processes are similar as well.

The fifth reason for the labor movement decline are changes in the workplace, that leave less space for traditional collective protest action, and at the same time, expand opportunities for individualized protection. Among the most important changes are sectoral shifts. In Ukraine in 1990–2010, there had been the tendency for decline in employment in the sectors where people worked in large industrial collectives (by two times — in industry; by one and a half — in building, by five times — in agriculture), for increase in the sectors dominated by small and medium-sized enterprises and for self-employment (almost by five times in trade and service sector, by two times in restaurant and hotel, and financial sectors). The latter is characterized by more individualized work which demands work flexibility, outsourcing, and regulation via temporary or individual labor contracts. Shifting of employment from state to private sector is an influential factor (in Ukraine, the ratio of workers employed in state and private sectors changed from 9:1 in 1994 to 1:1.2 in 2010) because individual contracts in private sectors are usual and trade unions were not encouraged. The spread of unofficial employment, the level of which was 23% in Ukraine in 2010, had a considerable influence as well. Without official labor contracts, employees were deprived of overt protection of their interests. All these changes of labor relations led to the formation of the prekariat (instead of the proletariat) — a class of employed workers involved into unstable, unofficial, flexible labor relations. It is considered that such work relations do not provide a stable ground for class unification and mobilization.

The sixth reason for the demobilization of employees is diversification of social protection. In the 1990s, strikes and appeals to trade unions were the most effective and popular ways of resolving labor disputes. From the 2000s, a tendency to diversification of forms and subjects, protecting the workers’ interests and participating in regulation of employment conditions and wages has been observed. These functions are carried out more and more effectively (winning the trust of workers) by such institutions as the courts, state regulating bodies and the system of individual employment contracts. This process is called “diversification of social protection” (Соболев, 2009: p. 169). The fact that trade unions are losing their role of a universal mechanism for social protection is a worldwide tendency. At the same time, appealing to court is becoming a fairly common channel of social
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... protection. Although the derailed court statistics concerning labor disputes is not at the author’s disposal, I will present the data of the State Statistic Committee of Ukraine on the number of cases of reinstatement of employment, wages payment and reparation of damages to enterprises and organizations reviewed in the courts of first instance (see Table 6). Nowadays, labor disputes concerning payment of wages are most widespread. It is obvious that the outburst in the number of statements of claim to courts concerning payment of wages is connected with the legal strengthening of administrative responsibility of the heads of enterprises.

Table 6

The dynamics of the number of statements of claim, reviewed by courts of first instance in civil proceedings in Ukraine, thous.*

<table>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reinstatement of employment</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payment of wages</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>237.6</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reparation of damages caused by workers to a state enterprise, organization</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
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</table>


The seventh reason (connected with allowances for the specifics of statistical instruments) is a change in the methodology of strikes fixation. In the 1990s, official statistics took into account all the strikes, but from the year 2000, the strikes carried out without the compliance regulated in the Law of procedure (“illegal”) and nonstandard forms of strikes (work-to-rule, pickets) are not recorded. So, the official data are considered understated. Recently, some organizations which compile an alternative record of labor protests have appeared (Protesty, 2011; Biziukov, 2010). Nevertheless, this, to my mind, cannot significantly alter our opinion about the general decline of strike mobilization and the trends of change.

Conclusion

I will formulate several conclusions based on the data obtained. During the last two decades, the following tendencies in the development of labor movement in post-Soviet Ukraine have become obvious: a considerable decline in the number of strikes and trade union membership, change in the forms of resolving labor conflicts from spontaneous to more and more institutionalized, weakening of the traditional strike importance, and at the same time, realization of various alternative forms of mobilization (from Italian strike to Internet-maidan of informational sector workers, who are organized in net protest communities), social protection diversification, narrowing of space for collective actions for...
protecting class interests, resulting from individualization of labor.

The described tendencies of the labor movement dynamics are similar to those that took place in the developed capitalist countries, but they occurred several decades later. For example, the peak of strikes which the Western countries experienced in the 1970s occurred in the post-Soviet countries in the 1990s. The similarity can also be seen in the fact that, while the trade unions and the labor movement are being considered weak social actors, the mobilization potential of employers is gaining strength (one of the evidence of which is the increase in the number of employers united in associations). Post-Soviet countries also copy the Western mechanisms for ensuring class agreement (in the form of the tripartite social dialogue model). Yet, the forms of realization of this model, in experts’ opinion, do not achieve their aim, but rather demobilize employees in their search for more effective ways of resolving labor conflicts, making these conflicts latent. A high level of protest moods among different groups of employed and self-employed workers, as well as the absence of powerful class organizations and visible, real actions to protect their interests, is the evidence that class and labor conflicts do not find their resolution in Ukraine. However, it is impossible to predict how far it is from latent protest attitudes to class mobilization and solidarity on a national scale. What class will be in the front row of class protests? What positive program of social change will it offer? Sociologists must monitor these processes.

Different groups of employees and their organizations have shown that they are able to protect their interests and rights, but their collective experience, to my mind, has some drawbacks. For example, the reasons for their protests so far have been different aspects of their struggle for survival and right to labor, but not the demands for massive social improvement of living standards, working conditions and wages. Employees’ protests are mainly aimed at solving a specific problem situation, but not at a systematic prolonged challenge of the dominating position of the administrative authorities. Workers are not inclined to class solidarity and occasions when strikers were supported by workers of another sector or a neighboring factory are rare. The enumerated reasons give ground for subscribing to the conclusions of a number of researchers that the labor movement today “does not reach the level of social-political force which is able to affect the course of major social reforms” (Воейков, 2004: p. 25).

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MEASURING THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIETY THROUGH SOCIAL INCLUSION: AN UNNOTICED DECLINE IN CAPABILITIES DURING A PERIOD OF ECONOMIC GROWTH IN UKRAINE*

Yuriy Savelyev (Kyiv)

The present paper aims at estimating the progress of Ukrainian society beyond economic growth through the capability model of social inclusion. It is based on the capability approach, which emphasizes human freedom and freedom of choice as a core of human development (Sen, 1999), and a modernization theory (Welzel, Inglehart, Klingemann, 2003), the paper develops a theoretical framework of social inclusion to expose development challenges, persistent inequality and invisible capability decline. It has been argued that social inclusion is related to both options application, which is the freedom to choose (Foster, Sen, 1997), and choice application, therefore, social inclusion is a key factor for human development. The crucial dimensions of modernization are relative access to information resources, recognition, participation, values as motives of action and choice, and governmental leverages of granting of the freedom of choice.

The empirical analysis focuses on Ukraine as a case of the post-socialist developing society and reveals limitations of conventional indicators of official statistics, survey data and Human Development Index (HDI). The studies have shown that despite positive economic and inequality momentum, the actual increase in disposable income per capita and Human Development Index in Ukraine in the first half of 2000’s, certain capabilities have deteriorated. Thus, the developed model demonstrates an obscure capability decline during a period of economic growth in Ukraine, and provides evidence that economic growth cannot be considered equal to the progress of society and does not guarantee social inclusion.

Keywords: development, social inclusion, modernization, capability approach, post-socialist societies, Ukraine

Introduction

Nowadays political elites of various countries are obsessed with economic growth. There is a dominance of neoliberal interpretation of development in current political and social science discourses, while “neoliberalism has become a deeply problematic and incoherent term” (Venugopal, 2015). However, governments of emerging markets countries consider as their goal to advance competitive economy to succeed in the global market (Martinelli & He, 2015).

Conversely, the capability approach has emphasized the increase in capabilities as a core of human development process (Anand & Sen, 1994; Sen, 1999). In fact, human freedom and opportunity freedom comprise a person’s capability set and the actual combination of functioning (Foster & Sen, 1997). This also implies that even people with equal rights and opportunities people may not be able to choose options they are capable of. Hence, it is important to measure the development of society beyond economic growth (Stiglitz, Sen, Fitoussi, 2009).

The paper elaborates the capability model of social inclusion and attempts to use such approach to measure the development of Ukrainian society as well as to reveal hidden risks or inclusion and explicate inequality indicators.

In this paper after a brief overview of problems of post-socialist development and current problems of modernization in Eastern Europe, first, I will argue on the importance of the notion of social inclusion in perception of the development of society. Based on the three-element modernization and human development approach suggested by C. Welzel, R. Inglehart and H-D. Klingemann (2003) I agree that social inclusion is related to both options application, which is the freedom to choose over alternatives in the capability approach, and the choice application, which is the actually chosen alternative, is an important dimension of modernization. The present theoretical framework of social inclusion may be a contribution into the application of the capability approach in sociology to expose development challenges, persistent inequality and exclusion that would enhance the assessment of the needs of vulnerable groups.

Second, the paper focuses on Ukraine as a case of the post-socialist society undergoing the process of modernization. The research demonstrates limitations of commonly used indicators of official statistics, available data of traditional surveys and widely-used Human Development Index (HDI) linking these indicators data to the capability set. I show that despite positive momentum in economic growth, average income and human development in Ukraine in
the first half of 2000’s, capabilities of the vast majority of its citizens have been jeopardized. In particular, an access to adequate housing, which was already at a very low level in 1998, dramatically plummeted in the 2000’s.

As a research method I use both primary and secondary data analysis comparing trends of various existing indicators including HDI, GDP PPP per capita, the Gini index, national and regional income and housing statistics, average monthly wage, price trends on the secondary housing market, social surveys carried out by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences [NAS] of Ukraine. The sources of the study comprise statistical information of the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, United Nations Human Development Reports, the International Monetary Fund data, Association of Real Estate Specialists of Ukraine [ASNU], annual surveys of the Institute of Sociology of the NAS of Ukraine ‘Ukrainian Society: Sociological Monitoring 1994–2010’.

Problem background and theoretical framework for the capability model of social inclusion

Sociologists (Esping-Andersen, 2007) and economists (Yusuf et al., 2009; Sachs, 2008; Piketty, 2014) emphasize that a crucial problem of modern society is a consistent inequality, which has been growing not only in various countries but also in the global system overall. A challenging problem for social scientists is varieties of social existence and alternatives of social, economic and cultural development (ISA, 2006). Since modernity emerged in Western (Northern-Atlantic) civilization and was spontaneous in terms of its culture and societal evolution, Ukraine and many other post-socialist countries are developing societies, which determines numerous problems of their growth and makes the inequality predicament more acute.

Since the dissolution of the Eastern Bloc, theories of neo-modernization of post-socialist countries have become the mainstream idea. Thus, there was conceived an optimistic project of transformation of post-socialist societies into the western capitalist liberal model. P. Sztompka pointed out that since 1989 the theory of modernization had focused on the attempts of post-communist countries to ‘return to Europe’ and to join modern Western civilization (Штомпка, 1996: p. 101).

Modernization of post-communist countries was followed by criticism. (Аллард, 2002; Kapustin, 2003). It was not a smooth process and in a number of cases desired modernization turned into ‘the unprecedented demodernization of a twentieth-century country’ when society was pulled ‘backward to a pre-modern era’ (Cohen, 2001: pp. 45, 169). However, despite common challenges there are obvious differences in the paths of development of former socialist countries in the region.

After the dissolution of the Eastern Bloc and the Soviet Union in the beginning of the 1990’s, Central and Eastern Europe split into two entities with different development directions. While three post-Soviet republics (Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine) were involved into post-Soviet integration project (CIS) supported by the Russian Federation, the other three post-Soviet republics
(Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) together with the rest of Central and Eastern European societies became determined to complete European integration.

Since the middle of the 1990’s modernization of Central and Eastern Europe had been ‘predominantly understood in terms of a gradual incorporation of the post-communist societies into the European project. This process was mostly considered as a convergence in legal, institutional, and political terms’ (Blokker, 2005: p. 515). It has radically altered the concept of Eastern Europe.

Due to the EU enlargements during 2000’s three Eastern European countries – Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine – ended up in a specific zone that now embodies European civilization borderland. These countries share the same features: they used to be parts of empires (Russian, Austro-Hungarian and then Soviet) and may be considered as post-colonial societies; they were involved in the Communist project of accelerated modernization that was the opposite for the Western one. Nowadays they are located between the EU and the Russian Federation and experience integrative process on both sides.

After the EU enlargements, Eastern Europe does not even exist as an integrated region. A criterion for belonging to the European project is much more important than geographical proximity. Modern Eastern Europe, which has always been defined as a peripheral region, has basically narrowed down to three countries: Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine.

At this moment, there are two peripheral regions in civilized Europe. The first one is in the above-mentioned Eastern Europe; the second one is ‘Western Balkans’ (FYR Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia including Kosovo).1 Nevertheless, these two regions differ significantly. While societies of Western Balkans committed to integration process and either have been granted a status of an aspiring member or recognized as a potential candidate (European Commission, 2007), Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine are a long way from that.

Moreover, the region of Western Balkans is radically different from Eastern Europe. Western Balkan countries are located on the frontiers of modern European project, which has been expanding its spatial boundaries. Those societies do not have an alternative to integration. Sooner or later they are likely to be engaged in the project. It is just a matter of their preparedness that requires some time. In contrast to them, Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine are the borderland which is located between European Union, which represents integration on the basis of common liberal values of Western post-industrial market-economy democracy, and the Russian Federation, which often declares to have an exceptional ‘Eurasian’ way of development. Therefore, in the case of Eastern Europe there is an alternative to integration. There are three possible ways of development for Eastern European borderland: either one of integration options will be implemented [European or Russian] or the region will remain a borderland used as a buffer from both sides.

After the dissolution of the 1990’s there began a period of rapid economic growth in the region which gave an optimistic outlook. However, Moldova and Ukraine [Belarus has better economic performance close to the level of new EU

1 Above exclude Turkey and the Russian Federation.
members – Bulgaria and Romania] still have the lowest GDP per capita and Human Development Index (HDI) in Europe (Human Development Report, 2011). The Russian Federation and Belarus have not succeeded in the development of democratic institutions. Ukrainian democracy is deficient and the state is unstable.

The question is how to measure social development beyond conventional economic growth indicators (Stiglitz, Sen, Fitoussi, 2009).

Since 1990 Human Development Index (HDI) has been widely used for this purpose. However, since it was introduced, HDI has been criticized as ‘conceptually weak and empirically unsound, involving serious problems of non-comparability over time and space’ measure (Srinivasan, 1994: p. 241). R. Sugden [1993] questioned the capability of HDI as an operational tool. Over the past 25 years HDI methodology has developed and undergone significant changes of conceptual development and operationalization (e.g. Nussbaum, Sen, 1993; Martinetti, 2000; Kuklys, 2005; Comim et al., 2008).

HDI is rooted in the capability approach which allows not only to compare countries but also to gain a deeper understanding of a process and factors of modernization focusing on the increase in capabilities as a core of human development. Adopting the capability approach, C. Welzel, R. Inglehart and H-D. Klingemann [2003] suggested a three-element modernization theory comprising individual resources (objective means of choice), emancipative cultural values (motives of choice) and institutional rules (effective rights to human choice). Primarily this theory focuses on the increasing role of emancipative and self-expression values due to the growth of resources. The second priority is the connection between emancipative values as the motives of choice and effective exercise of the right to freedom and efficient functioning of democratic institutions. However, the theory is limited to the inverse relationship between resources and values. It does not reveal differences in the access to the resources, participation and the ways of providing opportunities for choice.

According to A. Sen, the increase in capabilities is a twofold set comprising the options application, which is the freedom to choose over various alternatives, and the choice application, which is involved with the alternative that is actually chosen (Foster, Sen, 1997). Ways and means of granting human freedom and opportunity to choose are crucial and they require participation of every member of the society in all aspects of life forms, i.e. their social inclusion. The growth of capabilities is not possible without inclusion of social actors, since it takes into account their choice application. That is why social inclusion is considered a crucial instrument for human development (Анджелкович та ін., 2011). On the other hand, lack of social inclusion also limits freedom of choice.

Therefore, an elaborated model of human development and modernization should also embrace a dimension of social inclusion. The concept of social inclusion has been deeply rooted in sociological theory. T. Parsons considered social development (in his terms, evolutionary change) as evolving to higher system levels, first of all, in “integrative subsystem” – “the core of a society as a social system” which he called ‘societal community’ (Parsons, 1971: p.11). He distinguished four aspects of structural change: differentiation, adaptive upgrading, inclusion, and
value generalization (Parsons, 1966: p. 22; Parsons, 1971: p. 26; 1977: 48]. Inclusion was understood as an aspect of system integration (Parsons, 1971: p. 27) as well as gaining “status of full membership in the relevant community system of previously excluded groups which have developed legitimate capacities to contribute to the functioning of the system” (Parsons, 1966: p. 22; Parsons, 1977: p. 49).

N. Mouzelis, one of the followers of T. Parsons, emphasized the first aspect of system integration and believed that inclusion of ‘institutional complexes’ or ‘unites’ could take balanced or unbalanced forms (Mouzelis, 1999: pp. 145, 158). In contrast, J. C. Alexander linked inclusion to solidarity and understood it as “the process by which previously excluded groups gain solidarity in the ‘terminal’ community of a society” (Alexander, 1981: p. 7). He emphasized subjective feeling of solidarity and its phenomenological impact: “To the extent that individuals are felt to be full members of the terminal community, they have been, to that degree included” (Alexander, 1981: p. 7). However, he considered only one specific form of inclusion of ethnic groups, deliberately omitting class inclusion.

Using E. Durkheim’s concepts of organic and mechanical solidarity L. Wilson conceptualized social inclusion in connection with social capital as an index of social cohesion/conflict, which is, in fact, relevant for any ‘community formation’ as well as for ‘inter-community relationships’ (Wilson, 2006: p. 351). M. Lamont (2009) adheres to the similar approach. However, instead of solidarity she uses concepts of ‘social recognition’ and ‘cultural citizenship’ (Lamont, 2009: p. 151). She focuses on responses of discriminated ethnic and racial groups and their ‘destigmatization’ strategies as a way to enhance social inclusion. In contrast to J-C. Alexander, M. Lamont neglects institutional and structural factors, limiting the analysis by available cultural meanings and repertoires. However, it is not clear, how such strategies have been formed, why some of them are effective and the others are not and how they are compatible with the reaction of the core groups. Moreover, as it turned out, not all effective “destigmatization strategies lead to greater inclusion” (Lamont, 2009: p. 168). Taking into consideration her main argument that social inclusion is an important aspect which “makes societies successful” (Lamont, 2009: p. 151), this may lead to the conclusion that some destigmatization strategies of out-groups can hinder society to become successful.

These theoretical contributions demonstrate that social inclusion refers to the integration of social system, social institutions, social and cultural capital and various forms of incorporation of different social groups into a core society. Thus, the concept of social inclusion does not just refer to particular deprived groups [the unemployed, the poor, immigrants, people with disabilities, the homeless, etc.] as they are usually identified in policy-related mainstream literature. Furthermore, inclusion [which is linked together with exclusion] is a vitally important societal process of integration and disintegration in forming intra-group and inter-group relationships. Social relationships of various types are built on relative capabilities allocated for social agents and groups which determine their actual choices. Consequently, in addition to descriptive and normative functions, the concept of social inclusion in conjunction with the capability approach can be used as an analytical tool for understanding
the ways of securing human freedom and possibility of choice and, ultimately, the development of society. Hence an amended theoretical model to estimate development of a modernizing society comprises:

1. The means of providing choice (the capability set) and securing access to the resources; fair and efficient system of redistribution of resources (Dworkin, 2002).
2. Recognition, which determines social esteem of ‘abilities and activities’ and eventually ‘contribution to social reproduction’ of different social groups (Honneth, 2001: pp. 54-55).
3. Participation which reflects the capabilities for social interaction (Fraser, 1995; Fraser, 2007).
4. Values as motives of action and choice (Schwartz et al., 2001; Welzel, Inglehart and Klingemann, 2003).

The combination of all elements accounts for the options application as well as for the choice application. Consequently, modernization is a process that expands capabilities and enhances social inclusion.

The core focus of this paper is on the problem of the relative access to the resources studying the case of a modernizing society in Eastern Europe with an attempt to reveal hidden risks for inclusion and estimate human development via selected specific aspect of the capability set.

Decline in capabilities as a risk for inclusion in Ukraine

As noted above, measurement of social development via the capabilities is problematic (Sugden, 1993). Traditional statistical measures often may not be indicative of the actual capabilities and risks for inclusion. As Table 1 shows, in Ukraine widely-used inequality indicators were stable within a given period and the situation was slightly improving.

### Inequality measures in Ukraine in 1999-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Share of income or consumption %</th>
<th>Gini index</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poorest 10%</td>
<td>Richest 10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>22.5</td>
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<td>2000 - 2010</td>
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</table>


However, the average monthly wages statistics show rising inequality between Ukrainian regions and the city of Kyiv (Table 2). The gap between all regions and the capital of Ukraine is growing and **13 out of 25 regions** therein had an average wage less than 50% of Kyiv’s value (Ukraine’s capital) in 2008 (0 regions – in 1995).
National value compared to Kyiv decreased by 14.25% between 1995 and 2008. The following regions have experienced the biggest changes within this period: Donetska region – 31.45%, Dnipropetrovska – 29.97%, Zaporizka – 25.05%. The smallest changes occurred in Zakarpatska region – 2.73%, Volynska – 8.11%, Khmelnytska – 8.51%. Although the average wages of the latter regions are less than half of Kyiv’s. Significantly, only 3 regions out of 24 (excluding the city of Kyiv and Kyivska region) had the average monthly wages above the national average in 2008.

From the resource perspective the capabilities can be measured by availability of assets and actual access to them. The fact that inhabitants of Kyiv have higher wages than residents of other regions does not necessarily mean that they have greater capabilities; it may be harder to get access to assets in Kyiv because of their higher relative value.

### Table 2

**National and regional average monthly wages as percentage of the city of Kyiv average monthly wage in 1995-2008**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>73.00</td>
<td>61.94</td>
<td>60.71</td>
<td>58.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomous Republic of Crimea</td>
<td>70.00</td>
<td>57.89</td>
<td>56.90</td>
<td>52.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vinnytska</td>
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<td>46.56</td>
<td>43.89</td>
<td>45.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volynska</td>
<td>53.00</td>
<td>42.51</td>
<td>41.92</td>
<td>44.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dnipropetrovska</td>
<td>91.00</td>
<td>76.52</td>
<td>69.12</td>
<td>61.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donetska</td>
<td>97.00</td>
<td>78.95</td>
<td>72.27</td>
<td>65.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhytomyrska</td>
<td>61.00</td>
<td>47.77</td>
<td>43.89</td>
<td>45.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zakarpatska</td>
<td>50.00</td>
<td>43.72</td>
<td>49.80</td>
<td>47.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaporizka</td>
<td>84.00</td>
<td>74.09</td>
<td>71.09</td>
<td>58.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivano-Frankivska</td>
<td>65.00</td>
<td>48.58</td>
<td>52.83</td>
<td>50.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyivska</td>
<td>78.00</td>
<td>61.13</td>
<td>61.76</td>
<td>60.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirovograd ska</td>
<td>58.00</td>
<td>48.18</td>
<td>46.39</td>
<td>46.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luganska</td>
<td>82.00</td>
<td>65.99</td>
<td>62.29</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lvivska</td>
<td>62.00</td>
<td>53.44</td>
<td>55.06</td>
<td>51.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mykolayvsko</td>
<td>68.00</td>
<td>58.70</td>
<td>61.76</td>
<td>52.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Odeska</td>
<td>66.00</td>
<td>59.11</td>
<td>59.66</td>
<td>53.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poltavska</td>
<td>76.00</td>
<td>60.73</td>
<td>57.42</td>
<td>54.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rovenska</td>
<td>61.00</td>
<td>48.58</td>
<td>51.25</td>
<td>49.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumsko</td>
<td>66.00</td>
<td>52.63</td>
<td>49.80</td>
<td>47.89</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ternopil ska</td>
<td>53.00</td>
<td>42.11</td>
<td>39.95</td>
<td>42.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kharkivska</td>
<td>72.00</td>
<td>64.37</td>
<td>59.79</td>
<td>54.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khersonska</td>
<td>59.00</td>
<td>50.61</td>
<td>46.78</td>
<td>44.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khmelnytska</td>
<td>55.00</td>
<td>46.15</td>
<td>42.44</td>
<td>46.49</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cherkaska</td>
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<td>51.42</td>
<td>45.99</td>
<td>47.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chernivetska</td>
<td>55.00</td>
<td>42.91</td>
<td>45.20</td>
<td>45.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chernigivska</td>
<td>57.00</td>
<td>49.39</td>
<td>44.94</td>
<td>44.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Kyiv</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, 2010. [Wage accruals per pay-roll, UAH]*

Percentages calculated by the author.
According to the official state statistics, within the last decade Ukrainians obtained on average more financial resources than in the previous period, which implies increase in capabilities. Based on the reports of the State Committee of Statistics of Ukraine I have calculated that between 1998 and 2008 real salaries in Ukraine increased by 309% (nominal wages increased by 1176%).

Real disposable income since 2001 till 2008 has grown by 263,5%. The percentage of the population with per capita total income below the minimum subsistence level has decreased more than four and a half times from 39,2 million (80,2% of the overall population) in 2001 to 8,1 million (18,1% of the population) in 2008 (official subsistence minimum was increased by 231,8%) (Державна служба статистики України, 2010). These objective statistics indicators are also supported by subjective self-assessment of the population shown in the nationally representative surveys. During 8 years the number of people who felt satisfied with their social position increased almost three times from 7% in 1998 to 20,2% in 2006 (Паніна, 2006).

Available data appears to suggest that on average the capabilities of the population in Ukraine have improved. However, this suggestion may not embrace whole capability set. As an example, I will explore such vital capability as housing.

According to the survey of the Institute of Sociology of NAS of Ukraine in 2001 36,7% of the respondents lived in a private apartment owned by their families and 35,6% lived in a private house (part of the house) which were in possession of their families (Паніна, 2006). Hence, over 72% of Ukrainians could feel secure with regard to their access to housing.

The State Statistics Committee of Ukraine has reported that from 2000 till 2008 overall 672 thousand apartments were put into service with total size of 68 753 sq. m and the number of apartments built per 1000 population rose from 1,3 in 2000 to 2,0 in 2008; there were 22,8 sq. m average per one inhabitant in 2008 compared to 20,2 sq. m in 1998 (Державна служба статистики України, 2010).

The average number of rooms for a dwelling was 2,8 in 2006 compared to 2,6 in 1998, and on average a room was shared by 1,7 inhabitants in 2006 compared to 2,0 in 1998 (Паніна, 2006).

The number of families and single people registered as requiring municipal or cooperative accommodations decreased from 2 million and 29 thousand in 1998 to 1 million and 216 thousand in 2008 (Державна служба статистики України, 2010). It is noteworthy, that during the same period there were only 245 thousand families and single people who obtained municipal or cooperative accommodations (Державна служба статистики України, 2010).

The official statistics and the survey data show that the housing situation for Ukrainians is stable and slightly improving. However, what is the capability of a Ukrainian to acquire a dwelling during their lifetime? I calculate such capability as the number of years needed for a family of two fulltime workers to earn an amount of money to purchase a 50 sq. m apartment at a current market price on the secondary housing market in a particular region. The number of years is calculated based on the average monthly wage for a particular region assuming that the whole wage amount before paying taxes of one family member is provided for the purchase.
Table 3 demonstrates that in Desnianskyi district of the city of Kyiv, which has persistently had the lowest prices on the secondary housing market in Kyiv over a decade, the capability to purchase a modest apartment implies saving the whole monthly wage (without even paying taxes), in fact, for the same period of 12 years in 1998 and 2003.

This period became almost one and a half time longer at the beginning of 2008 and reached 17 years. Meanwhile, the average monthly wage in Kyiv increased over 3 times between 1998 and 2003 and more than 4 times between 2003 and 2008.

The actual housing capabilities situation in Kyiv is even more constrained. I calculated the price for a 50 sq. m apartment based on an average price for 1 sq. m in the district. However, smaller apartments normally have higher price for one sq. m on the housing market. Besides, I selected the district with the minimum price in the city.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Market prices for a sq. m on the secondary housing market, average monthly wages and number of years expected to purchase a 50 sq. m apartment in Desnianskyi district of the city of Kyiv in 1998-2008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sq. m price in USD</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAH/USD official exchange rate</td>
<td>1,91</td>
<td>5,33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sq. m price in UAH</td>
<td>699,06</td>
<td>2206,62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calculated price of 50 sq. m apartment in UAH</td>
<td>34953</td>
<td>110331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly wage in the city of Kyiv [Payroll accruals, UAH]</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>761</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of years expected to purchase an apartment</td>
<td>11,8</td>
<td>12,0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Market prices for a sq. m on the secondary housing market, average monthly wages and number of years expected to purchase a 50 sq. m apartment in Sviatoshinskyi district of the City of Kyiv in 1998-2008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sq. m price in USD</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAH/USD official exchange rate</td>
<td>1,91</td>
<td>5,33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sq. m price in UAH</td>
<td>785,01</td>
<td>2350,53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calculated price of 50 sq. m apartment in UAH</td>
<td>39250,5</td>
<td>117526,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly wage in the city of Kyiv [Payroll accruals, UAH]</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>761</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of years expected to purchase an apartment</td>
<td>13,2</td>
<td>12,9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4 presents calculations for Sviatoshinskyi district, in which prices for 1 sq. m were close to median for Kyiv during the period under consideration.

The period needed to earn a required amount of money fluctuated around 13 years in 1998 and 2003. But it exceeded 19 years in 2008. The difference between this district and the district with the minimal price became more significant – over two years. According to SV Development consulting company database the mean price for 1 sq. m in 2008 in Kyiv was 3523 USD. Consequently, an apartment at a mean price would demand over 23 years of earnings. It was 16,5 years at the mean price of 568 USD for 1 sq. m in 2003.

Since no data is available on real estate prices in Ukrainian regions, it was possible to calculate the index only for several large cities and for a shorter period.

Table 5 shows that despite lower prices on the secondary housing market comparing to Kyiv, the capability to purchase own apartment became lower in all large Ukrainian regional cities in 2008. However, it is possible to divide them into two entities by the number of years expected to purchase an apartment. The first one embraces three cities – Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk and Kharkiv which number as well as in Kyiv (16,5 years) ranged between 16 and 16,6 years in 2003. The values increased by 9,4 – 10,5 years by 2008 with the range of 25,6 – 26,6 years. Remarkably, the value in Kyiv (23 years) was lower by 2,6 years than in Donetsk and 3,6 than in Kharkiv in 2008.

The second entity of cities, Odesa and Lviv, had considerably higher values of 23,5 –and 25,9 years in 2003 [one third longer period than in the first entity]. In 2008 they reached the point of 38,6 and 40,5 years respectively. (The difference of approximately one third between two entities remained. The difference between the second entity and Kyiv rose to more than 40 %.) Although the prices on the secondary housing markets of regional cities of both entities were very similar:
mean price of 417.8 (USD per 1 sq. m), standard deviation of 57.3 and the coefficient of variation of 0.137 in 2003; and mean price of 2589.6 (USD per 1 sq. m), standard deviation of 357.03 and the coefficient of variation of 0.138 in 2008, the disparity in the capability indicator was determined by lower monthly wages in Lviv and Odesa regions together with relatively more expensive housing.

Thus, the above-mentioned calculations demonstrate the actual significant decline in the capability to acquire own housing in the largest Ukrainian cities including the capital. Meanwhile other relevant statistical indicators and survey self-reports failed to reveal the negative trend in housing capabilities.

**Conclusion**

Following the way of modernization and European integration it is necessary for Ukraine to build a cohesive society with an inclusive sustainable growth. However, while the EU has discussions on the concept and the future of a welfare state, Ukrainian social policy has been limited by building clientele relationship with socially excluded groups.

That is why a study of social inclusion and human development in Eastern Europe within the context of European integration is important for comparison and forecasting development in Ukraine. Adopting the capabilities approach to social inclusion allows measuring the access to the resources, hidden risks for inclusion and implicit indicators of inequality. From this perspective social inclusion is an important factor in human development which embraces the means of providing and securing human choice.

This paper shows that despite actual growth of GDP per capita, the increase of real disposable income and Human Development Index since 1995 the housing capability in Ukraine, which was still very low in 1998, dramatically worsened in 2000’s. Hence, the research exposes limitations of conventional indicators of official statistics, data of national surveys and Human Development Index (HDI).

The developed capabilities model can supplement existing methods of measurement of social development in sociology through social inclusion. In this particular case, the model application allowed demonstrating an obscure decline in capabilities during a successful period of economic growth in Ukraine in 2000’s. Therefore, economic growth does not guarantee the increase in capabilities and social inclusion.

The capabilities, which are allocated for social actors and groups, determine their actual choices. The choice application requires social inclusion of actors. Relative access to the resources, recognition, participation, values as motives of action and choice, and institutional means of securing choice can be considered as crucial dimensions of modernization. From this perspective it can be concluded that modernization which fosters social inclusion (but not economic growth per se) enhances growth of capabilities. The study also provides evidence that economic growth cannot be considered equal to the progress of society.
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COMPETENCE AS A RESOURCE OF VITAL ACTIVITY*

Anatolii Ruchka (Kyiv)

The focus of this analytical enquiry is on the problems of competence. The concept and essence of competence, its types, aspects, components, as well as their significance in the new conditions of life, have been discussed. Using empirical data, the author gives some examples of structural distribution of competence in today’s Ukrainian society and its dynamics in time. In practice, competence is an important resource for vital activity, which can be of benefit both to individuals and society as a whole.

Keywords: competence, types, aspects and components of competence, key competences, empirical indicators of competence, competence as a resource for vital activity.

An obvious change of claims to people’s vital activity is observed nowadays, when a lot of various time challenges arise in conditions of global transformations. Indeed, in the information society the human capital, which has been formed before, cannot realize its potential adequately or optimally in extra-information historical conditions. The present labor market, practice of business and management demands to human resources remind of this clearly. Besides, life itself raises a lot of such questions before each person which did not exist before. And naturally it demands competent answers, adequate decisions, realization of programs concerning the perfection of human vital activity in new social conditions. Hence one can say that new time challenges expect a competent vital activity of people in respect of these challenges.

It should be noted that today the competence as the resource of vital activity in any social spheres and sectors appears as a subject of significant interest of management technologies both at the level of society and at the level of its different organizations and associations. Formation of new competences is in the centre of attention of education system of any modern society. Each enterprise should care actively for raising functional competence of its personnel for its efficient functioning. The labor market in its turn appears as a bright indicator of the fact that just competent employees are in the highest demand on the part of employers. Most people also individually understand that realization of personal intentions, aims, values, success achievement in the present life is possible only on the basis of high level of their competence. In this context each modern society appears as a society of competences of its citizens. The present society needs competences of necessarily high level for its successive functioning.

But what is competence? This term is used both in everyday and scientific language. In the past competence was identified in both cases with literacy and ability of certain people which were manifested in various spheres of their vital activity. Nowadays, when competence has become an important subject of investigations of numerous socio-humanitarian disciplines, especially pedagogics, psychology, culturology, law, management science, economics, sociology, its comprehension (concept) has been essentially extended, it has become ambiguous. One of the reasons of this obstacle makes various research tasks realized by various sciences, when studying the competence problems. For example, pedagogical science is first of all interested in the process, factors and results of competence formation in pupils when they study at school. Psychology mainly investigates psychological peculiarities of competence formation in pupils, students and adults. Attention is also drawn here to psychological manifestations of competence in conditions, when
young people and adults are adapted to new situations. Culturology itself cares more for studying a demonstration of people’s competence in connection with their life in multicultural society. Law mainly focuses on competence legitimacy, on those powers which are legally appointed to particular social parts (positions). Management sciences and economics are first of all keenly interested in quality (competence aspect) of human resources (at industrial enterprises, at the place of residence, in spheres of consumption, rest, mobility, etc).

And what is sociology about? It should be noted that sociological science began to take interest in competence problems later than pedagogics, psychology, management sciences. A new special discipline Competence Sociology recently (at the end of the 1st decade of the new century) appeared in the structure of sociological knowledge. The main motto of this scientific discipline is as follows: competence is not only a characteristic of a certain person; it is also relevant for human organizations and associations, for the society as a whole. Therewith a concept of competence is considered as especially successful when studying interaction of both separate persons and organizations, and of organizations and society as a whole.

Since nowadays a competence approach has become interdisciplinary, sociologists use actively the corresponding developments in other socio-humanitarian sciences. Thus, one can agree that competence is an attribute of professionalism, having in its basis considerable technological (functional) training within the limits of certain professional activity. But competence manifestation cannot be reduced just to realization of the mentioned professional training. Competence is a peculiar conglomerate. It includes a whole number of other components of extra-professional character, which, as the present practice shows, are absolutely essential for the contemporary person. The question is in social, cultural (cross-cultural), digital, creative and other competences. John Raven, a well-known English psychologist, gives in his monograph Competence in Modern Society (2002) a catalogue of 37 kinds of competences, most of them having nothing in common with specific functional training.

Thus, competence cannot be reduced to a certain separate component, which is necessary itself for performing certain vital activity. Competence is not only some official or professional commissions, some specific knowledge, some qualifications, skill, abilities. As was emphasized above, competence is the conglomerate (complex, unity) of certain components, such as knowledge, qualification, power, abilities, directions, value-sense positions that together provide achievements of the planned results (aims, values). In such context the high level competence can appear as a stable characteristic of separate people, certain organizations and associations, certain social groups, socio-cultural media, country population as a whole. And it can really perform the functions of a strong resource, raising vital activity of people (at enterprises, in business, in perception of the environment, in evaluation of urgent phenomena and events, in taking crucial decisions, settling of vital problems, etc.)

Numerous discussions concerning competence problems take place in scientific literature. They go into the concepts of competence and competency,
competence relation to motivation of people’s activity and their value-sense positions, etc. Below, we will consider the kinds and aspects of the phenomenon of competence. Professionals dealing with competence approach distinguish sometimes a lot of kinds of competence: general and specific competences, soft and hard, open and latent kinds; various subject competences (e.g., linguistic, musical, literature, sport, building, military, ecological, trade, language, etc.). The so-called key competences are worthy of special attention. These are, in a manner of speaking, strategic, basic competences; a contemporary person cannot do without their acquisition and realization. Specialists discussed the catalogue of such competences at symposium in Bern called Key Competences for Europe in 1996:

- social and political competences connected with readiness to take responsibility, to be active in taking decisions;
- political-and-cultural competences, which allow us to coexist harmoniously with people of the different culture and religion;
- information competences which belong to the ability to use oral and written communication;
- competences of self-development and self-education that determine the need and ability to learn over the whole life both in professional, social and private life;
- competences which are realized in the striving and ability to act rationally, productively and creatively.

It is out of doubt that such a catalogue of key competences is oriented not only to the present but also to the future. Its practical realization, as specialists imagined, will be of benefit both for isolated individuals and society as a whole.

Ten years later European Parliament took another catalogue of key competences as recommendations for the countries-members of EU. It was foreseen that these competences are acquired in the process of continuous learning during whole life. The catalogue represented competences necessary for citizens (Europeans) for their self-development, social integration, active civil position and acquiring chances on the labor market in the modern informational society. In general, eight key competences were distinguished, which provided realization of the following knowledge and skills:

- communication in native language;
- communication in foreign languages;
- education in the sphere of information;
- mastering of mathematical and basic technical knowledge and skills;
- learning capacity;
- ability to realize social and civil potentialities;
- initiative and enterprising;
- cultural consciousness and creativeness.

All the above key competences are equally important, since each of them can favor the successful life in the developed society. It is easy to note that some elements of vital active competence are characteristic of all eight key ones. In this case the question is in critical thinking, creativity, initiative, settlement of problem situations, risk evaluation, taking decisions, constructive managing emotions. At the same time the accepted key competences may be realized in several aspects:
cognitive, motivational and behavioral. Cognitive aspect is connected with knowledge, cognitive process, embraces logic, intuitive and creative thinking. This aspect embraces (from the above catalogue) two key competences: “to be educated in the information sphere” and “to have mathematical and basic knowledge and skills”.

The motivational aspect, in its turn, also embraces (from the above catalogue) two key competences: “to be initiative and enterprising” and “to be culture conscious and creative”. Such competences are based on motivation of vital activity of people, their directives and readiness to realization of certain goals. Internalized value-sense positions, which appear as standards of vital activity, including its motivation, are of great importance here.

The behavioral aspect (from the above catalogue) represents four key competences: “to communicate in mother tongue”, “to communicate in foreign language”, “to be able to learn”, “to be able to use social and civil means”. These competences are connected with skills, qualifications, abilities of people displayed in the effective actions or behavior, directed to the achievement of certain goals (results).

Allowing for the fact that the high-level competence is always based on combining the cognitive, motivational and behavioral aspects, one can make the following conclusions. If a person has only certain knowledge, it does not mean that he/she is absolutely competent. But availability of certain knowledge, in this respect, is necessary, since it is a theoretical basis of practical skills in a certain situation. In their turn the skills appear as qualifications and abilities which determine the effective use of knowledge for fulfilling the given tasks and for solving the available problems. However, the both may be favored (or not) by the motivational side of competence which, being based on the value-sense interpretation, determines interest in certain knowledge and readiness for its practical use (through realization of skills, abilities, qualifications). That means that the given motivational aspect, which is, as a whole, a subjective component of people’s vital activity, probably plays a decisive part both in formation and realization of their competence.

Now, as to analytics of certain empirical data obtained in sociological investigations of competence problems. It should be noted, that there is inconsiderable quantity of such sociological studies. Besides, there are a lot of methodical questions, including those concerning the methods of empirical research of competences and their relevant indicators. Sociologists try to settle these problems on the basis of experience obtained both in quantitative and qualitative sociological studies. Thus, colleagues N.V. Kostenko and L.G. Skokova have recently performed a high-quality research where they tested a certain scale of cultural competence on small retrievals. In so doing, the cognitive, motivational and behavioral block of questions to respondents were distinguished in the research tools. Using the data of the question blocks, the researchers have found out specificity of perception of other cultures by citizens of Ukraine, their directives and intercultural interaction, etc.

As to representative surveys of population in Ukraine performed by the Institute of Sociology of NAS of Ukraine, the corresponding research tools do not include questions dedicated to special study of our population competence. Such questions have been stressed today in connection with determining the quality of human resources of modern Ukraine and a search for reserves of high vital activity of its citizens.
To find out the situation in this sphere of social life one needs the urgent estimation of competence level of the society and its dynamics in time. Since our society is socially inhomogeneous, it is also expedient to have appropriate information concerning its certain groups (status, educational, cultural, regional, professional, etc.). And though the monitoring data array does not contain results immediately connected with competence problems, nevertheless it includes information which characterizes indirectly the state and dynamics of competence in the present-day Ukrainian society. When referring to indices (and methods) developed by N.V. Panina and Ye.I. Golovakha for determining social self-feeling of Ukraine population, one can find such indices which can be used for characteristic of vital competence of our citizens. The following ones were chosen for this end: ability to live in new social conditions; most suited job; up-to-date economic knowledge; self-confidence; current political knowledge; resoluteness in achieving one’s goals; initiative and independence in solving vital problems; the possibility to work wholeheartedly.

**Table 1**

**Distribution of questioned citizens of Ukraine by the level of their competence according to eight positions of vital activity, (2010-2017, %, indices by the scale 0-5)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positions of vital activity</th>
<th>Scale of indices</th>
<th>Middle index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not interested</td>
<td>Not enough</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability to live in new social conditions</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most suited job</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modern economic conditions</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-confidence</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up-to-date political knowledge</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resoluteness in achieving own goals</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiative and independence in settling vital problems</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possibility to work wholeheartedly</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vital competence (by eight positions)</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In accordance with the method the respondents were asked: *What of the above are you short for?* And a scale of answers was foreseen: *not interested, not enough, difficult to answer, enough.* When processing the respondents’ answers the indices of...
the mentioned factors were based on point estimates of corresponding variants of the offered scale, when *not interested* was estimated as zero point, *not enough* – as one point, *difficult to answer* – as three points, *enough* – as five points. So, these point estimates represent self-estimates of respondents as to those or other indices of their competence. Thus, the estimate from 0 to 2.5 points meant unsatisfactory, low level of competence and from 2.5 to 5 points – its satisfactory, relatively high level.

The data given below (Table 1) represent indices of eight positions (indicators) of vital activity of inquired citizens of Ukraine and their dynamics for the period from 2010 to 2017. As is evident, the vital competence of our citizens (by eight indices) for the mentioned period has been relatively increased.

Indices of seven (of eight) factors of vital competence of our citizens have increased for the above period. The factor of self-confidence has decreased a bit compared with 2010, that was not statistically significant. Thus, the dynamics of competence indices of population of Ukraine is positive as a whole. Therewith special attention is drawn by the increase of indices of such factors of population competence as most suited job, ability to live in new social conditions and modern economic knowledge. At the same time, despite the fact that the total competence level of our population slightly exceeds 2.5 points (that is its middle level), the number of our low-competent people is sufficient. By respondents’ self-estimates they made 32.0% in 2010, and 33.4% – in 2017. The number of competent people, by respondents’ self-estimates, is also not very large. In 2010 they made 31.5, in 2017 – 36.8%. Here one can observe a certain increase but the figures of this process do not amaze. There are also people who cannot estimate the level of their own competence in one or another sphere of their life (20.5%). Besides, 9.2% of respondents in 2017 are not interested in this question at all. Thus, now and further we have much to do (in education, business, competence management, social and cultural policy, etc.) to achieve the optimal, high level of competence of our citizens.

Now pass to empirical significance of one or other aspects of competence. Two of the eight mentioned factors of competence of our citizens represent its cognitive aspect: modern economic knowledge and up-to-date political knowledge. The motivational aspect of competence is represented by three factors: self-confidence, resoluteness in achieving own goals, initiative and independence in deciding the vital problems. The behavioral aspect also embraces three factors of competence: ability to live in new social conditions, the most suited job and a possibility to work wholeheartedly. Below (Table 2) the author presents data indicating the empirical significance of the given competence aspects and their dynamics for the period from 2010 to 2017. As is seen, the motivational factor dominates in both cases; on the one hand it can determine the interest in certain knowledge, on the other hand – it can favor self-organization and readiness to their practical use. The gain in empirical significance of the cognitive and behavioral aspects for the mentioned period, also probably evidences for the corresponding potential of the components of motivational aspect. The indices of seven (of eight) factors of vital competence of our citizens have increased for the mentioned period. The factor of self-confidence has decreased a little compared with 2010 that was not statistically significant. So, the dynamics of indices of population confidence is positive as a whole in Ukraine. Therewith
special attention is drawn by the increase of indices of such factors of population competence as the most suited job, ability to live in the new social conditions, and up-to-date economic knowledge. Simultaneously, in spite of the fact that the total level of our population competence somewhat exceeds 2.5 points, that is its middle level of competence, the number of low-competent people in our country is rather sufficient. By the estimates of respondents they made 32.0% in 2010, and 33.4% in 2017. The number of competent people, by self-estimates of respondents, is also not large. In 2010 the competent people made 31.5%, in 2017 their number achieved 36.8%. The increase was observed here, and that is good, but the figures of this process do not amaze. Also there are people which cannot estimate the level of their own competence in one or another sphere of their life (20.5%). Besides, 9.2% of respondents in 2017 are not interested in this problem. So, now and further we have much to do (in education, business, competence management, social and cultural policy, etc.) to achieve the optimal, high competence level of our citizens.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspects of vital competence</th>
<th>Scale of indices</th>
<th>Aggregated middle index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not interested</td>
<td>Not enough</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivational</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behavioral</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Now pass to empirical significance of one or other aspects of competence. Two among the eight presented factors of competence of our citizens represent its cognitive aspect: modern economic knowledge and up-to-date political knowledge. The motivational aspect of competence is represented by three factors: self-confidence, resoluteness in achieving own goals, initiative and independence in deciding the vital problems. The behavioral aspect also embraces three factors of competence: ability to live in new social conditions, the most suited job and a possibility to work wholeheartedly. Below (Table 3) the author presents data indicating the empirical significance of the given competence aspects and their dynamics for the period from 2010 to 2017. As we see, the motivational factor dominates in both cases; on the one hand it can determine the interest in certain knowledge, on the other hand – it can favor self-organization and readiness to use them practically. The increase of empirical significance of the cognitive and behavioral aspects for the mentioned period also probably evidences for the corresponding potential of the components of motivational aspect of competence. These components, which are connected with personal features, abilities, motives, value-sense positions, are called “the soft elements of human competence” in scientific literature. Today its increase as a significant resource of vital activity depends just on them.
And at last, let us consider diagnostic potentialities of sociological studies of competence problems. The elucidation of competence level of some groups of our citizens in the home society is an important task of sociology in this context. Educational, lingual, professional, regional, cultural, etc. groups could be taken into account. The data on competence levels (by the above indices) of the inquired citizens of Ukraine (2017) depending on their belonging to certain social and professional categories are presented below (Table 3).

As is obvious, the highest level of competence (according to self-estimates of respondents by eight factors) is characteristic of the representatives of administrative stratum, businessmen, specialists in technical and humanitarian sphere. The aggregated middle index of competence of these groups is 3.36 points. About a half of respondents of this set of socio-professional categories think that they have enough knowledge, skills and corresponding directions and abilities to perform certain vital activity. At the same time 24.3% of respondents of the mentioned categories, on the contrary, consider themselves to be low-competent people, they are short of the corresponding knowledge, skills, directions and abilities.

Then follow qualified workers and officials of attending personnel. The aggregated middle index of competence level of these social-professional categories is 2.94 points. According to self-estimates, 40.1% of respondents of the given categories consider themselves to be competent, and 34.1% – low-competent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social and professional categories</th>
<th>Scale of factors</th>
<th>Middle index (0÷5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not interested</td>
<td>Not enough</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative stratum (State machinery officials, heads of enterprises, institutions, etc.)</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Businessmen (in big, medium-sized and small business) and self-employed</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialists of technical sphere (having higher or secondary special education)</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>23.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialists in humanitarian sphere (in the field of science, culture, health care, education, etc., with a higher or secondary special education)</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qualified workers</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>35.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officials of assisting personnel</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>32.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pupils / Students</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>39.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-skilled workers</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>39.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>37.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewives</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>37.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pensioners</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>36.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In its turn the aggregated middle index of competence of such categories as pupils/students, low-skilled workers, unemployed people, housewives is 2.72 points. 34.1% of respondents consider themselves to be competent, while 38.3% are short of the corresponding knowledge, skills, directions and abilities.

And at last, the rank ladder of competence with its below average level (2.20 points) is completed by pensioners. Only 25.8% of respondents consider themselves to be competent, while 36.2% - low-competent. A considerable part of people who are not interested in the problem of competence (19.9%) was also found among pensioners.

In general, if it is remembered that the above social and professional categories are often different as to income, education, social status, and even age, their different levels of competence do not surprise. The problem is, probably, that actually equal levels of competence of the given categories are relatively far from its optimal, high level. The increase of competence as a whole is the essential resource of vital activity of our population. In this respect monitoring data of the Institute of Sociology, NAS of Ukraine, for example, demonstrate: competent citizens much more often than low-competent ones think that their life depends rather on themselves than on the external circumstances. They have also been more actively included into new life than low-competent people; their number in the medium-sized and small business is larger. The competent people differ from low-competent ones by their independency, initiative, creativity, ability to adapt themselves to new social conditions, their positive adherence to democratic values and practices. Thus, the high-level competence is really a creative resource of vital activity that can be of appreciable benefit both to a single person and society as a whole.

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Raven J. Competence in modern society. It’s identification, development and release].
The article analyses the social activation / alienation and neo-patrimonial practices as social factors of institutional changes in modern societies. The concepts of social activation and neo-patrimonial practices are clarified on the basis of neo-institutional approach and neo-patrimonialism conception. Much attention is given to the weakening of the institutional systems in the transforming Ukrainian society which results in forming neo-patrimonial practices.

**Keywords:** institutional changes, social activation, social alienation, neo-patrimonial practices.

* Part of this research was published: Liseyenko E. Social factors of institutional changes in modern post-Soviet society // PolitBook. – 2014. – № 4. – P. 100–106.
In modern sociology the comprehension of the institutional changes processes in contemporary societies claims broad scientific attention. P. Shtompka in his theory of “social formation” draws attention to the role of tradition (“constant existence of the past in the present”) in the nature of institutional changes. This statement explains why old institutions undergo changes, though these changes do not form new institutions but form the synthetic type of social institutions (i.e. the past is not only preserved in the present but it is also tightly interwoven with the present) (Штомпка, 1996: p. 7). D. North accounts the orientation of institutional changes for the differences between institutions and organizations and their interaction. He believes that institutional changes occur because the leaders of political or economic organizations provide current institutional framework with some changes (Норт, 1997). Based on D. Nort’s description of the internal structure of the Institute as the rules of the game, one may identify the characteristics that indicate the process of institutional change:

1) emergence of new rules of the game, their legitimacy and feasibility;
2) provision of new rights and freedoms;
3) modernized orientation of the socio-cultural norms;
4) public monitoring of new rules and regulations implementation.

P. Berger and T. Lukman considered habitualization (getting used to doing something) of human activity and interaction to be the source of any institutionalization (Бергер, Лукман, 1995: p. 87). They pointed out that any action which is often repeated becomes a model (Бергер, Лукман, 1995: p. 89-90). These processes precede any institutionalization and can be applied both to a number of interacting individuals and to a hypothetically secluded individual who is remote from any social interaction” (Бергер, Лукман, 1995: p. 91). S. Huntington in his paper “Political order in changing societies” notes that institutionalization is the process whereby organizations and procedures acquire value and stability” (Хантингтон, 2004: p. 32). According to S. Huntington, if there aren’t strong social institutions in a society then it lacks the means to define and implement the public interest. Thus, a government with a low level of institutionalization is not only a weak government but a bad one. A weak government that does not have the authority is unable to execute its functions successfully.

Among papers written by Ukrainian sociologists, those by E. Golovakha, S. Makeev, O. Kutsenko, N. Panina, I. Popova are of particular interest, because they examine the nature, character and trends of institutional change in contemporary Ukrainian society. Moreover, it should be noted that a significant contribution
to the study of features of the post-Soviet institutional process was made by E. Golovakha and N. Panina in a theory of “double institutionalization” (Головаха, Панина, 2001: p. 5-22).

The most important result of the transformational process and reformist policy in Ukrainian society during last twenty-three years was the creation of the institutional infrastructure of a democratic state. However, the occurred institutionalization of market economy elements and democratic political relations was not a product of the national culture and the evolution of civil society (free participation of citizens in the society, full realization of their “social self”). As a result, new institutions were created in the Ukrainian society; however, after becoming legal, they didn’t become legitimate in the public consciousness. As the process of public institutions functioning is implemented in social practices, the concept of social activation characterizes the possibility of an individual to participate fully in all institutional structures that accumulate different and significant resources and rules existing in the society. Whereas the basis of social activation (participation) is the consciousness of freedom and the freedom of action, the concept of social alienation defines structural and socio-cultural limitation of freedom. There can be distinguished objective and subjective aspects in the phenomenon of social alienation. Objective manifestations of alienation are associated with the lack of opportunities for social participation and an individual’s awareness of the inability to influence the decisions concerning purpose, nature and organization of the actions. The process of alienation is also evident in the subjective characteristics such as socio-psychological state of a person that affects his or her social health, social consciousness and nature of the actions. American sociologist M. Seaman suggested considering alienation as a specific psychological state of a person, where in its development and manifestation four types of social alienation can be distinguished:

1) “powerlessness” as a sense of the impossibility to influence one’s social environment;

2) “atrophy of sense” as impossibility to achieve important goals legally;

3) “isolation” as a sense of detachment from the norms and values of society;

4) “out-of-body experience” as the inability to be engaged in activities that could bring psychological satisfaction (Seeman, 1959: p. 783-791).

Subjective expressions of social alienation in Ukrainian society are represented by widespread feelings of social powerlessness, isolation and person’s detachment from society. The existence of social alienation is the basis for the appearance of specific social practices which eventually contribute to the transformation of social institutions. Moreover, as noted by N. Luhmann the problem of social alienation turns into socially dangerous problem of the society cleavage into “persons”, “citizens” and “individuals” who are not able to become involved in the institutional structures of society. (Луман, 1999: p. 128-143). As a result, the quality and focus of social institutions are determined primarily by
the interests of certain management teams and the structure of that area (not legislative, but administrative and bureaucratic area) in which it is implemented. The same trends are evident in political sphere as the authorities are clandestine in relation to society, in a way of the media monopolization, the use of technologies to manipulate the public opinion. In economic sphere these trends are evident in an emergence of non-legal mechanisms of interaction between officials and businessmen, the illegal nature of the business, a hidden secondary employment of working population. As to legal sphere they appear in form of the total juridical dependence on the executive branch, impunity for major economic and criminal crimes, and disrespect for the law.

At the same time the efficiency of public institutions mostly depends on mutual correspondence of: firstly, the formal, legal and administrative standards that are set and controlled by the state structures, and socio-cultural norms, that appear in the process of historical development of a society and are controlled by civil structures; and secondly, mutual correspondence of informal norms, rules and actual practices. D. Nort in “Institutions, institutional change and economic performance” notes that informal rules used to emerge spontaneously, in the course of interactions between agents, and formal rules are written consolidations of already existing informal rules (Hopr, 1997).

Thus, according to D. Nort, formal rules appear as fixation of the stable core of a social institution, and informal rules appear as its changeable periphery. In societies that are transforming, which do not have democratic traditions or developed civil structures, illegal rules, norms and practices, that express the interests of the elites (officials, managers, etc.) often emerge and eventually affect the way public institutions function. A. Fisun states that the post-Soviet transformations in the 1990-ies led to the formation of neo-patrimonialism in the Ukrainian society instead of democracy and the former involves, first of all, not traditional and / or ideological motives of the actors, but rather incentives of a rent-seeking type. He distinguishes three main principles of the way neo-patrimonial system acts:

1) the political center is separate and independent from the periphery, it concentrates on political, economic and symbolic resources of power, while blocking access for all other groups and layers of society to these resources and positions of the control over them;

2) the state is managed as a private ownership (patrimonium) of ruling groups - holders of state power that privatize various public functions and institutions, making them a source of the private income;

3) ethnic, clan, regional, and family and kinship ties do not disappear, but are reproduced in contemporary political and economic relations, defining the methods and principles of the way to function (Фисун, 2007).

The concept of neo-patrimonialism comes from the fact that modern social institutions in the post-Soviet countries perform the legitimate role of a facade of a patrimonial regime. The key role in the functioning of the basic social institutions under neo-patrimonialism are not rational-legal relations within the formal
systems of interaction but the ties between a client and a patron that control the access of neo-patrimonialism players to various resources based on relations of personal dependence. So the neo-patrimonial practices are the actual forms and ways of the basic social institutions functioning in neo-patrimonial system of a state.

Under neo-patrimonialism public institutions are used to achieve economic and political goals for private persons. For example, power and fiscal functions of the state in fact become an effective tool to suppress any political resistance and to eliminate economic competitors – according to the following expression “everything is for friends, but law is for enemies”. The multi-party institute is not the most important characteristic of a democratic society, because the relationship of the parties and the executive branch is directly opposite to the canons of western democracies. First, there is no opposition party under neo-patrimonialism both in the Parliament, and in the whole public policy; secondly, not state-administrative institutions depend on parties but the parties depend on them. In such a situation even real freedom of speech is not so significant. The freedom of speech exists, but there isn’t any political influence or it is too little.

In addition neo-patrimonial bureaucracy is formed not only on the basis of the selection of bureaucrats according to business qualities, but on the principle of loyalty to the patron. Consequently, its actual practices correspond not so much to the letter and spirit of law, but to the interests of the patron and personal interests of officials, where the loyalty is bought by the distribution of profitable positions. In such conditions, corruption is not simply a consequence of the regime, but also its content. Even M. Weber pointed out that the assignment of official position leads to the loss of their bureaucratic functions, and a patrimonial official ceases to be a civil servant, because the state and public interests become their personal or corporate. It should be noted that neo-patrimonial system of a society contributes to the strengthening of social alienation of citizens from participation in politics and development of legal nihilism. These are very characteristic features of the political culture of Ukraine’s population. (Головаха, Панина, 2007: p. 4-23). That is why the extension of social activation of citizens in the process of institutional change and the narrowing of the neo-patrimonial practices realization area depend on the formation of such social qualities as citizenship, independence, responsibility and development of legal consciousness in the society.

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THE RIGHTS OF ETHNIC MINORITIES IN UKRAINE:
DYNAMICS OF TRANSFORMATION*

Nikolai Shulga (Kyiv)

The article analyzes the Ukrainian legislation from the Act of Declaration of independence of Ukraine to the early XXI century. The main stages of the attitude of the Ukrainian state to ethnic minorities are distinguished. It is emphasized that within ten years, interethnic relations in Ukraine were developed in a unique way. Several stages can be indicated in that period. Each of them is characterized by an interrelation of political forces with public life and, as a consequence, each is characterized by political and legislative documents proclaiming the rights of ethnic minorities that were adopted.

It is concluded that the process of forming Ukrainian legislation on national minorities has already undergone several stages and this process is still not finished. At the moment, it is very difficult to predict which tendencies will succeed in the near future because the situation in the society regarding that issue is very contradictory. The active discussions relating to the self-identity of Ukrainian society (either democratic, multiethnic community, or nationalistic (natiocratic) state) have been continuing till this day.

Keywords: ethnic minorities, identity, native language, Ukrainian legislation, individual and collective rights of ethnic minorities

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BACKGROUND

In recent years the issue of ethnic minorities’ rights has been intensively deliberated upon in Ukraine. Politicians, lawyers, scholars, and representatives of non-governmental organizations and mass media discuss this issue publicly. Some positive stereotypes of ethnic relations, status of ethnic minorities in the state and society, and quality of legislation have been already formed in the public opinion.

In addition, the problem has been under consideration at the official level. President of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma, while reviewing conclusions of international organizations concerning the issue, claimed that “international experts and institutions, that control ethnic policy and observance of requirements established by national and international law in the field of ethnic minorities’ rights, admit that those principles and statutes belong to the most democratic ones” (Кучма, 1997).

"Prime Minister of Ukraine V. Pustovoitenko spoke out about the recent conditions of interethnic relations in Ukraine in the same context. However, the Prime Minister admitted that in the field of national relations it is quite dangerous to flatter oneself with external tranquility—calm on the surface does not exclude undercurrents” (Пустовойтенко, 1997). This article will analyze the contradictory development of the Ukrainian legislation on ethnic minorities’ rights that occurred from the late 1980s to the late 1990s.

It is well known that the Soviet Union was established as a federal state. The Soviet republics were states of self-determined nations, i.e., for the Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Georgians, Armenians, and others. A number of states had autonomous republics, autonomous regions and national districts because representatives of other ethnic groups lived in their territory. An impression developed that national issues were resolved in this way—every ethnic group had its own state-territorial formation. The Russian Federation had the most complex one and was composed of autonomous republics and regions and national districts. There were also autonomous republics in Uzbekistan, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Tajikistan. However, the problem regarding the rights of national and ethnic groups was not resolved, even theoretically, through the formation of state-nations. As all republics were multiethnic, other than people who had their state-territorial formation, there were a few ethnic groups which had no defined legal status. In other words, their rights were not defended by law.

Some citizens of newly independent states believed that the interethnic problem emerged after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. This interethnic
problem did not exist previously on a day-to-day level, and moreover it did not have a hostile character or a form of military conflict. Certainly, throughout several decades of the USSR’s existence, the deterioration of the interethnic relations can be observed. However, in the light of recent dramatic events it is not considered to be a very serious problem in many independent states.

Nevertheless, such belief is incorrect. Interethnic problems potentially existed both in the Soviet Union and in other multiethnic states. For instance, Ukraine, as a unitary republic, formed part of USSR and yet, it did not have any national-territorial formations. The law did not protect the rights of the ethnic groups and these groups were not given either the status of independent legitimate entities or separate social categories in the jurisdiction of the state. Their specific language, religious and ethnic-cultural characteristics were simply ignored by the state.

Except Ukrainians (who already had their native language used in educational institutions, press, radio, TV, and theaters), the conditions for the preservation of ethnic self-identity, for the reproduction and development of national culture, and for education in their native language, were only created for Russians and partly for Moldavians and Hungarians. However, other ethnic groups of several thousand members did not have such conditions. They had to choose schools in which the courses were taught either in Russian or Ukrainian. They did not have their own press, or TV, or radio broadcast in their native language. There were no national theaters, museums, libraries, etc. There was the same situation even for large ethnic groups such as Belarusians, Jews, Bulgarians, Poles, Greeks, Romanians, and Tatars. Sometimes this situation could be viewed as absurd. For example, although similar in nature, Moldavians could send their children to school where the courses were taught in their native language, while Romanians could not.

The legal aspect of national relations and public discussion of the ethnic minorities’ problems became major issues in the Soviet Union only in the late 1980s. In that period the existence of such a social-judicial category as a national minority was legally accepted. Since that time the laws which proclaimed additional rights in the sphere of language, culture, and traditions have begun to be adopted for citizens of those groups.

**STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT**

Within ten years, interethnic relations in Ukraine were developed in a unique way. Several stages can be indicated in that period. Each of them is characterized by an interrelation of political forces with public life and, as a consequence, each is characterized by political and legislative documents proclaiming the rights of ethnic minorities that were adopted. Although this article does not detail the characteristics of every stage, particular features will be distinguished.

In the development of the Ukrainian legislation that embodies ethnic-political and ethnic-cultural relations, four periods can be defined during the last decade.
First Stage

During the first stage, Ukrainian and USSR laws ignored the existence of certain spheres of public relations, such as national-ethnic relations. This period continued till 1989 during which the law simply ignored the presence of national-ethnic relations in society. However, in practice the state admitted the multi-ethnicity of Ukraine in a “twisted” and asymmetrical way. Such recognition was, for instance, expressed in the teaching process. In two particular schools, courses were taught in five languages (Ukrainian, Russian, Moldavian, Hungarian, and Polish). Some textbooks and newspapers were published and some radio and TV broadcasting were provided in these languages.

Second Stage

The second stage commenced in 1989 when the Supreme Council of USSR adopted the Law on Languages in Ukrainian SSR. This statute officially recognized the multi-ethnicity and multi-linguistic character of Ukraine’s population. Primary attention was given to the issue of the two languages in the society—Ukrainian and Russian. However, the languages of other ethnic minorities were also addressed. This period continued until December 1, 1991, and created a chain of political events in the territory of USSR, including the Parade of Sovereignty and other historical events that occurred before the dissolution of the country. During this period, constitutional documents that proclaimed maximum rights for ethnic minorities were adopted.

In the second period, supporters of Ukraine’s independence demonstrated their adherence to liberal-democratic values, including these relating to national relations. This can be explained by the fact that the leading political forces, which directed Ukrainian public life at that time, were interested in the course of independence proclaimed by all ethnic groups, and first of all by Russians. Nevertheless, it is important to admit that in this period the Supreme Rada of Ukraine adopted mainly declarations, rather than laws, in the sphere of national relations. Declarations do not have a normative-legal essence, but instead have a political-legislative character. The Declaration on State Sovereignty (July 16, 1990) and the Declaration of Nationalities’ Rights (November 1, 1991) were adopted during the second stage.

The Declaration on the State Sovereignty of Ukraine included important statements in order to provide rights to ethnic minorities. First of all, the multi-ethnicity of the state was admitted. Section 2, Democracy, states that the people of Ukraine are composed of citizens of all nationalities. This statement opened public integration into a newly independent state. Further, the document proclaimed that the state guaranteed all nationalities residing in the territory of the republic the right to sovereign national-cultural development. So, this was a claim to accept ethnic rights for not only certain citizens, but also for entire ethnic groups. Secondly, the document declared that the state should provide equality of all citizens before the law, regardless of their origin, social and
property status, race, national identity, gender, education, language, political adherence, religion, occupation, residence, and other circumstances. Thirdly, the state guaranteed to all nationalities residing in the republic the right to national-cultural development. Fourthly, the Declaration outlined the order of formation of national-administrative units for the realization of the rights of those groups.

Consequently, the Declaration on the State Sovereignty of Ukraine founded the basis for the principles of state-building. Those principles were based on the model of admitting the collective and group rights of ethnic minorities: the acceptance of separate rights of nationalities (i.e., ethnic groups) and acceptance of the possibility of the formation of national-administrative units.

Thus, in addition to proclaiming equal rights for all citizens, the state declared additional rights to people and national groups. From a theoretical and practical perspective, that proposition has a principal meaning.

Understanding the necessity of guaranteeing collective rights is not a concept which is accepted everywhere under international law. Even nowadays there is a suspicious attitude towards the collective rights of ethnic groups. For instance, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted in 1948 did not mention the rights of minorities. That document assumed that guaranteeing rights to separate human beings would automatically provide for the collective rights of groups, including ethnic minorities. Nevertheless, a special article regarding minorities was included in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966). This document stated that “in countries, ethnic and religious minorities, and persons who are referred to as such minorities along with other members of the group, cannot be refused the right to preserve their culture, profess their religion and execute their customs, and also use their native language.” However, it should be mentioned that a firm opinion as to what constitutes collective and individual rights does not exist among experts.

The proclamation of freedom in this period served as a powerful spur for the renovation, stabilization, and development of the national-cultural life of ethnic minorities’ groups in Ukraine. Different national unions and organizations began appearing all over the country and people began to study their native history, traditions, customs, and home languages. Small clubs were united to form organizations and associations, and Ukrainian national-cultural societies were established. Another important document was the Declaration of Ukraine Nationalities’ Rights. This document was ratified by the Supreme Rada of Ukraine on November 1, 1991, only one month before the referendum on the state independence of Ukraine took place. The content of this document was affected by the political atmosphere in that period and the political-legislative context in the society, including the presence of the relatively democratic Law on Languages in the Ukrainian SSR.

The Declaration of Ukrainian Nationalities’ Rights further developed the statements on the rights of national and ethnic groups formulated in the Declaration on Ukraine’s State Sovereignty. It declared that the Ukrainian state guaranteed equal political, economic, social and cultural rights to all people, national groups, and citizens, residing in its territory.
The principle was expressed in a number of propositions in the document that defended the rights of ethnic groups as collective subjects. In particular, the groups received the right to preserve the traditional area of settlement. The document also proclaimed that their state should establish national-administrative units. In the areas of “compact residence”, the national minorities could use their native language and state language equally. In addition, their native language could be freely used in all spheres of public life, including education, production, and broadcasting. The document also declared that the law defended the ethnic groups’ monuments of history and culture. The Declaration gave special attention to the Russian language. If the authorities did not guarantee free use of the Russian language, then the referendum would fail. As a result, Article 3 of the Declaration clearly defined that “the Ukrainian state provides the right of free usage of the Russian language to all its citizens.” The Declaration of Nationalities’ Rights played an important role in the preparation stage for the referendum on the independence of Ukraine. The citizens of Ukraine and representatives of different nationalities believed in the prospect of a democratic constitutional building of a state.

Another significant document, which was also adopted in the second period, was the Law of Ukraine on Citizenship. During the dissolution of USSR, the loss and acquisition of a new citizenship was unexpected for the prevailing majority of the population. In comparison to the renouncement of citizenship, the reverse occurred during the dissolution of USSR—in one night the country disappeared and consequently abandoned its citizens. The realization of the mass loss and necessity of the acquisition of a new citizenship did not occur immediately or in one act, but was a process that occurred over time.

The uniqueness of the period caused novel and sometimes unusual problems. In fact, all newly established states in the frame of the former USSR elaborated and adopted new laws on citizenship. Their implementation led to the existence of many categories of people with new legal status, people who previously had the same status, i.e., citizens of USSR. These categories of people include people with a new citizenship and stateless people, who can be divided into those who would like to receive a new citizenship but due to the recently adopted law such citizenship cannot be granted, and those who have not made a determination regarding their citizenship.

Certainly, the best situation was that which allowed a person to simply (or automatically) be granted a citizenship of the country where the person resides. In Ukraine, the Law on Citizenship was adopted right after the independence declaration. That decree was adopted by the Supreme Council of Ukraine and came into force in October 1991. It defined the permanent legal relationship between a person and the Ukrainian state. All citizens of USSR permanently residing in the territory of Ukraine at the time the law was passed were granted citizenship of Ukraine. Such a democratic principle of the definition of Ukrainian citizenship promoted stability and peace in the society, avoided a mass appearance of stateless people in Ukraine, and did not instigate a new wave of migration to the post-Soviet territory.
This policy was implemented by the influential political forces of Ukraine during the stage of the independence declaration and it achieved positive results. In the referendum more than 91% of citizens voted for independence. Moreover, all regions of the republic and all minorities voted for independence as well. One can conclude that the above mentioned declarations and laws were among the factors that contributed to the result of the referendum.

The effects of the ignorance of ethnic rights and national-cultural interests can be seen in events that took place in some newly independent states of the former USSR. All of the dramatic incidents that took place in Nagorno-Karabakh, South Osetia, Abkhazia, Trans-Dniester Region (Pridnestrovie), and other so-called “hot spots” started as ethnic conflicts and then escalated.

**Third Stage**

In the third stage, the Laws on National Minorities in Ukraine, Education, Radio, and TV and other laws related to ethnic minorities’ norms on the use of native language were adopted. In particular, the Law on National Minorities, ratified by the Supreme Rada of Ukraine in June 1992, more adequately defined the status, rights and responsibilities of persons related to different ethnic groups and national and ethnic groups as collective objects. First of all, this law defined the term “national minority.” The law determined that groups of citizens of Ukraine can be referred to as national minorities if they are not Ukrainians by origin, but show a national self-consciousness and community of interests. That definition, on the one hand, is very democratic since it does not make high demands of other ethnic groups, and on the other hand, it is very broadly interpreted because it does not consist of either low or high quantitative restrictions. Moreover, there is neither mention of time restriction criteria for residing in a certain territory (as, for instance, in Hungary where there is a requirement of residence in the territory of the state for no less than 100 years), nor are there any other limitations for ethnic groups who claim the status of national minority. This allows a group to claim that it belongs to a national minority, and consequently, requires that rights be provided to any ethnic group (even if it consists of two non-Ukrainian persons) one day after the citizenship is granted.

Second, the Law on National Minorities in Ukraine clearly defines the source of financing national minorities from the state, i.e., the state budget. In addition, the law states that the budget should contain special provisions for national minorities. Realistically, it means that there should be a special provision in the budget for the development of national minorities. Nevertheless, the law does not indicate what part of the budget should be assigned for national minorities’ development, how much would be allocated, etc.

Third, the Law on National Minorities in Ukraine provides the state guarantee of the right of national-cultural autonomy to all national minorities. It defines this right to include the use of and education in native language or study of native language in the state educational institutions (or national-cultural societies), the development of national cultural traditions, the use of national symbols, the celebration of national holidays, the observance of own religion, the
preservation and development of national literature, arts and mass media, the creation of national cultural and educational centers, and any other activities that are not contrary to active legislation.

Fourthly, new guarantees for ethnic groups are included in the Law on National Minorities. Such guarantees include the right to preserve the environment in the area of their historic and contemporary residence. Fifthly, the law addresses the return of the representatives of the deported people to Ukraine. The law indicates how this complex legal, social-economic and migration process can occur through additional corresponding legal acts and agreements between Ukraine and other countries. In other words, the law introduces another group—the deported nation.

Finally, it should be pointed out that the Law on National Minorities not only gives concrete expression to above mentioned declarations, but also creates a number of problems. Several problems emerge if we analyze the adopted law together with its draft, which was discussed by the Supreme Council of Ukraine. At the plenary session, the representatives of the right wing of the Supreme Rada blocked the adoption of three articles devoted to the right to establish national territorial units (districts, settlements, and rural councils). That was the beginning of rights deviation, which was proclaimed earlier in the declarations regarding state sovereignty and rights of the nationalities of Ukraine.

That tendency was also revealed during consideration of other drafts in that period. For instance, the Law on Education does not address the issue of the language of instruction for national minorities in various educational institutions. The law itself does not have substantial character and refers to articles of the Law on Languages. This is one of the gaps in the Ukrainian legislation which is filled with various sub-legal instructions and decrees from ministries. It is the sphere where the conflict between national minorities’ organizations and state institutions mostly emerges from.

The Law on TV and Broadcasting Systems approaches the issue of the language of broadcasting in more concrete way. Article 9 (Language of Television and Radio Broadcasts) states that TV and radio companies must broadcast in the state language. Broadcasts to certain regions can be transmitted in languages of the national minorities who are concentrated in a certain territory. In other words, broadcasts in national minorities’ languages can be transmitted to fixed regions, while all Ukrainian TV and radio channels cannot conduct their broadcasting in the languages of ethnic minorities. This article is directed against the central channels in order to prevent broadcasting in the Russian language. It is unclear whether anyone benefits from this, but in any case, the state does not. By restricting more than half of its citizens whose native language is Russian, the state loses the opportunity to introduce its policies and viewpoints on many issues through broadcasting. Radio and TV stations often break this requirement, because if they do not, a conflict would arise with the practice of their customers and they would incur economic losses (customers frequently ask these stations to produce advertising in the Russian language). It is unclear how the state intends to relay information to citizens who belong to national minorities and are scattered all over the territory of Ukraine, if not in their native language.
Fourth Stage

The fourth stage in the development of ethnic policy in Ukraine began in 1996, when the current Constitution of Ukraine was adopted. The Constitution determined the rights of the national minorities at the level of basic law. The national minorities’ rights are discussed in several articles (10, 11, 24, 37, 53, 85 (6), 92 (3-4), 119 (3), 132). Thus, the Constitution gives substantial consideration to that issue. Although we will not discuss each of those articles here, Article 10 (2) should be specially mentioned. It states that the free development, use and defense of Russian and other languages of national minorities are guaranteed in Ukraine. The fact that the Russian language is emphasized can be explained by its exceptional meaning in public life, and its growing use and traditions. This article carries on the tradition which was started by Article 3 of the Declaration of Nationalities’ Rights in Ukraine. It provided a right to its citizens to freely use the Russian language.

The Constitution does not include several norms that were previously discussed in declarations and laws. In particular, the Constitution does not refer to national minorities’ languages and their use in places of compact residence, as was mentioned in the Declaration of Nationalities’ Rights and some drafts of the Constitution. However, the term “places of compact residence” is used in Article 119 (3).

Restrictions

The same tendencies regarding the constriction of national minorities’ rights continue to appear. In particular, as occurred in the third stage, these tendencies appear in the spheres of minorities’ languages and especially the Russian language. Certain political forces attempt to restrict the rights of minorities by blocking and reconsidering statements related to ethnic issues. For example, in the preparation and adaptation of the Law on Compulsory Education in Ukraine that restricts the use of the Russian language, Article 7 (Language of Education) had to be withdrawn and the law had to be passed without this article. It occurred because the new draft of Article 7 could not obtain the required number of votes for passage.

Constitution of the Autonomic Republic of Crimea

One of the important documents in the sphere of national relations is the Constitution of the Autonomic Republic of Crimea (ARC). It is well known that the draft of the Constitution was the subject of long-term sharp discussion in Ukrainian society. The interests of several ethnic groups (Ukrainians, Russians, Crimean Tatars, and also the representatives of other national minorities) were discussed. The status of the Russian language was relatively higher than the languages of other ethnic minorities. In ARC, the Russian language, as the language of the majority of population, was proclaimed to be the language of interethnica interactions and to be used in all spheres of public life.

The authors of the ARC Constitution worked to find a compromise for the language issue. All attempts led to conflict situations. The document was criticized, on the one hand, by the Russian non-government organizations and, on the other
hand, by associations of the Crimean Tatars. The representatives of Russian non-government organizations believed that the new Constitution of ARC deprived the Russian language of its status as the state language as it had been granted in the previous Constitution of ARC, and the Crimean Tatars have been dissatisfied with a number of its regulations. For instance, they believe that the Constitution of ARC does not provide for their representation in the Supreme Rada of the Crimea, since it eliminates the guaranteed quotas. They are also dissatisfied with the fact that the Crimean Tatar language does not have the status of a state language.

One more negative tendency which is a feature of the fourth period should be mentioned. The state bodies attempt to pass laws and regulations that contradict the international norms outlined in agreements signed by Ukraine. In particular, there are some provisions in the Framework Convention on Protection of National Minorities (1994) which are contrary to provisions in a number of legal acts, especially those that were adopted by the Ministry of Education of Ukraine regarding studying and teaching in the Russian language at schools, universities and colleges.

In the fourth stage, the relations between political forces in the Parliament are unstable when dealing with the issue of the status of national minorities in the state and society. One political force does not have the ability (i.e., sufficient number of votes) to pass the law. However, these groups have an opportunity to not pass an act in Parliament. This affects the society in general and leads to many drafts being suspended in ministries, state departments, government, and numerous committees of the Supreme Rada for several years. For instance, the draft of the Conception of the State Ethnic Policy had such a destiny.

**Conception of the State Ethnic Policy**

The first draft of this document was prepared in 1994. Then, after being elaborated upon several times, it was finally submitted to the Commissions of the Supreme Rada. However, it still has not been considered by the Parliament.

Since this particular bill concerns the ethnic policy of Ukraine, it should be considered in depth. This document contains a number of statements that have been a subject for polemics among politicians, parliamentarians, and political parties for a long time. In particular, several issues should be mentioned as they may cause negative effects if the bill passes.

First of all, we would like to address the conceptual issues. The Constitutional statement (Article 2), which refers to the Ukrainian nation as the state-forming element, is unique and specific to the process of the revival of the Ukrainian nation. Further, in the second section the law guarantees the sovereign state system to its Ukrainian people. These statements can be interpreted in different ways, such as an interpretation that the Ukrainian state system has a national, i.e. ethnic, character. In other words, ethnic Ukrainians are the state-forming nation, while national minorities are the passive component in the public structure. According to the draft of the Conception of the State Ethnic Policy, it is recommended that national minorities increase their activities in order to strengthen their stability as a component of the Ukrainian society. The draft allows one to conclude that the expression “Ukrainian
nation constructing as the state-forming nation” means the Ukrainian ethnic group strengthening as the state-forming element. However, this contradicts the Constitution of Ukraine. The Preamble to the Constitution states that all Ukrainian people and the Ukrainian nation have a right of self-determination. Further in Article 5, one can find the following expression: “the bearer of sovereignty and the single source of power in Ukraine are people.” There is no indication that one part of the society is self-determined in the state, while the second one is not. Consequently, the Constitution of Ukraine does not mean national-ethnic state formation, but rather means the civil state system, in other words, the system which is formed by all citizens regardless of their ethnic origin. Evidently, this constitutional statement should be repeated from time to time. Nobody should forget that the state-forming elements are all the nations of Ukraine and all its citizens.

Furthermore, the Introduction to the Constitution states that the entire Ukrainian society strives towards the development and empowerment of a democratic, social, and lawful state. In other words, it is very important to exclude any exaggeration of roles of separate ethnic groups in the state formation process, even if it is a titular nation or the majority of population. Our society is multiethnic. All ethnic groups should have equal political, social and other rights. Chapter 3 of the Constitution indicates that the language situation should correspond with the ethnic-national structure of the state. This may be the simplest concept of a multi-ethnic society structure, which is based on an ethnic structure only. In fact, a multiethnic society with an ethnic-national structure consists of the language, cultural, and religious elements of the corresponding group. Moreover, each of those groups has its own unique significance and, as a rule, it does not correspond with other groups. This was the reason for the adoption of the Declaration on People Relating to National or Ethnic, Language, and Religious Minorities by the United Nations. Various international documents mention the rights of language groups. In particular, the European Charter on Regional and Minorities’ Languages and the Framework Convention on Protection of National Minorities (1994) address these rights.

Therefore, incorrect language with an ethnic-national structure can lead to a violation of human rights if the ethnic origins do not coincide with the native languages. In Ukraine, the number of ethnic Ukrainians whose native language is not Ukrainian is more than 4.5 million people. Among Jews, Greeks, Poles, Bulgarians, Germans and other nationalities, their synchronicity is true only for a small percentage.

In the same paragraph of the draft, the formulation, although awkward, of the issue regarding gradual transformation of consciousness should cause the national minorities to consider the Ukrainian language and culture together with their own language and culture. With respect to this issue, the authors of the conception hold the positions of the late nineteenth/early twentieth century Marxism. According to Marxist theory, ideologists, party, and the state can confidently change the mass consciousness. Modern Marxism moved away from that position, while the authors of the Conception continue to dispute that point of view. It is not still clear which political, social, and legal mechanisms are needed in order to realize the idea of consciousness transformation under the conditions of political pluralism.
The next statement (Paragraph 5, Section 3) of the Conception of the State Ethnic Policy, that can be considered perilous from the point of view of human rights, discusses the notion of denationalization. According to the Conception, in the regions where ethnic Ukrainians either are the minority population or underwent the denationalization due to historical consequences, the state should carry out measures towards renewing their consciousness as an integral inner attribute in every nation and its mentality. One can find similar formulations in Paragraph 4, Section 9. However, it is not absolutely clear what the phrase “underwent the denationalization” means. Does this expression mean that violent measures were used against certain people or does it mean something else? Who will determine whether a person experienced denationalization or not? How can one determine personal choice concerning language and ethnic self-identification and distinguish it from denationalization?

The expression “rebuilding their self-consciousness” is also unclear. This concept might include an intention (historic intentions) to force people without a national consciousness to obtain a national consciousness. Our history has many similar examples. After all, for a person there is no principal meaning in terms of positions of transformation—whether it is a social stratification, political party, religion, or nation. In all cases, a person is considered to play an insignificant part in society and that has to be subordinated to objectives of the crowd, class, or nation.

Furthermore, the practical implementation and role of the fourth paragraph (Section 2) of the Conception are also quite ambiguous. This paragraph claims that the realization of the state ethnic policy in Ukraine is aimed at evaluating the contribution of ethnic communities to the development of Ukrainian society. What is the criterion of such evaluation? What does one need to classify ethnic groups on the basis of their contribution? History has already shown what lies behind an attempt to divide ethnic groups as “good” and “not so good”. One more part of the Conception of the State Ethnic Policy should be mentioned. Paragraph 5 of Section 1 declares that the state should recruit the representatives of the Ukrainian diaspora to the state forming process in Ukraine. This is, in our opinion, a doubtful argument as it means involving citizens of other countries in the process of state governance. Certainly, we are not against cooperation between Ukrainians and citizens of other states. The point is that in this collaboration we should adhere to a certain framework that is determined by the Constitution of Ukraine. In other words, while discussing the participation of citizens of other countries in the creation of our state, the precision in formulas and in determination of cooperation is essential. Citizens of Ukraine would hardly agree to other countries’ citizens participating in the determination of some key issues in political life, such as referendums, elections, or development of fundamental directions in the government’s activity. The reverse side of this preposition is that Ukrainian citizens who are related to national minorities can pretend to participate in the political life of other countries, for example, Hungarians in Hungary, Poles in Poland, Russians in Russia, etc. Would Hungary, Poland, and Russia agree to such interference? And, how can that be related not only to the Constitution of Ukraine, but also to the International Law?
Effect of Fourth Stage

Hence, the fourth stage of the ethnic policy development incorporated the problems of the previous periods and can be characterized by the existence of contradictory laws and regulations towards national minorities’ rights. Also, the contradiction between legislation and practice should be stressed. The following contradictions are found:

- between existing and new laws on the status and rights of national minorities in Ukraine; between the Constitution and laws; between laws and sub-legal acts;
- between political statements of recent leaders and the practice;
- between the legal status of miscellaneous territorial groups of Russians in Ukraine (for instance, the Constitution of ARC proclaimed the Russian language, together with Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar languages, as the business and educational language, while in other regions, the Russian population cannot use their language in the same way); and
- between international documents signed by Ukraine and different types of sub-legal acts: resolutions, instructions from ministries, departments, etc.

These contradictions are not resolved. They constantly reoccur in everyday life. The use of language by ethnic minorities in Ukraine is regulated and used at three levels. The first level is the legal and official level. Here, the law refers to the use of the languages of national minorities, however, it does not provide the mechanism to implement such use. The second level is also official, and is the level of sub-legal acts. The tendency of national minorities’ and, especially the Russian language role restriction can be noticed. The practice of the implementation of these documents has been expressed geographically. In the western regions of Ukraine these establishments are fulfilled and over-fulfilled, while in the eastern regions they are mainly ignored. The third level is everyday life. Languages and culture of national minorities and especially Russian language and culture, despite the tendencies that took place at the second stratum, continue to occupy solid and prestigious positions. It can be observed easily by comparing data of the survey on the Russian culture status in Ukraine among the Ukrainian population with its legal uncertainty.

Within the last five to six years, several sociological surveys, conducted by Ukrainian and foreign sociologists, took place in Ukraine. Although different methodological approaches were applied, their results were roughly the same. Research shows that the Russian language and culture have been widely spread into all spheres of life. The surveys revealed a high level of tolerance in ethnic and political orientations among Ukrainian citizens. An interesting fact is that the tolerance among the population was much higher than that among politicians, especially among representatives of the right wing. According to the data of the Kiev International Institute of Sociology on the issue regarding the place of Russian language, approximately 20% of respondents came out in favor of granting the status of not simply the official languages, but the second state language. Half of the respondents (49%) voted for granting the Russian language the status of the official language. Hence, more than two-thirds of the population expressed their desire to increase the status of the Russian language in Ukraine.
The increasing political-legal status of Russian culture in Ukraine is the most substantial development in the program of various political parties and unions. It is one of the main topics that have been discussed during all election campaigns since 1989.

The gap between the socially valuable status of the Russian culture among Ukrainian citizens and its political, legal, and officially propagated status is one of the reasons for the constant political confrontation over the issue of Russian culture. This political confrontation took place in the Supreme Rada during the discussion of the draft of the Law on Cabinet of Ministers and its particular articles on the status of the Russian language, and changes and additional amendments to the Law on Citizenship, the Law on Elections, Law on Compulsory Education in Ukraine, the Constitution of ARC, etc. In addition to the state level, the confrontation also occurred in the regions (Donetsk, Kharkov, Dnepropetrovsk, and other cities in the eastern and southern part of Ukraine). The gap between law and practice leads to the phenomena of legal nihilism and even cynicism; double morals; the situation that occurs when citizens with a high sense of ethic and lawful culture find themselves undetermined and unsatisfied; and to vitality for political speculation in both russification and ukrainification.

CONCLUSION

Hence, the process of forming Ukrainian legislation on national minorities has already undergone several stages and this process is still not finished. At the moment, it is very difficult to predict which tendencies will succeed in the near future because the situation in the society regarding that issue is very contradictory. The active discussions relating to the self-identity of Ukrainian society (either democratic, multiethnic community, or nationalistic (natiocratic) state) have been continuing till this day.

Translated by T. Trokhina

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ATTITUDE OF THE POPULATION OF UKRAINE TOWARDS THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

Mykola Churylov (Kyiv)

This article analyzes the public attitude to the influence of the European institutions on economic cooperation between Ukraine and these organizations, examines the public attitude to Ukraine’s political and other aspects related to the social situation in Ukraine. Most Ukrainians share the official doctrine of a balanced foreign policy course, emphasizing the necessity of a more active protection of national interests. The people’s perception of certain Western states and international institutions is based on historical memory (former USSR states) and some prejudice towards the US and Germany. The attitude towards these countries is rather irrational, because they are real strategic partners of Ukraine on its way to the European community. A pro-Russian vector dominated in the foreign policy orientation of the Ukrainians. However, the tendency is not stable and constant. The reforms of the Ukrainian armed forces were rather inconsistent and took a rather slow pace. Regarding the public attitude towards the European institutions, there is a clear determination for improved economic cooperation between Ukraine and these organizations. There are fewer supporters of Ukraine joining NATO than supporters of its joining the EU. In public opinion, the acknowledgement of mutual interests of the European community and Ukraine in developing beneficial relations could promote a positive attitude among the Ukrainians towards a pro-European foreign policy.

Keywords: Security, attitude, preference, influence, foreign policy, evaluation, country security, integration, public opinion, respondent, relation.
Since the time when the country gained its independence, Ukraine has come a long way from a totalitarian society to a developing civil society. During these years of independence, both the socio-political life of the country and the consciousness of its citizens have changed significantly. These changes (positive as well as negative) have influenced all spheres of public life. In the article below, we will analyze only one of the issues that the public faces - the attitude of the population towards the national security strategy.

The concept of national security strategy is many-sided and covers all aspects of each state’s life: relations with other states, which are determined by a state’s foreign policy, guarantees of territorial integrity, security, constitutional rights and freedom of its citizens; protection of personal interests and state interests from criminal infringement; development of the national economy; national health care; education, etc. We will not cover the whole range of problems related to the national security strategy; rather we will only analyze public opinion in the country, which characterizes the direction of a state’s foreign policy and the relations between Ukraine and international social institutions that ensure the country’s security.

Social studies, which are regularly conducted by SOCIS and TNS Ukraine, show that, according to the public opinion in Ukraine, state authorities should pursue an active and constructive foreign policy in various directions. This was the opinion of most of the respondents (more than 63 per cent) in the summer of 2000.

In order to evaluate the importance of a European orientation in the consciousness of adult Ukrainians, we must analyze the whole picture of their foreign policy orientations and must consider the population’s orientation toward the East and West taken as a coordinate system.

In the consciousness of the general population, a perspective of a foreign policy activity of Ukraine was considered in the light of the official doctrine of balance. That is why it was not surprising that most participants of the studies carried out in the country prefer an active and constructive foreign policy in various directions.

Speaking of adherents of Western or Eastern orientations in the foreign policy pursued by Ukraine, we can say that, according to the research findings in February 2000, the majority of the respondents favoured Ukraine’s integration
into Europe, that is to say, into the West. The analysis showed a significant difference of opinion between the respondents from particular regions. In Table 1, the responses are not presented from those respondents who were not able to provide a definite answer to the question (about 12 per cent overall).

**Table 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional distribution</th>
<th>Oriented to the West</th>
<th>Oriented to the East</th>
<th>Balanced</th>
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<tr>
<td>Kyiv</td>
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<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central region</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>5</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

First of all, we should mention that the orientation towards a country’s balanced foreign policy prevailed in all Ukraine’s regions. Pro-Western orientation was pronounced clearly enough only in two regions: in the west of Ukraine and in Kyiv. According to the analysis based on the type of settlements, the urban population is more inclined to support a pro-Western course in the foreign policy than the rural population (14 per cent against 10 per cent). Besides, the older the respondents are, the smaller the number of supporters of a pro-Western foreign policy. In particular, almost every fifth respondent among young people up to 25 years old supported pro-Western orientation. At the same time, this figure is seven per cent less than the one among the pensioners. On the contrary, among the respondents who belong to the latter category, every 10th respondent was in favour of a pro-Eastern direction in the foreign policy (only four per cent of the young respondents up to 25 years old share this opinion).

It is necessary to point out that the population had a strong orientation towards contacts with foreign countries. Namely, 17 per cent of the respondents gave priority to establishing relations with EU countries and 18 per cent of the respondents support cooperation with other countries in Europe and North America (the USA, Canada). At the same time, monitoring of the foreign policy orientation of the Ukrainian population showed that the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), as a model of an organization for international cooperation, was becoming less popular. On the contrary, there were more and more Ukrainians who showed a preference for a Slav bloc of the former Soviet states (Russia, Belarus, Ukraine) and the findings suggested below prove the observation.

We should point out that the option of an East Slav bloc was not suggested to the respondents in the period between 1994 and 1996 (as this idea was not publicly known at that time). This is the reason why the data regarding this direction of the Ukrainian foreign policy is not presented in Table 2 for that period. It should be mentioned that the poll participants had the possibility of singling out only one vector in foreign policy. The idea of creating an East Slav bloc was reanimated after the Declaration of Union between Russia and Belarus in December 1999. More than
one-third of the respondents focused on the positive influence of the union between Russia and Belarus for Ukraine’s future despite the fact that a half of the respondents interviewed in June 2000, considered such a union to be of no importance for Ukraine, and 17 per cent of the respondents stated that the union would have a negative effect.

Table 2

Direction of Ukraine’s development that the respondents prefer (in percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>developing relations within the framework of the CIS</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>strengthening relations mainly with Russia</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening the East Slav Bloc (Russia, Belarus, Ukraine)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>creation a Baltic–Black Sea union</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To establish relations with developed Western countries</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Looking for its own resources and strengthening the country’s independence</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Particular Ukraine’s regions should choose their own ways</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult to answer</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Similar to foreign policy orientation, the public reaction on the decisions taken by the governments of Russia and Belarus, to a considerable extent, was influenced by the regions where the respondents lived and by their national identity. Most adherents of this kind of a union are ethnic Russians and the respondents who lived in the Crimea, in the southern and eastern regions of Ukraine. However, in the north western, western regions and in the capital the majority of the population was against this union. We must also mention that the majority of the adherents of this idea were supporters of left-wing political parties. Generally, they are oriented towards a pro-Russian vector in the foreign policy.

Most participants of the poll (59 per cent) were inclined to believe that it was most expedient to maintain friendly and partnership relations with both Russia and Belarus without joining the union they formed. However, according to 29 per cent of the respondents, it would be better for Ukraine to join this union.

When we speak on foreign policy orientation of the Ukrainian citizens, on their sympathy or antipathy to certain countries, on their attitude towards economic and other help provided to Ukraine by other states, we must not forget about Russia even if it is not discussed at that time.

There were many factors that influenced the attitude towards Russia as Ukraine’s partner, but among all those factors, we must single out the most important ones. First of all, it must be mentioned that over seven million Ukrainians
live on the territory of Russia, and about 10 million Russians live in Ukraine. Most of them have relatives, friends and acquaintances in the neighboring country. Moreover, these two countries have some common periods in the course of history - they were parts of one state - the Russian Empire and then the Soviet Union.

The second important factor that influenced the attitude of the Ukrainian citizens towards Russia is Ukraine’s dependence on Russia for energy supplies that resulted in a growing debt of the state of Ukraine to Russia. Those two factors were the main reasons why more than half of the respondents (almost 53 per cent) believed that, first of all, it was useful for Ukraine to develop its relations with Russia. However, every third respondent thought that it was expedient for Ukraine to be also oriented towards other countries that could supply gas and oil, and as a result, Ukraine could then become independent of Russia.

We should also mention the fact that some contradictions in the way of thinking are typical for the public opinion of the Ukrainian citizens. On the one hand, the respondents provided a negative evaluation of the political course of the Russian government towards Ukraine, and on the other, more than one half of the respondents (54 per cent) were in favour of establishing closer relations with Russia as the main exporter of energy resources for the Ukrainian economy. We can assume that such an attitude was influenced not only by the wish to develop mutually beneficial relations with our northern neighbour but also by certain precautions against worsening relations with a nuclear state.

Such an idea is proved by the fact that the public foresees a possible threat to Ukraine primarily from such nuclear states as the United States of America and Russia. That is why the number of respondents who considered Russia a potential threat either decreased or increased depending on the level of intensification of Russian military operations carried out in Chechnya. If we consider the last terrorist attacks in Russia and the outburst of a military confrontation in the North Caucasus, fears of Ukrainians that Russian instability could be ‘exported’ to Ukraine became more justifiable. At the same time, the military conflict in the former Yugoslavia revived the image of the USA as a potential enemy in the mass consciousness of a considerable number of Ukrainians.

Moreover, as a result of the conflict in Yugoslavia and NATO’s intervention, the participants of our polls evaluated the existing situation as very dangerous and threatening to the national security of Ukraine. In our opinion polls, as a result of the factors mentioned above, in 1999, Ukrainians felt more threatened by the USA and Germany than in earlier years. By contrast, they were not worried about neighbouring countries that did not possess nuclear weapons.

Summing up, we may conclude that a pro-Russian vector dominated in the foreign policy orientation of the Ukrainian population. It would be thoughtless to consider this orientation stable and permanent. We can and should speak of the factors that may influence in some way and may have negative influence on the attitude of the citizens towards Russia. In the opinion of only six per cent of the respondents, the policy pursued by the Ukrainian government regarding Russia meets our country’s national interests and guarantees national security. At the
same time, 40 per cent of the respondents had opposite views and another 41 per cent could not answer this question.

When analyzing the foreign policy orientation of the Ukrainian population, we should not forget that ever since Ukraine became independent, certain politicians, political journalists and correspondents have stressed Ukraine’s unique role in the system of the European security. In their opinion, Ukraine plays a ‘buffer’ role in the relations between the countries of Western Europe and Russia. This role is becoming more important with NATO expansion closer to the Russian borders. On the one hand, this information has led part of the population to believe in the unique importance of Ukraine for the European Union and NATO, and on the other hand, it has made most of the population concerned. The role of a ‘fly between a hammer and an anvil’ is rather dangerous, taking into account the fact that neither Russia nor the EU countries nor NATO have guaranteed safety to this ‘fly’. In our opinion, this is the reason why most Ukrainian citizens speak of a country’s balanced foreign policy.

Speaking of Ukraine’s security, we should point out that despite the constant statements made by the Western countries that Ukraine has never been considered a ‘buffer’ territory between the West and Russia, if relations between Russia and NATO were to change in a positive way, Ukraine could become less important for the West in terms of security. Such transformation in Ukraine’s position is quite logical but it is not objective and it is beyond the limits of Ukraine’s subjective possibilities. However, there is another factor: the Western countries, which will continue to deal with Russia through its historical past, still has a chance to ‘guarantee’ stability in new relations with Moscow by seeking a more clearly-defined status for Kyiv in the sphere of the Euro-Atlantic security. That is why, in this case, it is quite possible that Ukraine may keep its ‘buffer’ status between the West and Russia, but the importance of this status may be quite different for Ukraine’s foreign policy. Today, it is rather difficult to foresee the character of changes in relations between the West and Ukraine because it is necessary to take into account quite a large number of problems connected with these relations, which haven’t still been resolved.

Speaking of the foreign policy orientation of the country’s population, we may suppose that every country has a certain image that corresponds to the main character features of its inhabitants. Taking this statement into consideration, it is interesting to study how the respondents associate the countries with definite features of the human character.

In one of the studies conducted in the mid-1990s, the respondents were offered a fairly long list of character features (12 options) for 10 countries. The participants were not allowed to give more than three answers for each country on the list. Three integrated characteristics were picked out to characterize the countries: the first one included all features that describe a country’s might. In our opinion, this integrated characteristic consisted of such features as: ‘wealth’, ‘power’ and ‘self-confidence’. The second characteristic described the attitude towards life and consisted of: ‘thoroughness’, ‘self-confidence’, ‘rationalism’ and ‘industry’. The third characteristic consisted of negative features such as: ‘unpredictability’, ‘militancy’ and ‘laziness’.
According to the characteristic of ‘well-being’, the respondents singled out such countries as the USA and Switzerland. As for the power of a country (the characteristic is ‘might’) the absolute leader was the USA (72 per cent of the respondents). The data also showed that Russia had the highest index among the rest of the countries - 28 per cent, Germany - 23 per cent, Great Britain - 22 per cent.

According to the respondents, the English were the most confident nation (31 per cent) followed by the Americans (29 per cent). As for rationality, Japan took the first place (35 per cent) - the country that has achieved great success in electronics and hi-technology fields. The most industrious nation was Ukraine (59 per cent), and this is actually the only criterion where Ukraine took the first place.

As a result of the military conflict in Yugoslavia, the respondents considered Yugoslavia and Russia the most unpredictable and unstable countries (50 and 49 per cent correspondingly). Ukraine had the highest index among the other countries (30 per cent). However, in this case, the unpredictability referred to the economic sphere and it was related to the financial problems that the citizens faced in the course of so-called ‘economic reforms’ of the country. That index included a kind of ‘protest potential’ that formed in Ukraine as a reaction to the economic conditions of the population. The same conclusion could be made about Russia. We should not forget the statements made by certain political leaders about active help to Yugoslavia during the military conflict in that country, and the nuclear potential of the Russian Federation.

All these factors together resulted in a vision of Russia as an unstable and unpredictable state. According to the respondents, the most militant countries were Yugoslavia and the USA (50 and 40 per cent), which were associated with two opposite parties of the conflict in Kosovo. Among the other countries, Russia was named as the most militant one (16 per cent). At the same time, according to the respondents, Bulgaria and Ukraine were the most peaceful countries (59 and 54 per cent).

The population’s foreign policy orientation is a significant factor in determining the political activity of the leading Ukrainian politicians. It was obvious during the last presidential elections in Ukraine that the foreign policy orientation of the candidates had a rather strong influence on the electoral orientation of the population. That factor influenced the selection of a candidate more than the other factors such as support for a candidate by entrepreneurs, famous politicians, well-known citizens and the activities of the candidate’s election campaign.

During the 1999 presidential elections, a candidate’s adherence to a balanced development of both Ukrainian-Russian relations and Ukraine’s relations with the West had the most positive influence on the respondents’ decision to vote for this candidate. The factor of pro-Russian influence was rather weighty. More than one-third of the respondents were in favour of the revival of the USSR. The candidate who supported the idea of a union between Ukraine and NATO had the least number of adherents. In the table given below, the respondents who could not define their point of view were not taken into account.
Table 3

The influence of a candidate’s foreign policy orientation on the selection made by the respondents during the elections in 1999 (In percentage to the number of those who gave responses, data of March 1999)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Foreign policy orientation of candidates</th>
<th>Positively</th>
<th>Negatively</th>
<th>Would not influence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Candidate is in favour of a close economic and political union with Russia.</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate supports Ukraine joining a revived Soviet state.</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate supports economic Ukraine’s integration with Western countries.</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate is in favour of both balanced relations with Russia and Western countries.</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate supports its own, independent foreign policy, non-bloc status of Ukraine.</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate is in favour of Ukraine joining NATO as fast as possible</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Experts in the field of a political science often consider the election of a new President with the possibility of correcting the country’s foreign policy course. That is why the re-elected President of Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma, taking into consideration the public opinion, had first to pursue a well-considered foreign policy, which means maintaining friendly and partner relations both with the CIS and Western countries. Our polls showed that the public expected the re-elected President to maintain constructive and peaceful relations with foreign countries, taking into account Ukraine’s national interests (34 per cent correspondingly). Five per cent of the respondents expected an increase in foreign investments in Ukraine, and only three per cent expected Ukraine’s accession to NATO. It should be mentioned that that question turned out to be difficult for 16 per cent of the respondents.

PUBLIC EVALUATION OF THE COUNTRY’S SECURITY AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

The national security of a country is linked to the external world in two ways. Firstly, it depends on the processes taking place in the world around us. As a result of integrity strengthening and inter-dependency development in the present world, security that was considered an internal basis of a state’s sovereignty, has become the subject of international cooperation and negotiations. Secondly, the national security of a state is ensured by both its own efforts and collective measures taken at local, regional and global levels.

Some NATO and OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe) documents, which lay the basis for today’s security foundation built on cooperation, integrity and equality, emphasize a kind of security based on partnership. The policy
pursued by two of the most representative organizations in the macro-region is an attempt to bring international cooperation to the level of partnership, considering the latter a new kind of relation in the field of security. But the potential that they have vested in creating many-sided mechanisms for the implementation of this approach is not explored enough in practice. The events that occurred in the USA on September 11, 2001 made the people of all the countries thoroughly evaluate the level of security in their countries and pay closer attention to the problems related to the security and state of the armed forces of their countries.

According to the data of the express-poll conducted by our company on 12 September, 2001 in Kyiv, more than 96 per cent of the respondents were alarmed and worried by this tragedy and more than 38 per cent of the respondents were shocked. Most residents in Kyiv believed that terrorist attack was an act of punishment or an act to frighten the whole nation and humanity. In the opinion of 20 per cent of the residents in Kyiv, those terrorist attacks were a declaration of war against the USA (according to the findings of the Gallup Poll, 86 per cent of Americans considered those terrorist attacks ‘a declaration of war against America’). Almost one-half of the respondents believed that those events would, to some extent, influence their life and 90 per cent of those who shared that opinion expected that their life would become worse.

At the beginning of October 2001, another event occurred and it made the Ukrainian society pay closer attention to the problems of military efficiency and alert readiness of the Ukrainian military forces: a Russian civil aircraft that was flying from Tel Aviv to Moscow was brought down accidentally as a result of firing exercises by the Ukrainian air defence forces.

According to the polls carried out by our company, in the opinion of almost one-half of the respondents, it was not suitable to conduct large-scale military training when the military situation in the world was so tense. Secondly, according to 12 per cent of the respondents, the Ukrainian air defence forces were responsible for that tragedy, more than 30 per cent of the respondents believed it was a terrorist attack; in the opinion of 28 per cent of the poll’s participants, some drawbacks in the aircraft caused the tragedy; in the opinion of more than 52 per cent of the respondents, Ukraine did not have reliable air defence forces and 63 per cent of the respondents were sure that Ukraine lacked a strong and effective army. Therefore, Ukrainians were far from being certain that the Ukrainian army could, if necessary, ensure proper national security for the Ukrainian state. That is why when asked ‘Do you feel safe on territory of Ukraine nowadays?’, during the poll carried out at the end of 2001, 49 per cent of the respondents answered that they did, and the same number said they did not.

Modern concepts of international security consider a state’s security to be the main goal of a security system of any state. However, in practice there are several countries in the Euro-Atlantic macro-region which are not able to solve complex problems of national security without external help (Ukraine has recently become one of these states for certain economic and political reasons). In addition, the probability of solving these problems on the basis of establishing bilateral relations has never been considered realistic.
The uniqueness of the North Atlantic Alliance in the sphere of Euro-Atlantic security presupposes the efficient joining of the elements of cooperative and collective security. In particular, this means an absolute transformation of NATO's role and structure. It may come true if the process of the European Union transformation is to be aimed at the practical implementation of the collective security principles. This may speed up the process of transformation of collective security elements ‘from inside’ which today are the basis of NATO. Under such conditions, there should be a strengthening of partner relations - a caucus of activity, which will take place within the framework of the Council for the North Atlantic partnership. At the same time, it may create conditions for a deeper dialogue between NATO and OSCE, taking into account that NATO partnership and OSCE partnership have a similar nature.

Regarding the 11 September events, a concept of equal security in the Euro-Atlantic macro-region should be revived. Multilateral mechanisms, which may replace Euro-Atlantic cooperation in the field of security with a partnership scheme, need de facto to be conceptualized in order to have a deeper understanding of the direction of modern processes development. There is practically no alternative to NATO in terms of solving security problems for today’s Europe, taking into consideration the fact that the potentials of the EU are in embryonic form. That is why contradictions within NATO are not so important for the European security in the near future in comparison with the contradictions that accompanied the formation of the European Union itself.

**ATTITUDE TOWARDS EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS**

General foreign policy orientations of the Ukrainians discussed above are a consequence of their (positive or negative) attitude towards some foreign countries and the European Union, towards public and military organizations. The population’s vision of foreign policy vectors of our state is based on this attitude.

There are two tendencies in the attitude of Ukrainian citizens towards the international European institutions. First of all, there is a well-considered, positive attitude towards economic cooperation of our country with various European institutions (first of all, with the EU) and at the same time, a mainly negative attitude to the possibility of military cooperation within NATO. EU expansion towards the East raises the issue of future relations between Ukraine and this international organization. In February 2000, the majority of the respondents (more than 67 per cent) supported the idea of Ukraine’s EU membership and at the same time, only nine per cent of the respondents were against it. The opponents of Ukraine’s EU membership lived mainly in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and in the eastern regions of Ukraine where the population had pro-Russian orientations and distanced itself from European integration. More than half of the poll participants (57 per cent) could see Ukraine as a full member of the European Union in a few years, a little over a quarter of the respondents were inclined to support immediate EU membership. Only nine per cent of the respondents
supported the idea of EU associate membership for Ukraine. What is Ukraine’s role within the European Union structure, according to the public opinion of that time? A little less than half of the adherents of Ukraine’s EU membership saw our country as a full member of the union in several years. 29 per cent of the respondents were even more optimistic: they believed Ukraine would immediately become a EU full member. Certain economic prerequisites and, first of all, a proper level of the national economy development are necessary to become a EU member. That is why the position of those respondents who saw the role of Ukraine as an EU associate member, seemed to be better-grounded. According to the data of the poll conducted in June 2001, the respondents almost unanimously considered that the European interest in Ukraine was of the similar degree as the interest of Ukraine in Europe (81 per cent of the respondents). Such understanding of mutual interests may become the basis for a further positive attitude towards Ukraine’s integration in European institutions and strengthening of bilateral relations with Western European countries.

According to which criteria should Ukraine approach the European Union? The results obtained in June 2000 showed that in public opinion, the economic conditions of the population were in the foreground.

**Table 4**

**Hierarchy of Indices of Ukraine’s Integration in the European Union (in percentage)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank of indices</th>
<th>Indices of integration</th>
<th>Level of support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Living standards of the population</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Level of industrial growth</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Confidence in prosperous future</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Condition of the law and order system</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Condition of the system of education, science and culture</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Quality of industrial production</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Development of democracy</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The public had a rather clear idea of the dependency danger of different kinds Ukraine may face on its way to the European Union. For example, more than a quarter of the respondents thought that Ukraine should avoid financial dependency and 23 per cent of the respondents pointed out the danger of economic dependency. Almost an equal number of the respondents (12 and 13 per cent) pointed out the danger of imposing the values that are not suitable for Ukraine or the danger of Ukraine being treated like a ‘younger brother’. It is important to mention that almost half of the respondents believed that the leaders of the organization treated Ukraine on its way to the EU in a more prejudiced way than other countries.

Most respondents believed that the factors that influence Ukraine’s integration in the European Union are: strengthening of democratic rights and freedoms in the society, stabilization and reinforcement of Ukraine’s economy,
finding a solution for numerous social problems, a well-considered course in foreign policy and of course, Europe’s interest in Ukraine. Taking into consideration that Ukraine’s integration in the European community is a difficult and tedious process that requires certain economic reforms and political decisions taken by Ukraine, which in their turn could result in financial expenditure, the number of EU integration supporters decreased by 10 per cent at the beginning of 2000s. In 2001, 57 per cent of the respondents believed Ukraine should become a member of the European Union, as opposed to 2002, when the figure fell to 47 per cent. On the contrary, the number of those who opposed Ukraine’s integration in the EU increased from 14 to 23 per cent during the same period. About 23 per cent of the population did not have a clear attitude towards the issue.

The difference between those who supported Ukraine’s accession to the EU and those who supported its accession to the NATO was, first of all, in their number - fewer people supported the country’s accession to NATO than its accession to the EU. Specifically, every third participant of the poll supported Ukraine’s membership of NATO. At the same time, every fifth respondent was against its accession to NATO and half of the poll participants did not clarify their position on this issue.

Factors of the respondents’ age and education influenced their attitude towards Ukraine’s accession to NATO as well as their attitude towards the accession to EU. The older the respondents were, the less degree of support for NATO they demonstrated, and, there were more people who did not specify their attitude. The degree of support of Ukraine’s membership in NATO was directly proportional to the respondents’ educational level.

The analysis of the data received showed certain difference in public opinion of the inhabitants from different regions. In particular, the poll participants from the north-western region were most supportive of Ukraine’s accession to NATO. There were also more supporters of accession in the western, north-eastern, southern regions and in the city of Kyiv. In the other regions, except Crimea, there were generally an equal number of the supporters and the opponents of this idea. In Crimea, the ratio of the supporters to the opponents of accession to NATO is 1:3.

The result that we obtained was quite logical if we take into consideration the fact that the image of NATO, until recently, among the public was associated with a military threat. There is no doubt that the Soviet Union is in the past, but we must not forget that it is rather difficult to change a person’s way of thinking, especially of a middle-aged one, within such a short period of existence of the independent Ukrainian state. It is no surprise then that, particularly among the pensioners, there were more opponents of Ukraine’s accession to NATO than the supporters of the idea, and more than half did not have a particular attitude.

There was some correlation between the level of support of the military and economic integration of Ukraine into the organizations of Western Europe. Adherents of Ukraine’s accession to NATO almost unanimously support its EU membership; however, amongst the supporters of its EU membership only one
half (48 per cent) were oriented towards membership of NATO. Almost all the opponents of Ukraine’s accession to NATO (82 per cent) also rejected the idea of its EU membership. Thus, the adherents of Ukraine’s military integration were more inclined to accept the idea of possible economic integration of our country into the international institutions of Western Europe than the adherents of EU membership to accept the idea of Ukraine’s accession to NATO. We must point out the fact that the adherents of a capitalist way of development of our country provided the weightiest support of both Ukraine’s EU and NATO membership.

It must be also mentioned that there is a certain positive change in public opinion towards NATO. According to the data of a nationwide poll conducted by A. Razumkov’s analytical centre in April 2002, the number of Ukrainians who considered NATO an aggressive bloc decreased from 46 to 33 per cent. However, despite an increase in the number of positive evaluation of the Alliance, the number of Ukrainians who thought that Ukraine should join NATO did not change at that time.

The respondents’ support for a state’s foreign policy of comprehensive cooperation influenced their attitude towards Ukraine’s accession to both EU and NATO. The majority of the supporters of Ukraine’s close cooperation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe were inclined to support Ukraine’s accession to EU and to NATO. The same tendency was observed among the respondents who supported the close cooperation of Ukraine with the CIS countries. The idea of a balanced development of relations with both Western and CIS countries is, to a considerable extent, was pursued by the politicians of the country, but can hardly be implemented due to Russia’s position on NATO expansion to the East.

The results of the research conducted by our company showed that the respondents who supported the idea of a reunion of Ukraine with Russia and Belarus in a Slav state expressed the most negative attitude to the idea of its accession to EU and NATO. Those respondents actually kept in mind the idea of reviving the USSR, which means the abolition of the Ukrainian state. The attitude of Ukrainian citizens towards NATO became considerably controversial because of the above-mentioned NATO military operation in Yugoslavia and because of the assessment made on this operation by different political forces in the country.

In May 1999, more than half of the participants of a poll carried out by our company were against the proposal to break off diplomatic relations with the NATO member states (because of the events in Yugoslavia) whereas 13 per cent of the respondents held the opposite view. The respondents that lived in the western regions (more than 70 per cent) had the most negative attitude to that suggestion, whereas in Crimea, every fifth respondent supported the idea of breaking off diplomatic relations with NATO. The degree of the negative attitude towards breaking off relations increased depending on the respondents’ level of education: 20 per cent of the respondents who had a primary education (not more than seven years at school) and 64 per cent of those who had a higher education.

Considering the accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to NATO, Ukraine, having borders with or being close to these countries, Ukraine was faced with an important question: how should it regulate its relations with
this bloc? The public believed that our country should first maintain a constructive dialogue with the Alliance, taking into consideration our national interests. In September 1999, this opinion was expressed by 61 per cent of the respondents, not more than 14 per cent of the respondents were in favour of the country distancing itself from NATO. The rest of the participants could not specify their attitude towards the issue. According to the research that we regularly conducted, the factual knowledge that Ukrainians had on the establishment and development of NATO was rather poor. It was found out that 23 per cent of the respondents could name the year when NATO was established (1949) fairly precisely and only every 10th respondent was able to name the number of its member countries (19).

The respondents’ level of knowledge of these issues is directly proportional to the level of their education: the more the respondents are educated, the more they are informed. However, less than half of the respondents with a higher education knew the year of NATO’s establishment (47 per cent) and less than a quarter of them gave a precise number of NATO member countries (23 per cent).

In order to analyse the reasons for a low degree of popularity of the North Atlantic bloc, first of all, it is necessary to mention the negative information burden that most adults in both Ukraine and other former Soviet republics were subjected to. Soviet propaganda formed in the people’s minds the opinion of an aggressive NATO, whose main goal was to oppose and destroy everything developing and progressive. The idea that NATO was ready to destroy the Soviet Union at any convenient moment was deeply rooted in people’s consciousness. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there were not many changes. Although there was no propaganda against NATO, the mass media did little to provide objective information for the Ukrainians on changes within NATO: changes in the goals and objectives of the Alliance, NATO programmes, its development strategy, etc. Evhen Marchuk, Secretary of the Security Council of Ukraine was surprised by a lack of awareness of NATO activity demonstrated not only by ordinary officials but also by the heads of local administrations and deputies in the parliament. He believes that this situation is not normal and it hampers a correct understanding of the process of Ukraine’s integration into international structures. In our opinion, the present situation may be a result of both an insufficient level of interest among Ukrainians in such information and ineffective work of the NATO Information Centre in Ukraine, and a lack of interest in the bloc in propaganda and popularization of its image in such countries as Ukraine.

However, we think that the situation should change drastically after Ukraine’s decision to join NATO. The legal basis of cooperation between Ukraine and NATO will improve. This will happen along with the deepening and formalization of Ukraine’s relations with relevant NATO structures by signing bilateral agreements in certain fields of cooperation, which corresponds with the spirit of special partnership between Ukraine and NATO. This should all be covered by the media - the necessity of Ukraine’s integration into NATO should be explained, and the stages which Ukraine should pass on its way to NATO and objectives it faces at each stage should be described.
This paper is based on the evidence from the representative national survey and two follow-up focus groups conducted in Ukraine during the summer-autumn of 2015. It analyses the relationship between stayers and migrants by measuring perceived social distances on the private, professional, public and civic levels. The findings reveal that accepting diaspora as ‘neighbours’ and ‘co-workers’ would be the most comfortable options for a majority of respondents, yet possibilities for public and civil participation might be limited by the reluctance of local social institutions to accept new actors, as well as, by lack of role-holder’s motivation on the diaspora’s part. The data confirms that neighbouring countries remain the main route for Ukrainian outward migration and that overwhelmingly these flows are from Ukraine to Europe whereas Russia is decreasing as a destination country. As the economic downturn and lack of employment opportunities in the ‘cross-border countries’ might lead to return movement in the future, there is a need for growing engagement of the Near diaspora in development programmes at home.

*Keywords*: near diaspora, social distance, migrants and stayers attitudes.

*This research project was developed within the ERSTE Foundation Fellowship for Social Research 2015/2016.*
I thought of the new human brotherhood’s birth,
And wondered: how soon will it come to the earth?
I saw in the vision the vast, fertile fields
Worked jointly, providing significant yields,
Supporting the people in freedom and bounty.
Can this the Ukraine be my own native country…?

Ivan Franko¹ (1881)

There are strategies to reduce global poverty… at modest or no costs to rich countries. None involves aid delivery to poor countries. When Princeton students come to talk to me, bringing their moral commitment to make the world better, I tell them to work on and within their own governments. These are our best opportunities to promote the Great Escape for those who have yet to break free.

Angus Deaton² (2013)

Introduction

In the course of the last two decades Ukraine (42.8 million inhabitants as of September 2015) has been one of the ten most abundant suppliers to the workforce in Europe and a country with one of the largest diaspora in the world (Satzevich, 2002). According to the data from Ukrainian embassies abroad, reports from international agencies and experts estimate the overall number of Ukrainian workers on move might vary from 1.5 to 4.5 million. The five most popular routes of labor migration from Ukraine to Europe have traditionally been Poland, Italy, Czech Republic, Portugal and Spain. Geographical proximity has made Russia another typical destination for economic migrants from post-Soviet Ukraine (Roberts, 2009: p. 33). The size of what can be called diaspora remains disputable (as well as the meaning of the term itself) but, albeit vague views on its scope, it has been a huge community of not less than 7 million made up of a combination of people who have emigrated

¹ Ivan Franko is one of the best known Ukrainian poets and writers of the modern times and a cultural figure for the Ukrainian diaspora. As an emigrant for many years himself, he rigorously studied the reasons and outcomes of the Ukrainian escape abroad (Prymak, 1984: p. 311).
² Angus Deaton is a Professor of Princeton University and 2015 Nobel Prize Winner in Economics. Citation is taken from one of his recent books The Great Escape (Deaton, 2013: p. 324).
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from Ukraine as their ‘ancestral homeland’ in different periods and people who are ‘stranded minorities’ (Satzevich, 2002; Cohen, 2008) having remained stationary but still referring to themselves as a diaspora (Gemlen, 2008). The largest of the modern diaspora communities of Ukrainians reside in Russia, the United States, Canada, Latin America and Europe. The remittances that millions of Ukrainians, both labour migrants and diaspora, send from abroad made up $6.5 billion in 2014 which has been nearly 5 percent of Ukraine’s GDP. Nearly two thirds of this arrives from the far abroad (countries which do not have common border with Ukraine, including the world’s leading economies with the highest HDI); the remaining share comes from the neighbouring states (none of which belong to the HDI top-30 countries).

Having survived through the numerous up-and-downs of the post-Soviet period, including two uprisings in 2004 and 2013/2014 and two Russian hybrid interventions in its East and South, Ukraine remains a weak state with underdeveloped institutions and unstable economy. Is there any reasonable explanation for a continuing underperformance of Europe’s largest country with such a high potential of human resources at home and beyond?

Leaving aside a description of the turmoil historical events which had redrawn and, as the recent hostilities with Russia over Crimea and Donbas continue, is still redrawing the contours of the Ukrainian nation state on the contemporary political map, leaving aside the dramatic political transformations that have triggered out at least four waves of mass migration (with the recent one continuing to this day), and keeping analysis of the different current situations of the Ukrainian communities in the host countries for future detailed studies, let us state the focus of this research in relation to existing knowledge and implications for practice.

This paper is about public perception of the relationships between the Ukrainian stayers and Ukrainian migrants in its pragmatic sense. We want to determine why remittances made by the Ukrainian migrants from abroad and used by those who are left behind for survival and coping under crisis, do not

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3 See The Scopes of Ukrainian Near and Far diasporas and labour migrant communities abroad, return movements and remittances: expert estimations on selected data (2015) in the ATTACHMENT.

4 As compared to 2013, this amount has contracted by 27 percent. One of the main reasons has been the economic downturn in Russia, one of the major remittance source country, and depreciation of the rubles. See Remittances growth to slow sharply in 2015 as Europe and Russia stay weak (2015). The World Bank, April 13.

5 Human Development Index. See http://hdr.undp.org/en/data. Among 207 countries, Ukraine is the 92nd in the rating.

6 Author’s estimation is based on the data of the National Bank of Ukraine. See ATTACHMENT.

transform into transfers for accumulation and development? We shift our focus to the issue of the perceived social distance between stayers and migrants as a possible obstacle for cooperation and development in the country of origin.

On this stage, the first assumption we need to make before progressing further with the research and analysis is that in the Ukrainian public discourse diaspora is an ephemeral notion rather habitually used as a tribute to an unclear phenomenon. If one reads today’s Ukrainian press, diaspora remains one of the top-stories of the post-EuroMaidan reality supporting its home country from a distance. However, no one is able to measure the diaspora without answering the question: in the context of contemporary Ukraine, who are the diaspora people? What groups are encompassed under this umbrella term (labour migrants, Ukrainian historical minorities abroad, political migrants of the Soviet period, etc.)? We do not pretend to introduce any polished and all-encompassing definition but do emphasize that the definition needs to be conceptualised and rigorously defined as an empirically grounded term for further development of proper diaspora legislation and coherent diaspora policy (both are scarcely at place in Ukraine at the moment). The study will contribute to the development of a proper up to date terminology and launch a local discussion on how to increase diaspora’s impact on Ukraine.

Our second assumption refers to both theoretical and practical considerations. We suggest that for academic, research, and political purposes, a rich and extensive literature on ‘new diasporas’ formations (Tololyan, 1996; Van Hear, 1998; Cohen, 2008; Brettel et al., 2015; Heleniak, 2013, etc.) and its role in development of the origin states (Kuznetsov, 2013; Collier, 2013; Glick Schiller et al., 2010; Gemlen, 2008, etc.) should be analysed to employ new functional typologies and ‘impartial vocabulary’ (Cohen, 2008: p. 160) and enable comparative overviews particularly useful in the context of the transformation countries. Specifically, comparable data on diasporas’ impact on local economies in different countries of Central and Eastern Europe is necessary to compare performances and develop effective policy tools based on best practices.

Migrants: Grievance or Gratitude? And Part 4. Those Left Behind, pp. 145-227). We go further trying to look at the perceived-as-acceptable interactions between the two groups, as it is seen by ‘those left behind’.

8 The results of recent large-scale international projects revealed that evident effects of international emigration on local situation in Ukraine remain one of the lowest among the observed countries: living conditions have improved for family members of people who have moved abroad but migrants rarely contribute to the funding of the new infrastructures. See: THEMIS, a comparative, qualitative and quantitative study of the changing migration trajectories from several regions of three origin countries (Brazil, Morocco and Ukraine) to four destination countries (UK, Norway, the Netherlands and Portugal) led by International Migration Institute (Oxford, UK); INTERACT, an explanatory cross-national survey of migrant organisations in 82 origin and destination countries, including Ukraine, supervised by the European University Institute (Florence, Italy).

9 The term ‘diaspora’, ‘Ukrainians living abroad’ or ‘Ukrainian foreigners’ are mixed up and sometimes mentioned interchangeably during public discussions with reference to the large overseas communities which sometimes overlap with long-term labour migrants.
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Data sources, methods and variables: what is new?

The core of primary data on which this paper is based was obtained from the representative national survey “Public opinion in Ukraine” (N = 1,802 aged 18 and above) conducted by the Institute of Sociology (Kyiv, Ukraine). The fieldwork was conducted in July 2015 in all regions of the country (excluding Crimea, annexed by the Russian Federation since February/March 2014 and Donbas territories now under the control of the Russian-backed hybrid actors). The respondents were selected by household polling based on a rigorous sampling approach\textsuperscript{10}. The selected respondents were asked to complete self-administered questionnaires\textsuperscript{11} which among other thematic sections covering a broad range of topics related to socio-economic and political attitudes, included an ad-hoc set of questions on ‘diasporic agenda’ (developed within the ERSTE project). The same set of questions were also asked during the two follow-up focus groups with return migrants of working age from different emigration backgrounds who have been outside Ukraine for not less than five years (Nine white-collar/highly-qualified in Kyiv and Nine blue-collar in Lviv) in October/November 2015. This method of case-control enabled comparisons between a group of persons who have an extensive experience of living abroad and possibly identify themselves as belonging to a diaspora (or, as the rich narratives have demonstrated, as labour migrants, returnees, or a combination of multiple ‘selves’), and a group that does not.

The novelty of the research techniques used in this study was a response to the exploratory task of revealing perceived social distance between the society of the origin country / stayers and different migration-based groups which might be seen as part of a diaspora in its pioneer, contemporary, or future incarnations. We have identified three groups to be considered by the respondents as either close or far from themselves: 1) diaspora representatives, people who are not necessarily ethnic Ukrainians but whose families come from Ukraine and who are now nationals of other countries\textsuperscript{12}; 2) labour migrants or zarobitchany,\textsuperscript{13} Ukrainian

\textsuperscript{10}Specifically, a multistage probability-proportional-to-size sampling method with random route and quota-based screening on the last phase was used.

\textsuperscript{11} As researchers in many fields argue, although this method of surveying is subject to many errors, it might sometimes be more advantageous than compared to face-to-face interviewing, because firstly, we strive to avoid the potential errors imposed by interactions with the interviewer (including possible verbal clarifications and interpretations of the questions) and, secondly, because respondents’ aspirations to give socially acceptable answers should possibly be minimized.

\textsuperscript{12} This wording was approved during the pretest as the most clear to respondents. This refers to Ukraine as a specific locality (‘I come from Ukraine’ / ‘my family is from Ukraine’ / ‘I was born in Ukraine’) rather than to ethnicity (‘I am a Ukrainian’). As the pretest demonstrated, the public understanding of diaspora is rather wide-ranging and might include ‘authentic Ukrainians’ living abroad ever since the creation of the host states (they are considered as Ukrainian minorities in mainstream societies), Old/Pioneer diaspora who emigrated, largely for political reasons, before the break-up of the USSR, and other groups constructing a new economic crisis-driven diaspora since the 1990s.

\textsuperscript{13} Zarobitchany is a term for labour migrants widely used in Western Ukraine which due to the proximity to Central and South-East Europe remains largely involved in circular labour
nationals who work abroad on a temporary basis; 3) internally displaced persons (IDPs) from Donbas and Crimea. The final group refers to the new phenomenon for Ukraine of forced displacement that emerged since the crisis from 2014 to present. It was incorporated into the questionnaire for two reasons. First, they are commonly regarded as potential refugees who might increase the number of Ukrainian emigrants abroad, particularly in Europe. Second, a growing public concern over the social marginalisation of this group in Ukraine makes it emblematic as a potential threat to the established community tolerance (we will see if playing on these fears resonates with the data).

Using a modification of the Emory Bogardus Social Distance scale which ‘refers to the degrees and grades of understanding and feeling that persons experience regarding each other’ and measures secure ‘interpretations of the varying degrees and grades of understanding and feeling that exist in social situations’ (Bogardus, 1925: p. 299), we have carried out further work on adjusting and updating questionnaire tools to compare ‘distances’ in the four domains of social relations: private, professional, public, and civic.

It should be noted that in the mid-1990s, the Bogardus scale was successfully adapted by other international and local scholars (Прибыткова, 2006; Дробижева, 1998), including sociologist Natalia Panina who studied ethnic and national tolerance in Ukraine (Паніна, 2003, 2005). In her study respondents were asked if they would accept members of 21 ethnic or national groups, other than their own, and two groups identical or similar to their own (including ‘Ukrainians/compatriots’ and ‘Ukrainians living in other countries’) as family members, close friends, neighbours, co-workers, other citizens of Ukraine, or tourists, if at all (on the resulting single choice ordinal scale where “1” stood for full acceptance and “7” stood for zero acceptance). However, as further measurement exercise during our pilot work encompassing migration-based groups proved, not all of the items on the scale are mutually exclusive (you can equally allow someone as co-workers and as close friends, and both levels of acceptance would matter). Secondly, the respondents can perceive the degree of closeness differently. For many people, accepting someone as family members does not imply any close interaction, while co-working might mean everyday face-to-face contacts. As social researcher Vladimir Sergeev, one of the critics of the original Bogardus scale and its later adapted versions, argues ‘in the modern urbanized society living in one neighbourhood, on the same street or even in the same apartment block, means far less proximity than co-working in the same team’ (Цепреєв, 2008: p. 58).

To align our questions to the logic of appropriate social situations and minimize potential for different interpretations, we developed a series of multiple migration. For the first time the term was used in the novel Fata Morgana (1901) by the prominent Ukrainian writer Mykhailo Kotsiubynsky who depicted the profound changes in the Ukrainian rural area on the threshold of the dramatic revolutionary events (Citation: ‘Approaching the house, Andrii sees Hafijka who bring water to zarobitchany as they move to Tavria and Kuban just like the cranes flock’).
choice questions to measure perceived social distance on the private level (if representatives of the group are acceptable as 1 – family members, 2 – close friends and 3 – neighbours); professional level (instead of one item ‘co-workers’, we introduced: 1 – subordinates, 2 – co-workers, 3 – supervisors); public level / acceptable empowerment as public bodies (including participation in local and central authorities: 1 – people in charge of the local administration in the place where you live, 2 – people in charge of the ministries and state services of Ukraine, 3 – president of Ukraine; and civic level / acceptable eligibility to civil rights (1 – people voting during the elections of the President of Ukraine, Parliament or local authorities, 2 – people with tax exemptions, credit facilities or other cost benefits). Zero acceptance was formulated as ‘I would not accept them as any of the indicated above’ instead of ‘I would exclude them from my country’ in the original Bogardus scale and ‘I would not allow them to my country’ in the modified Panina’s version of the scale which was too peremptory.

Although the changes initiated to this extensive questionnaire made further comparative analysis of our new research results to the data obtained in the previous years, when the original adapted scale had been used, impossible, we utilize some pertinent evidence tracked by the past surveys. First, although Ukrainian society is generally considered tolerant even in the face of war and economic hardships (Alekseev, 2015: p. 3,6), empirical data of the past years showed some traits of national isolationism and hidden forms of xenophobia that are declining over the last couple of years in relation to ethnically distant groups (Ворона, Шульга, 2014: р. 261). Second, while ethnicity keeps rather a weak position in the hierarchy of the dominant identities in Ukraine and an increasing number of people identify themselves first and foremost as citizens of their country rather than as representatives of an ethnic group or nation, the respondents show far more loyalty to their own ethnic group than to others (Панина, 2005: р. 37, 38; Іващенко, Стегній, 2015: р. 302, 303). Third, self-tolerance analysed as social distance toward its own ethnic group including stayers and migrants, should be referred to as a volatile indicator of societal attitudes which reflect major political changes or outstanding events (Панина, 2005: р. 42). Four, albeit a closer social distance towards Ukrainians as compatriots than towards Ukrainians living in

\[14\] On a seven-point scale, where 1 is the lowest and 7 is the highest degree of alienation, Social Distance Index (SDI, calculated as a mean of the observed results on a seven-point scale) towards Chechens, Arabs and Afghans made up 6.3-6.0 points (the highest of all ethnic groups); 5.0-5.3 towards Germans and Americans, 4.9-5.2 towards Slovaks, Czechs, Hungarians, Poles; and 4.3 towards Russians (data of 2014).

\[15\] Increasing social distance, observed in the survey data in Ukraine in 2001, were seen as a hallmark of the September 11th after-shock when people became less tolerant to all ethnic groups, including their own. Although EuroMaidan of 2013-2014 in Ukraine has not resulted in a drop in tolerance indicators, yet, higher human costs of the military conflict in Donbas, further deterioration of living standards and growing disenchantment with a government unable to undertake reforms, might lead to a rise of xenophobia.
other countries, attitudes towards Ukrainians overseas / in the diaspora are marked with quite a high level of tolerance and remain within the ‘one-of-us’ margins of the social distance scale (Ворона, Шульга, 2012: p. 578).

With these seemingly optimistic empirical observations in mind, we examine how social distance works as a dependent variable on different levels of interaction in more specified situations. We use independent variables such as age, education, main activity/occupation, region of residence, etc. to test factors that influence closeness or alienation. Also, as the existing data is at best inconclusive when it comes to the scope of migration, there is a need to scrutinize up-to-date social evidence of the Ukrainian population near and beyond. To address this, we introduce new questions on personal links with family members, friends, or acquaintances living, working or staying abroad (in Russia, Eastern Europe, Western Europe, and other countries).

Findings

Descriptive Overview of the Survey Results

The results from our quantitative investigations help to test, from the stayers’ perspective, the statement which William Safran defined as perceived impossibility for ‘expatriate minority communities’ to be ‘fully accepted by their host society’ (Safran, 1991: p. 83). In Graphs 1-5 we display comparative views of stayers, a representative sample of the Ukrainian adult population, on accepting diaspora (or, to mention once again, other countries’ nationals of Ukrainian origin as stated in the questionnaire) and other migration-based communities (including Ukrainian labour migrants who temporary work abroad, and IDPs from the annexed Crimea and occupied Donbas) on different levels of interactions.

When measuring social distance between migrants and stayers, we did not differentiate between the Near and Far diasporas, as the pre-test demonstrated that people of different socioeconomic backgrounds are often perplexed by such a detailed and specific question. Still, to delineate the ground for further possible comparisons across this Near/Far line, we will correlate the obtained data on social distance with other variables, such as personal links to migrants in the neighbouring states and beyond, and region of residence, etc.

Private level: let’s be neighbours? As previous studies indicated, the Social Distance Index (SDI) for Ukrainians living in Ukraine has increased from 1.5 in

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16 SDI towards Ukrainians/compatriots made up 2.2 points in 2014 (the highest index of all observed). SDI towards Ukrainians living in other countries was 3.2 points (before 2014 it was almost equal to that towards Russians but the later dropped after the current conflict to 4.3).

17 As Natalia Panina suggested, all values of the Social Distance Index lower than ‘4’ can be interpreted as proximity (Паніна, 2005: p. 29).
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1998 to 2.3 in 2014 and for Ukrainians living abroad it decreased from 3.9 in 1998 to 3.1 in 2014. Notably in 1998, 18.8 percent of respondents were ready to accept ‘abroad Ukrainians’ as family members (on a single-choice scale). Despite the ups and downs of the 2000s, it has increased to 25.3 percent up to 2014. Now, the data we obtained in 2015 using the modified scale with multiple-choice answers, displayed that the degree of closest possible acceptance remained fairly unchanged (see Graph 1). However, it also revealed that accepting Diaspora as ‘neighbours’ would be the most comfortable option for a majority of the respondents. The data presents interesting observations across groups. For example, the graphs reveal private-level-acceptance for diaspora and labour migrants are almost identical, while it drops for IDPs who are somewhat less likely to be treated as ‘one-of-us’.

Professional level: co-workers versus ‘employer-employee’? The professional domain of interactions between stayers and migrants has been an issue of growing importance in light of the recent turnaround in views on skilled migration. This is seen a potential factor of institutional change, progress, and knowledge-based sustainability ‘at home’ (Kuznetsov, 2013: p. 151-169) rather than a ‘symptom of a development failure’ causing ‘further underdevelopment’ (Bakewell, 2009: p. 787). Leaving aside statistic-based estimations as to the attractiveness of the local labour market for migrants, we focus here on the subjective side of the story only: is the diaspora community, which might bring home skills, experience and networks developed while living and working abroad, welcome by stayers? Unfortunately previously conducted surveys based on a single-choice scale provided scarce data on the views for acceptable forms of interactions on the professional level. Consequently, we can only generalize that before and after the military conflict of 2014/2015 resulting in a considerable decrease of overall tolerance towards Russians (as mentioned previously the SDI dropped from 3.3 in 2012 to 4.3 in 2014), the level of accepting diaspora members as co-workers has remained lower than that for the ‘big neighbours’ (yet, for the first time since

Graph 1. Views of stayers on accepting diaspora and other migrant communities on the private level by percentage
independence, abroad Ukrainians have become more welcome than Russians as family members). The graph below demonstrates the models of ‘office hierarchy’ the respondent would assign to different migration-based groups: for diaspora, labour migrants, and IDPs, most would choose co-workers rather than ‘employer-employee’ type of relationships (see Graph 2). The levels of acceptance are almost identical for all groups, except for a slightly higher acceptance in favour of diaspora in a ‘supervisory’ role that might reflect some acknowledgment of the foreign Ukrainians ‘wealth of experiences’ (Kuznetsov, 2013: p. 229).

Public level: limited access to the top? Political scientists often describe diaspora communities as an increasingly influential agent of political control ‘here and there’ through participation in ‘trans-local (undertaken from abroad and targeting local communities)’ and ‘homeland (implying direct intervention in the political affairs of the homeland and lobbying the host government or other relevant political actors on issues related to the country of origin)’ politics (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2009: p. 1623, 1624). The recent developments in Ukraine suggest that the representatives of diaspora communities from the West, along with other countries’ nationals, might occasionally be appointed in the central and local governments. However, there is no ‘inevitable positive change’ on the way to ‘the European modernisation after the fall of tyranny’, as the newly elected president put it in his inauguration speech (Wilson, 2014: p. 3139), seen in the Ukraine’s personnel policy. Most appointments of the high-ranking officials remain opaque and there is no indication of growing transparency and competitiveness on different levels of political participation and public administration (later we will see how it’s being discussed by the insiders who participated in our focus-groups). We were interested to see if this ‘lack of open access’, so rigorously preserved by the Ukrainian policy-makers when it comes to the formation of executive authorities, confronts public expectations. In the graph below we display how stayers view acceptable empowerment of different migration-based groups as public bodies (including participation in local and central authorities).
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Although diaspora performs generally better than the rest of the groups, the demand for its participation in the local and central authorities is displayed as rather low. It is also worth mentioning that the differences between labour migrants’ and IDPs’ representation on the graph remain fairly within the margin of sampling error (see Graph 3). As evidenced during the focus groups discussions, low representation of migrant groups in power hampers the formation of functional networks at home and works as a pull factor for further emigration. The Ukrainian diaspora together with other migration-based groups are seen by respondents as the least influential agents in the national social pyramid (see Graph 4).

Graph 3. Views of stayers on accepting diaspora and other migrant communities on public level by percentage

Graph 4. Views of stayers and migrants on the hierarchy of influences in Ukrainian society by percentage
Civic level: semi-citizens? The views of stayers on the eligibility of diaspora to civil rights, including the right to vote during the elections of different levels, reflect its ambivalent ‘membership status’ in the country of origin (Van Hear, 1998: p. 146). While membership in the host country is manifested through legality of presence, right of residence, cultural compatibility, and citizenship claims (Van Hear, 1998: p. 147), we argue that in the case of diaspora in a culturally homogeneous homeland which has liberal visa policy and applies an ‘I-know-nothing’ approach on dual citizenship issues (which is not legally allowed but very rarely forbidden), some other aspects of membership seem to be challenged. Apart from the possible reluctance of the local social institutions to accept diaspora and migrants in certain roles, there might be problems with ‘role-holders’ motivations (Harre, 1979: p. 97) for deeper involvement in structures and relationships at home. If we compare views on subjective acceptance of the diaspora between ‘stayers’ and ‘migrants’, we will see that ‘migrants’ assume a far larger acceptance on the private, professional, and public levels of interactions than ‘stayers’ (see Table 1), while on the civil level the figures are fairly equal (see Graph 5). This means that in public discourse external voting during the elections is not seen as a sensitive issue, presumably due to the generally low level of trust in the effectiveness of the democratic institutions in Ukraine, an assertion repeatedly confirmed in national surveys. Apparently, even in the case of labour migrants who are eligible to vote as citizens of Ukraine but due to the limited access to an inadequately low number of polling stations abroad are not able to do so, there is

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In Ukraine, the right to overseas absentee voting is granted only to Ukrainian citizens who left the country legally (Rojas, 2004: p. 4). As in Ukraine no one is allowed to register as a dual citizen, members of the Ukrainian diaspora have no right to vote.
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no indication of concern over this issue in the obtained data. To further illustrate the situation, we have determined the turnout of Ukrainians abroad during the most recent parliamentary elections in 2014. In the United States 1,587 Ukrainian citizens have voted out of 42.5 thousand registered voters, in Russia 744 votes out of 42.9 thousand, in Hungary 278 voters out of 5.5 thousand (as a rule, the larger the host country, the lower the turnout). Future analyses for increasing voter turnout of Ukrainians abroad, besides the consideration of the gained leadership positions in host societies (which is, unfortunately, a rare case for the Near diasporas, and still rather an exception for the Far diasporas19), should focus on the issue of electoral potential of the different groups of Ukrainian overseas communities.

Previous research of migration in Central and Eastern Europe suggested that people with lower life satisfaction are more likely to express an intention to emigrate, yet emigration does not always bring an increase in happiness, particularly if we compare migrants and stayers (Bartram, 2013: p. 168). Our data suggest that people with migratory experience are generally much more optimistic when thinking about their own future and the future of Ukraine (see Table 1 – negative and positive feelings about future). This might be explained by the observation that either people with higher level of optimism have a greater tendency towards migration (Bartram, 2013: p. 156) or that it is because they feel more self-confident, able to take care of their life and overall are more satisfied with their social status which is higher than that of the stayers (see Table 1 – self-estimation in the social hierarchy).

The findings listed in Table 1 reveal that the region of residence plays a significant role in shaping public attitudes towards different issues, including self-identification and level of optimism/pessimism. It also remains an important factor influencing the level of tolerance towards different groups with migration experience on all levels of interaction. Although the level of Diaspora’ and labour migrants’ acceptance in the West Ukraine is two times lower than that displayed by the control group (people who lived and worked abroad for not less than five years), it is still higher than in Kyiv, the metropolitan capital, and much higher than in Eastern Ukraine. We have figured out that the influence of age on social distance is not significant, while the effect of education on diaspora acceptance is high on the ‘friendship’ and ‘co-worker’ levels.

It is also important to note that Eastern Ukraine, an area of industrial importance during the Soviet rule, is the predominantly Russian-speaking region where labour was imported from other parts of Ukraine and neighbouring Russia (Predborsk et al., 2004: p. 408). Migration for better-paid jobs to Europe is rather

19 So far, Canadian Ukrainians have demonstrated the best political performance in the host country, taking up posts in the central government (Hoppe, 2015) and still demonstrating their attachment to country of origin (for example, ending oath with Ukrainian words as Canada’s new employment minister Mary Ann Mihychuk did). In Russia, which also witnesses successful careers of Ukrainians, most cases refer to situations of assimilation (preserving Ukrainian identity is not the best asset for ascending career trajectories).
### Table 1

Accepting diaspora and labour migrants: comparative views across groups and regions by percentage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Would accept...</th>
<th>Control group* (N=19)</th>
<th>Overall in Kyiv (N=139)</th>
<th>Overall in West Ukraine (N=375)</th>
<th>Overall in East Ukraine (N=407)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>...diaspora as family members</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...labour migrants as family members</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...IDPs from Donbas as family members</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...diaspora as supervisors</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...labour migrants as supervisors</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...IDPs from Donbas as supervisors</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...diaspora as president of Ukraine</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...labour migrants as president of Ukraine</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...IDPs from Donbas as president of Ukraine</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...diaspora voting during the elections</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...labour migrants voting during the elections</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...diaspora possessing tax exemptions, credit facilities or other cost benefits</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...labour migrants possessing tax exemptions, credit facilities or other cost benefits</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...IDPs from Donbas possessing tax exemptions, credit facilities or other cost benefits</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would not accept diaspora as any of the indicated above</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would not accept labour migrants as any of the indicated above</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would not accept IDPs from Donbas as any of the indicated above</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>22.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>People with high education</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>37.6</td>
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<td>Self-estimation in the social hierarchy (on the scale, where 1 – the lowest, 7 – the highest position), MEAN</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>3.72</td>
<td>3.51</td>
<td>3.37</td>
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<tr>
<td>Feels negatively about own future</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feels positively about own future</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feels negatively about Ukraine’s future</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feels positively about Ukraine’s future</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identify themselves first and foremost as citizens of Europe or world</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...as a representative of its nation or ethnic group</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>…as citizen of Ukraine</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>65.1</td>
<td>53.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knows someone who temporary works in Russia</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>33.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>…works in Eastern Europe</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>…works in Western Europe</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>…works in other countries</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knows someone who permanently lives in Russia</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>29.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>…lives in Eastern Europe</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>…lives in Western Europe</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>…lives in other countries</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Participants of the focus-groups with migration experience (more than five years abroad) in Kyiv and Lviv.
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Graph 6. Scope of Near and Far migration through personal links with family members, friends or acquaintances living, working or staying abroad by percentage

difficult from that region, so Russia is closer and more easily accessible as a large market for goods and labour. The obtained data indicate that up to a third of respondents in Eastern Ukraine have family members, friends, or acquaintances who permanently live or temporarily work in Russia (much higher than in other regions) but it has been a long-term trend that ‘just as for a majority of Ukrainians, most movements remain within Ukraine’ (Roberts, 2009: p. 33). Less developed in terms of local industries Western Ukraine has been suffering from high unemployment rates since the early 1990s but it is better positioned in terms of its proximity to several EU border countries. In Western Ukraine, nearly 40 percent of the respondents have links to those who work in Eastern Europe. Due to the concentration of high-skilled labour and better infrastructure including access to migration agencies and worldwide transportation routes, Kyiv has the highest share of those who personally know people living and working in Western Europe. As the data indicated, labour migration from Ukraine to Europe is greater than to Russia (see Graph 6). A fact that is also true for permanent stays. However, overall migration to Eastern Europe is lower than to Russia. If we look at the Near/Far line, neighbouring countries (including Russia and Eastern Europe) remain the main destination for Ukrainians who have permanently settled or who temporarily work abroad. As the data on migration intentions (survey conducted in 2014) suggest, there is a trend towards a decline in the share of those who plan to move to Russia and redistribution of migration flows in favour of Europe and new destination countries. The economic crisis and reduced employment opportunities abroad might lead to a further decline in migration mobility, yet mass return movement, particularly from ‘Far abroad’, is not likely
to take place. Possible tendencies for the ‘Near abroad’ are discussed below in the focus-groups narratives.

**Focus-Groups Observations Descriptive Overview**

Here we proceed to the focus-group results in order to present a narrative of the voices of people who have experienced migration. These results deal with the pros and cons of their being a member of both Near and Far migration communities, that are considered from the perspective of country of origin where they have now resettled temporarily or permanently. We have grouped the data into the topics which either supplement or extend the survey results positioned as challenges and opportunities of the Near diasporas.

The focus group in Kyiv included highly-qualified young people (including a CEO in international company, a lawyer, a choreographer, an interpreter, a musician of the symphonic orchestra, a manager of creative industries, an IT-specialist, a HR-manager and a sales-manager). One half of the informants identified themselves as ‘diaspora’, while the other half were divided equally on ‘labour migrants’ and ‘Ukraine citizens who work abroad’.

In Lviv we met people of working age who worked abroad as construction workers, nurses, nannies, restaurant waiters, drivers, and welders. All of them identified themselves as ‘labour migrants’.

A majority of informants confirmed that their coming back was temporary, caused either by family reasons or by a break during work. People who worked in Russia returned for one of the three reasons: deportation, reassignment to another branch of the company they work for in Moscow, or disappointment with the political situation in Russia and decision to move in other direction (preferably to the West).

Most people we interviewed occurred not to prefer that their relatives or friends emigrate or go for contract work to the neighbour countries because of the high rate of unemployment there and lower salaries as compared to the West. Another reason was a ‘Big Brother’ syndrome which captures people’s mind in most neighbour states and affects friendly attitudes towards Ukrainians.

Illegal emigration is diminishing as an applicable option in all destination countries. It is no longer a good strategy for groups of potential migrants including blue-collar workers and those who try to make their way to Europe through family ties. Also, language proficiency and eligibility for legal status abroad should be requisite for everyone who wants to succeed. Success depends on how advanced you are as a foreign language speaker and as a sociable person in a new environment.

The results of the focus-groups discussions suggest that certain groups of Ukrainians with migratory experience (specifically, middle-level managers and qualified specialists involved in construction and services) might return to Ukraine if they are offered a reasonably high salary and reliable benefits package. As both survey data and focus-groups discussions have demonstrated, residents have no hostile attitudes towards those who return from abroad. However, no particular goodwill is observed on the side of employers.
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The role of the state-policy in attracting ‘good people returning’ should be increased through conducting real targeted reforms, fighting corruption and nepotism, and minimizing financial barriers which prevent people from making nostalgic dreams come true.


*Kyiv and Lviv: white- and blue-collar returnees speak*

**Employment opportunities are more limited in Near abroad than in the West and South Europe**

I went (to Portugal) because there was a demand for labour and a good salary was offered. A lot of people went there at that time to earn money and to see the world. Certainly, why not? (Blue-collar male returnee from Portugal)

It’s not that easy for a Ukrainian to find a job there as Poles themselves move to UK, to Germany to find a job. (White-collar male returnee from Poland)

Poles move to Finland, to Sweden, to other places [such as] Germany, Italy, Spain. A lot of them move. And there in these countries I mentioned, they are perceived just like Ukrainian ‘zarobitchany’ in Poland. In the West they don’t consider Poland as real Europe. (White-collar female returnee from Poland)

**Colonial/Post-Imperial syndrome in the Near states**

Here’s what I personally observed... An old German-style house in Polish rural area. Germans had built it many years ago... A man near the house spoke up to me: ‘Guess what, you will return to us sooner or later’. What did he mean? Like many other Poles, he thought, that Ukraine would become a Polish territory one day. (White-collar male returnee from Poland)

They (in Russia and neighbouring states) give us a cool reception. One might think that it’s ok as Russians speak the language which is familiar to us. But they behave badly, very badly. If you want to train your iron nerves, then, of course, you should hit the road (to Russia). Even if you study in a prestigious university (Moscow State University), your mates look at you with an unfavourable eye just because you are so-called ‘khokhol’ (an ethnic slur for Ukrainians). Now it has become even worse. God help you if people would know that you are a Ukrainian. I wouldn’t go there again. (White-collar male returnee from Russia)

I was tired of the stupid clients during the last year of my work there (in Moscow). They went crazy because of the politics and propaganda. A couple of clients left because they asked me where I’m from, and I said that I was a ‘banderivka’ (a follower of the Ukrainian nationalist movement). So, my Moscow-based Italian boss said, ‘You better go to Italy. I will help you’. I will go there next month. (Blue-collar female returnee from Russia)

For them all in the neighbouring states we are a younger brother in economic sense. But I think that near abroad has not overhauled us, globally speaking. (White-collar male returnee from Germany and Latvia)

**Developmental and ideological drawbacks in the Near states**

The lifestyle in Poland is a bit... closed. Relying on each other, dealing with those who are ‘one-of-them’. Here in Ukraine it is more open-minded. There they are largely mono-
confessional and mono-ethnic. Ukraine has a variety of churches of different confessions. (White-collar male returnee from Poland)

I would differentiate between the countries (where I moved). I would recommend Germany. Last year I would have recommended Kazakhstan. Today they have a little slowdown in national economy… I would recommend London as a particular place in Great Britain. I would not recommend Baltic States, specifically Latvia. They have very strange attitudes, very similar to what Ukraine has now. It is similar because the state is divided into two parts. They have a Daugavpils city which is the only city in Europe striving to become a part of Russia, to be in Russia with one hundred percent of its population. This is a kind of some straightforward downshift. In this context, it’s difficult to accept the Baltic states I would probably exclude Estonia out of these group but Latvia and Lithuania are not the best places to go. (White-collar male returnee from Germany and Latvia)

Certainly, people change abroad, particularly in Europe, because the difference between us is huge. The mentality is different. But Russia is not far ahead of us. There it’s all the same. (Blue-collar female returnee from Russia)

Why are they (Czechs) so narrow-minded in their perception of the world? I don’t know. But they closed off themselves. Czech territory is the whole world for them. On my way there I was in the train with the Czechs and I heard that they said to each other: ‘Is he a ‘moskal’ (an ethnic slur for Russians)? Haven’t they died out yet?’ Yes they are very tough to Russians. Probably, because of 1968. But we are a different nation! They think if we are from the ex-USSR, we are all Russians. (Blue-collar male returnee from Czech Republic)

Legality of stay is required everywhere now

For sure, in the neighbouring states you should have an official job. If you have it legally, you have more rights. You are getting the same salary as Poles do. Feel equal. Feel more confident. (White-collar female returnee from Poland)

Illegal work fades away. Everyone is doing his best to arrange it officially. Even if you work at a shovel, you understand that you need it legal. (White-collar male returnee from Czech Republic)

You should go abroad only if you have ties there. If you don’t know anyone, it’s risky. (Blue-collar female returnee from Russia)

Language proficiency is required everywhere now

You should speak the local language when you come. Then it’s all right. But if you arrive and don’t understand what’s going on around you for a year, not able to understand what they tell you to do… Yes, in previous years people went without any basic language skills. But now… You feel differently if you are able to speak. And people perceive you in a different way. Not like a monkey from a third world country… (Blue-collar male returnee from Portugal)

Even if you go to Czech Republic or Poland you shouldn’t think you will have no problem with the language because it’s similar. No. You should learn it before you get there. And you should go legally. (Blue-collar male returnee from Czech Republic)

The younger generation doesn’t speak Russian anymore. They don’t even know who Lenin was. We have learned Russian at school, so we have this asset on the labour market.
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But even though, for us it’s hard to speak like Russians when you arrive. (Blue-collar female returnee from Russia)

Distance towards Ukrainians in Near and Far abroad might be different

If you are in senior position, they have some regard for you. But what if you are a manual worker? The distance is huge then. In the neighbouring states they are very sensitive as to Ukrainians. They have some view on our reputation. ‘Are you a Ukrainian? Oh, it could not be worse’. (White-collar male returnee from Czech Republic)

You are ‘one of us’ until everything is all right. When a problem happens, you are a stranger. (Blue-collar male returnee from Portugal and Spain)

I think Czechs treat Ukrainians like aliens. They think they are Europeans but when you say that you’re a European too, they mock you. No, of course, they are trying to avoid telling it explicitly but it’s clear that they consider us to be far away from them. They don’t take Ukraine as equal to them. Overall, you are an alien to them. That’s it. (Blue-collar male returnee from Czech Republic)

Adaptation (in neighbouring states)? It depends on whether you find groups which are mentally close to you or not. For instance, if you speak Russian in the Baltic states it might be an advantage of yours but it also might become a problem. Sometimes it might prevent conflicts because your vis-à-vis is a Russian speaker. But someone might never become your friend just for the same reason. It is all complicated. (White-collar male returnee from Germany and Latvia)

I liked it in Germany very much. The quality of life and attitudes of people have been great. Very welcoming, no hostility at all. But these are only about professional relations in the office. Finding new friends? No, I haven’t managed that. But Georgia was different: I’ve got lots of new contacts and good friends. (White-collar female returnee from Germany and Georgia)

Who belongs to diaspora

I think diaspora includes those who have left Ukraine for good, who settled abroad. I immediately think of people in Italy, in Canada. I assume they will never come back to Ukraine. They might keep some links, some cultural ties... But they will remain a diaspora. (White-collar female returnee from Poland)

I see some problem with the diaspora which identifies itself as such and comes to Ukraine wearing a traditional embroidered shirt... They are diaspora only here in Ukraine. When they come back they live their life. By the way, I was witnessing in 2009, under president Yushchenko, when some important political issues should have been raised during the Ukrainian World Congress in Kyiv... Indeed, lots of discussions have been around but later on, when the participants were supposed to adopt some address to the political circles, they all dropped off for a closing reception... In the end, nothing had been adopted. But I also see some other diaspora which might not be able to come here, they simply cannot move out... but they worry about Ukraine, they send money to their parents (talks about labour migrants)... When it’s the third of even fourth generation living abroad, outside Ukraine, their understanding of belonging is changing. They don’t grasp what is going on here. They are completely in a different reality. (White-collar male returnee from Poland)

We have a huge diaspora in Canada which is strongly lobbying Ukraine’s interests. Twenty percent parliament members are Ukrainians. (White-collar male returnee from the USA)
Yes, but is Canada a state which influences world economy now? I agree that Canada is a great place to live... But I think Europe and the USA are far more influential. The Russian Diaspora in Germany is lobbying for Russian interests. They have very flexible networks of ‘branches’ and ‘buttons’ to press. It is maintained by the origin country, by its propaganda. We don’t have anything like that in Ukraine. So there’s a kind of a buffer, a sort of a gap. (White-collar male returnee from Germany and Latvia)

Useful skills from abroad

Corporate ethics is something we have to learn from them. When at work, no obscene talking or offense are allowed. You should have full respect for your colleagues. (Blue-collar female returnee from Poland)

I like their trade union system. If you’re a member, you are given free attorney if necessary, and provided with any support you need. I have witnessed three strikes, when they were fighting for better salary. And if it’s a strike, it’s a real strike, not fake one. No one works until their needs are met. (Blue-collar male returnee from Portugal and Spain)

I saw a lot of positive things. There they have really new technologies. And you should always upgrade it. If you lag behind, you’re dead. We co-worked with the Czechs but they did a more qualified job, we were not allowed in there. For example, electricity and water-supply system was their full responsibility. We had no access there. But still we’ve been observing their work and we have learnt a lot. For example, work safety impressed me a lot. That is what we should bring with us from there: new technologies, in-service training, and work security. (Blue-collar male returnee from Czech Republic)

Recent changes in the state of origin

Ukraine is still not considered a potential market for foreign investment. A few partners are financially reliable here. (White-collar male returnee from Latvia and Germany)

What are the reasons for hiring a top-manager who does not know the context, cannot speak the language? Ukraine needs insiders with western experience. Can you imagine the ideological impact they might have? They might become legionaries of changes, opinion-leaders. Those who return back to work for Ukraine after having earned good money abroad. (White-collar male returnee from the USA)

There are some features showing that the crisis broke the ice for changes. There is a little sign that the demand for highly-qualified people with Western diplomas will increase. But it is just a little sign. (White-collar male returnee from Poland)

Stayers’ attitudes to migrants (in the country of origin)

Nearly seventy percent of my friends have left Ukraine after the crisis (of 2013-2014). They had a chance and they used it as much as they could. I think everyone would do the same but, ironically, a majority of people who stayed here think that those who left have escaped the problems and ran away. (White-collar male returnee from Germany and Latvia)

People think that you are a tough girl because you’ve been abroad. You’ve earned money, so now you can easily afford property. (Blue-collar female returnee from Russia)
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When you arrive you are supposed to organize a reception for your ex-colleagues and friends because you can afford it and you’re full of stories. (Blue-collar female returnee from Portugal)

I don’t see any special interest from the side of employers because I have got new skills abroad. No. Sometimes it’s about a gap between your possible expectations and their offer. They think you’re spoiled for choices, want to get a high salary they are not able to pay. But it’s all in their head. (Blue-collar male returnee from Spain)

People say you behave differently after you return. You look like a foreigner. (Blue-collar female returnee from Italy)

Ukraine in some provinces is still very reserved, too (like some Polish and Czech areas mentioned before). Go to the Yavoriv region (near Lviv) and you can hear the young passers-by saying: ‘Oh, look at that Black man!’ They behave as they meet a living statute or something. They are about to cross the street (if they see a stranger who looks different). Is that normal? (Blue-collar male returnee from Russia)

Adults point at ethnically different people in the tram, showing them to their kids. It’s in Lviv which is meant to be a European city... (Blue-collar female returnee from Italy)

Strangers at Home

You can be alien here, when you return. (Blue-collar female returnee from Poland)

I felt depressed after my return. Everything was so disappointing to me. Bad roads, destruction all around, lack of illumination. I even went to a psychotherapist to check up what’s wrong with me. The therapist said, I was fine and had no troubles. (Blue-collar female returnee from Italy)

I couldn’t drive here. After 10 years of experience as a driver abroad, on my third day in Ukraine I left my car on the road. I couldn’t take the style of driving here. (Blue-collar female returnee from Portugal)

Possibilities for permanent return

In spite the financial matters, you always have family issues. A migrant always thinks about returning home. (White-collar female returnee from Poland)

The state should encourage people to return with more job opportunities and social guarantees. Civil solidarity is also an important issue and it has to be solved. (White-collar female returnee from Poland)

Each of us would return to Ukraine to work here now if we were offered higher salaries. (White-collar female returnee from Slovenia)

I don’t see any reason to return to Ukraine now. First, considering the economic issue: average salary is 3000 USD there and 300 here. Second, talking about the political issue: we have lost Crimea, and two more regions in Donbas have an uncertain status. It is not clear what would happen in near future. Third, social development is suspended: no jobs, total regress. What is there to return to? (White-collar male returnee from the USA)
It is not likely that a CEO working in Raiffeisen Bank in Germany will return to Ukraine even if he is offered a high salary. He might send money here but returning... No. But experienced middle-level managers should be invited and integrated as much as possible. Their skills and knowledge should be useful for Ukraine. (White-collar male returnee from Germany and Latvia)

Further possible migrations to the West

I have an idea of moving either to the USA or to Germany. I have relatives here and there. Anyway, I won’t go to Russia again. (White-collar male returnee from Russia)

I think of moving to the States. I like the spirit of classic capitalism. Australia and Canada are also possible options. Or may be some other metropolitan countries, somewhere where a person feels free. It’s about freedom, you know. They do not worry about tomorrow. It’s important to feel this rhythm, compare it with what we have here. And come back to Ukraine one day. Maybe. (White-collar male returnee from Poland)

Conclusions

The major goal of this paper was to study public opinions on the possible interactions between Ukrainian residents and Ukrainian migrants by measuring the social distance between them on private, professional, public, and civic levels. Diaspora, along with the three other groups with migratory experience, including labour migrants, IDPs from Donbas and IDPs from Crimea, were identified as groups to be related to in a range of role-play situations. Regarding the perceived social distance, the data revealed minor differences between diaspora and labour migrants. It suggests further interpretations of the contemporary notion of diaspora and specifically, recognition of its new implementations, dispersions, and regroupings, as put by Nickolas Van Hear. At the same time, we argue that the present-day notion of diaspora used in the Ukrainian public discourse is vague, out-dated and needs to be revisited. For that purpose, we define the diaspora as a national and cultural minority which: 1) resides abroad; 2) holds citizenship or permanent residence status in the destination countries; 3) refers to the country of origin as a conceptual homeland; 4) forms communities based on common interests and values; 5) uses social institutions for defending their rights or preserving their peculiarities in the destination countries; 6) plans eventual return. Labour migrants and other groups (such as political migrants, refugees, etc.) might become a part of diaspora if they are offered the conditions underlined above. As we originally assumed, the notion of Near diaspora refers to the communities residing in neighbouring states (having common border with a country of origin). However, there might be a need to delineate it across the symbolic proximity line. Specifically, people who live in the neighbouring states but have no or weak ties with the country of origin are more likely to be regarded as Far diaspora. At the same time, communities in the geographically distant countries might be actively involved in local economies, politics, and culture in their country of origin through formal and informal networks. As Near diaspora
Ivanchenko-Stadnik Kateryna. Too close or too far: contemporary challenges and opportunities of the ‘near diasporas’ from a country of origin perspective...

residing in the cross-border countries is a more plausible group for return, it should become a target for country of origin policies for reintegration. A model of Near diaspora engagement might include special employment programmes for high achievers and participation of opinion-makers in the local reform-oriented agencies, administrations, and governments (Kuznetsov, 2013: p. 18). The caution here is that Near Diaspora might be seen by the stayers as ‘too close’ and be, therefore, neglected by the government as a valuable resource of advancement. Missing the opportunity for development yet again seems to remain the biggest challenge for Ukraine.

Acknowledgement

I am grateful for the valuable information on the scope of Ukrainian communities abroad provided by Dr. Iryna Kliuchkovska and Dr. Oksana Pyatkovska. I also express my appreciation to Prof. Irina Pribytkova for her ideas regarding the methodology used in this paper and to Dr. Laura Dean for her insight and editorial assistance.

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### The Scope of the Ukrainian Near and Far diasporas and labour migrant communities abroad, return movements and remittances. Expert estimations on selected data (2015)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>'NEAR'</th>
<th>'FAR'</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Eastern Europe (with focus on V4 countries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'FAR'</td>
<td>Western Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other countries of the region with a large Ukrainian community</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### DIASPORA

(people of Ukrainian descent / other countries' nationals)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>'NEAR'</th>
<th>'FAR'</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Eastern Europe (with focus on V4 countries)</td>
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<td>'FAR'</td>
<td>Western Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other countries of the region with a large Ukrainian community</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1.9 – 2 mln.</th>
<th>250-300.000 (including Baltic States)</th>
<th>200.000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Across countries, the largest diaspora communities are located in Poland – 50.000⁴ Czech Republic – 65.000 Romania – 60.000 Latvia – 40.000 Estonia – 20.000</td>
<td>Across countries, the largest diaspora communities are located in Germany – 120.000 France – 30.000⁵ Great Britain – 50.000⁶</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan – 500.000 Moldova – 500.000-600.000</td>
<td>200.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,2 mln., including USA – 1 mln.⁷</td>
<td>Latin America – 1,2 mln. Australia – 40.000⁷</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### LABOUR MIGRANTS

(Ukrainian nationals working abroad on the temporary basis)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1.5 - 2 mln.</th>
<th>700-800.000 (including asylum seekers who, unable to prove a genuine case for asylum, try to enter neighboring countries through traditional labour migration and family routes). Poland – 450-500.000² Czech Republic – 120.000 Hungary – 30-40.000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>500-700.000 (including South of Europe which remains an important destination) Germany – 100.000 Italy –300.000 Spain – 90.000 Greece – 20.000 Portugal – 50.000⁴</td>
<td>500.000 including USA – 400.000 Canada – 100.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan – 200-300.000</td>
<td>500.000 including USA – 150.000 Oceania – 15-17.000 Latin America – 10.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
No mass return observed (except for a few individual cases)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LABOUR MIGRANTS RETURN MIGRATION</th>
<th>Up to 30 per cent of migrants return from Russia and reestablish their routes to EU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No mass return observed</td>
<td>As circular migration is the most widespread practice across Ukrainian labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>migrants to Eastern Europe, return is temporary, and onward movement usually</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>follows</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No mass return observed</td>
<td>Up to 80 per cent of labour migrants claim their intentions to return but this</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>does not take place in mass</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No mass return observed</td>
<td>No mass return observed</td>
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<tr>
<td>No mass return observed</td>
<td>No mass return observed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REMITTANCES TO UKRAINE (1st half of 2015, in $ mln, top-30 countries)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>544.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(29 per cent of the total received during the reported period)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland – 21.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic – 11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(sub-total – 33.1 or 1.8 per cent of the total)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan – 23.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan – 19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan – 11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(sub-total – 54.7 or 2.9 per cent of the total)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany – 130.6 Great Britain – 111.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece – 110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus – 109.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy – 76.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands – 32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain – 28.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Switzerland – 27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France – 26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium – 18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway – 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal – 15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland – 17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(sub-total – 725.2 or 38.3 per cent of the total)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA – 239.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada – 49.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(sub-total – 289.2 or 15.3 per cent of the total)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel – 46.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE – 37.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore – 37.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China – 25.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey – 18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama – 15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginian Islands – 14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isle of Man – 14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong – 14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(sub-total – 223.8 or 11.8 per cent of the total)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Sources: United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, State Statistics Services of foreign states, Eurostat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Center for demographic and socio-economic research of Ukrainians in the USA, State Migration Service of Ukraine, State Register of Voters of Ukraine, data of the Ukrainian civil society organizations abroad, National Bank of Ukraine.

Comments: experts argue that statistics has been the weakest point in any study of the Ukrainian diaspora and labor migration. Any data on the numbers of Ukrainians and scope of the current migration flows are inaccurate due to the lack of systematic analysis which has not ever been conducted in Ukraine as an independent state. Also, no fundamental methodology of calculations has been developed. As the data provided by social, cultural, and religious organizations are rather subjective, a large discrepancy is observed across official sources based on national censuses, reports of consulates and border services, and unofficial figures.

1 An assertion confirmed by the OSCE monitoring committee, the military aggression against Ukraine has resulted in a sharp decline in the number of Russian citizens of Ukrainian descent identifying themselves as Ukrainians. Due to straightforward assimilation policy Russian Federation (RF) imposed restrictions in the sphere of minority rights (particularly, in cultural development, education, and language use). Active cultural and political participation of the Ukrainian diaspora representatives that took place in the 1990s, when the national NGOs were actively developed in RF, have dramatically decreased due to the persecution of activists. The latest example has been Viktor Hirzhov, the executive secretary the Ukrainian Congress in RF, who was prohibited to enter the territory of RF where he had lived for years, and Natalya Shadrina, Director of the Ukrainian Literature Library in Moscow, taken into custody.

2 Experts report on the constant increase in the number of different types of migrant workers, as well as the growth of the number of Ukrainian students who go to study in Poland. The present stage of political mobilization in Ukraine since the annexation of Crimea and military conflict in Donbas is witnessing the formation of new Ukrainian NGOs in Poland engaged in active social work (e.g. Our choice).

3 Developing the strategy of cooperation with the Ukrainian Near diasporas should take into account the ‘autochthonous Ukrainians’ (for example, in Poland, Czech Republic, Romania, etc.) requiring different approaches to interact with them.

4 In the countries of South Europe, experts observe the intense processes of Ukrainian integration into the host societies. However since the crisis in Ukraine, Ukrainian diaspora has played an increasingly active role in educational and cultural activities in order to demonstrate solidarity with the homeland.

5 Experts argue that a large dispersion of the Ukrainian diaspora in France hampers its mobilization. Yet, the influx of newcomers and rise in activities of the Greek Catholic parish in Paris promotes a more active diaspora life.

6 In UK, the Ukrainian diaspora can be characterized as long-standing / largely formed by the ‘pioneers’. The recent more close contacts between the old diaspora and newcomers work for a more active ‘Ukrainian life’ in the host country. The Ukrainian Institute in London, aimed to support Ukrainian educational institutions on different levels, has been a powerful driving force of such interaction. Also, experts report on the establishment of new Ukrainian organizations in the European countries where the diasporas used to be weak (Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden, etc.).

7 Large and active Ukrainian communities in the United States, Canada, and Australia work closely with the newly established NGOs (Razom for Ukraine, United Help Ukraine, Ukraine Freedom Support Group, etc.) and form a powerful Ukrainian lobby in the West.

20 Assessments on the scope of the Ukrainian diaspora and labour migrant communities are made by Dr. Iryna Kliuchkovska, the Director of the International Institute of Education, Culture and Relations with Diaspora, Lviv Polytechnic National University, on the basis of the unpublished data from different sources on demand of the ERSTE-supported project.

21 Assessments on the remittances across regions are made by author on the basis of the National Bank of Ukraine published data for the 1st half of 2015.
The article aims at discussing the achievements, opportunities and barriers that stand in the way of entering the common European educational and scientific space by Ukrainian universities. On the basis of the analysis of the expert survey, it shows how Ukrainian universities, teachers, and students comply with the European standards of education. Internationalisation of higher education is transforming national education systems. It allows to improve the quality of education through more active use of scientific and educational potential of leading European universities. Ukraine has activated the transition to the multi-level system of staff training and continuous education system that meets the requirements of market economy principles and functioning of the united European educational space. Moreover, for this purpose it is essential to use new communication models in the area of university research and education. By now, communicative means of integrating universities to the common European educational space have not been developed, especially considering the changes occurring in the modern educational infrastructure. Standardisation, unification, mass character and individualisation of university education, location of universities at the crossroads of different cultures – all this factors update the role of new communication practices in the advancement of the university to the united European educational and scientific space.

Keywords: university, higher education, students, university lecturer, European educational and scientific space.

Contradictions of the modernization of university education in the context of Ukraine’s European integration

Ukraine’s accession to the Bologna Process in 2005 contributed to the rapid convergence of the university education in the country with European standards. I. Zharskaya and V. Netkova have analysed the dynamics of major indices of higher education market and have found out the main trends of its development (Жарская, Неткова, 2014). One of the major trends is the rapid approach of Ukrainian universities to European standards. Although this process began in the 1990s (Корсак, 1997). Currently, scientists admit that the world of the university is no longer confined to its classic model. Among the most common models are the models of an “entrepreneurial university”, “academic university”, “corporate university”, “regional university complex”, “open university”, “research university” (Поляков, 2004). The model of an entrepreneurial university has been used successfully by European universities, and it is gaining popularity in the modern world (particularly in Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, etc.) (Susanti, 2011). However, scientists note that commercialization of higher education and universities’ loss of autonomy (academic, financial, etc.) cause damage to universities (Head, 2011). In Ukraine, the search for an optimal model of a modern university is going on. Evaluation of the quality of educational activities of Ukrainian universities and the quality of students’ training is not complex in nature. Scientists admit the limitations of attempts to assess the quality of education in Ukraine using basic statistical approaches and methods applied in the management of goods and services quality (Герасименко, 2014). In our opinion, sociological research may be useful. For example, the achievements and limitations of Ukrainian students and universities to some extent are reflected in the data of the European project EVROSTUDENT (Social and Economic Conditions, 2012-2015).

Modernisation of educational activity in modern Ukraine is taking place in the context of European integration requirements. University education is increasingly becoming a multivariate, diverse, multi-model one; there is a constant search for the optimal model of a European university. This model must meet both European and national standards. University education in Ukraine is being reformed to become available. Trained professionals are to become competitive on the labour market and adapted to the new conditions of society. The processes of democratisation of educational space, stratification and education variability, its regionalisation and its desire to meet European standards facilitate this trend. Social changes in modern Ukrainian universities
are designed to ensure Ukraine’s accession to the European educational and scientific space. Knowledge is a determinant of the national competitiveness and resource of the innovative paradigm. Ukraine can only fit into this paradigm through the increasing participation in the international division of intellectual labour and the internationalisation of staff training.

Ukrainian model of the university education is based on Ukrainian realities, resources, culture, social institutions. University education in modern Ukraine as a temporal life value is evidenced by the fact that the majority of Ukrainians aspire to enter the university and consider it desirable for their children and grandchildren. Most researchers give such examples of constructive changes in university education of Ukraine. Institutional changes: development of non-public university education, establishment of the private education as an integral part of the reform process; development of the institute of a second higher education; transformation of universities into subjects of educational policy and independent players on the education market. Structural changes: diversity of types of higher education institutions; variety of programmes and learning forms; new practices of staff training, which are required by the labour market and consumers of the education services. Functional changes: increased financial autonomy of universities; democratisation of decision-making mechanisms, internal policy of university life; development of the system of extra educational services; using European standards in organisation, technology, forms and methods of learning.

Let us consider the problems arising at the universities of Ukraine in terms of data obtained during the national survey “Expert evaluation of the modernisation of higher education in Ukraine.” This study was conducted with the author’s participation by the sociologists of V. N. Karazin Kharkiv National University (field stage was taking place from November, 10th to December, 10th 2014; 540 lecturers representing all regions of Ukraine were polled; criteria for selecting experts: the main workplace of an expert was a position at a Ukrainian university, involvement in research and teaching and university activities, expert’s work experience at universities of one year or more).

Then we will give an expert evaluation of the situation at the universities of Ukraine on their way to European educational and scientific space.

Expert opinion as for the impact of the new Ukrainian law “On the Higher Education” (2014) on the situation in education. Particular differences in the experts’ evaluation of this impact have been found in the course of the study. They can indicate their carefulness in giving projections at a time when Ukrainian society is in a deep systemic crisis, which inevitably affects the institution of higher education. Conventionally, the following groups of experts were created: “optimists” (cumulative score was 47%) – those who hope that the situation in higher education “will be much better” (4 %) or “probably will be better” (43 %); “desperate in any change” (23 %) – believe that the situation in education with the adoption of the new Law “won’t change”; “pessimists” (17 %) – are inclined to think that the situation in education “will rather become worse” (15 %) or even “will become much worse” (12 %). 13 % of the experts didn’t define their position. Experts who rated the possible impact of the Law on the processes of modernisation of higher education more optimistically are those employed at government (state) universities, as compared to
private (for example, at government (state) universities there are 51% of “optimists” and only 37% at private ones).

Experts associated Barriers to the modernisation of higher education in Ukraine with such factors as “lack of higher education funding” (55% of responses: at government (state) universities – 57%, at private ones – 48%), “weak material base of Ukrainian universities” (46% in general: at government (state) universities – 48%, at private ones – 40%), “lack of specific mechanisms for implementing changes in higher education in Ukraine” (44%), “lack of effective educational management” (31%). Other factors, experts say, produce a less significant impact on higher school compliance with the new requirements, but they cannot be ignored. First, we are talking about such characteristics of human resources of the national higher school as “lack of motivation of lecturers to work under the new rules”, “conservatism, dogmatism, the inertia of lecturers’ thinking”, “unwillingness to compete”. In fact, these are socio-cultural barriers that impede modernisation processes in education. However, they are more evident among lecturers, compared with students. This may cause a number of problems in the relationship “student – lecturer” and affect their mutual misunderstanding, respect, and so on. Eventually it may retard the transition to a new level of relationship between students and lecturers.

Expert evaluation of innovations in higher education in Ukraine. In recent years higher school Ukraine has undergone a number of changes that have been actively discussed by the representatives of both higher school and community. According to the expert survey, the following changes are estimated as the most positive ones in Ukrainian universities: creating opportunities for academic mobility of lecturers, practitioners’ involvement in the learning process, innovations in organising and conducting research activities at the university, creating opportunities for academic mobility of students; transition to 2-level education: bachelor–master and others. Most of the innovations are in the area of positive assessments. The adverse reaction in the teaching environment is caused by those measures that increase bureaucracy. They are: formalisation of control over the lecturers’ work, increasing number of documents that record their activities; increasing time for students’ independent work and reducing time for classroom training; increasing number of written assignments, credits and exams. Thus, academic staff do not perceive activities that promote formalism in evaluating their performance and reduce space of direct communication with students, which is happening due to the total transition of Ukrainian universities to the written forms of control and assessment of students’ knowledge. Finally, the innovations applied to the system of higher education are strategically aimed at full integration of Ukraine into a single European education and research area. It can be concluded from our expert survey of lecturers that these changes are only entering the culture of Ukrainian universities, although the main ones are supported by the academic staff.

Expert opinion on the status and prospects of modernisation processes that occur at the level of higher education. Experts were offered, firstly, to evaluate the dynamics of change in their university for the last year, and secondly, to express their opinion on the priority issues that they believe should be solved
Khyzniak Larysa. Ukrainian universities in european educational and scientific space: achievements, opportunities and barriers

at the university. Almost 39% of the experts said that the situation at their universities did not change for the last year; almost 24% felt improvements and one third outlined that the situation at their university became worse. The experts, regardless of their gender, age, work experience, activity profile, academic degree, employment at a public or private educational establishment, noted the complexity of the situation nationwide.

Systemic crisis affected all the institutions of higher education in Ukraine, which requires finding ways to minimise the negative effects of existing risks. This is, why as part of the survey the experts were offered a projective situation: “Imagine that you are the President of your University. Which problems of the institution would you solve in the first place?” The data obtained in the course of our research shows that in the experts’ opinion the priority of issues is as follows. The first block consists of the problems (more than half of the experts pointed at them) of lecturers’ salary increase (63% of responses) and modern technical support of academic activities (51%). The second block (marked by 30 to 50% of the experts) included the problems such as academic mobility, collaboration with potential employers (37%), access to modern information and communication technologies. The third block consisted of the problems (noted by 20 to 30% of the experts) of lecturers’ professional development, organising individual workload of lecturers, diversification of funding sources of a university. These problems are perceived differently at Ukrainian public and private universities. At the same time, public and private universities have both common problems and differences. Thus, private universities have such problems as lecturers’ salary increase, support of the lecturers with great experience, virtualisation of the activities (website of the university, faculty, department), distance learning. Yet, public universities have problems associated with modern technical support of academic activities, access to modern information and communication resources, publishing. However, it should be kept in mind that Ukrainian public and private universities may have different ideas about the expediency of implementing certain innovations in the modernisation of higher education in Ukraine. For example, 42% of the experts at public universities called the issue of academic mobility an urgent problem and 30% – at private ones, but that does not mean that at private universities it is less common. The situation is similar with publishing because there is often a lack of funds at public universities, and private ones sometimes ignore it completely.

The experts’ evaluations point at differences in the urgent problems of universities depending on the length of the lecturers’ work experience. The experts with work experience of over 10 years are worried about their workload three times more than those who have been working less than 3 years. Obviously, this is influenced by the fact that the former had an opportunity to observe the process of raising initial workload of a higher school lecturer, which has taken place in recent years and has increased significantly the labour intensity of a lecturer, resulting in the lack of time for scientific work.

The experts generally described the impact of commercialisation on the higher education system in Ukraine as controversial, with some negative connotation. Most experts outline the unwillingness of Ukrainian universities to function in the market environment. Some experts admit the need to find
alternative sources of financing Ukrainian universities, but most of them tend to
the idea of direct funding of higher education from the state budget. This, in turn,
can be a significant barrier to social and cultural modernisation of higher education
in Ukraine, regardless of the basic models that will be used during this upgrade.

The existence of Ukrainian universities under pressure of the market economy
is problematic. In this vein, scholars outline the processes of commercialisation of
universities in Ukraine as state organisations; relations transformation with the
state and the emergence of new actors in the university field; the difference between
the level of the universities in addressing the needs of new social challenges set by
society, and the presence of their means and mechanisms for their implementation.
In Ukraine, on the one hand, the structure of training highly qualified stuff
does not meet the needs of the labour market, leading to unemployment of university
graduates and threatens to unbalance the quality of labour supply demand. On
the other hand, informational (post-industrial) society leaves no life-chances for
a person without higher education. Thus, dominant orientation of University
schools and departments is focused on harmonisation of relations between the
educational services market and the labour market.

Ukrainian students in teachers’ evaluations

Characteristics of a modern student: attitude to studying in expert
evaluation. According to most of the experts, positive characteristics of students’
attitude to studying are inherent in a smaller part of them. According to half of
the experts, there are some students, whose good attitude to studying is limited to
their presence in a classroom. Mostly, the attitude of students to studying is caused
by a pragmatic view, direct material interest, (for example, the role of student’s
rating in receiving scholarships) fear of sanctions that can be imposed on a student
by a lecturer for inadequate efforts; interest in the subjects studied; social and
psychological atmosphere in a student’s group; pragmatic (career) motives as the
desire to secure professional career; consideration for future employment success
and desire to become a highly qualified specialist. According to the experts, the
orientation of students to the result in study was the most important factor. Least
of all, the attitude of students to their studying is caused by parents’ control, self-
esteeem (“unwillingness to be left behind”), education fees. Thus, according to the
experts, pragmatic view dominates and depends on the demands of lecturers.

Independent work of students and the consequences of its volume growth
for modernisation of higher education. The experts believe that a considerable
increase in the volume of independent work has not forced students to work
more intensively and regularly throughout the semester. Perhaps this is because
independent work of students needs to be systematically monitored. Its methods
may be varied, including: current poll, express-control, test control, colloquiums,
etc. A significant increase in independent work did not help to deepen students’
knowledge, skills formation for working with educational and scientific literature
either and did not stimulate scientific research of students, their interest in
specific topics and issues. In terms of Ukraine’s integration into the European
educational space, more attention should be paid to research and methodology of research dedicated to improving the content and methods of optimisation of students' independent work. Organisation of students' independent work should be seen as a system of interaction between a student and educational material on subject that in case of its clear organising by a lecturer will provide activation of future professionals training, will strengthen creative and independent thinking. Therefore, the main task of independent work is the use of traditional and innovative forms and methods that, complementing each other, would form a system that could be adapted to the characteristics of the learning process at a particular higher educational establishment in order to optimise studying and training of highly qualified specialists.

Preventing plagiarism by students, expert evaluation. Successful modernisation of higher education is not possible without allocation of the factors that determine the quality of higher education and the transparency of its operation. Plagiarism has a negative impact on the quality of higher education and university science in general. For 45 % of lecturers it is sometimes possible to prevent plagiarism, 29 % – do it in most cases; 13 % – mostly fail; 3 % – fail to prevent plagiarism. Lecturers are concerned about the spread of plagiarism; all the participants expressed the need to prevent the spread of this phenomenon, develop conditions of mutual trust, high standards, openness and creativity, providing academic honesty of high quality.

Role of students in the rating and quality of lecturers. Innovations in higher education includes estimation of rating and quality of lecturers. It is a condition for implementation of competitive relations by which Universities may have objective parameters of evaluation of the teaching process.

More than half of the experts (54 %) determine the rating of the lecturers to be appropriate, regardless of gender, profile activities, work experience, employment in the public or private sectors of education. Almost one third are of the opposite opinion, they believe that rating of lecturers is pointless because it can negatively affect the moral atmosphere of the university. One in seven experts couldn’t determine their position on this issue.

Participation of students in determining the quality of lecturers’ work is becoming an increasingly common practice at Ukrainian universities, although it is seen as controversial by students and lecturers. Besides ethical aspects of this issue are undeveloped; this expert survey indicates the unwillingness of lecturers to the assessment of their work by students. Although nearly 51 % of the experts believe that it should be, because this technology is part of the feedback that allows lecturers to adjust their activities and relationships with students. Around 28 % strongly deny the possibility of an official, formalised assessment by students at their university. One in seven experts didn’t decide which position to choose on this issue. We’ve indicated the tendency that the longer the experts work in the system of higher education, the more negative attitude they have toward students’ assessment of lecturers. However, with the development of students’ self-government and the spread of their partnership with lecturers, students’ assessments of the quality of lecturers’ work are becoming more and more popular.
Ukrainian teachers: correspondence to the challenges of modernization of higher education

Expert evaluation of the prestige of the profession of a high school lecturer, similarities and differences of national lecturers and their western counterparts. The profession of a high school lecturer in modern Ukraine is inferior to other professions by the factors such as income, power, education and social reputation. Therefore, there is no coincidence that the prestige of the profession of a lecturer in Ukraine is estimated by experts ambiguously: 40% consider their work to be prestigious, one in three referred this job to non-prestigious ones, and almost 27% were unable to determine their position.

Half of the experts see no fundamental differences between Ukrainian lecturers and their western counterparts due to such characteristics as “responsibility”, “level of organisation”, “teaching skills” and “scientific qualification”. However, most Ukrainian lecturers are inferior to the western ones in “knowledge of foreign languages” and academic mobility. Fewer experts consider such features as “computer training”, “ability to establish professional communication” to be the ones with which Ukrainian lecturers feel less qualified than their western counterparts. An interesting situation can be seen in comparison of evaluating such position as “computer knowledge”, where there are the largest differences in the estimation of experts: 51% of them think that local lecturers are not inferior in computer knowledge to their western counterparts, while a third (34%) has the opposite opinion and only 4% indicated that Ukrainian lecturers are more qualified than their western counterparts. We should mention that 9–16% of the experts couldn’t decide which position they support as to comparison of advantages and disadvantages of local and western lecturers. This can be partly explained by insufficient awareness of Ukrainian lecturers of the abilities of their international counterparts. Even in our group of experts only 3% have experience of teaching at Western universities, less than a third (31%) participated in international conferences held abroad (countries of the former USSR). For this reason, a large number of experts (almost 30%) were unable to assess the level of higher education in Ukraine as compared with the European Union or other “western countries”. The opinions of experts are significantly different: 40% believe the quality of higher education in Ukraine is generally much lower than in the EU or other western countries, 22% felt that the education system is a comparable equivalent and 8% said that the level of higher education in Ukraine as a whole is much higher than in the EU.

Educational, methodical and scientific work of lecturers: compliance to the challenges of modernization. One of the ways of Ukraine’s educational system modernization is implementation of the innovative educational technologies and methods in the educational process of higher education establishments. The most common among lecturers are such types of work as constant course content updating, the use of new publications and research results (76%), regular content updates controls, tests, assignments for independent work etc.; constant improvement of their professional competence; constant contact with students, including via the Internet; active research activities (participation in conferences, writing articles, etc.) (72–74%). Less common is the use of new informational and
communicational technologies in the teaching process; use of innovative teaching methods; non-standard forms of training (55–66 %).

Information and communication technology in the arsenal of the lecturers of Ukraine. Hopes for the modernization of higher education today are largely connected with the introduction of new informational and communication technologies, which should be acquired by all members of the educational process. The survey found out the expert opinion s to which of these technologies local lecturers are equipped with, and thus allow them to meet modern professional requirements. Among the expert lecturers, the most widespread requirement is the use of electronic textbooks, manuals, teaching materials (75% of responses). About a third (62%) of respondents use electronic resources of libraries. Almost the same number of lecturers practice e-mailing the tasks to students. 60% of expert lecturers have got presentations to accompany the lectures which can be greatly constrained by the lack of appropriate technical support at some universities. Ukrainian higher education is on the verge of transition to on-line studying technologies, and yet lecturers may not be ready for it. Yes, only 9 % of the lecturers use video lectures. The same number of them has their own web resources. The higher education system is developing today on a new technical and technological basis, but Ukrainian lecturers are significantly behind their western counterparts in learning new information and communication technologies, which can be a barrier to the modernization of higher education in Ukraine.

Expert evaluation of affordability of scientific and pedagogical experience of western counterparts for lecturers in Ukraine. United European educational and research space is gradually opening for national lecturers. This takes place mainly through participation in international scientific events and marginally – due directly to teaching in western universities, research abroad, participation in international research projects. Unequal opportunities for exchange of experience of the local lecturers with their western counterparts depend on whether they have scientific degrees and whether they work at public or private universities. Lecturers of public universities have more opportunities to learn from the experience of their western counterparts. Among the experts and lecturers of public universities 18% were trained at Western universities and research centres (only 10 % at private universities), one in three participated in international research projects (only one in ten respondents at private universities) one in three has experience of international scientific conferences held abroad (only 22 % at private universities). To some extent, it indicates that lecturers of public educational institutions can more quickly master new educational and scientific technologies that are common in Western countries than their counterparts at private Ukrainian universities. However, this may slow down the processes of modernisation in the private education sector.

Integration processes in the field of university education are now reinforced by globalisation, which became the determining factor in the development of post-industrial world. This is evidenced by the following: appearance of new forms of learning and new areas of international education based on the latest information and communication technologies; increasing number of research centres involved in the current issues of training and developing appropriate
recommendations; attempts of the developed countries to conduct a coordinated policy and even to develop a common strategy in the field of education, including university. Internationalisation of higher education is transforming national education systems. It allows to improve the quality of education through more active use of scientific and educational potential of leading European universities.

Ukraine has activated the transition to the multi-level system of staff training and continuous education system that meets the requirements of market economy principles and functioning of the united European educational space. Moreover, it is advisable for this purpose to use new communication models in the area of university research and education. So far, communicative means of integrating universities into the common European educational space have not been developed, especially considering the changes that are occurring in the modern educational infrastructure. Standardisation, unification, mass character and individualisation of university education, existence of universities at the crossroads of different cultures – all this updates the role of new communication practices in the movement of universities to the creation of a united European educational and scientific space.

References


GENDER SPLIT S IN THE SPHERE OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

Olena Muradyan (Kharkiv)

This chapter is devoted to analysis of the level of economic activity and employment of population, of the problem of unemployment and occupational segregation by gender, of the level of access to work, of the perception and evaluation of professional perspectives in the gender dimension. It is noted that speaking about gender splits in any sphere is possible only if they are politically formulated. It is observed that gender inequalities arise at different levels and between different groups - between men and women, between heterosexuals and homosexuals, between the conditional gender "norm" and queer communities, etc. It is specified, that despite the warnings regarding the limitations of the conceptual-terminology apparatus, we can conclude that there is a gender division in the sphere of economic activity of Ukrainians: the main lines of this split are the weaker positions of women in terms of chances of finding a new job, a significantly lower female representation in the manufacturing sectors and in managerial positions, and greater availability of starting their own business for men. In the same time we have also seen the signs of discrimination against men in matters of employment, and the ambiguity of women's assessment of their own capabilities.

Keywords: gender, gender inequality, gender perspective, gender splits, economic activity.
Before addressing gender issues and splits in the field of economic activity, it is necessary to indicate somewhat more general positions. Firstly, the gender perspective in Sociology remains acutely controversial. And the controversial status is not a consequence of ideological opposition of purely imaginary sociologists reactionaries (although some colleagues are making attempts to block the gender issues in Sociology) and stems from the complex nature and blur character of gender issues as such. This blur character is inherent in any relatively new (in the sense of “non-sustained”) subjects, but gender is further eroded by extremely urgent updating in the political and moral spheres. The complexity of sociological analysis of a gender perspective is determined by the non-obviousness of the actual sociological aspects of its content. Thus, many arguments can be cited in favor of the reducing the content to psychological or social and psychological aspects, even with the appeal to the logic of some activists of gender movements that focus primarily on the need to address the conflict of personal choice and social and political normativity (certainly, only on the benefit of personal choice). Hypertrophy of a personal aspect enables to minimize the sociological dimension of gender perspective. However, such a hypertrophy can hardly be recognized as a sufficient foundation for the assignment or exclusion of any topic from the problem field of Sociology. Moreover, even if one concentrates exclusively on a conflict around a personal choice, it is still difficult to find grounds for ignoring the social nature and consequences of this conflict. However, we must admit that there are more serious counterarguments regarding the appropriateness of sociological research on gender issues. In particular, if we put aside the discourse of discrimination against minorities and apply optics of studying social groups to gender issues, we are immediately faced with difficulties, since a number of objects above discourse have no signs of a social group (e.g., everyone who is marked with LGBTQ acronym with the exception of the first two letters). Do these difficulties mean that we must study these objects only within the limits of Sociology of personality or only with the tools of high-quality methodology and microsociological approaches? Despite the relevance of emergence of this issue, we note that the answer may not be simple, even recognizing the appropriateness or necessity of microsociological view of the gender perspective does not automatically mean sufficient recognition of this view. Even if one is limited with the LGBTQ discourse, the first two letters which were excluded from the object of attention, in fact, constitute a clear majority of LGBTQ movement and have all the features of social groups. Since gender perspective is not limited with
LGBTQ problems, and the object of gender research includes all possible genders, also described difficulties are not insurmountable and gender issues are open for quantitative methodology.

An important condition for the realization of this openness is the specification of the problem to a level that provides the possibility of quantitative comparison. In fact, the use of data obtained through mass surveys almost automatically limits the potential research object of all possible gender groups to men and women. The reason is not only that the questionnaires of mass research (including the research of topical problems of Ukrainian society, conducted in August-September 2017 by the Sociological Association of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Institute of Social Research named after Alexander Yaremko) are traditionally not aimed at distinguishing other gender groups, except for women, men, girls and boys. Important factors of narrowing the object to these gender groups are the lack of quantitative significance of some of the other gender groups (transgender, queer, etc.), their specific (from uncertain to negatively marked public opinion) social status (at least in many post-socialist countries). Accordingly, LGBTQ representatives need more individualized research methods, both from the point of view of ensuring communicative comfort of respondents / informants, and avoiding the creation of non-sociological quantitative artifacts by constructing “study” groups.

Consequently, we note that the term “gender” in the title of this paragraph reflects exclusively sexual social characteristics, reversals of “gender division” and “sexual division” are used synonymously, and it will be about inequality in the field of economic activity between women and men that can create random “feminist” effects. However, narrowing “gender” to “sexual”, provided it is conscious, and not sporadic character, even specifies the sociological problematization of the topic, since some of its sharply popular aspects (for example, the rights of transgender children or queer socialization) are obviously relevant, but whether this actuality contains a sociological component, is not clear. On the contrary, inequality on the basis of gender in the economic and political spheres is quite a well-established subject of sociological study.

Before turning over to the consideration of the sphere of economic activity, let us dwell lastly on terminological problems, namely on the concept of “gender splits”. The term “split” is rather difficult to define, since it is closely (to the elimination of boundaries) related to the concepts of “division”, “segregation”, “delimitation”, “break” and all this non-strict terminology series has a certain estimated load. In the most detailed terms, the term “split” is developed in political sociology, where its understanding is based on the concept of “cleavage” (demarcation) of Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan, and resonates with the theories of a divided society. The basic interpretations of these concepts can be summarized in two approaches. According to the first one, the conditional terminology series “split” - “demarcation (cleavage)” - “division" reflects the growth of contradictions and conflicts between social groups. Although semantically, the “split” is sharper and more obvious than demarcation and division, it is also more
dynamic, which greatly enhances opportunities and increases the likelihood of overcoming it. Another point of view interprets the split, on the contrary, as a permanent form of division, which it acquires only under conditions of political articulation. That is, the division and delineation of this approach are seen as fragmented views and orientations, unsystematic practices, while articulation in some way institutionalizes them to the state of split. But with this approach, the semantic properties of each of the terms are even more distorted than in the first case. After all, if splits can be numerous at any level, and the dynamics of their occurrence, disappearance, aggravation is super-high, then the delineation is already the scale of the interactions of large social groups, whereas division is a characteristic of society as a whole (Дубляш, 2015). The split requires only political articulation, whereas division is embodied in political polarization and the creation of a conflict (force) field. Separation is not yet a division, and can be embodied in various forms, but, unlike splits, it has a certain historical extent. Divisions, in this way, can be both precursors to the distinction and the forms of embodiment. From this point of view, the two above-mentioned approaches lose their independent significance, since the relation within the terminological series becomes nonlinear. What matters to us is that the split reflects the acquisition of intergroup controversies of a conflict character, up to collisions, and the fact that any social split has a political dimension; one can even say that the split is the result of politicization of the inequality in question.

So, speaking about gender splits in any sphere is possible only if they are politically formulated, at least - with political articulation of one or another inequality. Gender inequalities arise at different levels and between different groups - between men and women, between heterosexuals and homosexuals, between the conditional gender “norm” and queer communities, etc. Some of the listed varieties of gender inequality are politically articulated - in particular, this is true of the inequality between men and women (which has received political formulation at least within the feminist movement) and between heterosexuals and homosexuals (articulated and updated in the political plane in the last quarter of the twentieth century; the beginning of the 21st century provided a new political acuity for this inequality as a result of the globalization of the Western standard of tolerance on the states of Eastern Europe and the development of the deep geological opposition to this standard). The politicization of a gender perspective, which is characteristic for the present time, has a certain retroactive effect, causes social effects that affect, including gender inequalities themselves (Мурадян, 2017). This gives grounds for at least suggesting the hypothesis of the existence of gender splits along these lines in various spheres of public life. It is worth recalling the connection between gender inequalities, and, as a consequence, splits, with inequalities and fractures by class, race, ethnicity, etc. In this regard, the attention of the theorists of socialist and post-colonial feminism was emphasized in due time; recognition of this connection not only requires a fundamental distinction between gender inequalities in the societies of developed and third-world countries, the separation of gender discrimination
against white-poor women and homosexuals from gender discrimination against colored poor women and homosexuals, but also forces them to focus on macro-scale manifestations of gender inequality and splits taking into account the socio-historical features of the investigated society.

The specifics of the gender perspective in Ukraine are to some extent built on the Soviet foundation. I. Tartakovskaya points out the differences between the Soviet representations (with representations of Western feminist movements) about the most pressing problems of gender inequality, in particular, inequalities between women and men. Because of the matrilocularity of Soviet society, Soviet women were independent; leadership in the family sphere was fixed by women, and despite the preservation of men’s freedom to spend free time and money, the pressure of the patriarchy was not an issue for a Soviet woman. However, family leadership was not as attractive as for Western radical feminists¹. Men’s domination in publicity and politics was offset by strict state supervision over these spheres, and labor relations (taking into account the positive dynamics of the institutionalization of the social and labor status of a mother) were relatively uniform. With the cessation of the existence of the USSR, the system of supporting the usual male and female economic roles was subjected to the greatest destruction as a result of the tacit removal of the state from the provision of this system, but the samples of gender relations have largely survived: the post-Soviet role of a working mother is much more complicated than the Soviet one to perform, but positive changes in perception and evaluation of this role have not taken place (Тартаковская, 2005: p. 135-137).

It should be noted here that the inconsistency between economic and socio-political changes, on the one hand, and the transformation of stereotypes and ideas about gender, on the other, raises the issue of gender identification for both women and men. Again, the Soviet “gender foundation” has to be taken into account, which largely deactivates certain aspects of “traditional” (that is, “male-female”) gender asymmetries, while exacerbating the other ones (for example, hetero-homosexual). The fulfillment of the usual for the Soviet order men’s gender roles in the new (and also those undergoing almost regular destabilization) economic conditions turned out to be no less complicated than similar women’s ones. This suggests that for the economic activity of Ukrainian citizens not so much gender splits or gender segregation as nonlinear, multi-dimensional gender inequalities are characteristic, the exacerbation of the latter takes place according to the logics different from the polarization one. Is there generally sufficient or adequate in such conditions to use the terminology based on the concepts of “splits” or “divisions” – this question remains open. Perhaps its application only completes the illusion of the uniqueness of gender relations in various areas of social interaction; perhaps only allows to manipulate, reconcile, or even identify gender relations with class relations in a manipulative way (so that in the further consideration it could be possible to shift focus from class conflict to (possibly

¹ Tartakovskaya notes that the family leadership of a Soviet woman relied on a significant expansion of the area of responsibility and increasing the burden of duties.
enforceable) gender ones); any of the critical hypotheses requires a detailed consideration, for which there is no place in our text. We do not propose to ignore the possible limitations of the use of the “split” terminology, but as long as we are not able to elaborate on these limitations, we will apply the term “split”, referring to its convention about gender positions in economic activity².

According to the results of the above-mentioned study of the Sociological Association of Ukraine, the gender distribution does not affect such indicators and characteristics of economic activity as the terms of the job search, the preferred ways of such search, or the respondents’ assessment of the suitability of their work, and

² Although it should be noted that this term seems conditional only at the theoretical level, since empirical evidence of split and discontinuities are numerous. Thus, the report of the International Labor Organization «Salaries in the World in 2016-2017» fixes the gender pay gap in favor of men in almost all countries (in European countries as a whole, at around 20%, and among those who receive high salary, this gap is doubled) (Заработная плата в мире, 2017: p. 83). But at the same time it is noted that this gap is lower than in previous years (Николаев, 2017: p. 4); consequently, there is a reason for refraining from unambiguous conclusions.
the salary used in the work of the effort. However, gender inequality is already fixed at the level of actual employment: among those who do not work, women are significantly above 63% (see Figure 1). On the one hand, this is a consequence of somewhat longer life expectancy of women in Ukraine, as a large proportion of those who do not work are pensioners, and among them women are more numerous for this reason.

On the other hand, women experience more difficulties with employment – due to frequent refusals of employers, due to problems with returning to jobs after maternity leaves, etc. It is indicative that the difference between men and women with job discrepancies is due to their gender (see Figure 2).

Undoubtedly, it can be assumed that a part of women who are faced with refusals because of their gender, in a specific way interpret the usual refusal of the employer and unreasonably attribute the “sexual” subtext to the situation. But, firstly, the perception of an employer’s act as discriminatory for such an extent is no less significant than objectively proven discrimination (let us recall Thomas theorem); secondly, among those who gave an affirmative answer to this question, women make up 80%. To assume that all of them characterize refusals as “sexually-motivated” is hardly possible.

The same applies to the answers to the question of the refusal to employ due to the family status of respondents (see Figure 3).

The distribution of positive responses to this question is even clearer: women account for more than 88% of those who are faced with refusals because of their marital status. This is highly indicative of the negative stereotype of the family tension on women, which is seen as a burden that will inevitably prevent them from fully responding to labor duties, whereas for men, the family burden is not considered to be either mandatory or so large as to «compete» with labor. It should

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3 That is, in our case - inequality on the basis of gender.
4 For all distributions discussed below, the coefficients of the presence of connection are reliable and significant at 99%; the percentage difference is also significant at the same level.
also be noted that there was no connection between the respondents’ gender and the distribution of responses to refusals not only because of language, age, political or religious views, but also through appearance and sexual orientation.

However, the impact of the respondents’ gender on their responses to the ease of employment in case of loss of the available workplace is evident (see Figure 4). Thus, among those who believe that without difficulty will find a new job, men prevail (64%), while among skeptics there are 57% of women. One can argue about how these assessments reflect the real state of affairs and how stereotypical the fears of women are due to their biased attitude to the «patriarchal» society, but it is unlikely that such a division should be explained solely by illusory women’s fears: at least a certain part of validity in these ratings is present. Figure 4. Respondents’ assessment of the ease of finding a new job in case of loss in a gender dimension (percentage, % of the total number of those who chose a specific answer)

The data on this issue seem even more revealing, if you note that the very threat of women’s loss of work is not connected with their excessive anxiety. Yes, men are more numerous (due to the general prevalence of men among those who work) both among those who feel such a threat as significant, and among those who deny it; and only in the conditionally “moderate” group of respondents who consider such a threat weak, the number of men and women is almost the same (see Table 1).

### Table 1

Perception of the threat of job losses in a gender perspective (percentage, % of the total number of those who chose a specific answer)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answers to the question: “Do you feel the threat of the loss of your main job?”</th>
<th>Gender of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, can lose in the nearest 3 months</td>
<td>55.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, can lose in the nearest 12 months</td>
<td>57.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat is weak</td>
<td>50.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No such threat</td>
<td>55.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Returning to the analysis of the employment structure, a certain gender split is fixed not only at the level of predominance of women among those who do not work, but also in the gender distribution of permanent workers and freelancers (see Table 2): the share of the former men and women is almost equal, while 67% of freelancers is made up by men.

Table 2
Form of employment in a gender perspective (percentage, % of all the total number of who chose a specific answer)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form of employment at the main working place</th>
<th>Gender of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have a permanent job</td>
<td>51.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have a project / temporary job, freelancer</td>
<td>67.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>56.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not work</td>
<td>36.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This can be explained by the fact that the areas of employment where freelance is most demanded are more likely to cause male interest (as, for example, the IT sphere) and the attractiveness of women to a more stable position due to the greater scope of responsibility generated by the Soviet gender foundation as it was indicated at the beginning of this chapter. We can note that from the point of view of protecting labor rights, freelance is the least secure form of employment, and, therefore, it is not entirely necessary to treat this state only from the romantic positions of «male adventurous activity and tendency toward independence»; it is necessary to take into account the possible discriminatory effects of such a situation for men - in contrast to the gender distribution of employment (see Table 3).

Table 3
Type of employment in a gender perspective (percentage, % of the total number of those who chose a specific answer)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of employment at the main working place</th>
<th>Gender of the main respondent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are hired in private sector</td>
<td>60.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are hired in state sector</td>
<td>36.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are self-employed</td>
<td>68.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>56.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As far as we can see, among the hired in private sector employees and among the self-employed the number of men is significantly higher (61% and 69% respectively), while among hired state employees 63% are women. It is worth considering this as a cumulative effect, on the one hand, of conscious choice, the purposeful provision of benefits for men and women by different types of employment, on the other hand, the implementation by men of the gender role of «an active and independent participant in the economy». In favor of this latter suggestion is also the fact that men prevail among those who work without formal registration – 66%, whereas among the officially hired men and women are on an equal footing. As an additional argument, it is possible to consider the data of the gender cross-section of answers as for their own business (see Figure 5).
Social and professional status in gender cross-section (percentage, % of the total number of those who chose a specific answer)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Your social and professional status today</th>
<th>Gender of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of an enterprise, organization</td>
<td>75.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of a department of an enterprise, organization</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrepreneur</td>
<td>64.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialist with higher or vocational education</td>
<td>39.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil servant</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military person, representative of Security Service of Ukraine, Ministry of Internal Affairs, etc.</td>
<td>75.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worker without specialized education</td>
<td>22.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qualified worker</td>
<td>62.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unqualified worker</td>
<td>54.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural worker</td>
<td>64.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

67% of men among business owners versus 46% of men in the whole array of respondents are quite revealing, although it can be assumed that such a ratio reflects not only the fulfillment of the above-mentioned «active and independent» gender roles. However, one way or another, this can be considered a manifestation of a gender split, even if there is room for discussion of its degree and severity. And it should be noted that this split can be traced also in the level of desires and intentions regarding their own business (see Figure 6). The most evident in these data is the difference between the gender distribution in the groups «Want and plan to start my own business» and «Want, but do not have the opportunity»: if in the first group men definitely prevail with 62%, in the second one the amount of men is already 10% less. This can be interpreted as the inequality of women and men at the level of self-assessment, affecting both self-confidence and overall self-esteem, and...
may well be interpreted as one of the symptoms of a gender split in economic activity.

The gender distribution of social and professional status also gives arguments in favor of the split hypothesis (see Table 4). The list of statuses among which women are predominant is quite eloquent: specialists with higher or secondary vocational education (61% of women), state civil servants (60% of women) and workers without formal education (77% of women). At the same time, men’s dominance is the most noticeable among heads of the organizations (75%) or departments (67%), military people and employees of law enforcement agencies (75%), entrepreneurs and farmers (64% each), and farmers in general are fully represented by men. Qualified workers are also predominantly men (60%). Taking into account the predominance of women among the unemployed, the wider representation of men among many statuses is not surprising. It is also possible to state the preservation of a traditional, stereotyped gender division of professional status: executive positions remain more «women», while leading and active positions (including farmers) are «occupied» by men. The analysis of the additional variable «social class»\(^5\) confirms this tendency: social classes «leaders» and «entrepreneurs» are 69% and 64% represented by men, while 63% of «workers with higher education» are women. However, if the split really exists, then it is not clear (although it has some political articulation) and can hardly be explained in a purely feminist way through the stereotypical and patriarchal basis of professional distribution. Since one should not forget that one of the «female» professional statuses - a specialist with a higher or secondary education - includes, for example, quite different employment positions in the sphere of education and science that are not limited to stereotypes (and to a certain extent stigmatized even in the times of «reorganization» of Soviet society and, moreover, in the post-Soviet period of the development of Ukrainian society) as a «teacher» and a «lecturer», and includes, among other things, research activities, which, in turn, cannot be considered purely «executive». The hypothetical split, whether unambiguous or not by nature,

\(^5\) Additional variables have been constructed.
is also confirmed by the gender division within the various branches of labor. Thus, according to the results of the study of the Sociological Association of Ukraine, it is obvious that male dominance in industry (66%), transport, communication, hotel and restaurant sector (69%), agriculture (72%), and especially building (90%) are obvious. In the scientific, informational, financial, and administrative services and public administration, a distribution is relevant for the entire array (54% of women), which, given the general prevalence of men among working respondents, appears to be more or less noticeable gender shift. But the most indicative is the gender division in the fields of education and health: 80% and 85% of women, respectively. This can still be considered an evidence of the preservation of the late Soviet gender split in the social and professional structure, which was also problematized, including the «female face» of pedagogy and medicine. We do not propose to take precisely this direction of problematics, but we will recall the influence of the Soviet gender foundation on the present and again we note: the split that is being considered is likely to be the result of the incompatibility of the Soviet gender roles of men and women with a fundamentally different political and economic system. Probably, the actual gender shift in certain spheres of social production was caused by the gradual «capitalization» of the Soviet economy in the last two decades of the existence of the USSR, and when, after the collapse of the USSR, such oriented to the design of the personality industries as education and medicine, continued the transition to the state of «service spheres» and to the market-profit principle of regulation, it only recorded a gender shift.

But the comparative graph of the gender cross-section of different sectors of employment clearly demonstrates a rather convincing split, not just a shift (see Figure 7).

These data do not give grounds for ambiguous interpretations: the proportion of women in a particular sector increases accordingly to the reducing the production content of this sector. This is yet another symptom and, at the same time, a measurement of the gender split in the field of economic activity.

Of particular interest in this background is the data on work in the family business - in terms of unequal gender inequalities in economic activity. Among those who perform unpaid work in the family business, men prevail (57%). Perhaps this is due to the fact that parents often seek help from boys (among the indicated respondents - up to 25 years old) than girls: parents engage them in family businesses as potential «heritors», especially if the business is related to spheres of motor transport, transportation, small-scale trade, etc. In this case, payment is often considered unnecessary since a young man in such work «acquires skills and experience» and at the same time «helps the family»; we must point out the unequivocal discriminatory potential of this kind of practice for men.

On the contrary, among those who worked before but do not work now, women are significantly more numerous than men (65% vs. 35%); the same applies to those who never worked but searched for work (respectively 70% vs. 30%), and those who did not work and did not search for work (90% vs. 10% respectively). Certainly, this is, on the one hand, a consequence of the general superiority of women over men among those who are not working. But, on the
other hand, such an obvious increase in the «female» shift depends on not so much the status of «non-working», but on the attempts to look for a job (or rather, on their absence) needs an explanation, even in case of absolute indices in the latter case (the total number of those who never worked and did not look for work was 10 respondents, among whom there was only one man), which, however, remains significant in terms of coefficients. It can be assumed that the potential tendency recorded is not evidence of a higher tendency for women to become spongers, but because men, especially in their youth, traditionally have tougher demands for job search from relatives and society.

The gender split in economic activity is complemented by the difference between men and women in such an aspect as labor abroad. Among those who worked abroad for more than a month in the past year, men (61%) are more numerous, which is likely to be considered as predictable, since men are more numerous among those who work. However, this can affect the complexity of interstate mobility for women (for example, women may be more devoted to anchors like children or parents, women are more difficult to enter some countries – for example, Israel – for legal reasons) or greater tendency of men to the so-called «higher labor abroad»; however, it should be taken into account that the male predominance is the result of the performance of a certain part of women and men in traditional gender labor roles, according to which family and, in this case, domestic work is fixed by wives, and a husband should be prepared for active up to adventurous search. So, among those who did not even think during the last year to go abroad to work, women make up almost 60%, while among those who thought about it occasionally or constantly – 42% and 45%.

Consequently, despite the warnings regarding the limitations of the conceptual-terminology apparatus, we can conclude that there is a gender division in the sphere of economic activity of Ukrainians. In a concise form, the main lines of this split are the weaker positions of women in terms of chances of finding a new job, a significantly lower female representation in the manufacturing sectors and in managerial positions,
and greater availability of starting their own business for men. There are grounds to argue that in the field of economic activity stereotypical division of occupations, forms and types of employment into «mostly women-like» and «predominantly men-like» is typical for most industrial societies. It can be assumed that this is the result of processes of concurrent consolidation and dysfunctionalisation of gender roles in the field of economic activity that began in Soviet times; processes that are contradictory both in their nature and in low, if not zero, compatibility with market forms of economic existence. Along with this, certainly, it should be noted that the hypothesis about the nonlinear and multidimensional nature of gender inequality in the field of economic activity has also received some confirmation: we have also seen the signs of discrimination against men in matters of employment, and the ambiguity of women’s assessment of their own capabilities, which suggests the need and prospects for further research on this topic.

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MECHANISMS FOR DEVELOPING SOCIAL CONVENTIONS IN HIGHER EDUCATION OF UKRAINE AS A PREREQUISITE OF ITS QUALITY ASSURANCE*

Svitlana Shchudlo (Drohobych)

The article is devoted to the search of the reserves of higher education quality increase. The author considers the quality of education to be the degree of education conformity to the needs of education entities for it.

The problem in educational quality assurance lies in lack of conventions in different educational actors’ needs of education. Tackling the problem deals with the matter of reaching consensus between educational actors as well as forming an efficient social partnership mechanism. The author suggests that quality assurance should be viewed as a convention mechanism.

From neoinstitutional point of view, the relationship between the above mentioned social actors in educational space is contract. This relationship is influenced by the variety of all the educational actors’ needs, expectations and aims.

Nowadays, the state domination in shaping educational norms and quality insurance is prevalent which does not go in line with modern reforms in education and society.

Educational democratization demands that the actors other than the state should be able to influence educational norms unlike in authoritarian states. By other actors I mean society, employers, students and academics.

The author associates the problems of ensuring the desired education quality with the diversification and the inconsistency of goals and requests to various subjects of the education. In order to solve the problem, the author suggests the formation of social conventions mechanism. The National Agency of Higher Education Quality should become the important platform for the educational needs adjustment.

Keywords: higher education of Ukraine, quality assurance, educational actors, social conventions in higher education.

**Problem statement.** The main objectives of modern education reforms in the national system of higher education is to enhance its quality and, as a result, to be competitive in the European Higher Education Area (EHEA). Ensuring the required quality of higher education is closely associated with social challenges. At various stages of its civilizational development, the society is placing on the system of education more and more new demands which are reflected in its goals. These goals, on the one hand, are quite permanent and, therefore, they are fixed and reproduced institutionally through the system of educational norms. On the other hand, they are rather dynamic, since society is constantly developing and changing its educational needs and demands.

We assume that the quality of education characterizes its compliance with public demands. The multifaceted needs of different participants in the education process are top-priority in every society and are caused by it. Thus, society determines the guidelines education should follow.

However, the relevance of assuring the quality of higher education, in our opinion, mainly consists of uncoordinated needs of various participants in the education process. Such a situation increases the need for consensus among the main participants in the education process. We believe that it can be solved only if an effective mechanism of social partnership has been created. In this case, the quality of education should be considered as a conventional phenomenon, which is the result of harmonious relationships among all the participants in education process and correlation of their needs with the legal requirements adopted in the education system, as well as socio-cultural needs of society (ЩуДjo, 2012: p. 174).

**Analysis of recent research.** In the suggested perspective, the quality of education has not been properly studied yet. Despite an abundance of research on higher education in sociology and the humanities in general, the quality of education in the context of sociological analysis is represented by insufficient scientific output: there are no special monographs dealing with this problem.

Scholars tend to briefly consider the quality of education, focusing on its certain aspects, such as factors and mechanisms for enhancing the quality of tertiary education in the context of promoting the knowledge society (V. Bakirov) and modernizing education (O. Navrotskyi), assuring the quality of higher education under the conditions of global challenges and lifelong learning (V. Astakhova), the criteria and indicators for evaluating the quality of tertiary education (K. Pavlenko), theoretical and methodological principles for exploring higher education and its quality (V. Chepak, I. Koshcheieva), the possibility and the prospects for conducting empirical analysis on the quality of education (V. Lukov, L. Sokurianska), the quality of educational services in the context of market relations and personal qualities of graduates (L. Khyzhniak, Ye. Podolska), the influence of academics’ performance...
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quality on the quality of higher education (K. Astakhova, V. Korzhiv, V. Kypen, K. Mykhailiova), etc. In addition, a rather insufficient attention has been paid to such issues as the connection between the quality of education and the axiological and normative systems of society, the needs and the requirements of various social groups involved in education process, relevant and perspective demands of the labour market for young specialists.

Sociological analysis of the problem under study is conducted in the context of applying neoinstitutional methodology, namely, actorcentric approach of M. Crozier, A. Touraine, F. Scharpf, D. Müller’s theory of contract, L. Thévenot and L. Boltanski’s convention theory, L. Sokurianska’s concept of social subjectivity. Therefore, the process of analyzing behaviour of participants in the education process and developing a model for adjusting their requirements for education should be scientifically effective provided it is based on neoinstitutional methodology and the above-mentioned theories. The problem can only be solved on the basis of social partnership mechanism, which is considered as a special system of educational relations, based on democratic principles of interaction and cooperation of all the interested stakeholders, who strive to enhance the quality of higher education.

The article’s aim is to identify the mechanisms for developing social conventions among the main participants in higher education in order to enhance the quality of education.

Results. As noted above, higher education is an environment with many “players”. Its contradictions are mainly connected with the disagreement between the goals of participants in the education process, different expectations and requirements imposed by them on education. In such a situation, it is imperative to coordinate the expectations and needs of all stakeholders and to ensure their interiorization with the system of education.

In this context, the quality of education should be viewed from two different angles: firstly, education standards and secondly, the demands of educational services consumers. In the first case, the quality is interpreted from the provider’s point of view, which means conformity of products or services with the requirements of standards or certification. The government mainly provides educational services through a network of educational institutions, and the quality of education is evaluated based on public mechanisms of licensing and accreditation. The second case implies the quality from the consumer’s point of view. The range of higher education consumers is quite broad. It includes students and their parents, potential employers, society as a whole. Moreover, it is rather challenging to draw a clear line between the providers and the consumers of educational services, since education is a special product that can be defined as the common good, whose “production” and consumption involve all the stakeholders mentioned above.

At the present stage, the prevailing role of the state and state authorities in the process of developing educational norms of higher education and evaluating its quality is explicit. So, the quality of education is mainly considered through the provider’s prism. This approach does not entirely correspond to the “spirit” of reforms, the integration of the national educational environment into the EHEA and the modern understanding of the education quality. In our opinion, the most optimal solution is to integrate these two aspects, namely, to discover such a formula of
quality that would coordinate the requirements of standards and consumers’ needs, as well as ensure their maximum compliance, that is, would be a conventional quality. Upon the adoption of the new Law of Ukraine “On Higher Education” (Про вищу освіту, 2017), this problem requires qualitatively new solutions. A newly established institution, the National Agency for Quality Assurance of Higher Education, is to meet the requirements of all stakeholders, to develop education standards and to monitor the quality of education.

The process of democratizing the educational space requires that the stakeholders influencing the development of educational norms should involve not only one “player” – the state, as admitted by authoritarian society, but also employers, students, professional academic communities, etc.

As noted above, an institutional structure of society determines “the rules of the game” in the social space of education. The main “players” are organizations, social groups and individuals, that is, those social actors who are able to influence current institutions and change them, formulate social inquiries in education and evaluate its quality. Having different interests and power of influence on the institution, “each social force attempts to impose its rules of the game on society or seeks to achieve a reasonable compromise” (Ядов, 2006: p. 19). The result of the agreement is manifested in the notions of a high quality education. Thus, studying the quality of education in the sociological context will be effective provided that it is viewed through the needs, expectations and requirements for education of the participants in the education process.

In our opinion, sociological analysis of interaction between the stakeholders in the market of educational services must take into account specificity of the social space, where they operate, namely, the educational space. Indeed, it specifies the interaction parameters. Modern educational space is extremely stratified. Due to the promotion of higher education, the increasing number of higher education institutions and higher education participants, this stratification is logically growing rather than mitigating. One can observe that the modes of education and the types of educational institutions are becoming more and more diversified. The sustainability of cultural models within the educational space should strengthen and stabilize the interaction, make it more predictable, eliminate social tensions and conflicts arising in education, its interaction with other subsystems of society.

Both stratification and agentality of education process have been reflected in P. Bourdieu’s theory of social fields (Бурдье, 2007). According to it, the position of the participant depends on availability and volumes of capital (both physical and symbolic), for which society constantly struggles. Education also appears to be a field in which “agents are struggling for capital” (Бурдье, 1996). We consider educational agents as essentially stratified, as they differ in their demands for education, orientations and values of education and the criteria for evaluating its quality based on their social status.

In order to understand the behaviour of education process participants in the context of neoinstitutionalism, it is essential to analyze one of its main methodological principles according to which the business entity is not entirely rational, as revealed in H. Simon’s theory of bounded rationality. The irrationality of education process participants is quite obvious and must not be ignored.
Several groups of participants in the education process are formed in the higher education area. These groups are distinguished on the criteria of production, distribution and consumption of educational services. A. Vroeijenstijn (Вроейнстийн, 2000) identifies the following groups of participants in education process: students, teachers (academic community), employers, government (the state), and society as a whole. We consider this list to be rather broad but not entirely exhaustive.

Sociologist K. Pavlenko (Павленко, 2009) distinguishes the participants in the education process according to the groups of interests:

- state institutions interested in the effective use of educational institutions’ resources aimed at providing educational services in accordance with the needs of the labour market;
- civil society institutions interested in increasing the level of culture in society, promoting values, ensuring equal access to education;
- students and their families interested in comfortable learning, obtaining education, which guarantees further employment and personal development;
- employers expecting professional profile of graduates to meet the requirements of the occupied position;
- academics interested in ensuring academic freedom, development and effective knowledge application;
- managers of higher education institutions interested in effective institutional management.

L. Yakovenko and O. Pashchenko offer an economic view on the structure of participants in the educational services market:

- consumers (purchasers) who receive educational services (natural persons or teams);
- producers (suppliers) who provide educational services (state or private educational institutions, legal or natural persons);
- the state that regulates the market through various instruments in accordance with education policy (state order to implement professional training of specialists based on state funding);
- society as a whole, since it is affected by the influence of the population’s increasing or decreasing educational level on social climate (Яковенко, Пащенко, 2011: p. 108).

In the given classification, consumers and producers are clearly differentiated. Within the educational sphere, however, all participants are directly or indirectly involved in the process of producing educational services.

Taking into account different approaches to identifying the structure of participants in the education process, the most complete list of them can be presented, in our opinion, by such elements:

- the state, which is the legislator, that defines and shapes education policy, establishes educational norms (standards) through its relevant bodies. Its competence includes a contract with an educational institution to produce educational services;
- educational institutions, academic community, which are direct producers of educational services;
- students and their parents; these two groups can be considered separately or together. An umbrella criterion for them is that they are the main consumers
of educational services in the market of educational services. The difference is manifested in different expectations and requirements for education. Students are direct consumers of educational services, and parents mostly investors in their children’s education. Therefore, they expect a quick and maximized result from the investment made;

- employers (public and private companies) are indirect consumers of educational services;
- public professional communities (agencies), that conduct external evaluation of higher education quality;
- society, which generates its requirements for education and shapes social demand through its civil society institutions. These requirements mainly reflect the need for education to implement economic, social and spiritual functions.

So, in the educational space there is a wide range of stakeholders, whose significance of interaction is essentially increasing. L. Yakovenko and O. Pashchenko note that “the participants in the educational services market, as well as the participants in any other market, compete with one another” (Яковенко, Пашченко, 2011: p. 115). Effective and well-established communication among the participants in education process will contribute to harmonizing expectations and requirements of all the interested “educational players”. The identification of requirements is transformed into a continuous process of coordinating the interests of various stakeholders. In this situation, one can observe the need to create a system for monitoring the demands of the participants in education process. Such a system should identify the needs and expectations of consumers, evaluate customer satisfaction with the quality of educational services, compare expectations and actual customer satisfaction, implement measures to enhance the quality of educational services. Thus, education should be evaluated by different, however, consistent criteria that reflect various aspects of this phenomenon and its diverse demands.

In the context of neoinstitutionalism, the relations between social actors can be considered as contractual. These relations are determined by diverse needs of all participants in education process, their expectations and goals. The situation is complicated by the fact that “learning outcomes can be evaluated for different stakeholders (employers, academics, managers of higher education institutions, etc.) according to different criteria, in different dimensions and at different levels. The outcomes, however, will be always different” (Вроейстийн, 2000: p. 159).

Provided that the combination of these requirements is consistent and reflected in the system of norms regulating educational activities, the situation is considered to be optimal. Thus, compliance with these standards will determine the quality of education. Higher education aims to completely fulfill all the requirements that should be reflected in the formulation of its goals and objectives. The quality, however, is determined by the results of negotiations among all the stakeholders on expected requirements (see Figure).

The process of developing new social institutions depends on active interaction among all social actors. It should be noted that the participants in the education process have unequal rights, different status in educational organizational system and different powers to change institutional norms. V. Yadov indicates, that “some of them have significant economic, cultural, social and other status resources (so-called
resource-intensive ones), while others, who do not have such capital, are forced to obey the established requirements” (Ядов, 2006: p. 19). In the institutional space of education, the distribution of power and the mechanisms of influence on resource allocation and decision-making are fixed, legalized and legitimized. Multiple social actors interiorize or reject the current rules of interactions but also create alternatives. Agreed rules and code of conduct for group participants in education process are gradually affecting the institutional process. Thus, interaction among social actors reaches its influence on “the rules of the game”.

Taking into account axiological and normative nature of social institutions, there appears to be the problem of all institutional actors’ adherence to certain axiological and normative principles. S. Oksamytna states that “the values, rules and norms, publicly declared by institutional actors and actually embodied in the practice of institutional relations, do not always coincide” (Оксамитна, 2010: p. 6). Unfortunately, the problem of axiological orientations of the participants in education process has not been explored by national sociology. If axiological preferences of both students and academics frequently become the object of empirical research, one can only find little information about axiological representations of resource-intensive actors, who are mostly developers of institutional norms and practices. In addition to axiological orientations of all the participants in education process, further research is needed on cultural, political and legal conditions for their institutional interaction.

The view on the quality of education developed in the process of interaction among stakeholders, is the result of their coordinated interests, investigated contradictions that may arise in the process of evaluating quality and is rooted in the context of studying the mechanisms for their coordination. Proceeding from the neoinstitutional theory of conventions, L. Thévenot considers the harmonization of interests regarding the common good to be the harmonization of general evaluation. In this context, the scholar uses the term “coordination” (Тевен, 2001). In addition, specificity in evaluating products that are the common (public) good, in particular education, lies in the fact that individuals do not always interact, therefore they are deprived of the opportunity to directly coordinate their interests, which prompts them to be guided in disputes by some general guidelines.

L. Thévenot suggests a special arrangement of interaction and coordination of social actors in the situation with the common (public) good. In particular, the scholar offers the following mechanism:

**Figure** Quality as the Subject of Discussion among Stakeholders
• reference to general guidelines based on which one can build their own judgments and take them as a point of reference in disputes. Common guidelines include searching for points of view;

• focus on mutual reconciliation, which arises based on the generalized judgment and allows specifying universal actions (Тевенœ, 2001: p. 113). The author views these general guidelines as “the orders of worth”, or “significant orders”, and believes that they are related to the ideas of justice and moral standards.

As a result of disseminating the common good, a great number of individuals are involved in its preservation and reproduction, so that one can observe the actions of others. Therefore, it is crucial to develop general guidelines, derivative from widely distributed agreements and forms of general evaluation, which may become the limits for reaching an agreement. The scholar emphasizes the importance of involving all agents in this process. In the situation of the common good, the “collapse” of at least one agent may violate it as a whole (Тевенœ, 2001: p. 115). In this case, L. Thévenot states that all support elements (human or other) must be available.

Multiple subjectivity of social actors in the market of educational services actualizes L. Boltanski’s and L. Thévenot views on the application of the equivalence principle to conflict situations. “In order to criticize something, it is necessary to unite people and objects by establishing certain links between them. The process of uniting various objects or different facts must be justified by the equivalence principle, which indicates what they have in common” (Болтански, Тевенœ, 2000: p. 67). Different social actors’ views on the quality of education do not coincide, since education evaluation is based on nonconsistent criteria. One defines what learning outcomes they would like to achieve in their own ways. The participants in education process can be guided by “different time horizons, which affects their attitude to maintaining standards” (Дентон, 2005: p. 146). Different criteria for the quality of education cause differences in evaluation. According to L. Boltanski and L. Thévenot, “the application of the equivalence principle is a basic action that is necessarily performed in order to impose the requirement, indicate the injustice and demand implementation” (Болтански, Тевенœ, 2000: p. 70).

We agree with the position of the above-mentioned scholars that “disputes are always based on inconsistencies, the object of which is the relative order of worth

### Orders of worth (by L. Thévenot and L. Boltanski)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Order of worth</th>
<th>The world of inspiration</th>
<th>The home world</th>
<th>The civil world</th>
<th>The world of thoughts</th>
<th>The world of market</th>
<th>The industrial world</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The way to evaluate (worth)</td>
<td>Welfare, nonconformism, creativity</td>
<td>Respect, reputation</td>
<td>Collective interest</td>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Price</td>
<td>Productivity, efficiency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The type of relevant worth</td>
<td>Emotional worth</td>
<td>Verbal worth based on life experience</td>
<td>Formal and official worth</td>
<td>Semiotic worth</td>
<td>Monetary worth</td>
<td>Measurable criteria, statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic relations</td>
<td>Passion</td>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>Cohesion</td>
<td>Recognition</td>
<td>Exchange</td>
<td>Functional connection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s qualification</td>
<td>Creative and inventive skills</td>
<td>Authority</td>
<td>Equality</td>
<td>Prominence</td>
<td>Needs, purchasing power</td>
<td>Professional competency, professionalism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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or value of various entities” (Болтански, Тевено, 2000: p. 70). However, there exist different orders of worth. The scholars distinguish six worlds, within which people’s behaviour is modeled based on these orders, which are viewed as the criterion individuals apply to justify their judgments in everyday situations. This is the world of inspiration, the home world, the civil world, the world of thoughts, the world of market and the industrial world.

Based on the combination of six worlds, the scholars have created a matrix in order to identify the ways of legitimate criticism that are most frequently used in society (Болтански, Тевено, 2000: p. 76) (see Table).

Based on L. Thévenot’s methodology, one can distinguish several orders in evaluating the quality of education.

Civil order. In this case, the criteria for evaluating the quality of education are based on collective interest. The quality criteria are determined by the interests of society, appeal to “eternal values”. The legitimate model of the education quality is a model of individual socialization.

Market order. The criteria for evaluating the quality of education are based on private (business) interest. The quality criteria are associated with satisfaction of particular consumers. The legitimate model of education is aimed at providing such services so that the student and / or the employer may act as a consumer (principal).

Professional order. In this order, the criteria for evaluating the quality of education are based on professional community. The quality criterion implies the expert’s conclusion about the quality of the object in accordance with certain professional standards. The legitimate model of education provides for obtaining relevant professional knowledge, skills and competences.

Industrial order. The criteria for evaluating the quality of education are based on general criteria and requirements. In order to evaluate the quality, the object should not to be an expert. The quality criterion confirms the compliance of both process and result with certain standards and norms. The described model’s specificity is rooted in the fact that its implementation requires prior creation of criteria and indicators (“investment in the form” based on L. Thévenot’s terminology). The legitimate model of education implies acquiring certain knowledge and skills.

Nowadays, the order in the world of thoughts is becoming more and more important. M. Denton indicates, that “academic” products, that is, the results of the university’s activities, are reputable products, whose attractiveness is determined primarily by their reputation” (Дентон, 2005: p. 132). The worth of reputation as an asset is determined by the asymmetry of information about the quality of education among purchasers and providers.

In the context of neoinstitutional theory, when evaluating the quality of education social actors are guided by current institutionalized rules. They regulate their interaction. However, these rules are the sources of power. According to N. Fligstein, they allow some actors to reproduce their privileged positions (Флигстин, 2001: p. 121). Quality evaluation in this perspective is defined not only as a set of institutional rules, but also as a system of power relations. The current rules of evaluation relate to the interests of certain educational groups. Describing the mechanism of cognitive constructs’ influence on real behaviour, N. Fligstein uses the “concept of control”, which, on the one hand, determines which behaviour
makes sense, that is, is characterized by cultural models, and on the other hand, sets possible limits, which allow to interpret the actions of other actors, as well as to build a system for legitimizing their own actions. Based on N. Fligstein’s power-oriented approach, the described orders which justify the process of evaluating education quality function as the concepts of control, whereas institutional actors reproduce most appropriate to them justification orders.

Thus, the industrial order is reproduced by the “technostructures”, that is, the structures eligible to conduct accreditation and licensing of educational institutions. Indeed, different state structures establish educational norms, standardize education and act as guarantors that the level of educational services provided by educational institutions is not lower than the minimum permissible level adopted in higher professional education.

In this case, the power of state structures to evaluate the quality of education mostly influences the standardization of education process. The problem appears when representatives of “technostructures” are not really involved in education process. Therefore, they may not always be the experts in the object being evaluated and actually perform professional evaluation. In addition, state structures evaluate the quality of education through accreditation based on officially established and approved criteria and indicators. The determined requirements always have the lowest permissible level. Provided that educational institutions have overcome it, they are entitled to conduct educational activities. Thus, issuing the accreditation documents, the state recognizes educational services provided by a certain educational institution to be of a high quality. However, in practice, hundreds of higher education institutions train specialists according to the same programme. Due to state accreditation, they are equal in status in the market and obtain the same diplomas. However, the difference in graduates’ professional level at various educational institutions and the demand in the labour market are obvious. State accreditation as a tool for evaluating the quality of education does not record an elevated (or elite) level of professional training and does not motivate educational institutions to enhance the quality of educational services.

In this context, the market order for evaluating the quality of education seems to be more efficient. However, this order turns out to be the most controversial one. Based on the market world’s position, education evaluation is conducted by several social actors simultaneously, primarily by employers. Their evaluation of education quality is indirect, since these consumers do not directly interact with educational institutions regarding the “purchase” of educational services. It is possible to identify their requirements by including individual professionals in education process and creating a network of accreditation structures involving professional communities. Such evaluation will be more objective and independent. The criteria can be determined by corporate communities of educational institutions and employers. If state structures guarantee education to be not below the established limits, public professional accreditation can become the tool for determining the level of achieving norms. In this case, the basis of regulation should include “the portrait of the graduate” – a comprehensive competency – and qualification-based characteristics of personalized “result of education process”. This position corresponds to the global trend in understanding the quality of higher education – a new paradigm of education quality.

Secondly, the most important direct consumer of educational services is the
student. The evaluation of the market order is manifested in the study of students’ views on the quality of education. Moreover, in many countries such a toolset must be used in higher education and taken into account when undergoing accreditation (Lewandowski, 2000: p. 67). M. Denton also emphasizes the reverse (negative) effect of this process: in order to make students’ evaluations more attractive, academics will provide them with more preferences – “such a trend will aggravate the quality of education” (Дентон, 2005: p. 145). However, the problems that may arise within this procedure are determined by specificity of education as a product. “The enhancement of educational services quality is followed by the increase in the cost of not only production, but also consumption” (Ливни, Полищук, 2005: p. 78).

Thus, evaluating education quality, the student as a principal (consumer) becomes involved into a conflict of interests. They wish to obtain high-quality education with less time and effort. The market order actualizes educational institutions’ attitude towards the student as a consumer, creating “servility at different levels of education” (Павленко, 2009: p. 48) and, dangerously, reducing the requirements for education process.

**Conclusions.** Summarizing, it is important to note that none of the mentioned procedures can be accepted as the only correct and effective one. Given the fact that European countries aim to reconsider the government’s role in education management, which is becoming more and more decentralized, the essential prerequisite for developing the national education system involves ensuring the institutionalization of social partnership among various stakeholders in the market of educational services, developing educational conventions, which should be based on the standards of the National Agency for Quality Assurance of Higher Education, and integrating cooperation.

**Reference**


The context features of the Ukrainian ecological movement formation are discussed in this article. The methodological approaches, suggested by Western sociologists, do not apply in this case, since they consider the genesis of a civil society in terms of paradigms developed in conditions of Western democracies. The development of environmental movement is interpreted in terms of resource mobilization, implicitly based on the premise of their presence in the society. In order to understand the genesis of the environmental movement in Ukraine as a social phenomenon the author analyses social and environmental space in totalitarian society. In this article it is pointed out that this environmental movement has following distinctive features: close connection with the intellectual environment of Ukrainian society; dependence on particular field of science (production and distribution of ecological knowledge in the society). Macro- and micro-social conditions have significantly changed, thus influencing the modern development of the environmental movement in Ukraine. At the same time, it can be clearly observed that the values shifted towards a new environmental paradigm and towards the state environmental policy caused by inefficiency of the relevant government institutions.

Keywords: environmental movement, eco-NGO, environmental problems, network-model social subject, environmentalization.
Main stages of development

In order to understand the development of environmental movement in Ukraine as a social phenomenon, we should take into account socio-environmental milieus of the social movements in totalitarian society. In the case of Soviet society environmental movement, there are four basic types of such milieus: first, higher education institutions, especially Biology and Natural Sciences departments in universities; second, Academy of Science system of research institutes; third, legitimate professional unions, especially artistic unions such as the National Writers’ Union of Ukraine; and fourth, professional popular science periodicals.

Ukraine Nature Conservation Society (UNCS) was the main environmental non-government organization of Ukraine in Soviet times. UNCS was established in 1946 as the republican branch of All-Soviet Nature Conservation Society and as the only officially allowed environmental non-government organization. Only the best representatives of Ukrainian intelligentsia worked at the UNCS in the first years of its existence. However, during the Stagnation Era of 1970s the progressive educated staff was eliminated and replaced by officials from various ministries and government agencies (frequently not even related to environment protection), as well as by retired military, police and party members. At that time UNCS was not a milieu, which could conceive an environmental movement; it was rather a sight for sore eyes for the environmentally conscious part of the population, since the State would not allow the public to intervene in any significant public issues. The Society mainly concerned itself with educational issues, sometimes fighting poaching or other violations of environmental laws.

Mid-80s became the era of Environmental Squads (ES) which existed in virtually all Biology departments of universities and Natural Sciences departments of pedagogical institutes. Student Environmental Squads not only protected the environment but also performed an important function of youth socialization. Supervisors of these Squads were teaching the members to use their professional skills during raids and expeditions, as well as social techniques for communication within the organization, interaction with the population, with administrative authority bodies and the mass media. Unlike UNCS, the Squads gave the feeling of personal choice and their conflicts with authorities (mostly local and small-scale) hardened the youth and allowed them to consider environmental issues not only from a narrowly scientific but also from a social point of view. This is where many modern Ukrainian environmental movements originated.
It was extremely important for the development of the environmental movement in post-totalitarian Ukraine that membership in Student Environmental Squads and involvement in their activities was based on the values which will later be important for informal leaders of eco-NGOs: self-government as a way of life, a need for self-actualization related to the desire of being helpful and supported by like-minded people; as well as the value of self-preservation, of biological and social survival of the human race.

Another noticeable phenomenon of popular environmental activity before Perestroika was the work in hobby groups at young naturalists’ and young tourists’ stations. Environmental education in this system was connected to rather profound teaching while the stations themselves, especially with enthusiastic teachers, were doing a lot of really useful deeds within environmental realm.

In 1988, there were 233 active regional, district and city stations of young naturalists, and over 32 thousand groups of young naturalists which involved over 600 thousand school students. Besides that, there were over 40 thousand units of blue and green patrols, as well as anti-soil erosion posts, over 8 thousand student production units and 985 school forest districts1. Ranger stations often were and still are a real way of involving youth into environmental activities.

Thus, until mid-80s the environmental movement in Ukraine was represented exclusively by the Ukraine Nature Conservation Society and the Environmental Squads (the latter considered, or actually were, a part of the UNCS, either formally or informally); as well as Komsomol task force units, groups of community fishing inspectors and community hunting inspectors. The main product of this development stage of the “green” movement were these organizations themselves, their infrastructure and leadership. The state authorities allowed “green” organizations to exist but would not consider them to be equal or even alternative to political structures. This period also created the prerequisites for the next stage in the development of environmental movement by forming a pro-environmental public opinion.

Late 80s and early 90s in Ukraine witnessed a booming growth of the environmental movement. This stage of development can rightfully be called the phase of mass mobilization and consolidation. Most cities in Ukraine witnessed environmental rallies and protest marches, since rallying became the most convenient form of expressing new ideas.

It was rally as a form of collective social action which contributed to changes in the situational context of the environmental movement’s development. In the era of political instability and social disunity, rallies had a tangible identity-creating potential and performed a function of social integration. Rallies contributed to the self-assertion of their participants, they helped overcome the feeling of total dependence on the Soviet-model social system. Thus, rally became a direct prerequisite for united actions.

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1 L. Shevchuk. To know in order to preserve. An interview with L.P.Maronyk, the director of Republican young naturalists’ station, Molod Ukrainy (Youth of Ukraine), November, 22, 1988.
Environmental protest marches were actually the first wave of general democratic protest marches. Environmentally conscious public initiatives practiced double membership, i.e. both in a separate eco-NGO and in local and regional democratically oriented movements. In the latter social movements, environmental activists played the role of both experts and advisers. Leaders of democratic movement, being strongly aware of a high public’s opinion on the “greens”, as well as of the population’s environmental preoccupations during the first post-Chernobyl years, readily used environmental slogans in order to achieve their own political goals.

Open struggle of recently formed eco-NGOs against dominant ideology and existing social and economic system stimulated a broader understanding of the urgent need to protect their natural environment.

Particularly, people living close to nuclear power stations were preoccupied about a possible repetition of Chernobyl catastrophe; mass protest marches started around all of Ukraine’s nuclear power stations. Republican authorities, pressured by the public, started revising nuclear energy program in Ukraine. As a result, in 1990 the government stopped the financing of nuclear power station construction near Chyhyryn (Cherkasy region), as well as of nuclear heating stations near Kharkiv and Odessa.

In 1998, Crimean association of environmental NGOs “Ecology and Peace” was formed as a social response to the construction of Crimean nuclear power station. The struggle of the “greens” in Crimea, actively supported by the public, was successful. The construction of nuclear power station on the Crimean peninsula was discontinued. In the course of anti-nuclear campaign, the Association gathered 350 thousand signatures against the construction; it also organized multi-thousand rallies and pickets in Crimean cities and directly on the construction site of the nuclear power station (Crimean association, 1995: p. 9).

After the Chernobyl catastrophe Ukrainian writers played a very active role in the development of environmental movement by creating a new field of writing – environmental journalism. In late 80s Ukrainian writers sharply blamed Ukrainian authorities of environmental irresponsibility and concealing the truth about Chernobyl catastrophe from the public (Стегній, 2001: p. 65).

In early January 1988 the “Literaturna Ukraina” (“Literary Ukraine”) newspaper published a letter by a group of noted Ukrainian scientists who protested against the planned expansion of the network of Ukrainian nuclear power stations. This letter protected the interests of Ukrainian population from Soviet bureaucracy; it caused a wide response among readers and was an additional impetus for the waking up of mass environmental consciousness (Кулик, 1998: p. 66).

During the same period, eco-NGOs and local movements were united as a result of mass mobilization; intensive organizational consolidation of all-Ukrainian environmental movement was started. A dual mechanism of “concentration and decentralization” emerged in the forming of the environmental community. Local environmental groups contributed to the creation of mass environmental
Ukrainian Green as an actor of alternative environmental policy

Ukrainian Environmental Association (UEA) “Green World” was formed as an organization in late 1987; at that time it was comprised of 27 organizations. Well-known Ukrainian writer Sergii Plachynda became the first head of the Association; and in the spring of 1988 the first conference of UEA “Green World” was held. This launched the development of the strategy and tactics of environmental movement in Ukraine. The main goal of the Association, according to its Statute, was to “involve broad public into solving environmental problems through the ideas of survival, democracy and humanism, contributing to ensure the right to healthy environment which is one of inalienable human rights for Ukrainian SSR citizens” (Statute of Ukrainian, 1990).

During this time, public environmentally-oriented initiatives and organizations were active in most cities of the country. Participants in newly formed eco-NGOs, actively supported by local populations, tried to single out and resolve specific environment preservation tasks at local levels. During this time not only narrowly focused nature-preserving organizations, but also broader environmental institutions are formed in Ukraine aiming at the dissemination and consolidation of environmental culture, at environmentalization of all vital activities of Ukrainian society.

As future events will show, growing public attention to environmental problems in the latter half of the 80s was, most likely, not as much a result of more environmental mass consciousness but rather was caused by a confluence of social and political circumstances, such as the reaction of Ukrainian society to the Chernobyl catastrophe; general public support of national independence; political novelty of “green” ideology at the beginnings of multi-party political system.

Environmental groups from various Ukrainian regions attempted to coordinate their activities and that led to the first all-Ukrainian UEA “Green World” congress in October 1989. At this congress the intention to create a “green” political party was voiced for the first time.

In December 1989, the UEA “Green World” was registered by the Ukrainian State Nature Preservation Committee as an all-Ukrainian environmental organization. With the purpose of creating a democratic image of the organization, its Statute set the important principle of associative building of the organization. Local environmental groups were guaranteed autonomy, given they follow the Association’s general statute and program.

Most environmental groups of the time joined the Association, for becoming a member was rather simple – it only required filing an application.

Having false idea of what general environmental movement was, namely the Association’s refusal to work out strict criteria for applicants, brought the organization to lumpenization. Practically anyone could come to its meetings since they were absolutely open for public, which led to discussing the most diverse matters starting from student hunger strike or miner strike and ending with environmental issues themselves. Professional ecologists, after having
to face incidents concerning aggressive dilettantism, political bias of certain “revolutionary inclined” activists, or aimless debates, were forced to discontinue active participation in such an organization.

Meanwhile, new political parties started to form, and a large part of socially active citizens became their social base. In the spring of 1990, the Party of Greens of Ukraine (PGU) headed by Yuri Scherbak, emerged out of the most politicized nucleus of the “Green World”.

Having identical aims, the party and the Association went on functioning in parallel ways and trying to be different in the methods and forms of achieving virtually the same goals. The PGU stated the participation in legislative bodies of all levels as its main task trying to create a political environmental lobby. At the same time, the UEA “Green World” aimed at solving environmental issues by means of influencing public opinion and forming environmental consciousness of the citizens. However, the party creation was not synchronized with a rather strict delimitation of the spheres of activity between the PGU and the UEA “Green World” which later caused a range of organizational problems.

In early 90s, signs of the environmental movement crisis in Ukraine became visible. During the election of the first President of independent Ukraine, the PGU failed in its attempts to nominate Y. Scherbak as the party’s candidate. The party failed even to gather the necessary 100 000 signatures supporting the “green” candidate’s nomination. Between 1991 and 1992, the party’s membership shrank fivefold from almost ten thousand to merely two thousand².

This failure was also an illustration of the constituency’s shrinking interest in environmental issues during deepening economic crisis. This was the time of social and economic disintegration, galloping inflation. Ukrainian society was going through socio-psychological pressure. Consequently, various political forces promptly adapted their slogans to the current conditions and declared the priority of first-level problems (welfare, personal security and health), thus leaving out environmental problems. Another factor affecting the situation was the growing disappointment of the population in parliamentary system and particularly in democratically oriented members of the parliament.

Absence of actual results in the environmental sphere triggered growing public pessimism regarding prospects of environmental improvement; public environmental activism was now regarded as a possible way for latent careerism and achieving personal profit. At the same time, environmental movement was losing its mass support in the form of public initiatives and media attention. Printed mass media felt the pressure of censorship, and since the “greens” advocated closing Chernobyl station and other nuclear power stations in Ukraine, activities of environmental non-government organizations virtually stopped being covered by the media. Under new socio-economic and political circumstances, the social base of Ukrainian environmental movement was tangibly politicized,

² “The greens”: post-Chernobyl wave. An interview with the PGU head V. Kononov, Holos Ukrainy (Voice of Ukraine), February, 6, 1993.
the movement’s constituency becoming a part of rank and file membership of numerous newly formed political parties.

Among other reasons of general slackening of the “greens”, the following factors are also worth noting: different political orientation of environmental organizations and a weak system of ideological and theoretical principles of the environmental movement during social transformation; difficulties in choosing strategic political allies; the lack of a state authoritative leader; the loss of its chief opponent, central Soviet government bodies; undefined relations with the government institutions of independent Ukraine; little influence of the movement and the PGU itself on state decisions regarding environmental improvements (Васюта, Васюта, Філіпчук, 1998: p. 283, 285).

With the loss of its mass media base and public resonance, the movement’s efforts are now more and more focused on applied research and projects, informative and educational activities. All this gives birth to a range of new “project type” eco-NGOs. Speaking of the participation of such organizations in Chernobyl-related projects, international organization “Chernobyl Union” created the “Echo-East” news agency in 1992, based on “Chernobyl Echo” newspaper. Due to undeveloped governmental social services at that time, this organization and a range of other Chernobyl-related structures were transformed into a union for social protection of Chernobyl victims and for distribution of humanitarian aid.

In early 90s a “new wave” of eco-NGOs appears in the environmental movement. This social phenomenon was brought to life by worsening economic conditions in Ukraine and opportunities to receive financial aid from the West to implement environmental projects. Financial and technical aid started coming in the form of grants from foreign governments and private funds. Since new Ukrainian authorities did not give any real support to the eco-NGOs, it is this foreign aid that in fact determines the aims and priorities of a large number of Ukrainian “green” organizations.

The system of searching for and obtaining grants stimulated professionalization of once multi-functional eco-NGOs, while grant distribution gave birth to an internal bureaucracy. Now it was not social need and moral convictions of the leaders, but a chance to obtain a profitable order (grant), which became the criteria for choosing a specialization of such eco-NGOs.

As a result, internal solidarity and solidarity among the groups give way to competition for limited resources. Vertical connections of local eco-NGOs with the “centre” (understood as the donor) acquire more and more significance. At the same time, horizontal connections are substantially weakened, as well as the contacts with local social milieu. Therefore, even though “new wave” organizations are able to act efficiently in specific issues and projects, they are still less useful for the creation of Ukrainian civil society3 than the “green”

3 In this case I agree with well-known Russian sociologist Oleg Yanitsky who understands civil society in a narrow sense as a substructure of society which includes all voluntary
organizations which have the experience of being active in pre-Perestroika time and which act openly and publicly.

Another phenomenon of environmental movement in Ukraine in the 90s was the diversity in the attitudes of eco-NGOs to social and political processes in independent Ukrainian state. According to their attitude to the dichotomy between national state and environment protection, at that time at least three types of organizations were singled out: conservationists (nature protectors), environmental patriots, and pragmatists (Борейко, Листопад, 1995: p. 7).

Conservationists prioritized solving environmental problems over other social issues in independent Ukraine of the time, particularly over such problems as energy crisis, creation of a national army, strengthening statehood. Ideology of environmental patriots was, on the contrary, based on the dominance of building the Ukrainian statehood. Pragmatists had a detached political line and took the position which can rather be characterized as situational adaptation depending on their personal profit or, to put it more accurately, on the conditions for their organizations’ survival.

What were the consequences of such ideological differences and the diversity in eco-NGOs’ social behaviour for further development of environmental movement in Ukraine?

The diversity of eco-NGOs gave Ukrainian environmental movement sufficient durability because different types of such NGOs were implanted in different social milieus and had access to different resources; this diversity also gave birth to a general range of tactical modes of action. At the same time, this variety of ideologies, political orientations and forms of social activity was an obstacle to the creation of a joint political strategy for the whole Ukrainian environmental movement.

Thus, growing typological diversity of eco-NGOs raised the durability of Ukrainian environmental movement as a separate social community but at the same time it lowered the chances of developing a united political line in the attitude toward national state and society itself.

Numerous sociological researches with the authors’ participation allow to state that the internal group relations of the “greens” in the 90s suffered a conflict of values, cultures and lifestyles. This conflict was caused by different motivations of the founders and new organization members⁴. As for the experienced participants of the environmental movement, who were not demanded neither by government, nor by quasi-public organizations of pre-Perestroika era, membership in an eco-NGO allowed them to actualize their potential both as professionals and as citizens. In their turn, a large number of new organization members saw their membership in eco-NGOs as a rather short temporary stage of their careers.

⁴ O Stegnii. The mentioned work, 228-230.
Ukrainian environmental movement of in mid-90s created a trend to co-ordinate united actions with republican government bodies, particularly the environmental ministry. This trend could be observed during the national seminar of eco-NGOs (Kyiv, September 1995) within the frame of numerous events organized by the European environmental movement and dedicated to the European year of environment protection and the process of creating the New Regional Environmental Centre (NREC).

The process of the NREC creation started in 1994 when, on the initiative of Ukrainian environmental ministry, the Group of authorized governmental representatives “Environment for Europe” and the members of Committee for Environmental Policy of European economic commission of the UN came to a decision to research the necessity to create new regional environmental centres for the CIS countries. Conclusions and recommendations of the research (New Regional Environmental Centers, 1995) unambiguously showed the necessity to create a service organization which would render the necessary informative, organizational and financial support to eco-NGOs with a limited access of authority bodies to the resources of this organization.

In order to inform the public about the new service organization and to activate the environmental movement, six regional seminars were held from August to November 1996. During these seminars the delegates were elected for the national conference which generalized local decisions, elected a regional coordinating council and submitted a project of the Statute of national representative office of the NREC (Мазурок, 1997: p. 5-7). NREC was officially registered in Ukraine in August 2000.

However, the newly formed Regional environmental centre in Kyiv happened to exist only for quite a short period of time because, due to the differences in approach between international donors and the Ukrainian party to the management and priority activities, the Centre virtually discontinued its activities in a few years.

The process of the NREC creation in Ukraine showed certain differences among individual leaders of eco-NGOs regarding the democracy of the election procedures in the organization’s governing bodies, as well as providing the sufficient representation of the views of all environmental activists while discussing and nominating “green” candidates to the Interim supervising Council⁵. Later on, a part of NGOs publicly criticized the procedure of creating the governing body and called the NREC functionaries undemocratic and corrupt; they also did not approve the work of the Centre of political engagement (financial servicing to one of new democratic parties). This conflict was an additional reason of the short existence of the Centre in Kyiv, unlike the successful 20-year work of Regional environmental centre of Central and Eastern Europe in Budapest⁶.

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⁵ The project of creating a new regional environmental centre in Ukraine. Newsletter, 2 (1998).

⁶ At round-table meeting dedicated to the 20th anniversary of this Centre in June 2010, Ukrainian deputy minister of environmental protection Stepan Lyzun informed of Ukraine’s
Unfortunately, these negative trends came back to life with renewed vigour during the discussion regarding the creation of a coalition of Ukrainian environmental organizations “ALTER-ECO” (November-December 1999) and during the procedure of nominating Ukrainian “green” candidates to Almaty forum of eco-NGOs7 (Kazakhstan, September-October 2000). The main reason for the contradictions in interpersonal communication of the “greens” was the unvoiced competition for the formalization of informal leadership over the environmental movement. First of all, the competition was for the right to head the unification process under the aegis of certain eco-NGOs and for the chance to represent the interest of Ukrainian environmental public before international donors and environmental community. Such contradictions were destructive and not only hampered the general development of the environmental movement in Ukraine for a while but also weakened its ability to regenerate in a post-totalitarian society.

In December 2000 a peculiar conclusion was brought to this period in the history of environmental movement in Ukraine. The first all-Ukrainian conference for the environmentally conscious public was held under the slogan “Environmental policy: The public view”. According to the organizational committee, over 270 participants were there to represent 118 eco-NGOs, state authorities, the Ministry of Environmental Resources of Ukraine structures, and international organizations.

The environmental community was hoping that the conference would provide a new impetus to unite the “green” forces into a powerful environmental movement. However, what actually happened was a public argument among the leaders of disunited parts of the Party of Greens of Ukraine, as well as among the supporters of People’s Democratic Party of Ukraine represented by All-Ukrainian Environmental League8 and their opponents. The conference showed how serious was the problem of formalizing Ukrainian environmental movement. Although, everyone who wished to speak was given the floor, no section meetings were held. Therefore, the participants were not able to focus on various thematic issues all together.

**Current state and development prospects**

The current state of the environmental movement development in Ukraine encompasses the latest decade and is characterized both by prolongation of the trends that existed in the 90s and by new phenomena.

In the analysis of the current state of environmental movement in Ukraine I view eco-NGOs as a network-model social subject; an actor placed in a

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7 The Forum was comprised of eco-NGOs of New independent states created on the territory of ex-USSR. This meeting of the “greens” was held parallel to Pan-European conference of environmental ministers.

8 A non-government organization which was created in 1997 with the assistance of People’s Democratic Party.
certain space, the elements of which are integrated and recreated by means of communicative and other network resources. From this prospect, all outlined problems can be classified as having to do with organizational and resource possibilities of eco-NGOs and with the societal context of their activities in modern Ukrainian society. What does the qualitative state of eco-NGOs tell us as one of the social actors in the institutionalization process of the environmental interests in the society full of socially generated risks?

Insufficient organizational and resource possibilities (or, when they are present, often inefficiently used), as well as a lack of creative forces of a large part of Ukrainian eco-NGOs prevent them from efficiently playing the part assigned to them in post-totalitarian society, the part of the main carrier of society’s environmental interests. On the one hand, the result is the citizens’ low awareness about the eco-NGOs’ successful experiences, and, on the other hand, not being able to create an image of a professional (and thus respectable) partner in the eyes of state power structures to solve the totality of environmental problems.

Can the situation be improved, and if so, by what means? In my opinion, it is technically possible and even necessary for the development of Ukrainian civil society to improve the qualitative state of the eco-NGOs’ creative resources, as well as their co-ordination, and to stop the search for a sole and undisputed “flagship” of the environmental movement. The situation in international environmental movement, as well as a growing role of non-government organizations on the whole, objectively stimulates Ukrainian “greens” to develop their own fundraising activities.

At the same time, at the national level there remains an extremely important issue of co-ordinating the eco-NGOs’ activities taking into account the corporate interests of both capital-city and regional organizations. This co-ordination ought to be based on the principles of participation rather than representation. This form of interaction brings up the question of mutual respect even in the cases when certain environmental leaders cannot find a common ground as to the chosen form and the content of a planned joint action. “Green” activists, surveyed in early 2000s, supported, first of all, holding regular sessions (forums) of environmental non-government organization, as well as, to a lesser extent, creating regional co-ordination centres or a single national co-ordination centre.

And in fact, during the first half of 2000s all-Ukrainian conferences of environmental public were held annually. In 2004 the fifth one (“Trans-border cooperation in solving environmental problems”) was held. It became the last one held in the form of an autonomous event of the “greens” and a separate information event.

In October 2010 the sixth all-Ukrainian conference of non-government environmental organizations “Public participation in the forming and realizing of the Strategy of national environmental policy and the National

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9 It should be noted that Ukraine’s specialized ministry did what it could to help financially in the holding of such conferences; however in the form, in the contents of speeches and discussions these were primarily the events of the environmental public.
action plan in environment protection” was held. Except for the editing in the name (“environmental public” changed to “environmental non-government organizations”), the conference was not an autonomous “green” event by its status since it was held within the framework of a bigger event, the International environmental forum “Environment 2010”. It is also worth noting that this forum was, in the first place, a state-sponsored event organized with the participation of the government, separate ministries, and government environmental organizations. The “green” conference itself was held in the new format, first of all, thanks to the efforts of the All-Ukrainian Environmental League (sponsored by the political People’s Democratic Party).

The long five-year break in a chain of all-Ukrainian “green” conferences and the change in their format can be explained by a range of reasons. The main one seems to be the little efficiency of such conferences due to the absence of a uniting environmental idea. The other one is related to differences in what is considered a priority among the “greens”. Here, one can single out many rather diverse areas: preservation of live nature (biodiversity), activities for nature protection; narrowly specialized environmental projects; participating in the development of environmental policies, changing the environmental legislation. Effects were felt at different qualitative levels of eco-NGOs, particularly on the level of management within organizations, professional knowledge in the branch, experience and the skills of co-operation between sectors, particularly with government specialized organizations and state authorities.

Under these conditions, there could be a more optimal form of interpersonal communication among the “greens”, such as eco-NGOs’ clustering according to separate related areas of their activities, as well as situational joining their forces in order to solve specific and short-term tasks.¹⁰

One can agree with the point of view that the concept of choosing between civil society groups and political parties is wrong, since it creates a threat to the representative democracy and losing real leverage for political influence inherent in civil society. They ought to be allies.

Most “green” parties advocate their image of a perfect civil order which is based on real people’s sovereignty; such order must have the following features: a broad development of local and producers’ self-government, a decentralization of all public spheres, transparency of social structures and their relations; creating natural and harmonious relations between the human race and the environment. However, the latest phase in the history of Ukrainian “greens” has been notable for the actual breach in relations with the political parties having environmental signs over the doors of their offices.

¹⁰ One of the latest examples of such situational interaction was the united actions (signature collection, open letter and picketing the Presidential Administration) in January 2011 against the new version of the Law of Ukraine “On the regulation of city planning”. The “greens” protested against the narrowing in citizens’ rights to participate in discussion when planning and developing territories, and against virtual abolition of obligatory ecological expertise in city planning.
Eco-NGOs are a sort of organizations that belong to the third sector of society, which means that they, unlike those that belong to the first two sectors, do not claim to participate in power representation. However, “green” organizations in their totality comprise the environmental movement which is an actor in political life. Besides, “green” activists have a right to be simultaneously a member of a certain eco-NGO and a member of a political party. Another thing is, however, that “mimicry” of this sort should not substitute political activities for environmental ones.

At the parliamentary election of 1998 the Green Party of Ukraine formed a part of Ukrainian legislative body for the first and the only time, receiving 19 seats. This “breakthrough” to the Supreme Council can be explained, first of all, by efficient electoral technologies (target work with the youth, organizing numerous “advanced” events, particularly rock concerts), as well as by grand financial injections. What also favoured the PGU was the constantly pressing problem of protecting Ukrainian citizens’ everyday environmental security. However, exploiting environmental themes without adequate practical actions in making life activities more environmental, without establishing active cooperative relations with the county’s environmental community, first of all with the most powerful networks of environmental non-government organizations – all of this objectively programmed the PGU failure at the next parliamentary elections in 2002.

During the time when a parliamentary GRU faction still existed, it turned out that leaders of the most powerful eco-NGOs who entered the authorities, and their rank and file members, have quite different understanding of the environmental movement’s political role. The former considered the movement to be an instrument of control over state decisions implementation, an instrument of civil supervision over compliance with environmental legislation. The latter demanded that the representatives of the “green” in the Supreme Council and local councils urgently help them solve pressing environmental problems, as well as act efficiently in eliminating particular hotbeds of environmental threat.

The societal context of the PGU further activities was negatively influenced by the “cloning” of environmentally oriented parties by PGU leaders. 2000 was the peak year for such cloning. According to the “Explications of the letter to the Justice ministry of Ukraine” dated 15 June 2000, all of the four newly formed environmental parties were related to a narrow circle of the PGU functionaries. All in all, by the beginning of 2002 there were seven officially registered environmental parties in Ukraine, five of which supported PGU activities and two opposed them.

Despite the numerical strength of political parties under environmental signs, none of them, including PGU, offered a realistic co-operation program to Ukrainian eco-NGOs. This fallacious stance of the parties toward environmental movement can be explained, first of all, by the lack of understanding of public movement’s environmental capital. This sort of social capital is defined as a totality of knowledge, skills and social practice produced and recreated in social
networks. This production is aimed at raising the environmental consciousness of the society, its economy, politics and culture. Environmental capital is both a resource for the “greens” and for society as a whole (Яницкий, 2009: p. 6).

As a result, the environmental movement in Ukraine in our time became the only advocate of an alternative (to the government’s) environmental policy under the conditions of dominating technocratic approach of Ukrainian establishment to the country’s development.

Speaking of the environmental policy sphere as a whole, Ukrainian “greens” try to interfere more actively in the development of environmental legislation, the regulatory norms of admissible pollution of the environment; in providing licenses; in local and regional physical planning; in applying legal regulations.

An example of active participation in the environmental politics was the broad public discussion of National action plan on environment hygiene, thanks to the activity of Ukrainian eco-NGO groups, especially networks of organizations “MAMA-86” and “Eco-Right”. For the first time in Ukraine, a situational coalition of eco-NGOs was promptly formed in order to complete a specific task. The process of public consultation was successful in proving to officials responsible for elaborating environmental policies that non-government organizations are able to make a highly professional contribution to the preparation of such a document (Тимченко, Сердюк, Турос, 2000: pp. 17-24).

A new example of involving Ukrainian “greens” into state environmental politics was the active eco-NGOs’ participation in the development of the Strategy of national environmental policy until 202011.

However, it must be admitted that on the whole co-operation between Ukrainian “greens” and state authorities develops more productively at regional and local levels. A unanimous majority of the environmental movement representatives is discontent to a certain extent with the place that non-governmental organizations occupy in the implementation of environmental policies in Ukraine. This results from both assessment of the movement’s own efforts and the authority bodies’ attitude towards it. This hypothesis is confirmed by the data obtained from interviewing “green” activists (Стегній, 2002: pp. 357-358).

The Ukrainian environmental community considers that the main impediment to co-operation between the “greens” and the state is the derogative attitude of central state authorities toward non-government organizations, as well as a similarly negative attitude of local authorities in certain regions. At the same time, most activists tend to think that it is the state executive authorities who are most responsible for the current state of environment in Ukraine.

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11 This Strategy was developed under the pressure from the EU as a precondition for budget financing in environmental protection. The Strategy project was being prepared for almost three years, during which non-government organizations constantly tried to influence its contents in order to turn the Strategy into a real tool to develop a more environmentally-oriented policy of Ukraine. The Strategy was adopted by the parliament as Law of Ukraine in December 2010.
Participatory observation with author’s involvement allows us to say with good reason that there is no direct communication between government bodies and the activists of eco-NGOs; there is the informational influence instead. The definition of communication implies “subject-to-subject” relations realized in a mutually profitable dialogue-modelled way characterized with feedback. Informative influence, on the other hand, means developing one-way relations which result in the effect of hypnosis.

Under such conditions, relations among eco-NGOs and their peer organizations remain the main communicative space of Ukrainian “greens” in modern time. At present day, the communicative space of Ukrainian “greens” is formed by electronic information networks within national umbrella organizations (like “MAMA-86”, All-Ukrainian Environmental League, National Environmental Centre), as well as websites of the most technically advanced and/or financially powerful eco-NGOs.

This channel of communication overlaps with the first one in a certain way but in this case the information is spread not only within the organization but is also open to the public. Other means of communication include national electronic groups and email list which are most effective in cases of fast informing about and reaction to specific anti-environmental cases (there are such email lists as “EcoUkr” with the target group of environmental non-government organizations, or “Eco-Media” for environmentalists, ecologists, and journalists); general environmental and specialized websites as communicative platforms for constant monitoring of events related to the environmental sphere and for open communication on environmental topics (for example, general environmental sites “Nature in Ukraine”, “Ukrainian environmental portal” and specialized websites like “Ukrainian Forester”, “Forest Friends” etc); individual blogs of “green” activists.

It’s clear that the power of social influence and resonance of the “green” movement depend, not least, on the public support of environmental ideas and values, i.e. environmentalization of the citizens’ everyday lives. However, according to the members of eco-NGOs, modern environmental movement in Ukraine has not achieved a public support that would be adequate to the acuteness of the environmental insecurity problem to life conditions. What are the reasons for the lack of active involvement of the country’s population in the environmental actions of the “greens”?

“Green” activists single out three main impediments: a low general level of environmental mass consciousness; the material pressure on the working

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12 A typical example is set by seminars featuring representatives of state administration bodies and eco-NGOs within ENPI-FLEG Program “Improving the systems of applying law and administration in the forest sector of the countries of Eastern direction of European neighborhood policy and Russia” which were held in 2009 and 2010 by the World Bank Representative Office in Ukraine. The author witnessed a lack of balanced communication and sometimes a direct confrontation between the aforementioned groups of participants in the seminars.
population; and shortcomings of the system of informing the public about urgent environmental problems. One cannot but notice that the problem of low environmental consciousness is largely determined exactly by economic difficulties and insufficient knowledge of existing environmental risks.

The most common ways that environmental activists use to involve the public in solving the environmental problems are: an efficient system of informing the population about environmental issues; environmentalization of the whole education system from pre-school institutions to higher education; environmentalization of state economic policy itself; and improvement of general socio-economic situation in the country. A large part of eco-NGO members also consider it necessary to impose harsher penalties upon those who violate environmental laws. This last idea deserves special attention because the environmental community strongly insists that every Ukrainian citizen is responsible for the current state of environment in our country.

Considering the future of the environmental movement in Ukraine, I will note that it is of primary importance for further participation of eco-NGOs in the environmental politics of transit society which produces socially generated risks. The “greens” themselves clearly realize their role in the environmentalization process of the society’s life. Economic hardships of common Ukrainians’ everyday lives do not mean that the issues of improvements in the “qualitative” state of eco-NGOs themselves, as the main carriers of the population’s environmental interests, should be removed from the agenda. Solving this task necessarily requires the consolidation of the environmental community, establishing a corresponding coordinated action of the “greens” both at the national and regional levels.

Ukrainian “greens” must understand the irrefutable fact that environmental movement is not independent from the rest of society, since it is, in its essence, a social phenomenon in a variety of the new social movements. Thus, without involving the “greens” into the social life democratization processes and into building a civil society, solving environmental problems is hardly probable. The difficulty is that the participation of eco-NGOs in establishing public control over the state structures in environmental sphere should not become a merely political activity, disregarding its environmental priorities. In this process, it is still rather urgent to strengthen the personnel kernel of the environmental movement with a new generation of educated and socially active activists who would not be haunted by their past mistakes.

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MONITORING OF ADDICTIVE BEHAVIOR OF KHARKIV YOUTH “YOUTH AND DRUGS”: CONCEPTUALIZATION OF EMPIRICAL OBSERVATIONS

Oleksii Serdiuk (Kharkiv)
Ihor Rushchenko (Kharkiv)

The article presents the data of 23-year cross-sectional research project “Youth and Drugs” conducted by sociologists from Kharkiv National University of Internal Affairs. Surveys conducted in 1995-2018 with sample sizes 1,000-1,500 subjects, using cluster-sampling procedure among youth aged 17-25 years old. Since 2016 the survey has been carried out simultaneously in two forms: 1) group face-to-face interviewing with a structured anonymous standardized self-administered paper questionnaire, 100-110 items; 2) web based survey (by an anonymous link and a personal invitation to the email address). The problems of epidemic spread of chemical and non-chemical addictions among young people and the factors that determine this process is considered in this article. The patterns of regular and irregular consumption of various addictive substances are analyzed. Authors describes the basic tendencies of the chemical addiction (alcohol, drugs and tobacco) and non chemical addiction (gambling and cyber addiction) epidemics in Ukraine. Authors concludes that the drug spread among youth has stabilized, but there are new drugs appeared and consumption of the most accessible of them tends to increase regularity. The theoretical model of sygmoidal epidemiological dynamics of the additive behavior distribution and epidemiological waves of additive behavior theory are proposed.

Keywords: sociological monitoring, epidemiological waves, chemical addiction, non chemical addiction, drugs, alcohol, gambling, cyber addiction.

The problem of addiction has a biopsychosocial nature; it is the subject matter of a number of science disciplines: biology, medicine, psychology, sociology, law. Therefore, the scientific study of addictive behavior has acquired an interdisciplinary nature. It is carried out by experts of different fields simultaneously (Сердюк, 2013: p. 128-133). Ukrainian sociologists began their own research in the 1990s. The greatest activity was shown by scientists from Kharkiv, Kyiv, and Odessa (Сердюк, 2008: p. 26-62). The relevance of these studies is not diminishing, since the problem of use and abuse of chemical substances is a persistent negative social phenomenon and requires constant monitoring and response.

Long-term epidemiological studies of addictive behavior are becoming interesting. These studies are held by sociologists from Kyiv (Ukrainian Institute for Social Research, the ESPAD study) (Балакірева, Бондар, Галіч та ін., 2011; Балакірева, Бондар, Приймак та ін., 2015) and Kharkiv (monitoring “Youth and Drugs”) (Молодежь и наркотики, 2000; Рущенко, 2014; Сердюк, 2007: p. 34-40; Рущенко, Сердюк, 2014: p. 230-239; Рущенко, Конюнов, Сердюк, Бєлоусов, 2014: p. 344-350) and by narcologists (monitoring of medical statistics of the Ministry of Healthcare of Ukraine) (Лінський, Мінко, Дьяченко та ін., 2009). Accumulation of empirical data allows us to take a step towards a theoretical explanation of epidemiological patterns. This article is focused on the conceptualization of empirical data obtained over the last two decades by Ukrainian scientists, in particular, in the framework of the monitoring “Youth and Drugs” in Kharkiv.

Epidemiological Studies of Addictive Behavior

The study of the population dynamics of addictive behavior refers to a section of epidemiological research that has diverse designs (Pearce, 2012: p. 393–397). Longitudinal studies of addiction have not been conducted in Ukraine yet. Our scientists focus on a cross-sectional design. The world methodology of addictive behavior studies is provided in our manual “Research on Etiology, Prevention and Treatment of Chemical Addictions” (Дослідження з етіології, 2015), where there are the abstracts of the main articles on various aspects of the chemical addiction study selected by the University of Michigan Addiction Center Research. Currently, the authors of the article are guided by the methodology of the “Monitoring the Future” research which is being conducted by the scientists of the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan (USA), and has longitudinal
The monitoring of Ukrainian medical statistics of addictive behavior is carried out by the team of Kharkiv scientists led by I.V. Linskyi and A. I. Mynko at the Institute of Neurology, Psychiatry and Narcoilogy of the AMS of Ukraine (Лінський, Мінко, Дьяченко та ін., 2009) and by the Center for Health Statistics, Ministry of Health (Ukraine) (Центр медичної статистики, 2018).

The analysis of monitoring data of medical statistics shows stabilization and reduction of narcolgical disease incidence (the number of new cases of addiction) and prevalence of narcolgical diseases (the number of people on the register of drug addicts) in recent years. This tendency concerns both drug addiction and alchoholism, although the history of these powerful social epidemics does not coincide in time. Alcoholism is the “old” epidemic, and we currently observe a “residual” phase. Drug addiction is a “new” epidemic, it was in its “active” phase during the 1990s; in other words, the increase of medical statistics was recorded, and the slowdown of the epidemic process took place at the beginning of the zero years. Peak indicators of drugs abuse and drug addiction illnesses coincide with the systemic social crisis of the 1990s, which, obviously, contributed to the dynamics of the “active” phase.

In Ukraine socio-epidemiological studies of various types of addiction in the monitoring mode have been conducted since the mid-1990s within the International Project ESPAD and the Regional Youth Initiative Project “Youth and Drugs” (Kharkiv). Since 1995, Ukraine has participated in a pan-European research project “The European School Survey Project on Alcohol and Other Drugs – ESPAD”. The measurements (waves) are carried out every four years; there were 6 waves in total – in 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015. The project covers more than 30 European countries. Scientific supervisor of the project in Ukraine is O. M. Balakirieva. The main objective of the ESPAD is to collect comparable data and to monitor the trends in the psychoactive substances use by the pupils and students of one age group (15-17 years old) in most European countries (Балакірєва, Бондар, Галіч та ін., 2011; Балакірєва, Бондар, Приймак та ін., 2015). The main trend recorded in the ESPAD results is the stabilization and a slight decrease in the use of alcohol, tobacco and drugs among Ukrainian youth starting from the fourth wave. The peak in drug use took place in 1999-2003, while the peak in alcohol consumption was in 2003-2007.

“Youth and Drugs” Monitoring

The most longstanding and regular study of addictive behavior among young people is the monitoring of the distribution of drugs and psychoactive substances in the youth environment of Kharkiv which is called “Youth and Drugs” (Сердюк, 2017; Рущенко, Сердюк, 2016: p. 42-54). The study has being conducted for 23 years. Surveys were conducted in 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2004, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2014, 2016 and 2017 (N = 1000-1500). Starting from 2015, the study has been conducted annually within the framework of the Program for Ensuring Public Safety and Order in Kharkiv region, with the support of the Department of Science and Education of Kharkiv Regional State Administration, the Sociological Association of
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Ukraine (the Research Committee on Sociology of Law and Deviant Behavior) and with technical support by the University of Michigan Addiction Center Research (using the Qualtrics research platform account for the Online Survey). The next survey will be conducted in 2018. The conclusion of the Committee on Professional Ethics of a Sociologist of the Sociological Association of Ukraine (SAU) regarding the methodology and research tools was obtained. In general, the methodology for conducting surveys remains unchanged. The results of previous surveys can be found on the Website of Kharkiv National University of Internal Affairs in the section “Scientific Publications of the Research Laboratory on Combating Crime” (Харківський національний університет внутрішніх справ, 2018).

The main objective of the monitoring is the observation over the process of epidemic spread of chemical and non-chemical addictions among young people and the factors that determine this process.

Since 2016 the students survey has been carried out simultaneously in two forms:

1) in the form of the group handout interviewing with the use of a paper structured anonymous questionnaire that is filled in with the respondents own hands.

2) in the form of an individual questionnaire using the online survey technology (by an anonymous link and a personal invitation to the email address).

In the course of 2017 survey, 2492 boys and girls, the students of Kharkiv higher educational institutions of the III-IV accreditation levels were interviewed. The division of boys and girls in the array of interviewed is respectively 41.9% and 58.1%. Eight hundred and forty-three anonymous respondents participated in the online survey. Among them there are 44.5% of boys and 55.5% of girls.

In 2017 the volume of the general total number was 97655 people (full-time students of higher educational institutions of the III-IV accreditation levels as on October 1, 2015). The statistical sampling error (with a 95% confidence probability) is: for indicators close to 50% ± 1.94%; for indicators close to 25% ± 1.68%; for indicators close to 10% ± 1.16%; for indicators close to 5% ± 0.84%.

There is an additional task in the course of the research realization. The task is to create a research base (the database of e-mail addresses of Kharkiv students) in order to introduce the longitudinal component.

The executors of the study developed a number of documents, such as: the standard forms of the Agreement on the use of the database of e-mail addresses of students of the Universities and the Agreement on the processing of e-mail address within individual and collective forms. The legal support for the creation of the research base was worked out. The contract was drawn up and the e-mail addresses of one of Kharkiv Universities were transferred under the Act.

The two leading Kharkiv Universities took an active part in the online survey. An anonymous link in one of them was distributed by emailing to the addresses of the own University domain. In another one it was distributed by the tutors and the leaders of the training groups. Both methods have proven their worth. Invitations were additionally sent to the individual e-mail addresses of the students of two other Kharkiv Universities. The chancellors of them agreed to create a database of
Serdiuk Oleksii, Rushchenko Ihor. Monitoring of addictive behavior of kharkiv youth “youth and drugs”: conceptualization of empirical observations

electronic mail addresses of their students. In both cases, the response rate did not exceed 10-12% (both for an anonymous and for a personal invitation). It should be noted from an institutional perspective that the technology of a paper survey is still more convenient. However, the technology of online survey is definitely more promising and requires efforts for its popularization and validation.

Results

Drug use. Data showing the dynamics of the psychoactive substances use is provided in Table 1 and Figure 1.

Table 1

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Answer “Yes” to a direct question</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectively tried **</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* From 2016 the wording of the direct question “Have you ever tried the “taste” of drugs?” was changed to “Have you tried drugs during the last 12 months?”

** The highest percentage of positive responses to the questions about the age of the first drugs use, the frequency of different drugs abuse and the ways of drug consumption.

According to the latest observation in 2017, a quarter of young people has an experience of drug use. The major part of this group “confesses” in a limited

Figure 1. Dynamics of drugs, alcohol and tobacco use among Kharkiv youth over a lifetime in % (data of 1995-2017).

Source: compiled from the data: (Сердюк, 2017)
number of times of drug consumption, rather than in regular use. The indicator of use of “light” drugs is basic to a certain extent and the most representative in the light of the massive experimentation of young people with marijuana. The variation of the indicator shows that after the phase of “stagnation” there could be a new wave of interest in “light” drugs. The percentage of regular drug users among young people does not exceed 1.5%.

The dynamics of consumption of certain classes and types of drugs is depicted in details in Table 2. For many years the cannabis use (22.8%) has occupied the “first place” by a significant margin according to the degree of prevalence. The second place is occupied by builder’s tea (5.8%). The so-called designer drugs “Spice” (5.6%) and “Salt” (4.3%) are at the third and the fourth places correspondingly. The fifth place belongs to LSD (3.8%). Approximately the same situation was observed a year ago.

Table 2

Percentage of the Respondents Who Have Tried Any Drug
(at least once in their lives)
Data for 1995 - 2017 (% out of all)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cannabis products</td>
<td>15,8</td>
<td>24,0</td>
<td>37,5</td>
<td>36,6</td>
<td>29,8</td>
<td>25,9</td>
<td>24,3</td>
<td>17,2</td>
<td>23,1</td>
<td>22,8</td>
<td>23,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical opiates: morphine and others</td>
<td>0,4</td>
<td>0,9</td>
<td>1,4</td>
<td>1,5</td>
<td>1,4</td>
<td>2,2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,8</td>
<td>2,2</td>
<td>2,8</td>
<td>2,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opiates in capsules / tablets (tramadol)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>4,5</td>
<td>4,4</td>
<td>6,7</td>
<td>3,7</td>
<td>1,9</td>
<td>1,4</td>
<td>2,0</td>
<td>1,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home-made opiates: shirka and others</td>
<td>2,2</td>
<td>1,0</td>
<td>1,2</td>
<td>1,2</td>
<td>0,7</td>
<td>1,2</td>
<td>0,8</td>
<td>0,8</td>
<td>0,5</td>
<td>1,4</td>
<td>0,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heroin</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0,6</td>
<td>0,7</td>
<td>0,3</td>
<td>0,3</td>
<td>1,2</td>
<td>0,5</td>
<td>0,8</td>
<td>0,5</td>
<td>1,3</td>
<td>0,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cocaine, crack</td>
<td>0,5</td>
<td>0,7</td>
<td>1,2</td>
<td>0,6</td>
<td>1,2</td>
<td>1,6</td>
<td>1,2</td>
<td>1,2</td>
<td>1,1</td>
<td>1,5</td>
<td>0,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Builder’s tea (strong tea)</td>
<td>13,9</td>
<td>14,1</td>
<td>16,5</td>
<td>8,1</td>
<td>9,6</td>
<td>9,4</td>
<td>8,3</td>
<td>7,4</td>
<td>6,2</td>
<td>5,8</td>
<td>4,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methamphetamine, Pervitin (Bolt)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0,9</td>
<td>0,9</td>
<td>2,1</td>
<td>1,2</td>
<td>1,1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,8</td>
<td>1,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphetamines and other stimulants</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0,9</td>
<td>0,5</td>
<td>1,2</td>
<td>2,8</td>
<td>1,5</td>
<td>1,8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,5</td>
<td>3,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect, Coldact, etc.</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0,5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4,2</td>
<td>0,3</td>
<td>0,9</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ephedron (Cat, “Cadillac express”)</td>
<td>0,6</td>
<td>1,2</td>
<td>0,8</td>
<td>0,3</td>
<td>0,2</td>
<td>0,8</td>
<td>0,5</td>
<td>0,5</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tranquilizers: sibazon, etc.</td>
<td>1,8</td>
<td>2,4</td>
<td>2,9</td>
<td>0,9</td>
<td>1,1</td>
<td>0,9</td>
<td>1,3</td>
<td>1,4</td>
<td>0,9</td>
<td>1,8</td>
<td>1,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbiturates and other sleeping pills</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1,1</td>
<td>0,3</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>1,4</td>
<td>0,8</td>
<td>0,7</td>
<td>1,7</td>
<td>2,4</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
With regard to the dynamics of the consumption of certain classes of drugs by young people we can note the growth in popularity of the so-called “Designer Drugs” and the growing number of regular cannabis consumers.

The total number of cannabis consumers among young people in 2017 was 22.8% (23.8% in the online survey). The number of episodic and regular users of cannabis products has increased. There is also the growth in the number of those who make single tries, and then do not return to the use of cannabis.

Opiates use remains relatively stable, both episodic and regular. Traditional for our region injecting opiates are inaccessible to the population. The monitoring indicator of them has never exceeded 1-3%. Now there is a slight increase in their consumption. For example, medical opiates were used by 2.8% of Kharkiv young
citizens (2.26% in 2016), oral opiates (tramadol, etc.) were consumed by 2.0% of respondents, home-made opiates – by 1.4% (0.5% in 2016), and heroin – by 1.3% of respondents (0.5% in 2016). It should be noted that regular young consumers of opiates were not recorded at all up to 2005.

Stimulants use. Builder’s tea use is decreasing, both episodical and regular (5.8% of young people use it), cocaine use remains relatively stable (1.5%).

Amphetamines and methamphetamines (bolt) were respectively consumed by 1.5% and 1.8% of respondents; their consumption is slowly increasing, which is especially evident in the case of the online survey (there was an increase to 3.9% and 1.4% respectively). The use of home-made drugs manufactured from medical products like Effect, Coldact, etc. that reached the maximum in 2008, now has gone down, and currently this indicator is excluded from the list of drugs. Ecstasy use, both episodical and regular, has a general tendency to decrease, it reached the maximum in 2008 (4.3%), and decreased in 2017 (to 2.2%).

Hallucinogens use had increased until 2008, and in the surveys of 2011 we recorded a decline in their consumption, and from 2014 to 2017 the use increased again. We started recording regular consumers of hallucinogens in 2005-2008 and their number has remained stable since then. LSD is now used by 3.8% of young people, psilocybin or mescaline – by 1.3%, phencyclidine – by 1.0%, and local vegetable mushrooms-hallucinogens are used by 2.1% of young people.

Sedative hypnotics and anxiolytic drugs use remains relatively stable against the background of a slight increase. Barbiturates use slightly has increased; they were consumed by 2.4% (1.7% in 2016). The use of the drug “butyrate” has increased almost three times to 1.3% (0.5% in 2016). Tranquilizers are used by 1.8% of young people, ketamine – by 1.2% of the respondents.

The consumption of inhalants tends to decrease after the stabilization during 6 years (since 2008). Now inhalants are used by 2.8% of youth.

Designer drugs are slowly gaining popularity. In 2010 the structure of drug addiction included so-called “Smoking blends”, “Mixes” or “Spice” (in most cases they contain synthetic analogue of Tetrahydrocannabinol, active substance of cannabinoids), in 2017 we recorded 5.6% of their consumers, which is only 0.2% less than in 2016. In recent years, another class of drugs – “Salt”, or “drug speed”, “narcotic lair” or “salt for baths” (containing synthetic stimulants) has become widespread; these drugs are used by 4.3% of young people. They refer to the so-called designer drugs, synthetic chemicals that are not matter to anti-drug legislation due to the changed chemical formula. Their growing popularity is a disturbing fact that requires a response from the law enforcement and preventive interventions.

Regarding regular users of psychoactive substances, if in 1999 we registered regular consumers by 8 positions of the list of addictive substances, in 2001 – by 5 positions, then in 2005 – by 13 positions, in 2008 – in 20 positions, in 2011 – 23 positions, in 2014 – already by 24 positions, in 2016 – by 21, and in 2017 again we had an increase up to 26 positions of the list of drugs offered by the respondents.

It is possible to distinguish three main observations regarding the dynamics of drug use:
1. We record the general stabilization of drug use;

2. Against the background of the general stabilization of drug use, there is an internal transformation that is manifested in the increasing use of certain substances and in the reducing use of others. Has increased the use of designer drugs, opiates and stimulants, as well as tranquilizers, hypnotics and inhalants;

3. The number of regular drug users has increased, practically, in accordance with all positions from the suggested list. A similar conclusion is confirmed by the data of the online survey.

**Alcohol consumption.** The consumption of alcohol remains relatively stable – 85.7% of young citizens of Kharkiv (Table 3) have consumed alcohol. This number has practically not changed over recent years. The number of those who consume alcohol regularly also has not changed – 10.5% in 2016 and 10.5% in 2017.

**Table 3.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>year</th>
<th>Tried 1-2 times</th>
<th>Tried several times</th>
<th>Used more than 10 times, but not regularly</th>
<th>Use regularly</th>
<th>Total number of those who tried</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>1,4</td>
<td>11,9</td>
<td>48,0</td>
<td>10,0</td>
<td>71,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>7,6</td>
<td>18,8</td>
<td>50,0</td>
<td>9,9</td>
<td>86,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>8,8</td>
<td>18,8</td>
<td>47,2</td>
<td>12,2</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>6,8</td>
<td>18,8</td>
<td>53,7</td>
<td>7,5</td>
<td>86,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>7,0</td>
<td>23,4</td>
<td>51,4</td>
<td>7,5</td>
<td>89,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>4,9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>10,5</td>
<td>84,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>5,8</td>
<td>18,9</td>
<td>50,5</td>
<td>10,5</td>
<td>85,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017 Web</td>
<td>5,4</td>
<td>14,2</td>
<td>44,7</td>
<td>18,0</td>
<td>82,2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: compiled from the data: (Сердюк, 2017).

The structure of alcohol consumed by young people has slightly changed (Table 4). It is noteworthy that the growth in 1999 and 2008 and the decrease in 2011 and 2014 of beer and strong alcoholic beverages consumption took place together. This tendency was also supported by the consumption of low-alcohol cocktails. But in 2017 the tendency has changed. The consumption of dry wine and low-alcohol cocktails has increased significantly. The consumption of strong liquors and beer has decreased. In the case of the online survey, we observe low rates for all types of alcoholic beverages.

**Tobacco smoking.** Table 5 shows that smoking is still widespread and, unfortunately, it is still a stable form of addictive behavior. We observe slight fluctuations in the number of consumers of tobacco products, for instance, in 1999 there were 59.2% of young Kharkiv smokers, in 2001 – 64.3%, in 2005 – 66.4%, in 2008 – 64.8%; in 2011 – 66.8%; in 2014 – 61.5%, in 2016 – 53.3%, and in 2017 – 66.4%. The number of regular tobacco consumers among young people has also increased to 14.8% (after declining to 11.2% in 2014).
Structure of Alcoholic Drinks Consumption by Kharkiv Youth
(averaged indicators per week in milliliters for 1999-2017)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beer</td>
<td>1842</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>1405</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>685</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dry wine, sparkling wine</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fortified wine</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vodka, cognac, home-distilled vodka</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-alcoholic drinks</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: compiled from the data: (Сердюк, 2017).

Percentage of Kharkiv Youth Who Have Smoked Tobacco.
(comparative data for 1999-2017, % out of all)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total number of those who smoked</td>
<td>59,2</td>
<td>64,3</td>
<td>66,4</td>
<td>64,8</td>
<td>66,8</td>
<td>61,5</td>
<td>53,3</td>
<td>66,4</td>
<td>61,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smoke on a Regular basis</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>26,0</td>
<td>26,4</td>
<td>24,7</td>
<td>19,3</td>
<td>11,2</td>
<td>14,7</td>
<td>14,8</td>
<td>17,3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: compiled from the data: (Сердюк, 2017).

In 2016 a new indicator was added to the list of psychoactive substances. It is electronic cigarettes, which consumption is increasing. According to the survey, 50.7% of the respondents have tried to smoke electronic cigarettes (in 2016 – 45.5%) and 2.6% of them smoke electronic cigarettes regularly.

Accompanying Indicators of the Epidemic Process

Contacts with subjects of illegal drug trafficking. It is possible to say that after a significant reduction in the contacts of young people with the subjects of illegal drug trafficking in the period from 2001 to 2014, the growth of this indicator has been recorded again. In total, 21% of the respondents met drug dealers in 2017, while in 2001 – 31.4%; in 2005 – 22%, in 2008 – 24.5%, in 2014 – 13.1%, and in 2016 – 19%.

Criminal activity of youth related to drug and alcohol use is relatively stable. According to the survey of 2017, 12.8% of young people admitted that they had committed offenses in the state of alcohol intoxication, 1.3% – in a state of drug intoxication, and only 0.8% of the respondents admitted that they had committed offenses in order to get money for drugs.

Drug use in the social environment of the respondents. According to monitoring data, there is an increase in the number of contacts with people who do drugs...
among young people. Also, there is an increase in the number of those who witnessed the situation of doing drugs by others. In 2017, there is a certain increase in contacts with drug sellers (on 1.8%). It can indicate a violation of the stabilization of the drug situation among students, and it requires further studies.

Assessment of the acuteness of alcohol and drug problems. In recent years, we have witnessed a slow decrease in the subjective assessment of the acuteness of alcohol and drug problems, wherein the problem of drug addiction is evaluated as more serious than the problem of alcoholism, despite its incommensurably larger scale of prevalence. These issues were most acutely evaluated in 2011.

Assessment of drug availability. Throughout the years of observation, in general, the young people are inclined to believe that drugs in Kharkiv are more easily accessible, but their availability is slowly decreasing.

Attitude towards drug users. There is a “negative stereotype” of the drug user in the minds of young people in Kharkiv, but in general we observe a tendency among them to reduce slowly the social distance with drug addicts (the index of social distance according to Bogardus scale was 6.04 in 2017). Tolerance towards drug users is slowly increasing.

Attitude towards drug and alcohol consumption. The regularities concerning the ideas of young citizens of Kharkiv about the use of drugs and alcohol are manifested in the “narrowing” of its permissible limits. The study of the motives of the drugs and alcohol consumption by young people discovered that the motivational structure of addictive behavior has not changed over the last 10-15 years and has a general tendency to the decrease of the motivational tension (generalization of the motives of consumption). The risk group includes young people who cannot find another way to get rid of unpleasant feelings, thoughts, or seek pleasure, the desire to experience unusual feelings, and eventually get accidentally into the company, where they are offered to try addictive substances. Under the pressure of the group such young people get into the consumer cohort. This is facilitated by the orientation towards social stereotypes regarding drugs use, such as “one should try everything in life, and you can stop at any time”.

The state of preventive activities of drug addiction among students. There is a negative dynamics of the number of preventive interventions into the youth environment. The major preventive activity is observed in educational institutions and at home. Doctors and law enforcement officers have traditionally been the least active in conducting preventive discussions and consultations among young people. The main channels for information on drugs for young people are the media and the Internet.

Gambling

Compared to previous years, the prevalence of gambling among young people has decreased from 20% to 13%. The interest in gambling among young people is also diminishing – in 2017 the interest is expressed by about 9% of the respondents. Playing cards is the most widespread game among various types of gambling activities among young people. Parimutuel betting and computer
games for money are the next in accordance with the prevalence. The casino is the least widespread (Table 6).

Table 6


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To play cards</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the salon of slot machines</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In casino</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To play computer games</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parimutuel betting (Tote)</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To play domino, backgammon and others</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: compiled from the data: (Сердюк, 2017).

Computer addiction

Computer addiction, Internet addiction, apparently, have become the forms of a classical social epidemic, which chronologically follows the fashion for drugs in Ukraine with a delay in 20 years. The “active” phase of the epidemic process, in our opinion, began in the tenth years of the XXI century, and we record the indicators of the “active” phase (Table 7). The main indicator, which reflects its degree, is the budget of the time spent on a computer or similar electronic devices. According to our data, the amount of time that young people spend using electronic devices for work and study, communication, games is increasing rather quickly. An index of 8 hours or more per day for electronic gadgets may indicate the beginning of a psychological addiction. In truth, the epidemic of computer addiction is qualitatively different from alcoholism, tobacco smoking and drug addiction.

The amount of time that young people spend using electronic devices for work and study, communication, games is increasing gradually and evenly. At the same time, there is still the main tendency that the least amount of hours is spent on games, more – on communication and entertainment, and the most of the time respondents pay attention to the use of computers and other electronic devices for studies and work.

Discussion: Conceptualization of Data of Empirical Observations

Thus, over twenty years of sociological surveillance within the framework of the monitoring “Youth and Drugs” a considerable amount of empirical information has been accumulated; the data has been regularly covered in scientific journals and monographs. The empirical basis provides an opportunity to make certain theoretical assumptions of an epidemiological nature that do not contradict or are directly confirmed by the data of other researchers, which are also provided in the article.
The Division of Answers to the Question “How Much Time Do You Spend Each Day on Your Computer or Similar Electronic Devices?” (% of those who answered)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Using computer for studies and work</th>
<th>0 hours</th>
<th>Up to 1 hour</th>
<th>1-2 hours</th>
<th>2-3 hours</th>
<th>3-4 hours</th>
<th>4-5 hours</th>
<th>5-6 hours</th>
<th>6-7 hours</th>
<th>7-8 hours</th>
<th>More than 8 hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,3</td>
<td>19,6</td>
<td>27,8</td>
<td>21,3</td>
<td>13,8</td>
<td>5,9</td>
<td>3,5</td>
<td>1,7</td>
<td>0,6</td>
<td>1,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10,8</td>
<td>22,7</td>
<td>24,1</td>
<td>19,0</td>
<td>10,3</td>
<td>4,7</td>
<td>2,1</td>
<td>2,3</td>
<td>2,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,4</td>
<td>4,9</td>
<td>15,4</td>
<td>18,2</td>
<td>16,7</td>
<td>13,2</td>
<td>10,9</td>
<td>6,1</td>
<td>3,3</td>
<td>8,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,7</td>
<td>6,6</td>
<td>17,3</td>
<td>20,7</td>
<td>15,5</td>
<td>12,1</td>
<td>9,3</td>
<td>4,5</td>
<td>4,3</td>
<td>8,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017 Web</td>
<td></td>
<td>0,8</td>
<td>4,3</td>
<td>12,1</td>
<td>20,6</td>
<td>14,5</td>
<td>13,6</td>
<td>7,9</td>
<td>5,7</td>
<td>6,2</td>
<td>14,3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Using computer for communication and entertainment</th>
<th>0 hours</th>
<th>Up to 1 hour</th>
<th>1-2 hours</th>
<th>2-3 hours</th>
<th>3-4 hours</th>
<th>4-5 hours</th>
<th>5-6 hours</th>
<th>6-7 hours</th>
<th>7-8 hours</th>
<th>More than 8 hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>26,3</td>
<td>22,4</td>
<td>17,3</td>
<td>11,3</td>
<td>5,5</td>
<td>2,5</td>
<td>1,1</td>
<td>0,7</td>
<td>2,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td></td>
<td>13,3</td>
<td>23,1</td>
<td>22,2</td>
<td>15,1</td>
<td>12,5</td>
<td>4,8</td>
<td>2,7</td>
<td>1,5</td>
<td>0,9</td>
<td>2,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,2</td>
<td>8,7</td>
<td>20,8</td>
<td>20,3</td>
<td>13,7</td>
<td>10,5</td>
<td>7,6</td>
<td>5,3</td>
<td>2,8</td>
<td>6,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,3</td>
<td>9,7</td>
<td>19,4</td>
<td>19,9</td>
<td>15,3</td>
<td>10,4</td>
<td>7,3</td>
<td>4,1</td>
<td>3,4</td>
<td>8,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017 Web</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,7</td>
<td>9,1</td>
<td>15,3</td>
<td>20,2</td>
<td>13,8</td>
<td>10,2</td>
<td>7,5</td>
<td>4,7</td>
<td>4,2</td>
<td>13,4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Using computer for games</th>
<th>0 hours</th>
<th>Up to 1 hour</th>
<th>1-2 hours</th>
<th>2-3 hours</th>
<th>3-4 hours</th>
<th>4-5 hours</th>
<th>5-6 hours</th>
<th>6-7 hours</th>
<th>7-8 hours</th>
<th>More than 8 hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td></td>
<td>46,5</td>
<td>22,2</td>
<td>11,7</td>
<td>7,1</td>
<td>4,7</td>
<td>2,4</td>
<td>1,3</td>
<td>0,4</td>
<td>0,7</td>
<td>1,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td></td>
<td>53,6</td>
<td>20,0</td>
<td>9,3</td>
<td>6,0</td>
<td>3,6</td>
<td>2,3</td>
<td>1,8</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>0,6</td>
<td>1,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td></td>
<td>46,4</td>
<td>21,3</td>
<td>12,3</td>
<td>6,2</td>
<td>4,5</td>
<td>3,2</td>
<td>0,9</td>
<td>0,9</td>
<td>0,5</td>
<td>1,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td></td>
<td>54,5</td>
<td>16,3</td>
<td>10,6</td>
<td>6,8</td>
<td>4,9</td>
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<td>1,3</td>
<td>0,6</td>
<td>0,3</td>
<td>1,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017 Web</td>
<td></td>
<td>49,4</td>
<td>17,0</td>
<td>12,8</td>
<td>7,9</td>
<td>4,3</td>
<td>3,2</td>
<td>1,3</td>
<td>1,1</td>
<td>0,8</td>
<td>2,1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: compiled from the data: (Сердюк, 2017).

Our ideas about the patterns of social epidemics that lead to addictive behavior can be summarized in several theses. We offer them to the scientific discourse.

First. In the era of modern and post-modern in the global dimension the societies periodically cover specific social epidemic processes, the content of which is the rapid expansion of forms of social activity that leads to a certain type of dependence and addictive behavior. The dynamics of the process consists in moving from the first experiments to stable behavior, which settles a certain type of dependence – chemical or non-chemical etiology. “Neophytes” are the youth, especially, boys, who, figuratively speaking, open the door for the society to the addictive behavior of a certain type. The historical-cultural situation is as follows: step by step, a new era is making people more free in comparison with traditional non-secularized society, but people are “voluntarily” sacrifice their freedom, joining the epidemic processes of addictive content. In our monitoring, we accumulate
statistical data on epidemic processes, at least in three different historical periods: early (increasing alcoholism of the population and spreading of tobacco smoking), postmodern (drug use), modern times (multimedia varieties of addiction). However, they have a common denominator both in the metaphysical (socio-philosophical) sense, and in relation to the patterns of social epidemics.

Second. Each time the epidemic is taking a sigma-like form, about what we have already had an opportunity to speak out on the pages of the “Ukrainian Society” [10]. It means the presence of several phases and, at least, two “breakpoints” that characterize the transition from one phase to another one (Figure 2). According to the dynamics of the epidemiological process there are certain social changes and circumstances that are involved either in the launch of the mechanism of the epidemic, or in the stagnation of the process.

The “latent” phase is characterized by a dynamic equilibrium, when a new form of behavior already exists, but there are mechanisms that restrain mass demonstrations. Using the example of the epidemic of drug addiction, we make sure that there have been local centers of the epidemic for decades (the first half of the XX century), mainly in the social underground, the criminal world, the prison community, or in ethnic communities, where there is a certain tradition of the use of drugs. But there were no social factors to launch the epidemic.

An important factor in the start of the active phase of the epidemic is, as a rule, the youth fashion, and also according to the theory of social networks – a demonstration of the appropriate behavior by actors occupying “star” and “nodal” positions in social networks. After the launch of the epidemic and the transition of the process to the “active phase” through the lower “breakpoint” there is a rather rapid growth of statistical indicators, which can be recorded within the framework of a special sociological research. The beginning of our observation

Figure 2. Sigma-like Dynamics of the Development of Social Epidemic of Chemical Addiction and Its “Epidemic Waves”
fell on the “active” phase of the youth fashion concerning the test of the “taste” of drugs, and the “breakpoint” was apparently crossed in the mid-1980s. The important epidemic background for this transition was: the transitional state of the society and the crisis of social morality, the emergence of the numerical social layer tolerant to drugs, the emergence of a fashion for drugs, which was reinforced by the ideologists of the youth underground, as well as the formed illegal market with its supply of psychoactive substances and informal advertising. The phase of active growth is characterized by a rapid increase in “neophytes”, an increase in the percentage of young people, who have tried drugs.

The “active” phase ends with the achievement of the upper “breakpoint”, when anti-drug factors dominate, and the slowdown of the epidemic process is taking place. After this we can, for several years, observe a drop in the indicators of addictive behavior, there is the phase of “stagnation” or “reverse dynamics”. For a long time, there is some background level of addictive demonstrations, that is, statistical indicators do not grow, but also do not fall significantly. As the experience of the western countries shows, it is not possible to return the situation to the epidemic minimum that existed at the beginning. Moreover, the “old” epidemics (alcoholism, tobacco smoking) are continued in the "frozen" form: their indicators do not grow and do not fall for a long time.

**Third.** The monitoring of the social epidemics of addictive nature allows us to offer a theory of “epidemiological waves”. The essence of the theory is that there are new epidemiological processes in modern society with a certain periodicity that lead to addictive behavior (Fig. 3).

They pass the phases according to the structure of the sigma-like curve, where the important characteristics are “breakpoints”, as well as the final “background” level of the phenomenon’s prevalence. Similar epidemic processes do not diminish by themselves. There is also a certain period of time or a historic time lag between the old and the new epidemics. Consequently, we assume that

![Figure 3. Epidemic Waves of Spreading Addictive Behavior](image-url)
the Internet epidemic reaching a peak will also have a phase of “reverse dynamic” and then it will go into the background mode. The epidemic process does not disappear because of the following reasons:

- firstly, new generations of youth (a certain percentage of young people) figuratively speaking, “pick up the baton”;
- secondly, the phenomenon ceases to be purely youth one over the time – different age groups of both men and women represent the type of addictive behavior that has been mastered in tender age. It is the effect of an “old hippie” who is inclined to use marijuana, figuratively speaking, “to the death”.

**Fourth.** Differentiation of epidemics of the “first” and “second” levels. Our monitoring is aimed at those who mainly experiment with drugs and other chemical and non-chemical objects, which subsequently cause a steady addiction. The epidemic of the “first” level is a social fashion, the essence of which is an experiment with the body and consciousness, so to speak, certain physiological and emotional experiences, a social game, and an attempt to follow a representative group. The epidemic of the “second” level has a pathological and medical nature. An experiment with a certain chemical substance (alcohol, tobacco, drugs, and toxic substances) or a form of social behavior (gambling, the use of electronic gadgets) leads to a stable and extremely negative physical or psychological addiction. There is a substitution of cause and effect in the middle of the process – the place of socio-psychological factors now is occupied by the biochemical process of the disease. Such a person has to become a patient and be under the supervision of a psychiatrist or psychologist. There is an obvious connection between the “first” and “second” levels of the epidemic process, although their internal structure is not identical. Structural characteristics of medical epidemics differ because the fall of fashion for certain actions does not automatically lead to the stagnation of the number of addicts. Their biographies are subordinated to other factors, the quality and accessibility of medical care, the level of organization in the society of the secondary and tertiary prevention become more important.

**Fifth.** There are local epidemics within mega-epidemics that have the features of general processes. This can be clearly illustrated by a periodic outbreak of unhealthy interest in certain types of psychoactive substances of a legal or illegal nature, the emergence of new series of low-alcohol beverages, a fashion for club drugs, smoking mixtures, etc. This is facilitated by the periodic renewal of the legal market for cigarettes and alcohol, which is due to the marketing departments of large manufacturing companies, or by the “release” of selling new gadgets and software resources by the IT giants. A striking example is the appearance in 2016 of the new game “Pokemon GO”, which captured the consciousness of many thousands or millions of users with the speed of an avalanche-like process. There are quite similar processes at the market of illicit drug trafficking – the synthesis of new psychoactive substances and the activity of world mafias in the saturation of criminal markets, triggering temporary epidemic outbreaks. No doubt, that big business and crazy money are the most noticeable factors that extend the history of social epidemics of addictive nature, even after the end of the era of the corresponding massive fashion.
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Onischuk Vitaliy

LANGUAGE PARTNERSHIP AS A MEANS OF INTER-INSTITUTIONAL AND INTER-CULTURAL INTERACTION

The article is devoted to the role of language partnership and socio-cultural factors in the stabilization of society. Ethnocultural form of the multinational country is considered. It is emphasized the need for a holistic concept of ethno-national development of Ukraine through the state language, the cultural sphere of life of the nation, the importance of ethnocultural social changes, national renaissance. The purpose of the article is to analyze the actual state of functioning of Ukrainian and languages of national minorities in a densely populated region of Ukraine by representatives of different ethnic groups, determining their status, influence on consciousness, national identity and socio-cultural environment in general. The social practices of manifestations of linguistic, cultural tolerance in the southern region of Ukraine - Odesa region are revealed.

Keywords: linguistic partnership, interethnic and intercultural interaction.
Language partnership is one of the means of regulating an interaction among different ethnic groups, individuals, small and large national groups that live densely in society. A system of language partnership can be formed in different ethno-social and ethno-cultural space, in a certain city or region and in a state; in any field of human relations – in economic and cultural, as well as in political, etc.

The language partnership in its modern concept began to evolve in Canada and in the United States after their formation. Unlike the Europeans, the nations of North America were not formed by gradual development of a single ethnic group, primarily united with a place of residence, a complex of common conditions, in particular, with the language of communication, but with representatives, the migrants, who have chosen for various reasons those countries to be their homeland. The reason for these nations formation was the maximum convergence of people through the so-called melting pot. In one way or another, cultures, mentalities, traditions and languages of different representatives of these nations were included into this melting pot as ingredients which added something new to a leading idea.

The role of these components, especially of language, should be studied in order to take into account the creation of modern Ukrainian political nation. We note that the above-mentioned original formation can not be artificially transferred to the Ukrainian background. Modern Ukraine is one of the most multi-ethnic countries in Europe. The poly-ethnic composition of Ukrainian society is a consequence of historic transition of territories from one state to another, as well as a traditional processes of border settlement of ethnic groups. The population structure was also formed due to the colonization of free lands by a representative of various ethnic groups in the 18th and 19th centuries. (Гордюенко, 2006: p.178)

The most motley region of Ukraine is Odessa, which in a result of historical processes became multi-ethnic, having a compact and dispersed pattern of resettlement. Due to the fact that this region belonged to the Ottoman Empire, then to the Russian Empire, Romania and the USSR, different groups living within this territory were abandoned and suffered a period of conservative stagnation.

Nowadays the low social-economic development of the Danube region, decline of infrastructure, high unemployment rate and the lack of state attention to the peripheral region create conditions for feeling an isolation from Ukraine. Currently Reni – Odessa route has been repaired, the direct daily night train Kiev – Izmail has been launched and the programs of territorial cooperation of the
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Eastern Partnership countries, which are essential factors of rapprochement and unity, are being developed.

Having created their state in 1991, the people of Ukraine built a unique construct that ensures the integrity of the process of creating a nation where the language, beside being a communication tool, is a deep stratum of people’s spiritual life and historical memory. The search for linguistic self-identity in Ukraine in the late 20th century and in the early 21st century has a sign of multiculturalism. (Ляпіна, 2017: p.66). This sociological category is quite modern, real and ambiguous.

Multiculturalism is a given, or, in other words, is an objective reality with a society within it and being a method of ethno-political management. Beside its cultural aspect, it should be noted that the concept of multiculturalism also has sociological and political dimensions, since for actual creation and development of multiculturalism in Ukrainian society or region are needed conscious state policy and appropriate measures both supported on the legislative level and by the executive branch, as well as with the efforts of civil society structures.

Nowadays multiculturalism is a mean of educating young people, a mean of realization their belonging to certain cultural roots – different roots. It has become a mean for cultivating tolerance and public responsibility. Only a person of culture and education can understand the equal value of the cultures of national minorities that are represented in Ukrainian society.

It is life itself that makes adjustments to assimilation theory and public expectations. Group or regional ethno-cultural identity remains a powerful factor of individual self-identification of members of society, which are different from most certain cultural traditions, religion or language. The studies of Odessa sociologists show Bulgarians, Gagauz, Moldovans, Ukrainians who live in the south of the Odessa region and speak their own ethnic language identify themselves as Bessarabians. There are no problems with using native – mother language there, everyone uses the language that he likes. This region is characterized as the most poly-linguistic. For the older generation of different ethnic groups the language of communication in public places, bazaars, public transport, etc., is Russian, because Ukrainian language had not been studied in schools previously, and young people of different ethnicities who have already got their education in independent Ukraine, if necessary, can fluently speak Ukrainian. Thus, they use at least three languages in everyday life – their native, Russian, and the language of the state – Ukrainian. Herewith, all Bulgarians know Gagauz language, Gagauz – Bulgarian, Moldovans – the language of Roma, etc.

The main tendency should be separated into analyzing the results of sociological research on the problems of self-identification and inter-ethnic relations in the Odessa region conducted by specialists of the Department of Sociology of the Odessa National University named after I. I. Mechnikov (1991, 1996 – professor N. Pobeda, 2010 – sociologist N. Nikon, 2015 – sociologists within the project of theUkrayinska myrotvorcha shkola – G. Shelest, Y. Serbina, T. Krivosheya): the stability of self–identification with the ethnic group, the first
and second studies showed that for Ukrainians it was 64%, for Russians – 59.2%, for Bulgarians – 54.3%, for Moldovans and Jews – 56%, for Germans – 68.4%, for Poles – 37.5%. Purity of ethnicity still remains despite the dynamism of social processes, the overwhelming influence of the Soviet Union and the new Ukrainian statehood. The results of 2010 confirmed the successful adaptation and integration of Bulgarian ethnic group to the new state reality, the research results of 2015 indicated that the most state-link-minded in the Danube region are Gagauz.

The study of 2015 showed the growth of Ukrainian civil identity. Evromaydan, the annexation of the Crimea, the invasion of Russian troops to the Donbas and events on May 2 in Odessa contributed to growth of Ukrainian citizenship over the national community representatives. Ethnic Ukrainians, Bulgarians, Gagauz, Moldovans and Russians, as well as representatives of other nationalities in the Danube Region, now are equally committed to the meta-idea of Ukrainian political nation. During 20 years in a row the number of nationalist ideology supporters was 2%, but now it is 3%. There are no reasons to mention the growth of xenophobia and nationalism. At the same time, there is a local identity – Bessarabian represented among the pollee in places of compact residence of national groups.

Regarding the use of native language, almost all ethnic groups are satisfied with the language policy in this region. But it must be taken into consideration that the older generation did not study Ukrainian language during the Soviet era. Nowadays Bulgarian and Moldavian communities have schools or extracurricular groups where the main teaching language is the language of national minorities. After finishing their study the graduates of such schools can speak neither Ukrainian nor even Russian, which makes them uncompetitive either when entering higher education institutions or at the labor market.

It is a difficult situation concerning the representatives of Roma minority. According to the population census in the region, there is more than 4 thousand Roma people living in families among the Bulgarians, Moldavians and Ukrainians. According to the data of the Ukrainian University for Social Studies, about half of Roma children do not attend school or can regularly shirk it. According to the Romani newspaper “Romani Yag”, in Transcarpathian region, which is also multinational, only 83.7% of Roma children received incomplete secondary education, 14.5% – general secondary education, 1.4% graduated from a vocational school, 0.3 % obtained specialized secondary education and only 0.4% obtained higher education. It should be noted that in 2014 the International Renaissance Foundation provided Roma students with 106 scholarships for studying in specialized secondary and higher educational institutions of Ukraine (Міжнародний фонд, 2015: p.4).

In order to improve the access for education for Roma children, the Parent Development Centers were established with the support of the Foundation in four Regions: Odessa, Volyn, Transcarpathian and Cherkassy. There are experienced teachers in these centers who teach parents a responsible approach of bringing
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children from birth to school age. It is necessary to pay attention to the relations of these regions inhabitants with the Romawhich, due to their domestic way of life, is not acceptable.

During the conduction of vocational guidance work the teachers of the Odessa National University named after I. I. Mechnikov found out that the graduates of Bulgarian and Moldavian nationality were set to enter the educational institutions of Bulgaria and Romania. A part of adult population of Bulgarian and Moldovan communities have passports of these neighbor states. Residents of separate villages of Izmail and Reni regions consider themselves as Romanians. It should be noted that this attitude had appeared after the last Soviet census of 1989 and particularly intensified in 2014.

The south part of Odessa region is characterized by multiculturalism which requires the state to adopt some appropriate policies regarding ethno-cultural segments of society. But for the quarter of a century this region of Ukraine has been a desert, a neglected land. Local authorities having their own ideas about a situation of the region tried to implement their models, drawing no attention to the mood and needs of population. With the help of balanced social and economic, national and psychologically subtle politics it could have been possible to make this region Ukrainian in 25 years – not in the sense of language, but in the sense of politics.

In order to establish an inter-ethnic distance in connection with the events of August 2016 in Loshchivivka village of Izmail district of the Odessa region we should refer to a long-term sociological monitoring by the University of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine “Ukrayinske Suspilstvo”. According to the Bogardus scale, the index of social separation of almost all ethnic groups in Ukraine did not exceed 3. As to the Germans and the Romanians, it reaches 4, while the index of about 5 is caused only by the Roma and the Chechens.

A negative attitude and high degree of alienation between the bulk of Ukrainian society and the Roma have a long history. Comparing the responses of youth and older people about their attitude to the Roma and readiness to admit them to their lives showed almost complete identity of their mood. Therefore, it can be stated that for all years of independence there has been no change in the attitude towards the Roma. A negative attitude, all the precautions and stereotypes concerning the Roma people are fully reproduced by new generations. Consequently, a biased attitude will be reproduced over and over again. We can mention the mechanism of reproduction of perceptions between the readiness of young people born and socialized in an independent Ukraine and the older generation who had lived most of their lives in other social conditions during the period of existence of the “Soviet people”, and we can mention the absence of significant societal changes in inter-ethnic relations.

Researches, first and foremost sociological, and the true-life reality showed rather high level of tolerance in inter-ethnic relations. In a democratic society it is possible to combine ethno-cultural diversity in one space, to demonstrate objectively that there are people of dominant nation living with us, their culture
differs from ours, but it is not a cause for not perceiving it or treating it with a certain detachment or hostility. The results of the “Social Inequalities: Perceptions by Ukrainian Society” national survey by the “Ukrainian University of Social Research named after Alexander Yaremenko” National Network being supported by the International Renaissance Foundation conducted in 24 regions of Ukraine in September 2017 showed that the language that job-seekers use was not an occasion for job rejection (only 1% of rejections). The answer to the question “Is there a tension in relations between Ukrainian-speaking and Russian-speaking citizens in Ukraine?” of 73.4% of pollee was “NO”, 19.2% answered “YES”; “between ethnic Ukrainians and other national-ethnic groups” 70.9% of pollee answered “NO”, 18.3% answered “YES”, others – not sure. (Бакіров, Балакірєва, Куценко, Мурадян, Сокуранська, 2017: р. 4, 11).

The language policy of the state should be flexible, inclusive, able to meet any needs, respectful for people. There are mechanisms for normal perception of others in the “We – They” paradigm. Today it can be noticed in respect to the Crimean Tatar people after the annexation of the Crimea.

The history of linguistic norm of new Law On Education of Ukraine is a vivid example of the government’s ability to create state problems, where representatives of indigenous people and national minorities were “mixed up” with foreigners and stateless persons. According to the official statistics of Ukraine, the languages of education for approximately 400 thousand children in 735 educational institutions are the languages of indigenous people and national minorities. As a rule, in such institutions Ukrainian language is studied as a subject. The Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine has to admit that there is a steady tendency in reduction of the level of general secondary education and deterioration of its quality among the children from schools where the education languages are the languages of national minorities, which is confirmed by the results of the External independent testing. During delivering a speech at the PACE, the President mentioned Beregovo, where 75% of school graduates did not pass an examination in Ukrainian (Ставнічук, 2017: p. 3).

In 2016, 60.1% of schoolchildren belonging to Hungarian and Romanian minorities did not pass an examination in Ukrainian language. In fact, it is a predictable discrimination of these children in respect of their future in the country. They are future immigrants and separatists.

The usage of universal state language can not be doubted either within the country or its neighbors and European structures. The PACE Resolution 2189 (2017) also noted that knowledge of the state language is a factor in social integration, and states reasonably demand the state language to be the language of education for everyone. (Ставнічук, 2017: p. 3).

Several countries, in particular Hungary, Romania, Poland, Bulgaria, Moldova, Greece and Russia, have made warnings regarding the provisions of the aforementioned law. At the same time, their position makes it necessary to analyze the level of observance of rights of ethnic Ukrainians in those neighboring countries. In Hungary Ukrainian diaspora is small – about 8 thousand people,
and Ukrainian is an officially recognized language of this national minority. But there are no primary or secondary schools with Ukrainian language as a language of education in these countries. About 50 thousand ethnic Ukrainians live in Romania. The only Ukrainian educational institution there is the Lyceum named after T. G. Shevchenko in the town of Siget Marmatius; less than 200 students study there. According to unofficial statistics, about 10 million Ukrainians live in Russia – and there are no Ukrainian schools there at all. (Ставнічук, 2017: p. 3).

In societies that have emerged as political nations having their state language, national identity essentially is a sense of belonging to such nation. Olgert I. Bochkovsky noted that a nation is people who want to become a nation. The roots of the ethnic are hidden in subconscious structures of a person, and corresponding behavioral settings are being formed in the process of socialization. Socialization of personality is the definition of truths cultivated by an individual and the process of personal learning of customary in society rules of their addition. Traditionally it is a task of a family, school, church, environment, mentors. But central position should be occupied by a state. For determining this problem, we conducted a probing study, the tool of which was a handout formalized questionnaire (survey) for self-knowledge. This study was confined to the Revolution of Dignity in 2013.

The series of the study included 56 people – 14 male and female of 1 indigenous group – Ukrainian, and 3 ethno-national groups – Russians, Bulgarians Jews, of age up to 25. All the interviewed people were the citizens of Ukraine, most of them lived in Odessa. The research strategy was based on comparative studies. According to the basic indicators, a comparison of all four ethnic groups was carried out consistently.

Questions were divided into such blocks: ethnicity criteria, ethical and civil self-identification, perceptions of ethnicity of others, ethnic reflection, ethnic selectivity, ethnic distance, cognitive interest in other ethnic groups, imagination of ethnic inequality, attitude towards national customs, traditions and national heroes, ideological orientation, idea of the positive and negative qualities of his people.

The analysis of the survey results among the representatives of indigenous ethnic groups concerned Ukrainians. All answers to the question in the block about ethnicity criteria “What brings together the people of the same nationality the most?”, without exception, were: history, common territory of residence, language, culture, traditions; in second place by the number of answers were common interests, life failures; less common answers were success in sports, patriotism.

The answers of Russian respondents were very similar to the answers of Ukrainians. For the Bulgarian representatives in the second place in terms of the number of responses were finding people (Bulgarians) in other country and in foreign-language environment, belonging to the historical homeland. Representatives of European youth added religion and for them there were a common goal and principles of existence in the first place.
In the block about ethnic and civil self-identification there was a question: “Is it more important for you to be a person of your nationality or to be a citizen of Ukraine?” Almost all of the respondents, as representatives of the title, state-building nationality, answered that it is important for them to be citizens of Ukraine, and only a small number of respondents answered that their nationality but not belonging to the state is very important for them.

The answers of half of Russian respondents were focused on the importance of nationality, while citizenship was not considered to be that important. The Bulgarians had previously answered that nationality is important, because citizenship can be acquired but nationality is a congenital thing. Half of respondents thought this way. Only one respondent put citizenship of Ukraine in the first place. The Jewish respondents were almost identical in their answers.

Answers to the question “At what age did you feel your nationality?” showed that more than 80% of young people felt themselves to be Ukrainians in adolescence, while others at the age of majority – after 18 years. Russians felt themselves to be Russians predominantly in adolescence – in 15 years – two third of the respondents. For the Bulgarians – 10-12 years and Jews – 10-14 years – also two third of the respondents.

The next block of questions was “Perception of ethnicity of the others”. While giving an answer to the question “Does your relation to a particular person depend on his nationality?” more than half of Ukrainian respondents said that their attitude to a person does not depend on nationality, but depends on personal qualities and respect for Ukrainian nation and state. Less number of responses said that their attitude to a person can sometimes depend on a person’s nationality, especially when this person shows disrespect to the Ukrainians or behaves aggressively.

All Russian respondents answered that their attitude to a person does not depend on a person’s nationality but depends on his individual qualities. Among the Bulgarians there were answers that their attitude to a person sometimes depends on nationality, someone even mentioned these nationalities and the reasons for unequal attitude, such as the dishonesty of Gypsies, the desire to enrich of Jews. As for Jews, they answered just like the Russians but mentioned that a person should not be dangerous towards them.

All the respondents from Ukrainian ethnic group, without exception, replied to the question “Have you ever been proud or ashamed of your nationality?” that usually they are proud of their nationality. All respondents of Russian ethno-national group usually are proud of their nationality. Most of the interviewed Bulgarians have the same opinion and 2 people did not answer this question. The Jews are proud of their nationality.

In the “Ethnic selectivity” block there was a question “Is it important for you to marry a person of your nationality, or his/her nationality will not matter?” 5 people answered that it is important, for 8 people nationality it does not matter and 1 person gave no answer. Two thirds of Russians and Bulgarians and 85% of Jews have a desire to marry a representative of their nationality.
Answers to the question “Are there nationalities living in Ukraine that you treat better or worse, or do you treat everyone the same?” were like this: almost half of the respondents said that they treat all people equally, characterizing them by their personal qualities but not by their nationality; in the second place in terms of the frequency of responses was negative attitude towards representatives of the Caucasus, Arabs, Turks and Muslim people in general; there were also answers that meant negative attitude towards the Ukrainians, Bulgarians and Gagauz. It should be noted that there is a certain level of xenophobia among young people.

The next block of questions was about the ethnic distance, and the respondents said that they would not want to be born African Americans, Muslim nationality and South-East Asia representatives. Several Russian respondents said that they would not want to be born any Muslim nationality representative, few Bulgarians – Gypsies, Jews – Arabs.

Answers to the question “Cognitive interest to other ethnic groups” showed that all the respondents are interested in learning the customs and traditions of other people in Ukraine and respect their own customs and traditions because it is their cultural heritage and respect toward ancestors. All of them are sure that everyone has equal rights. 100% of young people are indifferent to youth movements and political organizations. Among the positive qualities of their people, Ukrainian respondents named kindness, politeness, diligence, ability to communicate and courage. Rarely were mentioned pride, honesty and intelligence. Among the negatives qualities were mentioned envy, laziness and spinelessness, much rarely were mentioned cruelty, greed and impudence.

Russians named courage, generosity, kindness and pride among the positive qualities of Russians living in Ukrainian environment. Much less the respondents mentioned freedom, intelligence, politeness. While answering the question about negative qualities they mentioned haughtiness, envy, laziness and cruelty. Bulgarians named hospitality, hard working, ability to communicate, courage, honesty and intelligence among the positive qualities. Almost all of them mentioned cunning, greed, envy and impudence among the negative qualities. Some people also named haughtiness and hypocrisy.

Respondents of Jew nationality noticed only positive qualities among their representatives and did not name negative ones.

In the structure of social-cultural, political and economic factors that define the group ethnic “We” in the south of the Odessa region, language, common origin, traditions, customs, etc. are significant. According to S. Huntington, a country in order to be able to secure cultural identity must adhere to three conditions: 1) political and economic elite of a country must support and welcome this process in general; 2) people must agree to accept a new identity; 3) dominant groups of civilization in which a split country attempts to enter must be prepared to accept it: it is an elite that has an exceptional importance in overcoming a split in a country. (Хантингтон, 1994).

An effective instrument of the unity of a region and of the whole country is social-economic development of this region and confidence of national minorities
in this state, and, therefore, the issues of patriotic consciousness and practical behavior of all national communities assume a greater importance.

The cultural-linguistic and psychological closeness between a titular nation and national minorities contribute to an increase in understanding of Ukrainian civic identity. Linguistic and cultural orientations of Ukrainian population come under influence. The language partnership means a support of natural development and functioning of languages of state and national minorities within the constitutionally defined limits. All members of society win from cooperation on the basis of mutual recognition of linguistic rights of the majority and national minority in the territory of the state. Respect for the language of national minorities is the basis of coexistence in society, it promotes trust and serves for national security and unity.

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Traps for internal migration and possible collective actions for overcoming them are studied in the article. Finding the causes for internal migrants getting into traps, as well as the identification of these traps are an important component of scientific support for migration policies in the field of internal migration. Basing on the materials of empirical sociological research of internal migrants’ problems in modern Ukraine, conducted with the participation of the authors in 2015, the following traps of internal migration have been defined: “institutional trap”, “informational trap”, “resource trap”, and “poverty trap”. It is important to coordinate efforts to overcome the traps of internal migration of the state and civil society institutions and international organisations and to carry out the policy of “active tolerance” towards internal migrants in the country.

Keywords: migration, internal migration, forced migration, migrants, migration traps, collective action.

Introduction

The practices of internal migrations in the modern world problematize social policy towards IDPs. Managerial decisions, related to providing migrants with administrative and social services, to their rehabilitation and adaptation to the life in the new conditions, require scientific support.

Since the publication of E. Ravenstein’s work “The laws of migration” (Ravenstein, 1885), the phenomenon of migration and migrants has been studied in both theoretical and applied aspects. E. Ravenstein was the first who gave the classification of the population’s migration depending on the type of the borders crossed, the period of stay in the host place, the means of transportation, the reasons for relocation of the social groups participating in the migration process. However, today migration is described as a complex process including numerous aspects, historical conditions, character, duration, the motives for relocation, newcomers’ adaptation (Ravenstein, 1885).

Today, there are theories of assimilation (Robert Park, Ernst Burgess, Lloyd Warner, Milton Gordon), as well as the theory of segment assimilation (A. Portes, M. Chzhou, P. Rumbo, Richard Alba, Victor Nee). Despite their ethnocentrism and ideological overload, the concept of transnationalism is a theoretical frame for the migration analysis. In the transnational concept of migration, “a migrant is no longer perceived as a person driven out of his country and forced to assimilate or integrate, as he no longer belongs to the sending society. On the contrary, a migrant is perceived within this concept as the holder of two or more identities included in the social, economic and political life, and often several communities” (Костенко, 2014: p. 72). Forced migrants from the east of Ukraine are characterised by multiple identity, which has, however, certain threats (Khyzhniak L., Khyzhniak K., 2016). Anyway, migrants’ integration in the host society is still a popular topic for scientists’ research, presented in the works by Portes A., Fernarndez-Kelly P., Haller W. (Portes, Fernarndez-Kelly, Haller, 2005) and by Warner R. (Warner, 2007). In particular, the search for the value basis of integration of the local population and internal migrants continues. For example, P. Fadeev considers pursuance of social justice to be such a foundation. On the basis of empirical research material, he showed that all people (both locals and recently displaced migrants) exist in a common socio-cultural space, and experience similar problems, seek a decent
Khyzhniak O., Khyzhniak K. Traps for internal migration and collective actions of overcoming them (in terms of the military conflict in the east of Ukraine, 2014-2017) life and social justice. These are factors that unite people of different nationalities (Фадеев, 2016).

The migration process is taking place in the global world, so it is difficult to overestimate the international community’s reaction to migration (mainly from international organisations). However, internal migration has both a global context, and national specificity. It should be noted that internally displaced persons are the category of forced migrants that is used along with the concepts of “refugees” and “displaced persons”. In international law, the victims of forced migration are defined as refugees and displaced persons. For the last decade, European countries have faced the so-called “migration flood” (Савельев, 2016: p. 287), whose meaning requires new theoretical approaches.

The aim of the article is to identify traps for internal migration and possible collective actions for overcoming them (based on the example of IDPs in Ukraine).

In this article, we assume that internal migration can be voluntary and forced. V. Tishkov rightly points out that voluntary internal migration serves the purposes of development, the success of an individual and the country as a whole. These are the positive features of migration (Национализм в мировой истории, 2007). However, forced migration can be problematic both for the migrants and for the host party.

In our study, we rely on the work by L. Rybakovsky, who studied the historical background of migration and its determinants in terms of the management of these processes in order to reduce their destructive geopolitical consequences (Рыбаковский, 2016).

We believe that forced internal migration in modern Ukraine has its background and determinants, which could have been foreseen; and that it is possible to prevent or reduce their adverse national and global implications with the help of managerial decisions. The absence of national unity, a difficult transition in the foreign policy from multidirectional to unidirectional European choice – these determinants of internal split of the Ukrainian society in many ways contributed to the revolutionary events that began in Ukraine in November, 2013. The annexation of the Crimea by Russian Federation and the anti-terrorist operation in the east of Ukraine have led to a massive forced internal migration, which changed the lives of more than one million citizens of the country, some of whom have emigrated, and most have become internally displaced persons.

We will study the specificity of forced internal migrations on the example of modern Ukraine, as well as the “traps”, which they face.

1. Empirical basis and the methods of research of the “internal migration traps”.

Let us give characteristics to IDPs’ injured identity, based on the results of the research conducted with the participation of the authors by the scholars from V. N. Karazin Kharkiv National University from July 15th to 30th, 2015 (253 temporarily
displaced persons were interviewed). The criteria for selecting respondents are: a) legalisation of the status of displaced persons through formal registration; b) applying for social assistance to government institutions and volunteers. Interview locations: modular town for people from temporarily occupied territories (62%), volunteer centre «Kharkiv Station» (27%), summer camp «Romashka» (7%), rehabilitation centres «Promin’», «Turyst» (4%). Socio-demographic profile of displaced persons who were the respondents: mostly women (70%), 54% are children under 16; people from Luhansk (54%) and Donetsk (46%), 81% lived in the cities before moving; by age: 18-30 years – 23%, 31–55 years – 50%, 56 years and older – 27%.

Since 2014, numerous organisations from around the world have helped solve the problems of internally displaced persons in Ukraine. The characteristics of volunteerism during ATO can be given by empirical data of the sociological research conducted under the guidance of O. Khyzhniak by Kharkiv Regional Public Organisation “Agency of Social Engineering ‘Right of Choice’” (September 20 – October 4, 2014, a survey of Kharkiv residents in a face-to-face interview at the place of a respondent’s residence, n = 1004, the sample is proportional to the population structure by sex, age and place of residence). Volunteering has acquired a massive scale during ATO (anti-terrorist operation in Donbas) 2014, which contributed to the consolidation of the Ukrainian society facing external aggression in the east of the state. Almost 26% of the respondents at the time of the survey, according to their testimony, provided personal assistance to migrants from ATO area and 17% – directly to ATO participants. The following forms of assistance were most common: the transfer of food and goods to refugees (44%), transfer of funds to charities and organisations (37%), providing temporary accommodation (32%), participation in charity and patriotic events (meetings, rallies, etc.) (6%), participation in organising and conducting charity events (6%). Six percent of the respondents went to ATO area as volunteers to assist soldiers (Khyzhniak, 2014).

2. “Internal migration traps”, their types, characteristics and collective actions for their overcoming

2.1. “Institutional trap” of internal migration

“Institutional trap” is referred to as the lack of readiness of the Ukrainian society institutions (especially the state and its agencies) to provide social protection for a particular group of its citizens – internally displaced persons from the battle area.

“Institutional trap” of internal migration can also include the lack of security of internally displaced persons, which should be provided by some structure (primarily by the state).

Civilians evacuated from ATO area, often become the objects of provocations (from relatively “humane” type of illegal transportation fees to sometimes even
deadly ones) by unlawful armed groups. The report, prepared by the Centre for Civil Liberties and the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union in the framework of the Coalition of NGOs and initiatives “Justice for Peace in Donbas” presents relevant evidence on evacuation obstruction.

Collective actions for overcoming this “trap” are mostly taken by volunteers. Volunteers believe that today Ukraine has no answers to the question of how to protect people from it in the future. There is also a problem that concerns cargo transportations through the separation line with the temporarily occupied territory. Volunteers have developed and presented recommendations – both tactical (concerning the solution of the problems of documentation, cargo transportation and general fighting with the corruption in the system) and strategic, concerning a comprehensive strategy of evacuation.

2.2. “Informational trap” of internal migration

“Informational trap” is dangerous because it does not allow migrants to get necessary information and distorts their image, provoking intolerance towards them from the host community (e.g., stigmatisation of migrants, labelling them as “separatists”).

Evaluation of current informational needs and access to the information as to IDPs in Ukraine were provided by the International Public Organisation “Internews”, which presented the results of the survey “Understanding the information and communication needs of internally displaced persons”. Basic informational needs of internally displaced persons are not met, which is manifested in the following aspects. 1. Lack of useful news and relevant information about rights, benefits, changes in social policy, criteria for receiving assistance and support services available to internally displaced persons. 2. Too many messages about the war and not enough reports on a humanitarian crisis. 3. Lack of journalistic skills necessary for preparing the reports covering conflicts and humanitarian situation and reports on the issues related to the crisis (Гарантії для переселенців, 2016).

Internal migrants have felt the lack of information since the beginning of the migration. Thus, more than half of those surveyed (58%) noted that in the first days of arrival in Kharkov they lacked information about social services that help people like them. The “information trap” concerned mostly people from an elder age group, as compared to that of young people. The lack of information was especially relevant for those seniors who arrived without their children or grandchildren. During the first days after internally displaced persons’ arrival, there were no information booklets for migrants.

Official sources have reported only the estimated number of internally displaced persons, but there is a lack of information on the socio-demographic composition of the group, their social segmentation, social and medical needs, satisfaction with social services; willingness of social services to meet the specific needs of certain groups in this category (Хижняк, Андрющенко, 2015). For
better informing IDPs, international organisation Transparency International has prepared the infographics “The Migrant’s Assistant”.

Creation of The Common Information Database on Internally Displaced Persons is called to overcome the lack of information for social protection of internally displaced persons. However, not all internally displaced persons are registered, which makes official information on this category of social services not sufficient to effectively provide its members with social security.

Let us consider collective actions for overcoming this “trap”.

In September 2014 in Ukraine, the Resource centre for IDPs was created. This centre combined the following organisations: Secretariat of Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights, public initiative “Crimea-SOS”, project “Without Borders”, NGO “Centre Social Action”, initiative “House of friends”, NGO Centre for civic education “Almenda”, public initiative “Employment centre for free people”, ACF “Right to defence”, CF “Rokada”, public initiative “Crimean diaspora”, community initiative “Kit for refugees”, NGO Centre for civil liberties” and others. The Resource centre for internally displaced persons has a number of functions: establishing and improving the links between the various initiatives and organisations that support internally displaced persons; collecting humanitarian aid; analysing needs; coordinating assistance; providing legal advice and legal aid; providing advice on employment and temporary resettlement; participating in the preparation of the legal and analytical framework for the development and implementation of long-term strategies to help internally displaced persons and their integration; developing advocacy campaigns.

Similar regional centres allowed to coordinate the work of providing social services to IDPs according to the regional specificity. In Kharkiv region there is the Headquarters on finding solutions to the issues related to social security of internally displaced persons.

We should note that internally displaced persons are a heterogeneous group as to the social status, socio-demographic characteristics, resource capabilities and value orientations. This fact requires social services to conduct their segmentation and provide social protection and appropriate social care, taking into account the specific needs of all the individual categories. For this, it is necessary to carry out continuous monitoring of problematic issues of this group which will provide the necessary information for making appropriate managerial decisions.

2.3. “Resource trap” of internal migration

“Resource trap” is multifold and is related to the lack of resources of social services to assist internal migrants, unwillingness to provide this group with new services as special customers.

Various public services, together with local authorities, centres of administrative services created by local state administrations gradually became involved in providing social services to IDPs. Information on these centres can be obtained from local migration service units or local state administrations.
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However, there was an acute need to coordinate the efforts of local authorities, government agencies, volunteers and NGOs.

The resource for migrants’ integration is thought to be the language knowledge. Thus, V. Sokolova based on the experience of Spain proved the thesis about the defining role of a language competence in the process of external migrants’ social integration (Соколова, 2016). However, in the situation with Ukraine this rule is usually transformed. It is logical to assume that in a unitary state, such as Ukraine, which operates one state language (Ukrainian), internal migrants have no problems with communication using the official language.

Collective actions for overcoming this “trap” are related to the activities of international organisations. For providing social services to migrants, Kharkiv region cooperates with several international organisations, such as: Red Cross, International Organisation for Migration, German Society for International Cooperation (GIZ) etc.

Discussions as to the problems of IDPs in Kharkiv region and providing actual assistance involve such participants as United Nations Population Fund, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration of the US State Department, the Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons; PACE Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons and others.

However, there are some resource limitations from international sponsors. Thus, a series of modular camps have been built for the problem groups of internally displaced persons. However, this does not meet housing needs for the majority of IDPs.

Collective action for overcoming this “trap” in relation to the limited resources of the state and the host party are also connected with the ability of internally displaced persons for self-organisation.

### 2.4. “Poverty trap” of internal migration

Internal migrants’ poverty exhibits the same traits as poverty in general. It is both absolute and negative. Migrants who have run from war often found themselves absolutely poor, undocumented and devoid of necessities of life. “Poverty Trap” arises from the fact that the forced migration puts this group of migrants on the brink of survival.

The most painful problem for IDPs is lack of housing (it worries 70% of the respondents and doesn’t worry only every tenth), and for those who lost it as a result of armed hostilities, it is one of the most serious losses, almost irreparable. The state is currently able to provide them only with a temporary shelter where they live in overcrowded and insecure conditions. In such a situation, increase in dissatisfaction and social tensions is possible.

The second problem is the low level of income. It should be noted that the material and social losses of IDPs are measured not only by lost wages within permanent employment in the previous place of residence. After all, even in the
status of internally displaced persons, it is possible to find a new job; in addition, the government resumed full payment of pensions and other kinds of social benefits to disabled citizens who had moved to unoccupied territory. For example, registration of pension or social care is thought to be an acute problem by a fifth of the respondents, almost half (48%) do not care at all, and in the general list of problems it ranks only 10th. But firstly, the amount of these payments is low, and secondly, the loss of personal property is quite tangible. As a significant number of displaced persons had to be evacuated at the time of active armed hostilities, they could take only necessary things with them, and some of them do not have anything, even documents.

The third important problem is the issue of communication with the family members who remained in ATO area. It is extremely important for a little more than half of the respondents (52%). Unfortunately, sometimes social networking is almost the only possibility for IDPs to find out about what is happening to their relatives in ATO area. There is no need to mention that this method of communication is not available for everybody due to various reasons.

The problems of providing medical services to migrants in Ukraine is extremely serious. According to the data of NGO “Restoration of Donbas”, only 13.6% of adults out of 1.3 million registered migrants – which is 3% of the total population – used medical services; and among children this figure reaches 56%. The features of the eastern regions: the largest number of patients with complicated viral infections, including tuberculosis, an epidemic of which was stopped only a few years ago and AIDS (25% of all cases in Ukraine). Under the law, migrants are eligible for medical care in the place of their registration. One of the problems because of which we have such a low attendance of health facilities, the absence of a single “window”, where a migrant could register all the documents and still have time and energy to visit a doctor. The second problem is low consciousness. People do not consider it necessary to see a doctor. Regions that accept migrants, including those where there are most displaced people – Donetsk, Luhansk, Kyiv, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia – have no appropriate medical resource, because the budget for 2015 did not include the funds for these purposes. That means that migrants are served at the expense of the local population (Миколюк, 2015).

First and foremost, the efforts of volunteers and government agencies were directed to move from the battle area to safe environment the representatives of the most vulnerable categories, for whom it was difficult and sometimes impossible to escape on their own: the elderly, the disabled, terminally and chronically ill people and children. So, if we analyse the composition of the sample on the basis of “Occupation today” feature, we will see that a third is represented by the people of old age and disabled pensioners, i.e. persons unable to work. This, in our view, can also explain the fact that in the list of acute problems for our respondents such problems as lack of steady income (41%) and especially the lack of job (30%), which are traditionally believed to be the most acute problems for internally displaced persons, do not take leading positions (5th and 7th places, respectively). If counted together, the unworkable respondents and those who
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had job at the time of the survey, would amount to 57%, i.e. more than half of the population. There is also a definite dependence between the respondents’ age and the degree of urgency of the employment problem for them. Among those, who are “very concerned” about this issue and those who are “probably concerned”, there are mostly the representatives of 31 to 55 years old age group (61% and 65%, respectively). The relevance of the problem of stable income absence is greatly due to the presence of children under 16 years old in the respondents’ families. There can be logically traced a direct dependence, since the presence of such dependents as children intensifies greatly the need to find permanent, stable sources of income.

Thus, for IDPs it is extremely urgent to fulfil their basic, vital needs such as housing, increasing revenue, solve problems related to health, provision of basic necessities (food, clothing, pharmaceuticals, hygiene accommodation etc.), resolve issues related to employment.

Collective actions of overcoming the “poverty trap” by the public authorities are as follows:

- assistance in employment of workable persons;
- increasing the targeted social assistance to those categories of internally displaced persons who cannot solve problems of livelihood on their own.

It should be noted that IDPs’ employment has some difficulties. One of them is the unwillingness of Ukrainian employers to employ them.

“Internal migration traps” considered in this article affect the adaptation of internally displaced persons on the new territory. The difficulties of adaptation are proved by the fact that some of them come back to ATO area – even under bombardment.

Summary

Collective actions for overcoming “internal migration traps” have both institutional and non-institutional nature. Institutionally, these collective actions are presented in the form of public bodies, social services, international organisations, volunteer organisations providing support and assistance to internally displaced persons in difficult life circumstances. The main problem here is the coordination of various collective actors, the establishment of a permanent dialogue among them on the issues related to internally displaced persons. Non-institutional collective actions for overcoming “internal migration traps” are carried out by their relatives and friends. They exist at the level of horizontal self-organisation of those concerned about the fate of internally displaced persons and those who are willing to help them. Here, the main problem is the resource availability of support for the representatives of internally displaced persons. It is necessary implement the policy of “active tolerance” towards internal migrants, who are the citizens of the same country, and hope to defend their legitimate civil rights and some additional rights as victims of the war. Today, there is public demand not just for tolerance as coexistence with “another”, but
for what may be called “active tolerance”. Active tolerance can be described as a system of three subsystems: 1) institutions that “construct” tolerance as a cultural, social and personal value (i.e., institutions of science, law, politics and religion); 2) institutions broadcasting (transmitting) a tolerant view of the world, form tolerant competence (i.e., family, education, mass media) and 3) institutions that monitor compliance with the principles of tolerance in the society. Mostly, we mean here the institutions of law, the state of public opinion. We emphasize that legal tolerance and moral tolerance are hardly possible in reality without involving communication mechanism (Mann, Khyzhniak, 2017).

While providing internally displaced persons with social services it is impractical to rely on a simplified picture of their needs, values, interests, and focus on segmentation of the category of customers for social services by social characteristics, life plans, perception of the crisis situation where they found themselves. This research allows to predict the enhancing role of social services (both public and private) of a metropolis in providing IDPs with social protection and support. This is going to take place alongside the limiting of the role of other actors in guaranteeing the comfortable life of this vulnerable category of citizens. Eventually, while armed hostilities in Eastern Ukraine continue and the situation with displaced persons from ATO area does not improve, some problems (housing, decent work, etc.) acquire permanent character and migrants increasingly admit that they cannot cope with them without external help. Therefore, for the sake of improving their lives, they rely more and more on government, charities, volunteers and in the least – on relatives and friends.

Analysis of the research materials shows that successful overcoming the “traps” for IDPs primarily depends on: a) the quality of social services provided to this category of citizens (employment, housing, social benefits, etc.); b) tolerant citizens’ attitude and territorial community’s actions for solving the problems of internally displaced persons; c) coordination of work of local authorities and NGOs to help internally displaced persons. These aspects should be in the focus of the shapers of social policy concerning internally displaced persons.

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The authors

Bakirov Vil – Doctor of Sciences (Sociology), Full Professor, Academician of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, President of V.N. Karazin Kharkiv National University (Kharkiv).

Golovakha Yevhen – Doctor of Sciences (Philosophy), Head of the Department of Sociological History, Theory and Methodology, Institute of Sociology, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (Kyiv).

Gorbachyk Andrii – PhD in Physical and Mathematical Sciences, Dean of the School of Sociology, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv (Kyiv).

Ivashchenko-Stadnik Kateryna – PhD in History, Research Fellow, Institute of Sociology, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (Kyiv).

Churylov Mykola – Doctor of Sciences (Sociology), Managing Director TNS Ukraine (Kyiv).

Chernysh Natalya – Doctor of Sciences (Sociology), Full Professor, Department of Sociology, Ivan Franko National University of Lviv (Lviv).

Kharchenko Natalya – PhD in Sociology, Executive Director of the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (Kyiv).

Khyzhniak Kateryna – PhD in Philology, Associate Professor of the Cross-Cultural Communication and Foreign Languages Department, National Technical University “Kharkiv Polytechnic Institute” (Kharkiv).

Khyzhniak Larysa – Doctor in Sciences (Sociology), Professor, Professor of the Applied Sociology and Social Communications Department, School of Sociology, V.N. Karazin Kharkiv National University (Kharkiv).

Khyzhniak Oleksandr – Doctor of Sciences (Sociology), Associate Professor of the Applied Sociology and Social Communications Department, School of Sociology, V. N. Karazin Kharkiv National University (Kharkiv).

Kizilov Oleksandr – PhD in Sociology, Associate Professor, Head of the Department of Methods of Sociological Research of the School of Sociology, Director of Social and Humanitarian Research Centre, V.N. Karazin Kharkiv National University (Kharkiv).
**Ukrainian Sociology in the 21st Century**: Theory, Methods, Research Results

**Kononov Illya** – Doctor of Sciences (Sociology), Full Professor, Head of the Department of Philosophy and Sociology, Lugansk National Taras Shevchenko University (Starobelsk).

**Kostenko Natalia** – Doctor of Sciences (Sociology), Professor, Head of the Sociology of Culture and Mass Communications Department, Institute of Sociology, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (Kyiv).

**Kovalisko Natalia** – Doctor of Sciences (Sociology), Full Professor, Professor of the Department of Sociology, Ivan Franko National University of Lviv (Lviv).

**Kutsenko Olga** – Doctor of Sciences (Sociology), Full Professor, Head of Social Structure Department, Faculty of Sociology, School Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv (Kyiv).

**Kutuev Pavlo** – Professor of Sociology, Chair of the Department of Sociology, National Technical University of Ukraine “Igor Sikorsky Kyiv Polytechnic Institute” (Kyiv).

**Liseienko Elena** – Doctor of Sciences (Sociology), Professor of the Department of Philosophy, Sociology and Management of Sociocultural Activities, K. D. Ushynsky South Ukrainian National Pedagogical University (Odessa).

**Lubyva Tetyana** – Master of Sociology, Post-Graduate Student of the Institute of Sociology, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine of Ukraine (Kyiv).

**Makeyev Serhiy** – Doctor of Sciences (Sociology), Professor, Head of the Social Structures Department, Institute of Sociology, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (Kyiv).

**Maltseva Kateryna** – Doctor of Philosophy, PhD, Associate Professor, Department of Sociology, National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy (Kyiv); Affiliated Research Scientist, Department of Anthropology, University of Connecticut, USA.

**Muradyan Olena** – PhD in Sociology, Dean of the School of Sociology, V.N. Karazin Kharkiv National University (Kharkiv).

**Onyschuk Vitaliy** – Doctor of Sciences (Sociology), Professor, Head of the Department of Sociology of Odessa I. I. Mechnikov National University (Odessa).

**Otreshko Natalia** – Doctor of Sciences (Sociology), Docent, Leading Scientific Researcher, Institute of Culturology NAA (Kyiv).

**Panina Natalya** – Doctor of Sciences (Sociology), Institute of Sociology, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (Kyiv).

**Paniotto Volodymyr** – Doctor of Sciences (Philosophy), Professor of the National University “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy”, General Director of the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (Kyiv).

**Perverzyev Oleksandr** – Post-Graduate Student of the National University “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy” (Kyiv).

**Prybytkova Iryna** – Doctor of Science (Economics), Full Professor, Leading Research Fellow at the Social Structures Department, Institute of Sociology, National Academy
Romanenko Svitlana – PhD in Sociology, Associate Professor of the Department of Sociology, School of International Relations, Political science and Sociology, Odessa I.I. Mechnikov National University (Odessa).

Ruchka Anatolii – Doctor of Sciences (Philosophy), Professor, Institute of Sociology, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (Kyiv).

Savelyev Yurii – PhD in Philosophy, Associate Professor of School of Sociology, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv (Kyiv).

Serdiuk Oleksii – PhD in Sociology, Associate Professor, Deputy Head of the Research Laboratory on the Issues of Combating Crime at Kharkiv National University of Internal Affairs (Kharkiv).

Sereda Viktoriya – PhD in Sociology, Assistant Professor of the Department of Sociology, Ivan Franko National University of L’viv (Lviv).

Skokova Lyudmyla – PhD in Sociology, Associate Professor, Senior Research Fellow of the Sociology of Culture and Mass Communications Department, Institute of Sociology, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (Kyiv).

Rushchenko Ihor – Doctor of Sciences (Sociology), Professor, Professor of Sociology and Political Sciences Department, National Technical University “Kharkiv Polytechnic Institute” (Kharkiv).

Simonchuk Elena – PhD in Sociology, Senior Research Fellow, Social Structures Department, Institute of Sociology, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (Kyiv).

Shchudlo Svitlana – Doctor of Sciences (Sociology), Full Professor, Head of the Department of Law, Sociology and Political Science, Drohobych Ivan Franko State Pedagogical University (Drohobych).

Shulga Nikolai – Doctor of Sciences (Sociology), Principal Research Fellow, Vice-Director of Science Institute of Sociology, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (Kyiv).

Sokuryanska Lyudmila – Doctor of Sciences (Sociology), Full Professor, Head of the Department of Sociology, V.N. Karazin Kharkiv National University (Kharkiv).

Stegnii Oleksandr – Doctor of Sciences (Sociology), Leading Researcher Fellow, Institute of Sociology, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (Kyiv).

Stepanenko Viktor – Doctor of Sciences (Sociology), Leading Research Fellow, Institute of Sociology, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (Kyiv).

Ursulenko Kseniya – Master of Sociology, Sociologist of the Institute of Sociology, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (Kyiv).

Yevtukh Volodymyr – Doctor of Sciences (Sociology), Professor, Dean of the School of Socio-Economic Education and Management, National Pedagogical Dragomanov University (Kyiv).
Українська соціологія у ХХІ столітті: теорія, методи, результати досліджень

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Тел. 705-24-32